Populist Leaders Research Articles

How Do Populists Visually Represent ‘The People’? A Systematic Comparative Visual Content Analysis of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders’ Instagram Accounts

How do populists visually represent “the people”? While the literature on populism has tended to focus on text- and language-based documents, such as speeches, policies, and party documents to consider how populists characterize “the people,” in this article I undertake a systematic visual content analysis to consider how populist leaders on either side of the ideological spectrum visually represent “the people” in images from their official Instagram accounts ( N = 432). Comparing the cases of Donald Trump on the populist right and Bernie Sanders on the populist left, I code for the majority gender, race, and age of “the people” in each image, and supplement this with a discussion of the depictions of these categories. I find that Trump’s images of “the people” are significantly more homogenous across all categories—specifically more white, more masculine, and with less young people—than Sanders’, and situate these findings in the context of the literature on the differences between left and right populism. This article contributes to the study of populist communication by highlighting the role of images in representing “the people”; analyzing how left and right populists do this differently; and developing a method for measuring the demographic characteristics of “the people” in populists’ images that can be used in future studies. In doing so, it seeks to push the literature forward by highlighting that images are not something “extra” to be studied in populist communication, but rather are a central battleground for the construction of populist identities.

Macho populists versus COVID: Comparing political masculinities

This article uses a feminist lens to examine Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte and former United States President Donald Trump’s responses to COVID-19. It argues that both populist leaders mobilised masculinity as a resource in statecraft. Both initially responded to the pandemic with dismissiveness and denialism. For the rest of his term, Trump diminished the harms of COVID and emphasised ‘protecting the economy’. Duterte, however, eventually embraced the fear of COVID, imposed a strict lockdown, and secured emergency powers. This article first analyses differences in the masculinities the two politicians performed. It then explores how this performance of masculinity contributed to structuring public discourses in relation to the pandemic and situates it in neoliberal governance more broadly. For example, the performance of invincibility constructed others’ vulnerability and illness as an individual weakness rather than socially and relationally produced. Trump’s co-optation of the language of freedom encouraged protests against health measures and positioned medical experts as the ‘real threat’. In contrast, Duterte’s securitised approach made it difficult for citizens to protest repressive laws enacted by his government. Duterte’s ‘war on COVID’ was marked by his demand for obedience and discipline, thereby constituting anyone who questioned the harmful effects of a police-led lockdown as a threat to national security. Finally, the article reflects on the ways China’s growing role in global politics affects notions and practices of populist masculinities. Both leaders flexed diplomatic masculinity differently in relation to China: Duterte touted his personal closeness to China as a path to securing resources for the Philippines, while Trump’s vilification of China constructed COVID as a ‘foreign enemy’ as opposed to a crisis he was responsible for. Ultimately, these masculine responses undermined dissent and centred muscularity, either in the form of individual resilience or securitisation and policing, as the solution to the pandemic.

Why does populism not make populist foreign policy? Indonesia under Jokowi

ABSTRACT The consequences of populism on foreign policy have been a rising topic of academic inquiry in recent years. The latest literature exposes diverse propensities in the state governments’ international behaviour led by populist leaders. In comparison, foreign policies of populists in the Americas and Europe exhibit anti-elitism and anti-pluralism toward the outside world. Those in Asia tend to be populist domestically, not in foreign policy. This article focuses on the foreign policies of Asian populist government leaders and addresses the question as to why are their foreign policies sterile from populism? It presents the case of Indonesia under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi). The argument is that the enduring pragmatism and domestic constraints have hindered Jokowi's populist motive from shaping the role of the state foreign policy as the defender of the suppressed people against the repressive elite. Hence, Jokowi is unable to make any substantial change to the foreign policy of his non-populist predecessors, and he has to maintain Indonesia’s traditional foreign policy pillars. Nevertheless, the case of Jokowi's Indonesia can open up the space to challenge the established Euro-American scholarship advancing a positive connection between leaders’ populism and foreign policy.

