Punitive Populism Research Articles

Explanations for the Punitive Turn of Crime Policy in Bolivia, 2006-2016

In the last decade, Bolivia, as with most countries in the region, has seen an unprecedented increase of its prison population. This is often explained as the consequence of a punitive populism sweeping Latin America. Our article investigates what triggered this punitive turn in Bolivia by identifying some of the factors that impact crime policy and growing prison populations since the election of president Evo Morales in 2006. We argue that a complex array of local and international factors and shifts in crime policy to harden approaches to domestic violence led to steep increases in remand populations. Combined with other inefficiencies in the criminal justice system, this led to sustained increases in the prison population throughout most of this period. This study is based on new and previously unstudied statistical data produced by the Bolivian institutions in charge of implementing crime policy.

Populismo Punitivo y Derecho Penal Simbólico

Se analiza el crecimiento del llamado populismo punitivo y derecho penal simbólico en la legislación colombiana, la falta de eficacia a la hora de trazar la política criminal por parte del Estado y la esterilidad de los resultados en la disminución de la criminalidad, con el correlativo endurecimiento de las penas e instrumentalización de las mismas. Se busca determinar si existe seguridad jurídica con el derecho penal simbólico y el populismo punitivo; así como si los mismos responden a las funciones de la pena. El método utilizado es de alcance descriptivo, bibliográfico y se utilizan fuentes de información secundarias, seleccionadas de bases de datos confiables. Una vez recopilada toda la información se concluye que, con la implementación de estos dos conceptos no se garantiza la baja en el índice de criminalidad, debido a que se parte de una irresponsabilidad legislativa, las cuales no sirven para prevenir y controlar la criminalidad, pero si generan un sentimiento de tranquilidad e ilusión en la colectividad, no respondiendo los mismos a las funciones de la pena trazadas en el ordenamiento jurídico colombiano.

Confidence in the Police, Due Process, and Perp Walks

Research SummaryPerp walks have been declared constitutionally acceptable even though the practice could be perceived to be a form of preconviction punishment and a manifestation of populist punitiveness. In adjudicating the constitutionality of perp walks, courts have employed a balancing test in which the interests of the press and the public's desire to know about the activities of law enforcement are weighted heavily. No research has been aimed at examining public opinion about this practice, however. We report the results of a national opt‐in survey of public opinion on perp walks and find that less than one third of the sample respondents support them. By employing models derived from research on the influence of race and ethnicity on attitudes toward criminal justice policies, we find that, after controlling for concerns about the police and due process rights violations, African Americans and Hispanics/Latinos are more supportive of perp walks than are Whites. These findings suggest that perp walks are one of a few areas in which racial/ethnic minorities might take a harsher view of punitive criminal justice policies compared with Whites.Policy ImplicationsMedia coverage of some perp walks is likely unavoidable in a society with a free press, but the unscripted media coverage of a perp walk is different than the intentional coordination of a perp walk between law enforcement and the media. This practice of deliberately publicizing the arrest of criminal suspects has been defended by prosecutors and police. Contrary to claims that the public wants perp walks, however, we find that more people oppose than support perp walks. In light of the multiple constitutional concerns surrounding this practice, these results suggest that the orchestration of perp walks by law enforcement should be reconsidered.

Punitive Populism and Prison Collapse: Towards a Gradual Abolition of the Closed Prison in Colombia

This article explores the causes of punitive populism in Colombia along with its consequent prison collapse, which leads to propose the gradual abolition of closed prisons, as these institutions have failed to resocialize inmates. Taking into account collected data, it is found a need to rethink the use of closed prisons, by using them minimally, in cases that are more serious. As a methodology of analysis, the article addresses four major aspects, such as Punitive Populism and the Criminal Law of the Enemy, the perversion of the closed prison system, the collapse of the closed prison in Colombia and finally, alternatives for the gradual abolition of closed prisons. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21017/Rev.Repub.2018.v25.a53

Media and Punitive Populism inArgentina andChile

Punitive populism is common throughout Latin America. It involves political and public opinion support for more police officers, greater police autonomy, and tougher laws to punish crime—options that often perpetuate old police practices and resist police reform efforts. This article critically examines the role of the media in fostering punitive populism by examining the sources used by journalists. Comparing the ‘most different’ cases of Argentina and Chile and drawing on interviews conducted from 2009 to 2015, I argue that the choices made by journalists regarding their sources are affected by neoliberal media policies in a particular way that favours tough‐on‐crime discourses.

