Populist Attitudes Research Articles

Different Media, Different Audiences, Different Harassment? How the Journalist-Audience Relationship Shapes Experiences of Harassment

Many journalists regularly experience harassment in their daily work. Audiences in Western democracies have become increasingly aggressive in their communication due to the spread of anti-press sentiments and populist attitudes. This is further facilitated by technological changes, rendering interaction with journalists simple and intrusive. So far, research has found that journalists reporting on specific topics and embodying particular social identities regarding gender, race, sexuality, and religion are predominately and systematically under threat. While these individual factors are important to expose the political targeting of these journalists, we shifted our focus to the different journalist-audience relationships different media outlets establish. In an explorative interview study with 32 German journalists, we analyzed how experiences of harassment are related to the journalist-audience relationships developing in national and local as well as quality, tabloid, constructive, and young audience media. Our findings indicate that these contextual factors determine the composition of the audience, leading journalists to assess closeness or distance differently in the journalist-audience relationship. Subsequently, this results in dissimilar experiences of harassment.

The effect of combining a populist rhetoric into right-wing positions on candidates’ electoral support

The recent electoral success of right-wing populists in various democracies sparked a rich body of studies investigating the causes of populists’ mass support. These studies agree that populists’ “thick” policy positions, such as anti-immigration and social conservatism, partially explain their support, but there are mixed findings on whether populists’ “thin” rhetoric affects support for populists. This paper examines this problem by asking if combining a “thin” populism with different “thick” positions gives candidates any electoral advantage over adopting only the latter. Using an original conjoint experiment conducted in the US, it shows that populist leaders’ “thin” rhetoric alone does not affect their electoral support. However, when right-wing candidates combine “thin” populism with “thick” positions, the effect of combining these two stances on candidates’ ratings is substantially larger than adopting the same respective right-wing positions but not combining them with populism. This was found only among right-wing voters who hold populist attitudes, suggesting that populism can be electorally advantageous for right-wing candidates, but it does not lead voters to cross ideology lines because of populism.

Opening the door to anti‐system leaders? Anti‐corruption campaigns and the global rise of populism

AbstractAlmost all anti‐corruption drives contain an awareness raising element. However, recent research reveals that anti‐corruption awareness raising messages can backfire by triggering a sense that corruption is too big of a problem to tackle, thus encouraging resignation rather than resistance. We advance this literature by exploring another potential unintended impact. Corruption scandals have played a prominent role in the rise of many populist leaders, who claim to challenge ‘the corrupt status quo’. We test whether anti‐corruption messages that call attention to the problem unintentionally help to foster populist attitudes through an original survey experiment in Albania. Breaking new ground by testing messages based on descriptive (how the world is) and injunctive (how people want it to be) norms, we find that while the latter has no effect, exposure to the former – which is more common in contemporary anti‐corruption campaigns – is associated with greater agreement with populist sentiments and beliefs.

Populism Versus Nativism: Socio-Economic, Socio-Cultural, and Emotional Predictors

Previous research on predictors of populism and nativism has predominantly focused on socio-economic (e.g., education, employment, social status), and socio-cultural explanations (e.g., social identity and social status). In recent years, however, the role of negative emotions has become increasingly important in the study of populism and related concepts. In the current study, we examined two distinct negative emotions: anxiety and anger. We collected survey data from participants in 15 European countries ( N = 7,726) and tested three sets of measures reflecting different explanations, economic (e.g., education), socio-cultural (e.g., social identity), and emotional in predicting populist attitudes (compromising items on anti-elitism and people-centrism) and nativism. We tested these different predictors using structural equation modeling (SEM). The results of our basic SEM models show that negative emotions (anxiety and anger) predict both populist attitudes (people-centrism and anti-elitism) and nativism. In particular, anxiety predicts anger, which in turn predicts both populist attitudes and nativism. In our advanced SEM models, people-centrism was predicted by anger and social identity, whereas nativism was predicted by anger, anxiety, social identity, and education. Our study shows that negative emotions (anger, anxiety) are much better predictors of populist attitudes and nativism than mere socio-economic and socio-cultural factors.

