Positive Account Research Articles

Social Rationality and Human Reasoning: Logical Expressivism and the Flat Mind.

This paper attempts to reconcile the claims that the mind is both flat (Chater, 2018) and highly rational (Oaksford & Chater, 2020). According to the flat mind hypothesis, the mind is a mass of inconsistent and contradictory fragments of experience. However, standard accounts of rationality from formal epistemology argue that to be rational, our beliefs must be consistent, and we must believe all the logical consequences of our beliefs. A social account of rationality is developed based on Brandom's (1994) logical expressivism, in which respecting the norms of logic and probability theory is still central but where these standards apply to our public commitments in social dialogical contexts rather than to our individual belief systems (Skovgaard-Olsen, 2017). According to this account, even if someone's individual beliefs are inconsistent, they cannot be condemned as irrational if they acknowledge the inconsistency and seek to resolve it. It is shown how this approach interacts with people's fragmented and shallow world knowledge, and its social distribution yields some counterintuitive consequences, such as it sometimes being rational individually not seeking to resolve contradictions. Other consequences of this social expressivist approach are considered, including for dual process theories of reasoning, our view of beliefs, the status of logic, and Fodor's (1983) view of central systems. It is concluded that people can have flat minds and yet be highly rational.

Analysis of Critical and Positivist Accounting Theory in Latin America

This article establishes an analysis of the first contributions and the importance of the Critical and Positivist theories of accounting in Latin America over the years, through the study of scientific articles by recognized accounting experts from different countries on the theories. . Also, carry out a bibliographic examination of criticism and positivism applied to accounting, resulting in the correlation of concepts focused on accounting in Latin America. The type of research is descriptive with a qualitative approach with the purpose of developing a discussion of the Critical and Positivist theories of accounting in Latin America. Obtaining a greater scope to understand that this social science is immersed in two currents that are based on the fact that knowledge is obtained through practice and can be verified through scientific methods, establishing the importance of understanding the contributions that the critical and positivist theory in the field of accounting science.

جی ایس داراکی کتاب ’’رسول عربیؐ ‘‘ کاتجزیاتی مطالعہ

Biography refers to describing the events of the Holy Prophet's life, his style of life and teachings. In every era, biographers wrote books on the life of the Holy Prophet. Biography began in early Islam. The appearance of those who picked up the pen on the subject of biography took place during the Prophet’s (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) biographers began to write in honor of him. This trend started in the subcontinent as well Apart from Muslim biographers in the subcontinent, non-Muslim biographers also entered this field. Among these biographers, two types of biographers emerged, one class was the one who was inspired by the teachings of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) and wrote out of love for the Prophet (peace be upon him) and the other class was the one who wrote against the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him) out of hatred for the Prophet (peace be upon him) due to jealousy. In such a situation, some non-Muslim biographers wrote moderately. Yes, I am. S. Dara is counted among the authentic biographers. He supported realism and in honor of him, he wrote in such a way that even Muslim biographers could not help but praise him. When a Muslim biographer writes on this subject, it is generally believed that he as a believer has given a positive account of the life of his beloved Prophet. But when a non-Muslim steps into this valley, a series of questions begin to arise. People start thinking that why did he, as a non-Muslim, write on the biography of the Messenger of Allah? Does his writing contain the fragrance of the Prophet's love or the poison of the Prophet's hatred?

Normativity, prudence and welfare

AbstractMost discussions of discourse about welfare and discourse about prudence are a “package deal” when it comes to their normativity—either both or neither are normative. In this paper I argue against this conventional “package deal” assumption. I argue that discourse about welfare is not normative in one useful sense of that term, but that prudential discourse is normative. My argument draws in part on ideas from Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity. I then offer a novel positive account of the meaning of ‘welfare’. On the proposed account, the concept of welfare is not itself normative, in the sense of functioning directly to settle the thing to do. Even a global nihilist can coherently make claims about welfare. However, the concept of welfare is in a sense I will articulate “conditionally normative,” and this merely conditional normativity explains many of the data points which might seem to imply that welfare discourse is normative.

Frontloading and the Necessary A Posteriori

ABSTRACT In this paper, I reevaluate Kripke’s arguments for the necessary a posteriori contra a Kantian pure modal rationalism according to which modal cognition is a priori. I argue that Kripke’s critique of Kant suggests an impure but nevertheless ambitious modal rationalism according to which the basis of modal cognition remains a priori. I then argue that Kripke’s critique of pure modal rationalism does not go deep enough. More specifically, I argue that certain conditional modal judgments, which Kripke regards as a priori, are, in fact, a posteriori. An example is the conditional modal judgment that if gold is a metal, then it is necessary that gold is a metal (if gold exists). However, Chalmers has developed a general frontloading strategy for turning a posteriori conditionals into a priori ones. So, I consider whether the frontloading strategy may be applied in a development of a modest modal rationalist account of the necessary a posteriori. Although the frontloading strategy is attractive for the modal rationalist, I argue for a twofold conclusion. First, I conclude that a posteriori conditionals constitute a serious and unanswered challenge to modal rationalists. Second, I conclude that the frontloading strategy does not by itself provide a response to this challenge and that substantiating the strategy is problematic.

