Populist Framing Research Articles

Framing the Collective Memory of the 1990s as a Legitimation Tool for Putin’s Regime

ABSTRACT The article reveals how a sharp contrast between the “turbulent 1990s” and the “stable 2000s” was constructed and exploited by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev for shoring up the regime. Using a qualitative content analysis, I demonstrate how Putin’s power was legitimized through three discursive mechanisms of re-presenting the recent past: the coining of buzzwords that became symbolic descriptors of the 1990s; the populist framing of the regime’s policies; the composition of narratives about the immediate post-Soviet years. Constructed largely in the early 2000s, the negative framing of the Yeltsin decade became central to the official legitimizing discourse of Putin’s regime.

Populism and the Politics of Resentment

This article argues that understanding the dangers and risks of authoritarian populism in consolidated constitutional democracies requires analysis of the forms of pluralism and status anxieties that emerge in civil society, in a context of profound political, socio-economic and cultural change. This paper has two basic theses. The first is that when civil societies become deeply divided, and segmental pluralism maps onto party political polarization, generalized social solidarity is imperiled, as is commitment to democratic norms, social justice and liberal constitutionalism. The second, is that populist political entrepreneurs excel in fomenting social antagonisms by framing shifts in the forms of social pluralism in ways that foster deep political polarization, generalized distrust and a politics of resentment against ‘elites’, ‘the establishment’ and ‘outsiders’. Why populist offers resonate requires a social theoretical analysis of status/solidarity issues and a direct response to them. I navigate between two inadequate approaches: that of the Hofstadter consensus school which construes status concerns and populism as retrograde, anti-modern, paranoid and meriting no direct response; and that of the neo-Marxist tradition that acknowledges the mobilizing power of ‘cultural factors’ and status anxieties but deems them to be epiphenomena of the deeper story of economic distributive injustice. Both approaches focus on the ‘rational” dimension of material interest and see status anxieties as inevitably bound up with reactionary politics of resentment. I reject this assessment and seek to take up the status/solidarity issues in ways that take them seriously, challenge populist framing and provide alternative direct responses to them.

Economic Populism and Producerism: European Right-Wing Populist Parties in a Transatlantic Perspective

Abstract This article aims to develop a conceptual framework to address the economic dimension of right-wing populism. Moving beyond classic left-right economics and the divide between economic and cultural approaches, it argues that the political economy of right-wing populists is intertwined with cultural values in the construction of the ‘true’ people as an economic community whose well-being is in decline and under threat, and therefore needs to be restored. Looking at populist traditions across Europe and the United States, the paper emphasizes the significance of ‘producerist’ frames in economic populism. This is illustrated through an empirical analysis of differences and similarities in the economic policies and discourses of three established right-wing populist parties based in Europe (FN, SVP and UKIP), and the Tea Party and Donald Trump in the United States. We find that economic populist frames are common to all of the parties under scrutiny, albeit subject, however, to different interpretations of the producerist antagonism and groups. Our findings confirm that the intersection between economic populism and producerism provides a new—and fruitful—perspective on right-wing populism, while simultaneously demonstrating the relevance of a transatlantic approach to the study of the populist phenomenon.

Social exclusion and community in an urban retirement village

Large purpose-built retirement complexes including continuing care options are increasingly popular ways to ‘age in place’ for older people in New Zealand and internationally. Promoted by their corporate owners as a lifestyle choice offering a wealth of activities and social interaction in manicured settings along with security and increasing care on site as needed, these entities offer new ways for wealthier older people to age. Applying an ethnographic approach to a case study residential complex in Auckland, New Zealand, we explore how residents experience inclusion and exclusion, and sense of community within such environments with a diversity of fit and frail residents. Data was collected from interviews, walk-about conversations, social site mapping and a selection of media material to gain an understanding of the social issues important to the residents. The twelve participants, aged between 70 and 87, were all independent residents living in the independent part of the complex, which is situated in a socio-economically wealthy suburb of Auckland. We identified that social connections were often fragile, and existing social group membership was key to shared community experiences and a sense of belonging. Residents who found themselves on the social fringes, particularly as newcomers or through health decline, were at risk of marginalisation, stigma, and social exclusion. Further, we identified how the design and layout, and tensions in the structure of the resident-management relationship potentially hinder inclusiveness and sense of community. These findings shed light on alternative experiences at odds with the commercial and populist framing of these places as age-friendly and inclusive communities promoting active lifestyles.

