Populist Forces Research Articles

The Activation of Populist Attitudes

AbstractMost studies see demand for populist forces driven by broad sociological factors that make certain issues salient among specific constituencies. However, this argument is not normally tested at the individual level. We propose a theory of populist voting which argues that populist attitudes are themselves important predictors of voting, interacting with ideological positions. We test this theory through a comparison of recent voting in Chile and Greece, two countries where the contexts for activating populist attitudes are very different. We find that despite similar levels of populist attitudes across both countries, these attitudes explain much more of the vote in Greece than they do in Chile, and that in both countries they interact with ideological positions in predictable ways.

Populist Success in a Hung Parliament: The 2018 General Election in Italy

ABSTRACTThe 2018 Italian general elections were a crucial test to assess the resilience of mainstream parties vis-à-vis the challenge provided by populist forces and the stabilisation of the tripolar party system emerged in 2013. The article analyses the outcome of the election, whose most remarkable result was the unprecedented success of two populist parties, the M5S and the Lega, by focusing on key aspects such as the new electoral system, the coalition-building process, the electoral campaign, the evolution of the Italian party system, and the analysis of vote shifts between parties.

Europe’s Anti-immigrant Parties: False Start or Second Wind?

The article makes focus on the rise of Western Europe’s far-right parties which act with anti-immigrant agenda amid 2010s European migrant crisis. Massive influxes of refugees and migrants have accumulated huge political significance and triggered off a wide range of conflicts (both on international and national levels). The migrant crisis has indicated many social-political challenges for European countries. The crisis has been synchronous with a rise of popularity of right populist political movements (old ones as well as new ones), which promote restrictions of immigration etc. At the same time it cannot be ignored that West European right-wing populist political movements achieved some success in previous decades, well ahead of the current migrant crisis. Immigration issue has been a centerpiece of political discourses of West European right-wing parties (National Front in France, for instance) since late 1970s – early 1980s. But it is quite obvious that the 2010s migrant crisis became a trigger for revitalization of the far-right movements which are outspoken critics of the European Union as “a supra- national body” dictating its conditions to the member countries. Besides, the crisis gave a boost to a rise of new populist movements (for example, “Alternative for Germany”). In 2017 the populist right-wing parties in Europe won the largest support over the three past decades. Recently the right populist forces appeared in elections in a number of European countries (Germany, Austria, France etc.) as tough competitor of traditional mainstream political parties and won parliamentary representation and/or representation in the government coalitions. Furthermore, these movements demonstrate attempts to change their image to shift to political mainstream. However, in the foreseeable future, any cardinal breakthrough and far-right anti- immigrant parties’ coming to the power in Western Europe’s coutrnies is hardly possible.

The conventional campaign of an extraordinary election

ABSTRACTWhile the prediction of an exceptional victory of populist forces was shared by analysts at the closing of the parliamentary term, and accordingly a harsh electoral competition was expected, albeit with the aura of uncertainty raised by the new electoral law (‘Rosatellum’), the actual campaign has not proved at all ‘exceptional’. The leaders, the issues and the media coverage were rather a follow-up of the 2013 campaign. That campaign was truly a departure from the campaigning patterns of previous Italian electoral contests, both those of the ‘majoritarian’ (‘Mattarellum’) years and of the ‘proportional’ (‘Porcellum’) ones. What has marked significantly the 2018 campaign has been instead the intensive use of the social media

Populism and media policy failure

Far right populist politicians and movements have secured high levels of visibility thanks to often compliant media outlets and unregulated digital platforms. The pursuit of media coverage and the communication of rage are no longer incidental but essential to the growth of reactionary populisms. Yet, while prominent liberal media outlets are ‘aghast’ at events such as the election of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote, little attention has been paid to the structural conditions and policy frameworks that have facilitated the circulation of clickbait and misinformation, together with the incessant coverage of their leaders, that have been exploited by far right movements. This article identifies four areas of ‘media policy failure’ that have nurtured highly skewed media environments and concludes by calling for a new policy paradigm based around redistribution that aims to reconstruct media systems in order to undermine the appeal of populist forces on the far right.