Populist Attitudes among Teenagers: How Negative Relationships with Socialization Agents Are Linked to Populist Attitudes

While the origins and consequences of populist attitudes in adults are being studied extensively, it is still unknown when populist attitudes might emerge in a person’s life. Drawing on the existing literature on political socialization, we focus on populist attitudes during adolescence and explore the contributing role of negative relationships with parents, peers, and teachers. We provide the first comprehensive analysis of populist attitudes among a representative sample of children aged 12 to 18 (mean: 14.66 years) using a unique dataset gathered through interviews conducted in schools in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland (n=3,123). Our findings reveal a strong association between perceived unjust teacher behavior and the level of populist attitudes in adolescents, while the connection of peers and parents with populist attitudes appears to be limited. Further analyses using panel data from the UK support these findings.

Influencing People’s Populist Attitudes With Rhetoric and Emotions: An Online Experiment in the United States

Interest in populist voters has risen with the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, and the longevity of populist leaders in countries like Italy, Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela. Yet, little attention has been given to what mechanisms may affect populist attitudes, leaving us without recommendations for media or politicians on how to mitigate populism’s known negative effects. This study investigates one such mechanism—political rhetoric working through emotional states—to determine whether grievances centered on subjective perceptions of injustice and inequities in the system operate through negative emotions to increase populist attitudes, as is often assumed in the literature, and whether an antidote to those perceptions may be found in a sense of solidarity and mutual support. For our analysis, we conducted a nationally representative online survey experiment of 2,006 respondents in the United States in November 2018. Broadly, we find evidence that negative emotional states increase populist attitudes, but positive emotions do not have an impact. Likewise, political rhetoric reinforcing a sense of unfair advantage for some people further increases populist attitudes. Importantly, we find that reducing these negative emotions by emphasizing solidarity can reduce populist attitudes. These findings not only deepen our understanding of the triggers of populism, but also take the first step in building a tested toolbox of strategies to minimize its negative effects.

Rise of Populism: Identity Threats as an Explanation in Relation With Deprivation and Cultural Fear

This article introduces the thesis of threatened social identities as a new explanatory approach to the emergence of populist attitudes and tests it explicitly for the first time using quantitative data. We examine whether SIT indicators explain populist attitudes directly and influence effects of indicators of two established approaches: the losers of modernization thesis (LOM) and the cultural backlash thesis (CBT). We use a sample representative for the German labor force. Furthermore, we developed items to quantify the recognition of social identities for the first time with respect to social class and occupational identities. All four of our SIT indicators—recognition of social class, recognition of an East or West German identity, political recognition of occupational groups, and identity insecurity—are significant predictors of populist attitudes. Based on SEMs, we also conclude that these variables are important antecedents of previously established indicators of LOM and CBT on populist attitudes. Overall, we conclude that SIT adds to the literature on the emergence of populism as another complementary explanatory approach. In addition to being effective as an explanation in its own right, this thesis can also fill theoretical and empirical gaps of the established LOM and CBT.

Three-Pronged Resentment: How Status Insecurity, Relative Deprivation, and Powerlessness Mediate Between Social Positions and Populist Attitudes

Populist attitudes are frequently tied to a specific social position, namely the constituent’s status as a “loser of globalization.” Adding nuance to this explanatory framework, we investigate whether and how resentment mediates between social positions and populist attitudes. We distinguish three constitutive components of resentment—status insecurity, relative deprivation, and powerlessness—and analyze to what extent these sentiments explain the prevalence of two key populist attitudes: anti-elitism and demands for popular sovereignty. Using survey data from the Belgian National Election Study 2014, we show that although both populist attitudes are more likely among individuals of low socioeconomic status, this effect is mediated by a sense of group relative deprivation (anti-elitism and popular sovereignty) and feelings of powerlessness (anti-elitism). The effect of individual-level status insecurities on populist attitudes is, however, not significant. These results suggest that people do not simply adhere to antagonistic and people-centric views about politics because they experience economic precariousness; they embrace populist attitudes if their vulnerability is perceived in terms of a threatened sense of group position and understood as the outcome of an unjust society, wherein they feel powerless to alter their circumstances.