Radical right framing of social policy in Hungary: between nationalism and populism

AbstractThe populist radical right (PRR) is increasingly associated with welfare chauvinism, but the literature mainly focuses on Western and Northern European cases. Turning attention to Central Eastern Europe, this article investigates how PRR parties in Hungary frame welfare issues in five social policy areas from 2010 to 2016. This is done through a critical frame analysis applied to party manifestos and State of the Nation speeches by the Fidesz and Jobbik parties. Special care is taken to delineate the interlocking but not interchangeable concepts of nationalism and populism, as recent research asserts this distinction is often overlooked. The main findings are threefold: First, these parties articulate their positions chiefly through nationalist rather than populist framing; Second, while Hungary's PRR exhibits welfare chauvinist framing similar to Western and Northern Europe, a main difference detected was the role of the communist legacy; Third, beyond the article's original goals, the findings revealed a strong connection between nationalist framing and the role of gender, suggesting that the two are not mutually exclusive.

“Six Months Is a Joke”: Carceral Feminism and Penal Populism in the Wake of the Stanford Sexual Assault Case

This article analyzes coverage of the Stanford, California rape case, using a qualitative thematic press analysis to demonstrate how “rape culture” and penal populist framing intersected. Pulling from national newspapers, as well as diverse online fora, we show how characteristics of the case such as the perceived leniency toward the accused were featured in rape culture and penal populist narratives. In addition, we document a counternarrative that critiqued feminism to pit antirape activists against justice reformers, framing the case as exemplifying a “culture of mass incarceration.” We discuss the significance of this in the context of broader justice reform.

Populism and the Politics of Resentment

This article argues that understanding the dangers and risks of authoritarian populism in consolidated constitutional democracies requires analysis of the forms of pluralism and status anxieties that emerge in civil and economic society, in a context of profound political, socio-economic and cultural change. This paper has two basic theses. The first is that when societies become deeply divided, and segmental pluralism maps onto affective party political polarization, generalized social solidarity is imperiled, as is commitment to democratic norms, social justice and liberal democratic constitutionalism. The second, is that populist political entrepreneurs excel in fomenting social antagonisms by framing shifts in the forms of social pluralism in ways that foster deep political polarization, generalized distrust and a politics of resentment against ‘elites’, ‘the establishment’, ‘the oligarchy’, and ‘outsiders’. Why populist offers resonate requires a social theoretical analysis of status/solidarity and class issues and a direct response to them. I draw on Polanyi and Habermas to develop an explanatory approach to the current crisis and the populist responses it triggers. I navigate between two inadequate approaches: that of the Hofstadter consensus school which construes status concerns and populism as retrograde, anti-modern, paranoid and meriting no direct response; and that of the neo-Marxist tradition that acknowledges the mobilizing power of ‘cultural factors’ and status anxieties but deems them to be epiphenomena of the deeper story of economic distributive injustice. I reject this assessment and seek to take up the status/solidarity issues in ways that take them seriously, challenge populist framing and provide alternative direct responses to them. I reject the narrative frames of left populists who foment polarization and I try to present an alternative narrative framing for a future democratic politics that draws on the best in politically liberal, constitutionalist, democratic and socialist traditions.