Pious, populist, political masculinities in Pakistan and India

ABSTRACT This article makes a case for the inclusion of piety politics and populist masculinities in any analysis of the governance and international relations between two South Asian rivals and nuclear neighbours; Muslim-majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India. It offers a comparative case-study of the redeemed Sufi masculinity of the recently deposed Pakistani Prime Minister, Imran Khan, and the ascetic Hindutva one performed by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi. The study finds that the nativist, capitalist and gender discriminatory regimes of both populist leaders depend on subduing any dissenting resistance offered by subaltern masculinist and feminist politics. The conclusion finds that military-pious-heteronormative masculinity serves to stabilize patriarchy in both ‘manly states’ and underwrites regional security policies. It also points to how subversive movements are constantly challenging these hegemonic masculinities.

Hate Speech Acts in Populist Rhetoric

This research will study populism and populist rhetoric. At the first section of the research, common features of populist rhetoric is highlighted. In the second section of this study, by means of descriptive methodology phenomenon of populist rhetoric is studied. Also, communicative patterns of populist leaders are formulated. Furthermore, Speech act theory, is used in analysis of populist rhetoric. In brief, the side effects of use of hate speech acts in populist politicians’ rhetoric will be evaluated. For this study tweets of Donald Trump will be used as the input of research study. And the traces of hate speech will be followed in his speech.

Paternalistic leadership as a double-edged sword: Analysis of the Sri Lankan President's response to the COVID-19 crisis.

Despite the challenges facing small economies, leadership research has given scant attention to leaders’ behaviour in those countries during crises. Using seemingly paradoxical domains of paternalistic leadership theory: authoritarian, benevolent and moral leader behaviour, together with concepts like populism from the political science domain, we analyse how Sri Lanka’s ‘strongman’ President provided a façade of paternalistic leadership during the first phase of the COVID-19 pandemic. Through analysis of written and verbal content (public speeches, independent reports and government media output), we show how the power exercised through authoritarian, as opposed to authoritative behaviour, together with espoused morality and benevolence, appears to have been effective in the short term in containing the pandemic. However, sustained success in dealing with the crisis is hampered by the contradictions between this paternalistic façade and the dark realities of authoritarian and populist leadership. Accordingly, we offer theoretical insights into how the darker elements of paternalistic leadership can be better understood and averted.

Populist Minds Think Alike? National Identity Conceptions and Foreign Policy Preferences of Populist Leaders

Abstract The global wave of populism has recently drawn the attention of foreign policy analysts. Despite significant contributions, we still know little about populist leaders’ conceptions of their nation's identity and how these inform foreign policy preferences. What understanding do populists have regarding what their nation stands for and how high it stands in comparison to others? In this article, I introduce a theoretical model of identity-driven foreign policymaking that examines the national identity conceptions of six populist leaders and their non-populist predecessors via an original quantitative content analysis of foreign policy speeches. The article further assesses whether this identity conception translates into foreign policy preferences for revisionism toward the liberal international order by examining voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. The article contributes to conceptual and methodological approaches in foreign policy analysis to study individuals, as well as provides comparative empirical evidence for what drives populists’ foreign policy thinking.

Same, same but different? How democratically elected right-wing populists shape climate change policymaking

ABSTRACT The Paris Agreement expresses far-reaching commitments to combat climate change, but its translation into national contexts faces severe confrontation by populist movements and individuals worldwide. We unpack and compare how differently right-wing populist leaders translate rhetoric into climate policymaking and institutional change. We do so by investigating three areas of contestation: (1) the economic marginalization of the left behind, (2) conflicts between globalism and nationalist priorities, and (3) tensions between universalized science and situated experiences. We offer an analytical framework to study how right-wing populist leaders shape climate policymaking and test the approach with empirical observations from three democratically elected right-wing populists in the US, the Philippines, and Brazil. Populists severely affect climate policies in the long run, but these effects are highly context-specific. Engaging with populist climate politics needs to more seriously respond to local contexts and distinguish between the economic, anti-elitist, and knowledge foundations it is intertwined with.

