Relative Power Position Research Articles

The Power to Negotiate

The Cold War objectives of both the United States and the Soviet Union are basic factors in any possible negotiation of differences. A third, perhaps more tangible, factor is the distribution of power between the two blocs. Ever since Sputnik I took to space there has been much speculation concerning the relative power positions of the Communist powers and the West.One immediate but not too well-defined reaction to Sputnik I was that we ought to get down to serious negotiations with the Soviet Union immediately, since we seemed to have lost the race for military power. This approach to foreign policy is as dangerous as that of the crusading moralist. For the proposition which lies behind this position is that we can successfully negotiate with the Soviets from weakness.

Civilians, Soldiers, and American Military Policy

Intensive study of factors affecting the relative power position of states “in the long run”—location, human and material resources, level of economic development and rate of capital formation, national solidarity, etc.—is no substitute for consideration of certain other factors which operate in the short run and determine the extent to which a state's power potential is utilized to achieve specific foreign policy objectives. Wars are fought or threatened and diplomatic settlements or impasses reached in the short run. So are decisions affecting all these grave matters, and sometimes with long-range consequences.The main link between a state's long-run power potential and its government's achievement of present-day policy objectives are decisions taken regarding the level and character of military preparedness. Power potential is not a complete substitute for fighting capacity, especially when wars may begin with thermonuclear attacks which destroy the potential or prevent its being mobilized in time to influence the outcome of the war. Nor is it a substitute for the particular kinds of fighting capacity most efficient in deterring and localizing war.