‘If it's held dear, it’ll get pushed through’: Transmedia narratives, play cultures, and soft canon in tabletop role-playing games (TTRPGs)

Transmedia storytelling is a strategy adopted by media franchises and brands to create participatory story-worlds for their consumers; it incorporates a range of forms, actors, and texts, all of which have varying degrees of narrative authority in determining the events that occur. This article focuses on tabletop role-playing game Dungeons & Dragons to show how play cultures in Singapore are shaped by transmedia storytelling techniques. In doing so, it makes two contributions to existing research: first, it shifts scholarly focus from game texts to player practice, showing how communities of play are created through players’ emergent usage of transmedia storytelling techniques. Second, it describes a player practice of soft canon, which I theorise as an approach to shared world-making that prioritises the emotional resonance of narrative details over a positivist accounting of narrative events. The concept of soft canon reveals a new perspective on how communities create and sustain intersubjectively imagined worlds.

Экспериментальные исследования динамической работы железнодорожных мостов при воздействии высокоскоростного подвижного состава

The issue of considering the dynamic interaction of the railway rolling stock and the structures of bridge structures is especially important when solving the tasks of increasing the speeds of trains on the existing railway lines, as well as when prescribing high-speed mode on designed bridges. Rational accounting of the parameters of dynamic interaction allows you to perform complete and reliable calculations of elements of bridge structures, which in turn has a beneficial effect on predicting the period and nature of the operation of structures and, because of the economic component of projects. The modern solution to the problem of dynamic interaction is reduced to determining the degree of influence of each component of the unified mechanical system of the bridge-travel. Objective: the purpose of this study is to determine the parameters of dynamic interaction through experimental measurements of stresses, accelerations, and displacements of structures of the bridge structure located on the existing railway line with an organized high-speed traffic movement. Methods: experimental measurement using high-frequency voltage sensors, accelerations and movements with subsequent statistical processing and analysis of the results. Results: graphs and tables displaying a change in the measured values of relative deformations, accelerations, and movements over time. Practical importance: The practical significance of this study is to assess the degree of influence of the components of the dynamic interaction of high-speed rolling composition and the bridge structure, which allows you to form a holistic picture of the nature of the process of dynamic interaction.

Modelling Wealth and Wealth Inequality in Bulgaria

This paper analyses net wealth and net wealth inequality determinants in Bulgaria, for the 2000-2020 period. The econometric results suggest that the introduction of corporate and individual flat tax rates in 2007 and 2008 contribute to households’ net wealth creation but have no significant association with inequality variables. Interest rates on mortgage loans, cost of debt, budget surpluses and inflation have a negative association with wealth, while the value of houses, arable land, equity, interest income, budget deficits contribute to net wealth growth. The top percentile increases its wealth share supported by the value of houses, equity and positive current account to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) values, however the cost of debt and GDP per capita are in a negative association with top percentile inequality. The bottom half of the population increases its wealth share with higher GDP per capita values and higher consumer loans rates, however inflation affects it negatively. Inflation and investment income are in a positive association with the Gini coefficient, while interest rates on consumer loans, cost of debt, GDP per capita, Government revenues, dividend income, equity, and the value of houses reduce inequality.

“Smarties, you know what’s up!”: curating a community and cultivating pleasure as a social justice influencer

ABSTRACT This article analyzes the Instagram postings of Blair Imani, an influencer who blends lifestyle content with social justice advocacy. Through an analysis of popular posts and follower engagement, I argue that Imani’s primary work is not to raise awareness. Instead, she cultivates a community of “Smarties,” tied together by a comforting style, positive emotions, and the shared pleasure of being an enlightened insider. This analysis indicates how the ostensibly positive account of a social justice influencer is another element of algorithmically polarized social media, where communities are formed and pleasure is derived via condemnation of presumed others.