The emergence of guiding cases in China

Chinese legal reform is dotted with episodes of progress and stagnation. While significant steps have been taken to professionalize, specialize, and autotomize the judicial apparatus, populist forces have also informed the trajectory of reform. Guiding cases have ignited tremendous scholarly discourses about the importance of the tool, and how it can help ameliorate the legal system. Some scholars “cite their potential to fill statutory lacunae, unify legal standards, improve judicial efficiency, and limit judicial discretion.” Others argue that the Chinese political and legal system are ill-prepared (or incompatible) to adopt the guiding cases paradigm. This article investigates the development of guiding cases and attempts to shed light on their function and potential impact on the political and legal landscapes. We maintain that the current role of guiding cases in the overall system is still ambiguous and that the rise of guiding cases has had marked progress, but its development in the political and legal milieus remain to be discerned.

Where the fires are

The disintegration of the social in the USA (and elsewhere) creates the need for a strong central authority to secure order and boundaries. Hence the rise of ‘libertarian authoritarianism’, a novel political formation that is an inadvertent effect of neoliberal rationality. In this context Trump and other right-wing populist forces can be seen as part of a further reconfiguration of neoliberalism. White identity politics and male identity politics play a key role within this. In the face of this persistence and resilience of neoliberalism, we need, not hope, but ‘grit, responsibility and determination’. Small acts of local resistance have an important role to play here, and so too does political theory.

Varieties of Populism in Europe: Is the Rule of Law in Danger?

What the current surge of populism shows is that the rule of law and liberal democracy find themselves in great danger when the breadth of democratic support for their core principles begins to decrease. Both in Hungary and Poland, the populist forces relatively easily undermined the rule of law and democracy, and steered politics in a dangerous authoritarian direction. Ultimately, democratic political parties with credible political ideas and platforms offer the best hope for protection of liberal democracy. As the Western European examples show, as long as there exist credible liberal political platforms, the threat to the rule of law and democracy is not existential. While populists in Western Europe challenge certain liberal values and policies, they lack the capacity to threaten the essence of liberal democracy.

Questioning Consensuses: Right-Wing Populism, Anti-Populism, and the Threat of ‘Gender Ideology’

Since 2012, several European countries (among others Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia or Slovakia) have seen the rise of conservative and, in part, fundamentalist social movements against the perceived threat of what they call (depending on the context) ‘gender ideology’, ‘gender theory’, or ‘genderism’. The movements mobilizing against ‘gender ideology’ are frequently understood as a conservative backlash against achieved levels of equality between women and men and/or LGBTQ rights. This perspective of ‘the patriarchy/heteronormativity fighting back’ seems as tempting as it is simplifying. I discuss the transnational movements against ‘gender ideology’ in the context of the rise of right-wing populism and on the basis of considerations seeking to explain their demand side. On one hand, I argue that the study of this phenomenon provides important clues for understanding the reasons behind the rise of populist forces in Europe and beyond. On the other hand, I propose that ‘gender’ is not the final target for these movements and that they should not be understood primarily as mobilizations against equality. Rather, I see the emergence of these movements as a symptom of a larger systemic crisis. ‘Gender ideology’ in this sense embodies numerous deficits of the so-called progressive actors, and the movements or parties that mobilize against the perceived threat of ‘gender ideology’ react to these deficits by re-politicizing certain issues in a polarized language. Based on Chantal Mouffe’s critique of the established hegemonic idea of consensus in liberal democracy, I discuss two consensuses that are characteristic of the so-called progressive actors (including the feminist and LGBTQ actors), namely, the neoliberal consensus and the human rights consensus, and their contribution to the rise of the movements against ‘gender ideology’.

The Australian Right in the “Asian Century”: Inequality and Implications for Social Democracy

ABSTRACTThis article analyses the policy discourse of Australian right-wing governments, exploring how such governments have combined neo-liberal economic policies with social conservatism, populism, cultural nationalism and forms of authoritarianism. It also examines the resulting response of social democratic political parties. As a predominantly Western country situated in the Asia-Pacific region, Australian experience offers interesting insights into the domestic politics of right-wing governments facing the changing geo-political and geo-economic imperatives of the “Asian Century.” Conservative Australian governments have reasserted traditional Anglo-centric national identity and used competition from key Asian countries to further justify market-driven policies, reduced welfare benefits and reduced industrial relations standards. The social democratic Australian Labor Party has responded to right-wing government policy by placing an increased emphasis on challenging social and economic inequality. However, Labor’s own plans for equitable economic growth potentially underestimate the challenges posed by the intermeshing of the Australian and Asian economies and provide insights into the dilemmas that a changing geo-economics poses for Western social democracy more broadly. Meanwhile Australian conservatism is facing not just challenges from its social democratic opponent but also from far-right populist forces critical of globalisation.

ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ ПОПУЛИЗМ В КОНЦЕ 2010-х

The article is devoted to the assessment of the current state of the European populism. Basing on the outcomes of the European electoral cycle in 2017, as well as sociological polls data, the author suggests that, contrary to the opinion of some Western analysts concerning “decline of the populist wave”, there is stabilization of the populism’s impact on the political life of the continent. The article emphasizes that while in the Western Europe there is a certain stagnation of the “populist offensive” on the political power system, in Eastern and Central Europe there is a completely different situation – stabilization of positions in this system that have already been won by populism. Along with a certain consolidation of electoral niche previously gained by populism in some West European countries one can watch enhancing of populist impact on the European political discourse and the real policy of a number of mainstream parties. The article highlights some evolution trends of populist parties themselves. These include the intensification of contradictions between the desire of populists to win support of radicalized voters, on the one hand, and their striving to win positions in the political power system that requires some mitigation of populists’ anti-systemic radicalism, on the other. At the same time, the article provides abundant evidence of recent shifts in the European public mind, which contribute to the enlargement of the electoral base of populism by creating a new socio-psychological situation in European societies, more favorable for the populist forces’ activities. The author argues that although the political consequences of these trends are difficult to predict, essential aspects of the current political transformations generated by populism are further fragmentation of a political landscape and corresponding increase of uncertainties in the political life of Europe.&nbsp

The European Union’s existential crisis: current challenges from populism to Donald Trump

2016 was marked by the rise of populism and isolationism around the world. The European Union is losing a Member State for the first time, after the British voted to leave in their “Brexit” referendum. Across the Atlantic, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States, causing concern amongst European leaders. In the remaining Member States, populist and Eurosceptic political forces are becoming more relevant, further endangering the integrity of the European Union. In this paper, we analyse the motives behind the European Union’s “existential crisis”, which is arguably, one of the most significant challenges the EU will face in its near future. We conclude that the European Union must reform in order to regain their citizens’ trust and reinforce democracy.

What the (Ideational) Study of Populism Can Teach Us, and What It Can't

AbstractIn their hasty response to the recent wave of populist victories, many analysts have ignored previous scholarship on populism. In contrast, contributors to this special issue draw from well‐tested approaches to populism that allow them to build on previous work, especially work based on an ideational approach. In doing so, they highlight at least three things that a more scientific approach to populism can teach us. First, populism is not a new phenomenon, nor is the current wave necessarily stronger than previous ones; second, populist ideas exist at the level of individual voters and matter for political behavior; and third, populism has both positive and negative consequences for democracy. At the same time, contributions to this special issue allow us to highlight at least three limitations of the current ideational approach: it fails to comprehend other political ideas clearly and how they interact with populism; it lacks a theory about different modes of political organization pursued by populist forces; and it inadequately theorizes about the impact of populist forces on party systems.

European integration, social democratic Europeanism and the competitiveness discourse: a neo-Poulantzian approach to discursive policy analysis

This article addresses the so-called institutional deficit in poststructuralist discourse theory by articulating a recent development of such a theory, the so-called discursive policy analysis as mainly elaborated by David Howarth and Jason Glynos, with neo-Poulantzian state theory, especially as re-worked by Bob Jessop. It then employs the resulting framework for analysing the internal socio-political logic of the European integration process, and asks why this process has not been challenged by any robust counter-hegemonic alternative despite the regressive consequences that its neo-liberal design has triggered. The argument developed in the article is that the increasing support of European social democracy, once Euro-critical, to the European project played a crucial role in this development. Nevertheless, such a thesis raises the following research question: how the forces leading the European integration process were able to gain and maintain the active support of European social democracy to that process despite the lack of opportunities for social democratic policies at the EU level? To address this question, the article engages with the main policy proposals developed by the European social democratic parties between the mid-1980s and early 2000s, paying special attention to the impacts of these proposals on EU’s institutional architecture. The textual analysis of both the social democratic and EU policy discourses reveals that the widespread appeal of a narrative structured around the “empty signifier” of “competitiveness” served to integrate the social democratic identity within the neo-liberal integration project, organizing a range of discursive logics that successfully marginalized critical worries about European integration. Nevertheless, the article ends by hypothesizing that the technocratic mode of European integration that this historical development has instituted, constitutes the main condition of possibility for the current emergence of Eurosceptic populist forces throughout the EU, so that in the medium term the neo-liberal-oriented European construction might lead to the destablization of the very foundations of the European order.