Polarized Populists: Dark Campaigns, Affective Polarization, and the Moderating Role of Populist Attitudes

We investigate the antecedents of affective polarization in the American public, and focus specifically on the driving role of exposure to darker forms of campaign communication (negativity, incivility, populist rhetoric) and the intervening role of individual populist attitudes. Experimental evidence was gathered among a sample of US respondents (MTurk, N = 1,081); respondents were randomly exposed to a campaign message from a fictive candidate framed either positively or negatively, and afterwards asked to express their attitudes towards Democrats and Republicans. Results show that exposure to harsher forms of campaign negativity (character attacks associated with political incivility and populist messages) drives affective polarization upwards when compared to exposure to positive messages. We also show both a direct and moderating effect of populist attitudes: populist individuals are more likely to “like” negative campaign messages (they find them more amusing and fairer) and report higher levels of affective polarization. Furthermore, exposure to negative messages is associated with greater affective polarization particularly among respondents high in populist attitudes.

Introduction to the Triple Special Issue “The Emotional Side of Populist Support: Key Affective Mechanisms at Test”

Although research on populism has gained traction as an established field of inquiry, its affective underpinnings remain a puzzle. A relatively underexplored area of study, now garnering attention, is the intricate relationship between populism and emotions. This Triple Special Issue focuses on the demand side of populist politics, delving into populist attitudes and the role emotions play in their activation. Articles in this collection address three overarching research questions, which we explore in this Introduction: What are the primary emotional drivers of populist attitudes? Which emotions are evoked in audiences by populist communication and framing? What is the significance of exploring complex emotions and moving beyond “thin ideology” in the study of emotions and populism? In this Introduction, we assess the current state of the art and highlight the contributions of our collection to ongoing theoretical and empirical debates.

Emotional Predictors of Populism in the Case of Turkey

Individual-level indicators of populist attitudes vary from basic demographic factors to complex psychological dimensions. However, only a handful of studies have examined how emotions shape populist attitudes. To address this gap, and using observational data from Turkey, a context driven by strong polarization and populist politics, this study first examines how emotions—specifically, anger and enthusiasm—motivate distinct routes to populist attachment. It then explores the conditional effects of emotions in connection with political ideology and a conspiracy mindset. The results demonstrate, first, that anger is closely related to populist attitudes in contrast to enthusiasm, which is associated with weaker populist attitudes. Second, in the context of Turkey, where a populist party has been in power, there is an ideological asymmetry in that those on the political right are more influenced by anger than enthusiasm. Third, these emotions are potentially more effective in altering the populist views of those with low levels of conspiratorial mindset. Contributing to the literature on the connection between emotions and populism, this study presents evidence on how anger and enthusiasm influence populist preferences in a polarized country.

Bringing Emotions In: How Anger Shapes the Relationship Between Social Isolation and Populist Attitudes

In recent years, populism has attracted a lot of scholarly attention. In this article, I investigate the relationship between structural and subjective dimensions of social isolation and populist attitudes. In particular, I account for individuals’ emotional responses to social isolation that link social isolation to populist attitudes. Analyses based on original survey data show that both forms of social isolation are positively related to populist attitudes in six European countries. More importantly, mediation analyses reveal that in line with the proposed mediation argument, anger correlated both with isolation and populist attitudes. By offering a comparative test of the relationship between social isolation and populist attitudes and the mediating role of anger, I advance the understanding of how social isolation in a globalized world relates to populist attitudes. In this vein, the study underpins that emotional reactions to social changes are particularly important in understanding how these social changes affect political attitudes.