The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics. Lisa L. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press (2016). 272pp. £26.49hb ISBN 9780190228705

The Myth of Mob Rule: Violent Crime and Democratic Politics. Lisa L. Miller. New York: Oxford University Press (2016). 272pp. £26.49hb ISBN 9780190228705

Populism, Journalism, and the Limits of Reflexivity

This study considers how punitive populism as a strain of anti-intellectualism is condoned in the ways that US journalists imagine audiences. A disregard for intellect is nevertheless antithetical to journalism’s understanding of its contribution to an informed electorate. This contradiction between the representation of public antipathy and reason-based reporting leads to an appraisal of how journalists critiqued their work in the rise of presidential candidate Donald J. Trump. To identify boundaries of reflexivity, we compare the near-instant commentaries of scholars to the interpretations of journalists following the startling election of 2016. Textual analysis of news and news commentary documents a form of reflexivity in which practice is not so much justified to the public as the public is imagined in ways that justify problematic practice. Scholars viewed the rise of Trump as predictable when considering long-established routines of the press and journalists’ misunderstanding of populism. We suggest that reform of campaign coverage is contingent on the recognition of journalists that their work is shaped by audiences they imagine.

Combating Foreign Bribery in China: Rethinking Zero Tolerance with ‘Chinese Characteristics’

This article examines foreign bribery in China since the early 2000s and the State’s legal and penal changes in response to this increasingly common form of transnational corruption. It argues that over the last fifteen years, Chinese authorities have shifted national anti-bribery policies from one of de facto corporate impunity to de jure zero tolerance. Multinational corporations engaging in foreign bribery in China today are no longer vulnerable only to the risk of investigation, prosecution, and punishment by foreign jurisdictions. Rather, foreign corporations are now faced with much tougher domestic law enforcement, which forms part of the State’s wider crackdown on corruption in China. However, as our case studies reveal, while the impact of zero tolerance strategies in curbing corporate offending is debatable, applying strategies of ‘harsh justice’ may ultimately be counterproductive to social stability and crime control. Although draconian, zero-tolerance strategies may appeal to politics of punitive populism, the authors contend that alternative strategies based on diversionary justice, such as deferred prosecution agreements and/or negotiated settlements, can more effectively realize the aims of prevention, restitution, rehabilitation, and reform. Drawing valuable lessons from the US and UK experiences, China has the potential to devise its own reconciliation scheme, tailored to local concerns and culture, and balancing legal accountability, cost-efficiency and social stability, especially in relation to the limiting potential adverse economic harms flowing from prosecuting multinational corporations for foreign bribery in China. Balancing the ‘payoffs’ and ‘pitfalls’ of negotiated justice, this article concludes that trialing diversionary measures is likely to appeal to affected stakeholders, including regulatory agencies, law enforcement and judicial authorities, corporate and business sectors, and the wider community, which are seeking to end to cultures of impunity for corporate corruption.

Penological developments in contemporary China: Populist punitiveness vs. penal professionalism

This article examines the penal development in China over the last six decades to understand the ways in which populist punitiveness functions in the Chinese political and social contexts. It argues that populist punitiveness in China is a ‘top-down’ process whereby manipulative political elites play on public anxieties and fears of crime and social insecurity to serve different political objectives of the Chinese Communist Party. While public sentiment was promoted and reflected in penal policy in revolutionary (1950s-1970s) and reform (1970s-1990s) China, their influence, in the post-reform era (2000s-), has been blocked or filtered by the political will due to the emergence of a series of moderate political agendas. A new penal politics that favors professional knowledge over public opinion to serve the country's soft governance strategy is now taking shape in contemporary penal regime to prevail China's policy-making power and process.