Centrist and Radical Right Populists in Central and Eastern Europe: Divergent Visions of History and the EU

ABSTRACT This article compares the politics of history and positions in the EU of six ruling populist leaders and their parties (Fidesz, PiS, SDS, GERB, ANO and OĽaNO) from Central and Eastern European (CEE) EU member states. Through the comparison of leaders’ biographies and longitudinal analysis of party electoral manifestos an overlap between two types of CEE populism and two types of mnemonic actors in the region is found. Radical right-wing populist parties (Fidesz, PiS and SDS) are more oriented towards national histories, memory wars against ex-communists and critical events for losing or gaining their national sovereignty (mnemonic warriors). Centrist populist parties (GERB, ANO and OĽaNO) largely ignore that kind of narrative and focus on anti-corruption or promises of managing the state more effectively (mnemonic abnegators). Radical right-wing populist parties are also more likely to challenge the Brussels elites by using examples from their national histories. Emphasis on national traumas, anti-communism and their leaders’ vision of politics labelled here as combat tasks politics seems to be contributing to their Euroscepticism. Combat tasks politics, i.e. seeing politics as a constant battle against political enemies, underpins the Eurosceptic narratives of Kaczyński, Orbán and Janša-former dissidents who were politically socialised while challenging militarised communist regimes.

Populism and Law in Hungary – Introduction to the Special Issue

Abstract Populism is a nebulous concept that has almost as many definitions as scholars engaging with the concept that has a paradoxical relationship with law. On the one hand, populist politicians generally oppose the liberal ideal of separating politics and law, i.e. accepting that legal rules should limit political power, claiming that it would impede the expression of the popular will, yet they use legal regulation as their most important instrument to implement their policies. The chameleonic nature of populism and its instrumentalist approach to law presents a special challenge for lawyers that try to assess its impact on the domestic legal system. Populist legislation, after all, is seemingly indistinguishable from legislation adopted under non-populist regimes as populist regimes always claim to strictly adhere to formal procedural requirements and often justify the dramatic overhaul of previous rules invoking foreign examples. Hungary is a perfect litmus test for the examination of legal changes under populist leaders, because in 2010 the right-wing Fidesz-Kdnp party coalition won two-thirds majority in Parliament – a self-described “revolution in the voting booths” -, which gave it the power to completely overhaul the Hungarian legal system, even changing the constitution. In the past 10 years, virtually every significant branch of Hungarian law was recodified, adopting inter alia new criminal, civil, administrative and labor codes. The authors of this special issue attempted to analyze some of the most pertinent changes, in the field of constitutional law, adjudication, tax law, labor law, criminal regulation and asylum legislation.

Defending democracy or amplifying populism? Journalistic coverage, Twitter, and users’ engagement in Bolsonaro’s Brazil

The article examines how mainstream news organizations in Brazil have tweeted about Jair Bolsonaro, investigating to what extent they may (voluntarily or not) amplify the visibility of populist leaders. We also scrutinize the levels of audience engagement with posts mentioning the President. Our empirical design comprises a content analysis of 128,096 tweets published throughout 2019 by Folha de S. Paulo, O Estado de S. Paulo, and O Globo. The results reveal that such newspapers focused on controversies and negative issues involving Bolsonaro, while posts addressing public policies did not achieve high visibility or engagement. The article also discusses to what degree the newspapers may be taking advantage of users' preferences for content with populist features to reinforce their watchdog role and boost audience ratings. Our findings also contribute to understanding how populist leaders and media organizations can build a mutually beneficial relationship, even though they publicly claim to oppose each other. Finally, the paper suggests new hypotheses to be explored, such as the argument that quality papers may be loosening the division between news and opinion when using social media to satisfy audience niches in polarized environments.

European populism and the return of ‘illiberal sovereignty’: a case-study of Hungary

Abstract European populist leaders and movements often extol the virtues of sovereignty, but how exactly are they using this term? Scholars have typically relied on conventional understandings of the concept—Westphalian, popular and national sovereignty—to interpret populist discourses, but some have noted that these categories seem inadequate. This article asks whether much older, long overlooked, versions of sovereignty might help to explain the sovereignty discourse of European populists. These older variants include extralegal sovereignty (a leader's power to act outside the constraints of formal rules) and organic sovereignty (the power of a political community understood as a single ‘organism’). Both are inherently illiberal: extralegalism rejects constitutionalism, while organicism is inimical to political pluralism. An examination of the public speeches and statements of one prominent European populist leader, Prime Minister Victor Orbán of Hungary, reveals that he has, indeed, invoked these illiberal versions of sovereignty. By retrieving these older concepts, populists gain a powerful rhetorical tool to advance illiberal principles of political authority.