The Role of Misrecognition in Driving Support for Right-Wing Populism

Recent research suggests that citizens’ sense of being socially marginalized, or “left behind” in society, plays an important role in triggering support for right-wing populist attitudes. Although perceived misrecognition by others is thought to be a core aspect of this sense of social marginalization, the effect of (mis)recognition on citizens’ support for the populist-right, and the psychological mechanism underlying this effect, has thus far not been directly examined. Inspired by the social identity tradition, we conceptualize the establishment of subjective superiority over the elites on the one hand, and over national minorities on the other, as an identity management strategy in the face of social identity threat, triggered by perceived misrecognition by the elites. Across three studies conducted in Germany, we provide cross-sectional and experimental support for a causal model in which misrecognition, which is directed at people as “nationals” rather than as individuals, triggers contempt toward the elites and rejection of national minorities, via the perception that one’s belongingness to the nation, as a valued member thereof, is threatened (“social identity threat”). Our findings suggest that support for attitudes associated with the populist right may help citizens re-establish their valued identity as full members of the nation, in the face of those who allegedly deny or disregard it.

Ideological Identification, Type of Threat, and Differences in How Anger and Fear Relate to Anti-Immigrant and Populist Attitudes

Following calls for a clear analytical distinction between populism and the specific ideological projects to which it is attached, the present article examines how populist and anti-immigrant attitudes relate to feelings of fear and anger about perceived threats facing the country. It posits that, although the association of these two discrete negative emotions with anti-immigration attitudes should be related to individuals’ ideological identification and the type of threat, populist attitudes, by virtue of their ubiquitous character, should be strongly associated with feelings of anger regardless of ideology or threat type. Drawing on data from an online survey in Spain, I find that anti-immigration attitudes are associated with anger among right-wing individuals and with fear among those on the center and the left, and more strongly associated with emotions linked to cultural threats. By contrast, results indicate that populist attitudes go hand in hand with feelings of anger across ideological groups and type of threat.

Election integrity across Europe: who thinks elections are held fairly and why?

Abstract If elections are to perform their legitimizing role, they should not only be objectively free, fair and non-fraudulent, but should also be perceived by the public as such. This paper investigates who perceives elections to be fair and why by contrasting two main logics: one based on the idea that perceptions of election integrity arise from external cues voters get from their environment and a second logic claiming that perceptions are internally created based on attitudes and beliefs. We use original survey data collected in ten countries around the European Elections 2019. We find that perceptions of election fairness are unrelated to country levels of integrity but mainly relate to voters’ status as winners/losers of the elections, attachment to the institutions they elect and populist attitudes. We also find beliefs on fake news influence to weakly mediate the relation between populist attitudes and perceptions of election fairness.

Uncivil yet persuasive? Testing the persuasiveness of political incivility and the moderating role of populist attitudes and personality traits

AbstractPolitical incivility—that is, treating political opponents with disrespect—and its consequences are increasingly investigated. This article examines the effect of incivility on message persuasiveness and the moderating role of populist attitudes and personality traits. We test these relationships via original experimental data collected in Switzerland (Study 1, N = 1340) and the United States (Study 2, N = 1820, preregistered). In both studies, participants were asked their opinion about a controversial political issue, presented with persuasive information framed either civilly or uncivilly, and asked again their opinion about the issue to assess whether they changed their mind. Results of a between‐subject design show that incivility does not necessarily undermine the message's persuasiveness, contrary to what we expected. Notably, uncivil messages resonated more with those respondents exhibiting higher levels of populist attitudes (Study 2) and darker personality traits (both studies). Our results further suggest a connection between incivility, message congruence, and particularly cultural context, which warrants further investigations.