Punishment, violence, and grassroots democracy in South Africa—The politics of populist punitiveness

This article discusses the apparent contradictions, and consequences, of the state’s embracing of democratic ‘community’ based criminal justice initiatives, in tandem with long-term imprisonment, in the context of vigilantism in Khayelitsha, a black township on the outskirts of Cape Town. I argue that vigilante practices are part of a continuum of community-based crime prevention and punishment practices, where the legal and illegal are blurred, and with which the state is complicit. Looking back, from the vantage point of 2014 to the time when South Africa emerged from apartheid rule and held its first democratic elections, in April 1994, it is clear that mass democracy has had an uneasy relationship with the liberal values enshrined in the Constitution. I argue that punitive punishment is one of the consequences of the state’s turn toward democratic localism and its embracing of a discourse that encourages communities to take responsibility for crime prevention. The danger of rallying ‘communities’ around combating crime is that it has the potential to unleash violent technologies in the quest for ‘ethics’ and ‘morality.’ As George Herbert Mead pointed out many years ago, when community members unite against an outsider, they are bonded for an intense moment in a way that masks the very real problems that tear the community apart. The ironic twist is that ‘mob justice’ in Khayelitsha is also a mass technology to protect private property in the context of the endemic inequality that characterizes South Africa

Who’s afraid of penal populism? Technocracy and ‘the people’ in the sociology of punishment

Contemporary sociologists of punishment have criticized the rising incidence of incarceration and punitiveness across the Western world in recent decades. The concepts of populist punitiveness and penal populism have played a central role in their critiques of the burgeoning penal state. These concepts are frequently sustained by a doctrine of penal elitism, which delegates a limited right to politicians and ‘the people’ to shape institutions of punishment, favoring in their place the dominance of bureaucratic and professional elites. I argue that the technocratic inclinations of penal elitism are misguided on empirical, theoretical, and normative grounds. A commitment to democratic politics should make us wary of sidelining the public and their elected representatives in the politics of punishment. A brief discussion of Norway’s legal proceedings against Nazi collaborators in the mid-1940s and the introduction sentencing guidelines commissions in Minnesota in the 1980s shows – pace penal elitism – that professional elites may variously raise the banner of rehabilitationism or retributivism. While penal elitism may yield a few victorious battles against punitiveness, it will not win the war.

Neoliberalism and Control Strategies: the Urban Security Policies in Italy

From the early 1990s, In Italy discourses and practices referring to urban security and preven-tion have increased. The purpose of this article is to highlight the specific characteristics of the Italian ap-proach to urban security. Firstly, the strong leadership of local governments in defining the urban security policy, in a conflictual dynamic of national vs local. Secondly, the link between the issue of security and immigration, both at national and local levels. The reconstruction of the history of urban security policies in Italy is aimed at answering the following question: can we interpret the Italian case, despite its national specificity, as coherent with the shift in the culture of control argued by David Garland in relation to the UK and the US contexts? We argue that, also in the Italian context, we witnessed, on one hand, the use of local adaptive policies, in line with neoliberal principles. On the other hand, the rise of punitive populism in the rhetoric and practices, not only at the central State level, but also at local level where adaptive policies were developed together with administrative punitive measures. The conclusions propose a critical ac-count of Italian urban security policies

A Critique of Social Media Sensationalism illustrated through controversial cases and the role of punitive populism and effect on the Judiciary in South Africa

