Populist Strategies Research Articles

Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style (review)

Reviewed by: Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style Patricia L. Maclachlan (bio) Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style. By Yū Uchiyama; translated by Carl Freire. London, Routledge, 2010. x, 210 pages. $130.00. Over the past five years, Japan has been plagued by a string of lackluster and short-lived prime ministers, each of whom did his bit to shatter the public’s hopes for strong, decisive leadership. And the public’s hopes are by no means misplaced; whereas in the past Japanese prime ministers were expected to be little more than consensus-building power brokers, a number of developments ranging from Nakasone Yasuhiro’s administrative reforms of the 1980s to the changing leadership incentives resulting from the 1994 electoral reforms have raised the people’s expectations that prime ministers should behave like . . . well . . . presidents. Why, then, have Japanese prime ministers failed to make the grade in recent years? Uchiyama offers some clues to this and other puzzles in his comprehensive study of former Prime [End Page 204] Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō—that iconoclastic and risk-taking leader who did more than any of his recent predecessors to change the face of Japanese politics. Koizumi and Japanese Politics is an ambitious book that addresses a broad range of questions, only a few of which are outlined in the opening chapters. Uchiyama’s primary objective is to explain why Koizumi had such a major impact on Japanese politics and policy by analyzing his leadership style, the nature of his accomplishments, his place in the broader sweep of post-1955 politics, and his legacy for subsequent administrations. But as later chapters reveal, Uchiyama also seeks to explain why Koizumi came along when he did and what was qualitatively different about him in terms of the kinds of policies he espoused. The book begins with an insightful chapter on two key features of Koizumi’s leadership style and accomplishments. Like Hosokawa Morihiro and Nakasone before him, Uchiyama observes, Koizumi compensated for his lack of a strong party support base by appealing directly to the Japanese people for political support. Far more than his predecessors, however, Koizumi pursued a populist strategy that was characterized by skillful use of the media, a preference for short, easy-to-understand proclamations, folksy appeals to the public’s emotions, and the portrayal of conflicting policy positions as either “good” or “evil.” Uchiyama dubs this political style the “politics of pathos”—as opposed to logos, or reason—and highlights it as one of the main sources of Koizumi’s many accomplishments. That Koizumi’s “politics of pathos” was so effective was in large part a function of the second key feature of Koizumi’s style: his “top-down” leadership tactics. In contrast to the decentralized policymaking system of the now-defunct 1955 system that required bottom-up consensus building among multiple power centers, policymaking under Koizumi was far more centralized and hence amenable to strong prime ministerial leadership. As Uchiyama effectively explains in chapter 4, Koizumi was the beneficiary of both the 1994 electoral changes and the administrative reforms introduced under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō’s watch. Of particular note, he argues, was the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), a supra-ministerial body lodged in the Cabinet Office that empowers the prime minister to set the broad parameters of budgetary and policy change while cushioning him from the cacophony of political pressures that has proved so damaging to effective policymaking within the ministries. How, then, can we explain the failure of subsequent prime ministers to live up to Koizumi’s leadership standards? Because the institutional structure of the policymaking system has remained more or less unchanged since Koizumi left office, the answer lies in the nature of a prime minister’s “human resources.” For starters, none of Koizumi’s successors managed to replicate his media skills or populist communicative style. Equally important, [End Page 205] Uchiyama argues, has been the nature of leaders’ political time horizons. Whereas Koizumi was clearly prepared to sacrifice his political longevity in an effort to fulfill his policy-related objectives, his successors seemed all too willing to compromise their policy principles as they struggled to...

Democratic Decentralisation and Pro-poor Policy Reform in Indonesia: The Politics of Health Insurance for the Poor in Jembrana and Tabanan

Abstract This paper explores the conditions under which democratic decentralisation has contributed to pro-poor policy reform in Indonesia by examining the politics of health insurance for the poor in two Indonesian districts, Jembrana and Tabanan, both located in Bali. Governments in these districts have responded quite differently to the issue of health insurance for the poor since they gained primary responsibility for health policy as a result of Indonesia’s implementation of decentralisation in 2001. We argue that this variation has reflected differences in the nature of district heads’ political strategies — particularly the extent to which they have sought to develop a popular base among the poor — and that these in turn have reflected differences in their personal networks, alliances and constituencies. Comparative research suggests that pro-poor outcomes have only occurred in developing countries following democratic decentralisation when social-democratic political parties have secured power at the local level. In the Indonesian case, we suggest, political parties are not well defined in ideological and programmatic terms and tend to act as electoral vehicles for hire and mechanisms for the distribution of patronage, while local-level politics is increasingly dominated by the executive arm of government. Hence the pathway to pro-poor policy reform has been different — namely, via the emergence of local executives who pursue their interests and those of allies and backers via populist strategies with or without the support of parties.