Populist orientations of Ukrainians during a full-scale war

The article analyzes the populist attitudes in a society that has experienced full-scale external aggression under the conditions of populist rule and the “rally around the flag” effect. Typically, in countries where populists are in power, there is a decline in anti-elitist sentiment and a rise in support for anti-democratic orientations. However, after the landslide victory of populists in Ukraine in 2019 and even during the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, citizens demonstrated an increased level of support for populist ideas. In particular, most Ukrainians agree with populist ideas of people-centrism. Public opinion is still dominated by anti-establishment and anti-elitist orientations, despite national unity during the war and support for the current government. On the other hand, while advocating the absolute primacy of popular sovereignty, citizens are divided on whether they want to be represented in politics by an ordinary citizen rather than an experienced politician. Moreover, most Ukrainians do not agree with the expediency of violating the law to achieve a political result. Support for populism in Ukraine is concentrated primarily among economically disadvantaged people living in small towns, less educated, older people, and those with financial problems. At the same time, the populist orientations of Ukrainians during the war were not determined by regional or ethnolinguistic distinctions.

Conspiracy Mentality: How it Relates to Populism, Relative Deprivation, Mistrust of Expertise and Voting Behaviour.

Studies utilised OSL regression and structural equation modelling. The overall regression was statistically significant. It was found that dimensions of populist attitudes (anti-elitism, sovereignty), relative deprivation and mistrust of expertise were significant predictors of conspiracy mentality. In line with the second research aim, the fitness of models was confirmed and results suggest mistrust of expertise is also a significant predictor of far-right voting. The contribution of the paper lies in connecting conspiracy mentality with not only attitudes but also with important behaviour outcome - voting behaviour. We propose future research should experimentally examine whether the reduction of some of the identified predictors could possibly lower levels of conspiracy mentality and whether this reduction translates into voting behaviour.

Storm in a Teacup: Populist Attitudes and Voting for Populists in Croatia

U komparativnim studijama biračkog ponašanja populistički stavovi sve se više čine nezaobilaznim istraživačkim konstruktom. Ipak, dokazi o učincima populističkih stavova na glasovanje za populiste i dalje su mješoviti, uz to što se učinci drugih koncepata nerijetko pripisuju populizmu. Istovremeno, u Hrvatskoj populizam ostaje slabo istražena tema, posebice na razini stavova građana. S tim na umu, u ovoj se studiji nastoje istražiti učinci populističkih stavova na glasovanje za populističke stranke i kandidate u Hrvatskoj kao relevantnoj studiji slučaja. U te se svrhe koriste anketni podaci Hrvatskih izbornih studija iz 2018. i 2020. godine. Rezultati multinomialnih logističkih regresija pokazuju kako populistički stavovi nemaju učinak na glasovanje za populiste u parlamentarnim i predsjedničkim izborima. Također se pokazuje kako populistički stavovi povećavaju vjerojatnost izborne apstinencije i smanjuju vjerojatnost glasovanja za vladajuću stranku (HDZ). Ti nalazi otvaraju pitanja o korisnosti i funkcionalnosti postojećih ljestvica populističkih stavova te ukazuju na potrebu drukčijeg uokvirivanja čestica kojima se mjeri populizam.

The Interplay of Knowledge Overestimation, Social Media Use, and Populist Ideas: Cross-Sectional and Experimental Evidence From Germany and Taiwan

Social media expose users to an abundance of information about various issues. But they also make it difficult for users to assess the quality of this information. If users do not recognize this, they may overestimate their knowledge about those issues. Knowledge overestimation may lead to increased social media engagement and can be linked to attitudes deeming expert knowledge inferior to common sense, such as science-related populist attitudes. We investigate this during the COVID-19 pandemic in two preregistered, cross-sectional survey experiments in Germany and Taiwan, two countries with different cultures, media environments, and responses to the pandemic. Our study offers two contributions: First, we develop a novel measure of COVID-19-related knowledge. Second, we provide comparative evidence on how social media affordances shape the interplay between knowledge overestimation, social media exposure and engagement, and populist attitudes. We do not find that frequent exposure to COVID-19 information is associated with a higher likelihood of knowledge overestimation. However, we show that overestimation is linked to more user engagement with social media content about COVID-19. Experimental data indicate that engagement depends on whether users are in a private or public communication environment. We find minor differences between Germany and Taiwan.