Control, alt, delete: Patriarchal populist attacks on international women’s rights

AbstractThe rise of patriarchal populist leaders over the past decade has fortified a long-standing campaign by conservative governments and advocacy groups to undermine women’s international human rights. Their efforts have increasingly focused on revising language as a means to challenge and weaken the international norms and organizations essential to women’s and girls’ equality and health. Through our textual analysis of UN records, governmental and nongovernmental publications, media coverage of disputes over language, and background interviews with activists, we identify and delineate the significance of this ‘norm spoiling’ strategy and trace its expansion during the Trump administration. We find that women’s rights challengers have pursued three distinct spoiling tactics based in language: controlling what women’s rights advocates can say through policies such as the United States’ ‘global gag rule’; altering the meaning of women’s rights by reframing them as an attack on other rights, such as religious freedom; and deleting foundational words, such as ‘gender’ and ‘sexual and reproductive health and rights’, from international agreements. The role of language in today’s patriarchal populism goes beyond populist leaders’ speeches, rallies and tweets. Their governments and allies systematically control, alter or delete words central to women’s rights.

Populism and the politicisation of foreign policy

Populists in power often resort to the politicisation of foreign policy to generate domestic support. This article explores this process. First, it conceptualises populist politicisation of foreign policy. Second, it develops expectations on how such politicisation will take place: the distinctive features of populism (the intensity of populist discourse, the relative weight of anti-elitism and people-centrism, and a transnational understanding of the ‘people’ or the ‘elite’) will have an impact on how foreign policy is politicised. The empirical analysis focuses on selected public speeches and tweets by two populist leaders from the Global South: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Narendra Modi. The analysis reveals huge differences: the more populist Erdoğan emphasises anti-elitism and extensively resorts to the politicisation of Turkish foreign policy by constructing foreign threats. Modi is less populist and his discourse emphasises people-centrism; as expected, he only marginally politicises foreign policy, highlighting the greatness of the Indian nation.

Resistance to populism

ABSTRACT Populist leaders mobilize supporters to accomplish the political transformations they seek to achieve. However, once they are in office, populist leaders also encounter mobilizations against them because of their exclusionary rhetoric as well as their attack on existing democratic norms. These populists’ practices represent an erosion of (or threat to) political rights and move oppositional groups into struggle. Therefore, an increase in mobilizations under a populist leader can be seen as resistance to populism. Based on panel data analysis across 18 Latin American countries between 1990-2018, we find that populist rhetoric triggers a higher level of pro-democratic protests when it is combined with a populist leader’s rejection of democratic norms. The findings are discussed in line with the political consequences of populism in contemporary Latin America.

Argumentation profiles and the manipulation of common ground. The arguments of populist leaders on Twitter

The detection of hate speech and fake news in political discourse is at the same time a crucial necessity for democratic societies and a challenge for several areas of study. However, most of the studies have focused on what is explicitly stated: false article information, language expressing hatred, derogatory expressions. This paper argues that the explicit dimension of manipulation is only one – and the least problematic – of the risks of political discourse. The language of the unsaid is much more dangerous and incomparably more difficult to detect, hidden in different types of fallacies and inappropriate uses of emotive language. Through coding scheme developed by integrating instruments drawn from argumentation theory and pragmatics, a corpus of argumentative tweets published by 4 politicians (Matteo Salvini, Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, and Joseph Biden) within 6 months from their taking office is analyzed, detecting the types of argument, the fallacies, and the uses and misuses of “emotive words.” This coding results in the argumentation profiles of the speakers, which are compared statistically to show their different implicit strategies and deceptive tactics.