How to Make Impossible Decisions

In this paper, I propose that Derrida’s writing on the impossibility of justice has the potential for fruitful dialogue with Ruth Chang’s contemporary account of practical rationality. For Derrida, making a just decision must always come with a moment of undecidability, a “leap” into the unknown with an experience of doubt and anxiety that continues to “haunt” the decision-maker. By contrast, in her work on rationality, Chang proposes that hard decisions are difficult to make because the alternatives are “on a par,” such that there are no rational differences between the alternatives that would contribute to choosing one over the other. Hard decisions are made by expressing one’s own rational agency, generating will-based reasons to commit to or “drift” into one of the alternatives. Derrida writes of anxiety, doubt, and impossibility, yet Chang writes of commitment, agency, and rationality. Despite these differences, there are important comparisons and connections between the two accounts that are worth exploring. I suggest that the moment of the decision which Derrida describes as heterogeneous to knowledge can be understood as a moment of parity in which there is a lack of given reasons, as explained by Chang. Chang’s account of rational agency provides an interpretation of how decision-making is possible despite the undecidability as described by Derrida. This notion of commitment and agency as explained by Chang is not incompatible with Derrida’s insistence that the responsible decision is haunted by anxiety and doubt. Instead, I suggest that Derrida’s writing highlights uncertainty as central to understanding the nature of hard choices and how to navigate the demands of justice.

Rethinking Political Organization from a Feminist Standpoint: Politicizing an Ethics of Care and Vulnerability

In this paper, I develop a philosophical account demonstrating how alternative feminist concepts, in particular an ethics of care and vulnerability, would help improve our political policies and practices. I suggest that reviewing our political institutions from a feminist standpoint allows for a rethinking of these structures and practices in a more democratic framework, opening the field to all minoritized groups that are excluded from it still. I rely on a positive account of vulnerability, understood as an inherent relational dynamic of interdependency and solidarity between embodied subjects, rather than an individual show of weakness in reaction to violence. The central question I address is: if caring relations of solidarity are a possible response to vulnerability, how can this inform politics despite the ambiguity of vulnerability itself? Is such a positive reframing of the concept even possible? In other words, how do we articulate vulnerability with violence, and can it be reframed outside of these ties to violence? First, I look at Judith Butler’s positive renewal of the concept (Butler 2004). Second, I contrast this approach to the complementary findings of Adriana Cavarero (Cavarero 2011) that would allow for the emancipation of vulnerability from its dichotomous ties to violence. These findings could have political ramifications for addressing a revisited account of vulnerability that informs alternative political institutions and practices, which I explore in the final section.

Epistemologi : Rasionalisme, Empirisme, Kritisisme, Pragmatisme Positivisme dan Positivisme Logis

Epistemology in Philosophy, Epistemology comes from the Greek words, namely epistememe = knowledge and logos = words, thoughts, knowledge. Epistemology aims to critically examine the logical presuppositions and conditions that underlie the possibility of knowledge and tries to provide rational accountability for its claims to truth and objectivity. Rationalism is a philosophical ideology which states that reason is the most important tool for gaining knowledge and gaining knowledge. If empiricism says that knowledge is obtained by experiencing empirical objects, then rationalism teaches that knowledge is obtained by thinking. The tools in thinking are logical rules or logical rules.

Social Group Moral Encroachment

AbstractAccording to moral encroachers, the moral stakes of a belief partly determine how much evidence we need for the belief to count as knowledge. This view concerns the beliefs of individual believers. In this paper, I argue for a social group version of moral encroachment: dominant groups, such as white people or men, need to have more evidence than the marginalised in order for some of their beliefs to constitute knowledge. I argue for this claim in three steps. First, I spell out the group moral stakes involved – the harms dominant knowers cause the marginalised and the knowledge economy. Second, I show off the theoretical benefits of having the notion of social group moral encroachment at our disposal: it can be an invaluable tool for decolonial and feminist epistemologists if they want to avoid the relativistic ring to their views (a ring that tends to put off many well-wishers). Finally, I start on a positive account of social group moral encroachment by addressing a potential puzzle and responding to objections.

The harm threshold and Mill’s harm principle

The Harm Threshold (HT) holds that the state may interfere in medical decisions parents make on their children’s behalf only when those decisions are likely to cause serious harm to the child. Such a high bar for intervention seems incompatible with both parental obligations and the state’s role in protecting children’s well-being. In this paper, I assess the theoretical underpinnings for the HT, focusing on John Stuart Mill’s Harm Principle as its most plausible conceptual foundation. I offer (i) a novel, text-based argument showing that Mill’s Harm Principle does not give justificatory force to the HT; and (ii) a positive account of some considerations which, beyond significant harm, would comprise an intervention principle normatively grounded in Mill’s ethical theory. I find that substantive recommendations derived from Mill’s socio-political texts are less laissez-faire than they have been interpreted by HT proponents. Justification for state intervention owes not to the severity of a harm, but to whether that harm arises from the failure to satisfy one’s duty. Thus, a pediatric intervention principle derived from Mill ought not to be oriented around the degree of harm caused by a parent’s healthcare decision, but rather, the kind of harm—specifically, whether the harm arises from violation of parental obligation. These findings challenge the interpretation of Mill adopted by HT proponents, eliminating a critical source of justification for a protected domain of parental liberty and reorienting the debate to focus on parental duties.