A Symptomatic Analysis of the Justice and Development Party's Populism in Turkey, 2007–2010

AbstractThis article focuses on the populist strategy of the Turkish Justice and Development Party between the 2007 presidential election, when Turkish politics experienced an impasse, and the 2010 referendum over the constitutional amendments. As a means of analysing populism, the symptomatic approach is preferred over other theoretical perspectives, including empiricism and historicism. An analysis of the discourse articulated by Prime Minister Erdoğan leads us to the conclusion that he has continually appealed to the masses with an anti-institutional rhetoric that divides society into ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’, thereby fulfilling the criteria of populism according to the symptomatic approach.

Koizumi and Japanese politics: reform strategies and leadership style

This book offers an empirical and theoretical study of the Koizumi administration, covering such issues as the characteristics of its political style, its domestic and foreign policies, and its larger historical significance. The key questions that guide its approach are: what enabled Koizumi to exercise unusually strong leadership, and what structural transformations of Japanese politics did he achieve? Uchiyama looks at policy-making processes, newly created institutional arenas such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, Koizumi’s populist strategy, foreign policy, and neo-liberal convictions to assess the historical significance of his administration and seek out the basis for its wide public support. Finally, the book undertakes a normative evaluation of the merits and demerits of the Koizumi administration’s political style, and compares it with the Abe and Fukuda administrations that came after. This book will be of interest to scholars and students with an interest in comparative politics, administrative reform, and contemporary Japan.

Od pluralizma ka populizmu - arhitektonska kritika u vreme Interneta

Architecture has changed from a discipline in service of the larger part of the population through public housing, public buildings, public spaces, urban planning and design to a particular and already in itself disparate niche market of the real estate business that has more to do with the media industry than with public tasks. Architectural criticism has become part of this media industry as well. Thus, Postmodern architecture could flourish as the bastard child of political and cultural populist strategies. Today, architectural criticism finds itself in a deep crisis due to new developments in publishing and it's financing. This also affects Critical Theory. With its background of ideas rooted in Marxism and Enlightenment, Critical Theory seems to have great difficulty with not only the speed of new developments and the unpredictability of their directions, but also with the increasingly dominant irrational but powerful aspects of marketing and propaganda in which it's voice seems no longer heard beyond the walls of the academic ghetto.

The Rise of Ethnopopulism in Latin America

Latin America had long been the one region in the world without major ethnic parties, but in recent years a couple of inclusive ethnic parties have registered important electoral victories. A substantial literature maintains that ethnic parties win by mobilizing their base through exclusionary ethnic appeals, but this article argues that such appeals are unlikely to be successful in regions such as Latin America, where ethnic polarization is low and ethnic identification is fluid and multiple. In these areas, inclusive strategies are more likely to be successful. Indeed, some parties, which the author refers to as ethnopopulist parties, have won votes from diverse ethnic constituencies by moderating their discourse, forming cross-ethnic alliances, and formulating a broad populist appeal. This article focuses on the most successful ethnopopulist party to date, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia. It shows how the MAS used an inclusive ethnic appeal and classical populist strategies to fuse traditional populist constituencies—politically disenchanted urban mestizos with nationalist and statist views—to its rural, largely indigenous base. The article also examines the extent to which these arguments can account for the varying performance of other parties in the region.

The First Government of Northern Ireland, Education Reform and the Failure of Anti-populist Unionism, 1921-1925

This article examines education reform under the first government of Northern Ireland (1921–5). This embryonic period offered the Ulster Unionist leadership a chance to construct a more inclusive society, one that might diminish sectarian animosities, and thereby secure the fledgling state through cooperation rather than coercion. Such aspirations were severely tested by the ruling party’s need to secure the state against insurgency, and, more lastingly, to assuage the concerns of its historic constituency. The former led to a draconian security policy, the latter to a dependency on populist strategies and rhetoric. It is argued here, however, that this dependency was not absolute until July 1925. Before that, the Belfast government withstood growing pressure from populist agitators to reverse controversial aspects of its education reforms, only relenting when Protestant disaffection threatened the unity of the governing party and the existence of the state.