Polish plumbers and Romanian strawberry pickers: how the populist framing of EU migration impacts national policies

The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 that effectively increased migration from the EU’s new member states to its old ones, or the EU-15, has prompted debate in several countries regarding policies aimed at countering worker migration. In response, we here investigate the controversy by focusing on Poles and Romanians as the figures of such migration, which in old member states has spurred xenophobic attitudes. Specifically, we examine how many Poles and Romanians actually migrated, to which countries, and the reasons behind their migration, as well as scrutinise the development of xenophobic attitudes toward Polish and Romanian immigrants and how such intolerance impacts national policies in old member states? In conclusion, we argue that the debate concerning migration within the EU not only exaggerates actual migration, but also promotes myths meant to protect national interests, thereby suggesting that policies aimed at countering worker migration require evidence-based research.

The Populist Style in American Politics: Presidential Campaign Discourse, 1952–1996

This paper examines populist claims-making in US presidential elections. We define populism as a discursive strategy that juxtaposes the virtuous populace with a corrupt elite and views the former as the sole legitimate source of political power. In contrast to past research, we argue that populism is best operationalized as an attribute of political claims rather than a stable ideological property of political actors. This analytical strategy allows us to systematically measure how the use of populism is affected by a variety of contextual factors. Our empirical case consists of 2,406 speeches given by American presidential candidates between 1952 and 1996, which we code using automated text analysis. Populism is shown to be a common feature of presidential politics among both Democrats and Republicans, but its prevalence varies with candidates’ relative positions in the political field. In particular, we demonstrate that the probability of a candidate’s reliance on populist claims is directly proportional to his distance from the center of power (in this case, the presidency). This suggests that populism is primarily a strategic tool of political challengers, and particularly those who have legitimate claims to outsider status. By examining temporal changes in populist claims-making on the political left and right, its variation across geographic regions and field positions, and the changing content of populist frames, our paper contributes to the debate on populism in modern democracies, while integrating field theory with the study of institutional politics.

Rage and Protest

In 2011 numerous 'Occupy' and anti-austerity protests took place across Europe and the United States. Passionate indignation at the failure of political elites became a mobilizing force against formal political institutions. In Greece a mass movement known as the Aganaktismeni (the Indignant) became the main agent of social resistance to the memorandum signed by the Greek government, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund. The Greek movement did not take the form of a social movement sharing a collective identity. Left-wing protestors played a prominent role. Protestors embracing right-wing populist frames also participated actively in collective mobilizations, while segments of the extreme right attempted to manipulate rage to their advantage. During the Greek Indignant movement civil society remained a terrain contested by conflicting political forces. This unique feature of the Greek movement posed a completely different challenge to the principles of diversity and inclusiveness than the one debated within the Spanish Indignados and the Occupy protests. Furthermore, it illustrates that rage and indignation may spark dissimilar forms of political contention. Hence, rage and indignation do not merely motivate ‘passive citizens’ to participate in collective protest. They are linked to cognitive frames and individual preferences, which influence protestors’ claims and mobilizations’ political outcomes. Accordingly, advances in democratization and inclusive citizenship are only one of the possible outcomes of mobilizations prompted by rage and indignation.

The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany

In this article, we investigate the presence and forms of populist frames in the discourse of the extreme right by looking at different types of extreme right organizations in Italy and Germany. Focusing on the meso, organizational level, and applying a frame analysis to written documents (for example newspapers, magazines) of certain selected extreme right organizations, chosen from the political party and non-party extreme right milieu in the two countries, the article examines the relevance and the characteristics of the populist discourse in the extreme right. Similarities and differences between types of extreme right groups and countries in the framing strategies of populism are underlined and linked to the cultural (historical) and political-discursive opportunities. The bridging of appeal to the people with other (more traditional) frames of the extreme right (for example nativism) is shown. In particular, we look at how the central populist frame (namely the people versus the elite) is linked to the extreme right definition of the ‘us’ and the ‘them’, when developing diagnoses, prognoses and motivations to action. The analysis is based on a total of around 4000 frames collected in documents from 2002 to 2006.