Ponte Academic JournalDec 2016, Volume 72, Issue 12 A Critique of Social Media Sensationalism illustrated through controversial cases and the role of punitive populism and effect on the Judiciary in South AfricaAuthor(s): Rashri Baboolal-FrankJ. Ponte - Dec 2016 - Volume 72 - Issue 12 doi: 10.21506/j.ponte.2016.12.20 Abstract:In South Africa, there has been a media frenzy regarding court cases especially criminal judgments leading to the incarceration of criminals. The public reaction to the criminal judgments breathes positive and negative responses through social media. It is apparent that one case may bring public relief whereas other cases may frustrate the public. Court cases involving the infamous President Jacob Zuma, with a tainted history inter alia, rape charges to corruption to non-compliance with the public protector’s Nkandla report, which has certainly created public displeasure. The repugnant ongoing scent of corruption does not end with the President but is spread like a contagious disease throughout South Africa from white collar crime to blue collar crime. The Dewani case facts were perceived as an elaborate wedding between two opulent families to a murderous honeymoon in South Africa. South Africa became infamous as an ideal background to commit brutal crimes. It is apparent that South Africa is a world renown country that is dangerous in epic proportions, deterring foreigners as holiday makers and encouraging the brain drain of South Africans to immigrate to other promising first world countries with the promise of a better and safer future for the family. This paper will illustrate that the public openly critiques the justice system and exposes the corruption that has polluted the country and the role of punitive populism, which eases the frustration of the public in relation to a country ridiculed and plagued with crime. Download full text:Check if you have access through your login credentials or your institution Username Password

Auxílio-reclusão: o instituto mal(mau)dito das políticas sociais com as políticas penais

Resumo Tendo por eixo o instituto previdenciário auxílio-reclusão - pago aos dependentes do segurado de baixa renda preso - e a análise das representações sociais construídas a partir dessa prática, a pesquisa enfrenta uma dimensão da complexa interface entre a questão social e as políticas penais. A investigação utilizou como campo empírico o ambiente virtual, coletando dados através das mensagens postadas em blogs ou similares. Como referenciais teóricos privilegiou as perspectivas contemporâneas da sociologia do castigo e da economia política da punição, contemplando aspectos instrumentais e simbólicos das interseções em estudo. Seus resultados constatam a peculiar repulsa social no entorno do auxílio-reclusão, o que favorece apropriações no campo jurídico e político que, emolduradas por tecnicismos e populismos punitivos, ampliam a vulnerabilidade das conquistas sociais.

Late Modern Ambiguity and Gothic Narratives of Justice

This paper develops a Cultural Criminology of the Late Modern Gothic. It discusses how representations of criminal justice today are often framed by and narrated through a Gothic imagination. Often, and especially by those who have already noted its criminological significance, this trend is considered a cultural support for Punitive Populism and the demand for vindictive sanctions especially against ‘sensational’ offenders. Although such interpretations are partially valid they do not fully address the entire scope of the Late Modern Gothic—especially when it is invoked as a cultural support for transgression or resistance against the situated structures of (Late) Modernity. By discussing a number of recent media representations but particularly an episode from a popular TV serial, the paper indicates that the contemporary Gothic is now as much a source of subjective identification as it is an imagination of the cultural other: an identification with and not just against that which transcends cultural borders and the culturally ambiguous. Cultural Criminology is here employed to question assumptions that the ‘public mind’ is uniformly punitive and unable or unwilling to tolerate any form of criminal transgression. In responding to popular demands framed by the Gothic imagination, formal criminal justice interventions need not, therefore, necessarily assume a vindictive tone. A Humanistic Cultural Criminological approach to Late Modern Gothic transgressiveness can help reveal cultural complexities too easily ignored by conventional models of criminological analysis.