‘Every coward’s choice'? Political objection to military service in apartheid South Africa as sexual citizenship

Sexuality was articulated by the apartheid state as a means of disciplining the white population and marginalizing white opponents of apartheid. As such, homophobia was a recurrent feature of political and legal discourse. The End Conscription Campaign (ECC) opposed compulsory conscription for all white men in the apartheid era South African Defence Force (SADF). Its challenge was a potentially radical and profoundly destabilizing one and it articulated a competing definition of citizenship to that offered by the state. The pro‐ and anti‐conscription discourse was inherently gendered and overtly sexualized. The South African government regularly associated men who objected to military service with effeminacy, cowardice and sexual ‘deviance’. The case of Dr Ivan Toms' objection, a gay objector who wished to cite his sexuality as a primary motivation for his objection, reveals the unwillingness of the ECC to engage in sexual politics. Using Shane Phelan's and Zygmunt Bauman's concept of friends, enemies and strangers, this paper investigates the construction of both white gay men and white people who opposed apartheid as ‘strangers’ and suggests that the deployment of homophobia by the state was a stigmatizing discourse aimed at purging the ECC's political message from the public realm. In this context the ECC adopted an assimilatory discursive strategy, whereby they attempted to be ‘respectable whites’, negotiating over shared republican territory. This populist strategy, arguably safer in the short term, avoided issues of sexuality and the fundamental conflation of sexuality and citizenship in apartheid South Africa. The ECC thus circumscribed its radical and deconstructive political potential and did not offer a ‘radical democratic’ message in opposition to apartheid.

Reformas neoliberais e políticas públicas: hegemonia ideológica e redefinição das relações Estado-sociedade

A narrativa neoliberal ¾ produção de idéias, imagens, valores ¾ descreve e pretende explicar os supostos despautérios do mundo social "regulado politicamente". Para a reforma dos serviços públicos, como se sabe, aponta a supremacia do mercado como mecanismo alocador de recursos (eficiência) e também como gerador de justiça, igualdade, liberdade. Desenha a iminência do apocalipse para insinuar propostas salvacionistas. As demais visões do mundo são acusadas de caudatárias de "interesses especiais", estratégia de um populismo de novo tipo, que faz a guerra contra o Estado... com base nos poderes de Estado. A conquista da hegemonia neoliberal não se mede pelo sucesso em indicadores convencionais (crescimento econômico, bem-estar social). Também não significa apenas nem principalmente definir as respostas certas aos problemas, mas definir quais são os problemas certos e os termos em que devem ser equacionados. Seu alvo é modificar drasticamente os temas e valores compartilhados, de modo que se enquadrem as eventuais alternativas no terreno pejorativo do impensável e se alterem em profundidade os espaços e processos em que se fazem as escolhas sociais relevantes.

Exclusionary Populism in Austria, Italy, and Switzerland

SINCE THE LATE 1980S, A NEW BREED OF RADICAL right-wing parties and movements has gained considerable political ground in a number of liberal democracies. Several characteristics distinguish them from the more traditional parties: reliance on charismatic leadership; the pursuit of a populist strategy of political marketing with a pronounced consumer (that is, voter) orientation; and an appeal to popular anxieties, prejudices, and resentments. Typically, new populist parties and movements have marketed themselves both as uncompromising defenders of the rights and interests of the common people and as the only true representatives and promoters of 'genuine democracy.'At the same time, they espouse an ideology that is perhaps best described as a type of exclusionary populism.(1) At its core is a restrictive notion of citizenship that holds that genuine democracy is based on a culturally, if not ethnically, homogeneous community; that only longstanding citizens can be full members of civil society; and that society's benefits should accrue only to those who, either as citizens or at least as taxpayers, have made a substantial contribution to it.(2) The spirit of this common doctrine has found poignant expression in the notion of one's 'own people first' and the call for 'national preference.'In its more extreme cases, exclusionary populism takes the form of cultural nativism. The contemporary radical right couches its exclusionary agenda in the language of traditional liberalism, advancing the notion of 'rights' - of 'ethnic people,' to a 'culture,' but also to individual safety - that address 'deepseated and understandable fears about the erosion of identity and tradition by the globalizing (but only partially homogenizing) forces of modernity.'(3) In almost all cases, exclusionary populism follows the 'post-racist' turn introduced by the French intellectual new right. The nouvelle droite took leave of the traditional focus on inequality while affirming 'the incommensurability of different cultures.' The goal was to preserve 'collective identities (and inter-communitarian differences) at all costs.'(4)Rather than promcting notions of ethnocultural superiority, the aim of exclusionary populism is to protect 'the own' society, culture, and way of life against alien intrusion and contamination.(5) In contemporary right-wing discourse, this means, above all, safeguarding and defending the achievements and gains of European culture and civilization against challengers ranging from American popular culture to Islam.Just why popular politics of exclusion have been particularly successful in Western European countries and regions - Norway and Denmark, France, the Flemish part of Belgium, Austria, the northern part of Italy, and Switzerland - is an intriguing question.(6) These areas are not only among the most affluent, but they also have some of the lowest levels of unemployment in Western Europe. For example, in 2000, the annual average unemployment rate in Switzerland was 2.0 per cent; in Austria it was 5.8 per cent, the lowest since 1992 and considerably below the European Union (EU) average. In northern Italy, by the end of 2000, it was below five per cent in the northwest and significantly below four per cent in the northeast (compared to 10.0 per cent for Italy as a whole). When severe labour shortages threatened to derail the economic boom, companies located in these communities, together with regional employers associations, responded with an aggressive campaign to attract foreign workers from eastern Europe and the developing world. Expectations are that two decades hence immigrants will account for 15 per cent of the population of the Italian northeast.(7)The situation in northern Italy is one of the most striking examples of a secular trend that has begun to affect all West European countries. Even in Austria, which experienced a rather swift and dramatic rise in unemployment in the 1990s, industry and employers associations are increasingly vocal in their demands to government to open the country's doors to more foreign specialists to fill the rapidly growing number of vacancies, particularly in the information technology sector. …