Is Africa Catching the West's Cold - Again

Debate around a ‘new African populism’ raises at least three questions. Is it new? Is it uniquely African or merely reflective of some worldwide process? And what exactly is at stake, not only from populist forces themselves, but in how we react to them: do the higher classes risk misunderstanding ideas that are genuinely popular by dismissing them as merely populist?

Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the 2016 Brexit Decision

This essay proceeds in three steps. First, it will briefly outline the often invoked “crisis” of representative democracy and its major symptoms. Second, it will discuss a popular yet, as I shall argue, worryingly misguided response to that crisis: namely, the switch to plebiscitarian methods of “direct” democracy, as advocated, for example, by rightist populist forces in many European Union member states. The United Kingdom's Brexit referendum of June 2016 illuminates the weaknesses of this approach. Third, it will suggest a rough design for enriching representative electoral democracy with nonelectoral (but “aleatory,” or randomized) and nonmajoritarian (but deliberative and consultative) bodies and their peculiar methods of political will formation (as opposed to the expression of a popular will already formed).

The Political Theories, Preconditions and Dangers of the Governing Populism in Hungary

This study aims to explore the political theoretical background of governing populism in Hungary. It has been argued here that the political success of Viktor Orbán’s Governments are based on mixing three main political theoretical pillars: 1) the concept of the Political elaborated by Carl Schmitt; 2) the Weberian concept leader democracy; 3) and political constitutionalism. What is common in these three tendencies is the promise of repoliticisation. I will elaborate in this study that elitist populism and illiberal democracy are the two core concepts which can synchronize and converge the various (and sometimes contradictory) political theoretical backgrounds of Orbán’s regime. I also put forward here that the populist promise of political leadership is inherently false, because instead of repoliticisation, populist forces monopolize political representation and liquidate political responsibility.

From Dreams to Reality: The Challenges of Italy's Five Star Movement

Since its birth in 2009, the Five Star Movement has achieved incredible growth, accompanied by important electoral successes. This has resulted in concrete responsibilities and influential positions in the system. Grillo's movement was born as an anti-system and populist force with interesting peculiarities, and the main challenge it is now facing is to prove itself able to govern and to transform problems into solutions. So far the promised revolution has not taken place: a mixture of inexperience, internal divisions, scandals and contradictions has already damaged the image of the movement, which is facing many challenges and a difficult transition. The evolution of the Five Star Movement shows all the weaknesses of populist movements facing reality. The best strategy to confront them is to ensure that all their contradictions emerge and, at the same time, to regain the citizens’ trust by providing credible solutions to their problems.

Zur politischen Ökonomie des Helfens.

Starting out from the huge movement of aid to refugees in Germany, the article deals with the political economy of volunteering within its wider socio-economic and political context. The authors ask in how far civic engagement and volunteer involvement are not just appreciated as part of the new “Willkommenskultur” (‘welcome culture’), but explicitely exploited and co-opted as a productive resource in the context of welfare state cutbacks. The social and economic implications of the political economy of volunteering are discussed, i.e. the status of social rights in contrast to charitable help, the professionality and quality of services being provided by (non-trained) volunteers as well as the hierarchical interdependence between volunteers and refugees. At the same time, we take the specifics of the field “aid to refugees” into account since the anti-racist appeal of volunteers’ engagement should not be underestimated in times of new right-wing populist forces. The article finally deals with the question in how far practices of politically explicit “recalcitrant civic engagement” might prevent the co-optation and exploitation of volunteer involvement in contemporary capitalism with its restrictive border regime.

The Politics of Financial Development: A Review of Calomiris and Haber's Fragile by Design

Fragile by Design by Charles W. Calomiris and Stephen H. Haber introduces a framework for understanding financial crises and credit abundance with politics at its center. Using the historical experiences of five nations to illustrate, the authors propose that democracies such as the United States and Canada can have stable banks and ample credit so long as populist forces do not dominate the policy agenda, and that strong autocratic states such as Mexico can also achieve stability at the cost of restricting credit. Weak autocracies, such as Brazil over much of its history, often require inflationary finance and suffer from the banking fragility that comes with it. The authors identify populist ideologies and related policy decisions (such as unit banking, deposit insurance, and the Community Reinvestment Act) as underlying causes of banking instability in the United States as typified by the recent subprime crisis. Canada, in contrast, by holding populist forces in check through calculated political choices, remains crisis-free. (JEL D72, E44, G01, G21, N20, O16, O17)