Radical/Critical Social Work with Young Offenders: Challenges and Possibilities

In the UK, particularly in England, youth crime is perceived as a serious social problem, which is always near the top of the political agenda. Since the early 1990s, ‘populist punitiveness’ (Bottoms, 1995), amounting to varying degrees of punishment and control, has been key for addressing the problem. This culminated in New Labour's flagship Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and thereafter increasing concern with anti-social behaviour. The Conservative-led coalition is continuing in this vein. It is a ‘get tough’ approach in which the role of social work has been sidelined. In this article, I argue that such an approach is counterproductive as evidenced by the riots of August 2011 in London and other major cities. Rather than notions of punishment and control being to the fore, attention should be paid to the social and economic conditions that shape young people's lives and behaviour. For social workers, this involves relationship building with young offenders and their families and this is where a radical/critical work practice comes in. It is an emancipatory practice, which resists the neoliberal present and has some vision of a more socially just and equal future world.

Autoethnography and Emotion as Intellectual Resources

In contrast to many other social sciences, criminology has largely resisted the notion that qualitative inquiry has autoethnographic dimensions and remained quiet on the subject of the emotional investment required of ethnographic fieldworkers studying stigmatized and/or vulnerable “others” in settings where differential indices of power, authority, vulnerability, and despair are felt more keenly than most. Emotion appears in criminology in discussions about public sentiments, populist punitiveness, and the emotional motivations behind offending but rarely features as a lens through which one might better understand the process of doing research. This article examines the state of the field, discusses the work of a small minority of ethnographers who acknowledge the emotional content of prison studies, and tells the story of a personal research encounter that changed the author’s methodological and theoretical orientation. It argues that a more frank acknowledgment of the convergence of subject-object roles does not necessarily threaten the validity of social science, or at least, “it is a threat with a corresponding gain.”

Restorative justice and democracy: fostering public accountability for criminal justice

This essay examines the democratic aspects of restorative justice, placing it in the context of a more general civic engagement movement attempting to narrow the distance between citizens and the state. Along with the goals of fostering healing dialogs between victims, offenders, and communities that can lead to forgiveness and restoration of loss rather than compensatory penal harm, restorative justice programs such as the Vermont reparative probation program attempt to share responsibility and decision-making power for the awful tasks of criminal justice. Over the last 35 years, while restorative justice programs have become more widespread and more mainstream, their democratic dimensions have remained underdeveloped. This essay critically reflects on the degree to which restorative justice programs have involved the public in the professional domain of criminal justice administration and how well they have managed to operate within rule-bound bureaucratic environments while remaining informal and open to community members. It also assesses how well restorative justice, as a reform movement, has addressed the so-called populist punitiveness many commentators believe has driven the ‘get tough’ criminal justice policies, such as mandatory minimum sentencing, that make the US the current world leader in imprisonment.

Democracy and ‘punitive populism’: exploring the Supreme Court's role in El Salvador

El Salvador is characterized by the sad record of having one of the highest degrees of violence and crime in Latin America. Recent governments have tried to fight it with programmes called ‘mano dura’ or ‘super-mano dura’ with measures and practices that have often violated human rights and judicial guarantees. This paper aims to explore the Supreme Court's role in the application of these policies by the Salvadoran government. We discovered that the highest court in this country supports this kind of policies termed by some analysts ‘policies of punitive populism’. In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber acted in contrast to what is required by democratic theory. The paper proceeds as follows: in the first part we analyse the theoretical framework of public safety policies and frame the Salvadoran case. In the second part, we explore the Supreme Court cases that support (or not) these policies, examining the performance of the court in relation to these cases. The last part is a summary of our evidence.

New Labour and criminal justice: Reflections on a wasteland of missed opportunity

At the time of writing, the New Labour project has ended and Labour has returned to the opposition benches. It came into power in 1997 bringing with it a general optimism about change for the better, and in particular, hope that the penal and criminal justice systems would be steered away from the punitive populism of the Tory years and towards new constructive and rational goals based on values such as fairness and benevolence. This paper reflects back on that hope and concludes that whilst some positive achievements were made, New Labour’s overall performance in this field must be judged not only as disappointing but also as a failure to grasp a historic opportunity to change the face of criminal justice.