The resurgence of populism in Latin America

AbstractContemporary manifestations of “neopopulism” are situated in an analysis of the role of political institutions in capitalist societies, and the idea of structural and institutional crisis. It is argued that “populist” and “neopopulist” discourse alike must be understood in terms of their relationship to specific conjunctural projects for the reorientation of capitalist reproduction. This approach directs attention back to the contrasting conjunctures in which classical populist and contemporary neopopulist political projects were launched. It also provides a basis on which contemporary projects which adopt elements of populist strategy and discourse can be compared and evaluated.

The resurgence of populism in Latin America

Contemporary manifestations of “neopopulism” are situated in an analysis of the role of political institutions in capitalist societies, and the idea of structural and institutional crisis. It is argued that “populist” and “neopopulist” discourse alike must be understood in terms of their relationship to specific conjunctural projects for the reorientation of capitalist reproduction. This approach directs attention back to the contrasting conjunctures in which classical populist and contemporary neopopulist political projects were launched. It also provides a basis on which contemporary projects which adopt elements of populist strategy and discourse can be compared and evaluated.

Populism, Liberalization and Popular Participation: Industrial Democracy in Egypt

While the mobilizing character of the populist movements and regimes in the Third World countries offers a great potential for the practice of grassroots democracy, the populist ideology and development strategy, at the same time, set certain serious constraints against genuine democratic practices. This theory is illustrated by a historical analysis of the experience of industrial democracy in Egypt under President Nasser and the subsequent regimes. Industrial democracy was designed to serve as a part of the populist strategy of mobilizing the working class in the post-revolutionary Egypt.

Populist Strategies in Philippine Politics and Literature

Research Article| April 01 1981 Populist Strategies in Philippine Politics and Literature Gretchen Casper; Gretchen Casper Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google Leonard Casper Leonard Casper Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google South Atlantic Quarterly (1981) 80 (2): 156–163. https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-80-2-156 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gretchen Casper, Leonard Casper; Populist Strategies in Philippine Politics and Literature. South Atlantic Quarterly 1 April 1981; 80 (2): 156–163. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00382876-80-2-156 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsSouth Atlantic Quarterly Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Copyright © 1981 by Duke University Press1981 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Peasants and Economic Development: Populist Lessons for Africa

This study argues that in technical terms the usual economic models of international trade and development are misspecified because they deal only with market relations and omit important social and political equations (i.e., the social relations of production) which are important variables in the development matrix. This omission has led to development strategies which favor the “modern sector” at the expense of the traditional sector; the agricultural communities are undermined and impoverished. The traditional sector is maintained as a reservoir for cheap labor and as security for the old and the indigent to cushion off crisis in the capitalist modern sector. The traditional sector is undergoing a prolonged crisis without a smooth transition to capitalism or socialism. A more humane and viable process of development of the African economies is suggested: it is argued that Third World policymakers shift from the “dualistic” paradigm of economic development—a post World War II neoclassical paradigm associated with the work of Lewis (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964) and Jorgenson (1970)—to a version of the populist strategies of the Narodniki (Russian) and Maoism in transforming the backward agrarian economies of the Third World (Walicki, 1969; Gurley, 1975). Most Third World economies may be classified as subsistence economies with industrial enclave sectors. The majority of the world's population live in an agrarian environment. Yet neoclassical and Marxist economists, having preoccupied themselves with the study of the capitalist system, have ignored agrarian economics (Georgescu-Roegen, 1970). Noncapitalist economies have simply not captured the interest of most economists.