Internal Inconsistency and Secondary Ideas: Hume’s Problem in the Appendix with His Account of Personal Identity

Abstract: In the Appendix to the Treatise , Hume argues that there is a significant problem with his earlier account of personal identity. There has been considerable debate about what this problem actually is. I develop a new version of an internal inconsistency reading, where I argue that Hume realised that his original account of the connexion between perceptions in terms of an association of the ideas of the perceptions was not a viable means of explaining the connexion between perceptions as it leads to an infinite regress of ideas of perceptions. This is only stopped by accepting that the mind perceives a connexion between perceptions. This, however, is something Hume cannot accept. As a result, Hume is left without a positive account of the self, as he has no account of the connexion between perceptions.

The Freedom of Solar Systems

Abstract This essay discusses how, for Hegel, freedom can be realized in nature in a rudimentary fashion in solar systems. This solves a problem in Kant's account of freedom, namely, the problem that Kant only gives a negative argument for why freedom is not impossible but does not give a positive account of how freedom is real. I give a novel account of Kant's negative argument. Then, I show how, according to Hegel, solar systems can be considered as exhibiting freedom in a rudimentary fashion. Finally, I lay out how Hegel systematically develops this point about the freedom of solar systems in the ‘Mechanism’ chapter of the Science of Logic. In doing so, he uses Kant's negative argument in a ‘purified’ form to arrive at an account of an ‘intimate token-type relation’ between the planets in a solar system and the law that governs their motion. The essay as a whole provides a concrete example of how Hegel is an inheritor and radicalizer of Kant, both with respect to freedom's reality and with respect to philosophical method.

Naïve information aggregation in human social learning

To glean accurate information from social networks, people should distinguish evidence from hearsay. For example, when testimony depends on others’ beliefs as much as on first-hand information, there is a danger of evidence becoming inflated or ignored as it passes from person to person. We compare human inferences with an idealized rational account that anticipates and adjusts for these dependencies by evaluating peers’ communications with respect to the underlying communication pathways. We report on three multi-player experiments examining the dynamics of both mixed human–artificial and all-human social networks. Our analyses suggest that most human inferences are best described by a naïve learning account that is insensitive to known or inferred dependencies between network peers. Consequently, we find that simulated social learners that assume their peers behave rationally make systematic judgment errors when reasoning on the basis of actual human communications. We suggest human groups learn collectively through naïve signaling and aggregation that is computationally efficient and surprisingly robust. Overall, our results challenge the idea that everyday social inference is well captured by idealized rational accounts and provide insight into the conditions under which collective wisdom can emerge from social interactions.

Grace de Laguna, Joel Katzav, and conservatism in analytic philosophy

In this paper, we consider the implications of Grace Andrus de Laguna and Joel Katzav's work for the charge of conservatism against the analytic tradition. We differentiate that conservatism into three kinds: starting place; path dependency; and modesty. We also think again about gender in philosophy, consider the positive account of speculative philosophy presented by de Laguna and Katzav in comparison to some other naturalist trajectories, and conclude with a brief Australian addendum that reflects on a similar period in our own country which was also associated with the professional institutionalisation of analytic philosophy.

Facing up to the problem of intentionality

AbstractWe distinguish between different problems of “aboutness”: the “hard” problem of explaining the everyday phenomenon of intentionality and three less challenging “easy” sets of problems concerning the posits of folk psychology, the notions of representation invoked in the mind‐brain sciences, and the intensionality (with an “s”) of mental language. The problem of intentionality is especially hard in that, as is the case with the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness, there is no clear path to a solution using current methods. We argue that naturalistic theories of mental representation do not address the hard problem—either they are only intended to address the easy problems, or the claims they make help address the problem of intentionality only under undefended and prima facie implausible assumptions to the effect that the hard problem reduces to some combination of the easy problems. We offer a positive account of what would be required to properly face up to the problem of intentionality.

Kant’s Rationalist Account of Hope

Abstract Few fates seem worse than living without cause for hope. Yet what is it to have a cause for hope? And how is it related to having hope? Although these questions have received relatively little philosophical attention, I argue that Kant advances a rationalist account of hope that addresses them. My central thesis has two parts. First, hope is a rational attitude for Kant; certain rational conditions are needed to differentiate hope from other desiderative attitudes (such as mere wishing or fantasizing). Second, these rational conditions involve causal inferences made by the hoping agent. To hope, an agent must make certain inferences about the cause of her desire and the cause of her belief that the object of her desire is possible. In short, to hope requires an agent to take herself to have a cause for hope.