The life cycle of conspiracy theories: evidence from a long-term panel survey on conspiracy beliefs in Italy

AbstractConspiracy theories are gaining increasing interest in academic and public debate. A broad research agenda focused on the socio-political and psychological determinants of conspiracy theory beliefs, on the effect of social media as a new channel of dissemination, on the role played by populist leaders in explaining those theories, and on the impact on social and political outputs. This introduction to the special issue proposes a summary of this growing literature and addresses an aspect that is still under-investigated: the life cycle of conspiracy theories. Previous empirical studies investigated the topic either in a cross-sectional fashion or by employing short-term panels – focusing on how conspiracy theories change over a small period (e.g., before and after an election). Using panel survey data, we take a medium-term approach. We base our investigation on a longitudinal study composed of two survey waves, administered in 2016 and late 2020. Respondents were asked to rate the plausibility of different ‘classic’ conspiracy theories. This allows comparing changes in beliefs in those conspiracy theories over this 4-year time frame. Results show that believes in these theories decrease over time. Furthermore, this decline can only be marginally explained by individual socio-demographic characteristics or political orientations. After thoroughly describing these differences over time, we speculate on why this decline occurs, mainly basing our argument on the role of the media landscape in shaping public opinion.

Innocents, psychopaths and the imagination.

This article reflects on the manipulative practices of autocratic populist leaders in North and South America and looks at their speeches, which appeal to followers who desire love and protection, or who seek an outlet for aggressive impulses. Jung's considerations regarding the annihilation of the other, evil and the unconsciousness of the masses - manipulated for purposes of subjugation - are important for understanding the risks that threaten society. The behaviour of unscrupulous leaders seized by power complexes, reinforced by psychopathic traits in clinic and culture, creates an increasing number of victims. A lack of imagination for evil is behind the absence of malice as a defence and the idealization which opens doors to the violence of totalitarian leaders and of dominant figures in social and family relationships. The polarities evil-innocence and dominator-dominated are severely dissociated in contemporary society, endorsing Jung's vision as a warning against destructiveness.

The populist way out: Why contemporary populist leaders seek transnational legitimation

This article aims to contribute to the growing academic debate on the transnational drivers and patterns of contemporary populism. As populist leaderships expand both politically and geographically, the very nature of the populist phenomenon is changing, as it is increasingly being projected on the international stage. Contemporary populist leaders show a growing willingness to transfer the discursive construction of a struggle between ‘the people’ and ‘the elites’ to the regional and global levels as a way of obtaining internal and external legitimation. In so doing, they exploit the symbiotic two-level game that links national and international (de-)legitimation dynamics, seeking to gain ‘abroad’ the kind of legitimacy that they cannot obtain ‘at home’. This article suggests three mechanisms that explain the populist ‘way out’ from various legitimation traps based on the traditional distinctions between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. The article’s argument is illustrated with reference to prototypical cases of populism in Europe, the Americas, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The incorporation of the literature on international legitimacy enhances our understanding of the strategic activation of populist attitudes through the transnational articulation of empty signifiers, the global diffusion of this phenomenon, and the possibilities for its contestation and mitigation.

Contesting the “Corrupt Elites,” Creating the “Pure People,” and Renegotiating the Hierarchies of the International Order? Populism and Foreign Policy-Making in Turkey and Hungary

AbstractThis article explores the link between populism and hierarchies in international relations by examining the recent foreign policy-making in Turkey and Hungary—two countries run by populist leaders. We argue that when populists bring populism into foreign policy, they do so by contesting the “corrupt elites” of the international order and, simultaneously, attempt to create the “pure people” transnationally. The populists contest the “eliteness” and leadership status of these “elites” and the international order and its institutions, that is, the “establishment,” that these “elites” have come to represent by challenging them both in discourse and in action. The creation of the “pure people” happens by discursively demarcating the “underprivileged” of the international order as a subcategory based on religion and supplementing them with aid, thus mimicking the distributive strategies of populism, this time at the international level. We illustrate that when populist leaders, insert populism into foreign policies of their respective states, through contesting the “corrupt elites” and creating the “pure people,” the built-in vertical stratification mechanisms of populism that stems from the antagonistic binaries inherent to populism provide them with the necessary superiority and inferiority labels allowing them to renegotiate hierarchies in the international system in an attempt to modify the existing ones or to create new ones.