In this study, we have investigated the spray system's capabilities to reduce fission products in the containment atmosphere and control the containment pressure in a VVER-1000 nuclear power plant. Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident (LB-LOCA) without access to the active part of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), as a worst-case severe accident, has been investigated as a case study. Only containment is simulated via the MELCOR code, while leakage of various materials from the nuclear power plant's core and the primary circuit is considered as the boundary conditions. Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, many nuclear safety regulatory organizations focused on using portable equipment that is essential for decay heat removal in nuclear power plants during severe accidents. Based on the literature studies, the accident management scenarios have changed recently since severe accidents inside nuclear power plants have worried many scientists and the public. Evaluating the current spray system in a severe condition based on which this system was not designed is vital and novel. We considered that the spray system would be fully restored and perform its safety function using the existing portable equipment to depressurize the containment and deposition of the fission products. To calculate the maximum allowed delay time of the spray system recovery, the accident was modeled without the operation of the spray system while a safety criterion was considered to avoid reaching the ultimate pressure of containment. For a more detailed evaluation of the spray system, two different operating modes including the activation of one spray train and the activation of both spray trains have been selected. According to the obtained results, if the spray system is revived before 4,000s from the beginning of the accident, this system would be able to reasonably mitigate the accident consequences. Moreover, without the need for any external water supply source for the spray system, this system can be permanently fed from the containment sump for at least 800,000s after the initiation of the accident, requiring the relevant heat exchanger of the spray system to be recovered for this period.
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