Previous articleNext article No AccessDiscussionsValue and Parity*Joshua GertJoshua Gert Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 114, Number 3April 2004 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/381697 Views: 108Total views on this site Citations: 34Citations are reported from Crossref © 2004 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.PDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Chris Tucker Parity, Moral Options, and the Weights of Reasons, Noûs 11 (Apr 2022).https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12410Erich H. 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