Populist Research Articles

Climate and habitat type interact to influence contemporary dispersal potential in Prairie Smoke (Geum triflorum).

Understanding dispersal potential, or the probability a species will move a given distance, under different environmental conditions is essential to predicting species' ability to move across the landscape and track shifting ecological niches. Two important drivers of dispersal ability are climatic differences and variations in local habitat type. Despite the likelihood these global drivers act simultaneously on plant populations, and thus dispersal potential is likely to change as a result, their combined effects on dispersal are rarely examined. To understand the effect of climate and varying habitat types on dispersal potential, we studied Geum triflorum-a perennial grassland species that spans a wide range of environments, including both prairie and alvar habitats. We explored how the climate of the growing season and habitat type (prairie vs. alvar) interact to alter dispersal potential. We found a consistent interactive effect of climate and habitat type on dispersal potential. Across prairie populations, an increased number of growing degree days favored traits that increase dispersal potential or the probability of dispersing farther distances. However, for alvar populations, dispersal potential tended to decrease as the number of growing degree days increased. Our findings suggest that under continued warming, populations in prairie habitats will benefit from increased gene flow, while alvar populations will become increasingly segregated, with reduced potential to track shifting fitness optima.

Introduction to the Triple Special Issue “The Emotional Side of Populist Support: Key Affective Mechanisms at Test”

Although research on populism has gained traction as an established field of inquiry, its affective underpinnings remain a puzzle. A relatively underexplored area of study, now garnering attention, is the intricate relationship between populism and emotions. This Triple Special Issue focuses on the demand side of populist politics, delving into populist attitudes and the role emotions play in their activation. Articles in this collection address three overarching research questions, which we explore in this Introduction: What are the primary emotional drivers of populist attitudes? Which emotions are evoked in audiences by populist communication and framing? What is the significance of exploring complex emotions and moving beyond “thin ideology” in the study of emotions and populism? In this Introduction, we assess the current state of the art and highlight the contributions of our collection to ongoing theoretical and empirical debates.

Emotional Predictors of Populism in the Case of Turkey

Individual-level indicators of populist attitudes vary from basic demographic factors to complex psychological dimensions. However, only a handful of studies have examined how emotions shape populist attitudes. To address this gap, and using observational data from Turkey, a context driven by strong polarization and populist politics, this study first examines how emotions—specifically, anger and enthusiasm—motivate distinct routes to populist attachment. It then explores the conditional effects of emotions in connection with political ideology and a conspiracy mindset. The results demonstrate, first, that anger is closely related to populist attitudes in contrast to enthusiasm, which is associated with weaker populist attitudes. Second, in the context of Turkey, where a populist party has been in power, there is an ideological asymmetry in that those on the political right are more influenced by anger than enthusiasm. Third, these emotions are potentially more effective in altering the populist views of those with low levels of conspiratorial mindset. Contributing to the literature on the connection between emotions and populism, this study presents evidence on how anger and enthusiasm influence populist preferences in a polarized country.

Populist Appeals, Emotions, and Political Mobilization

Populist politicians frequently employ anti-establishment appeals in their discourse by targeting an imagined or real power elite. Do such appeals have a mobilizing effect among voters? What role do the emotional responses of voters play in this process? We address these questions using a vignette experiment embedded into a nationally representative survey fielded in Turkey, a country where a populist party has long been in power. Our research design enables us to assess whether voters respond more positively to a populist framing of a call for mobilization on an issue compared to a non-populist framing, and whether their emotional responses act as mediators. We find that populist rhetoric indeed does have a mobilizing effect, though only for a low-cost form of political participation (signing a petition) and only among the constituency of the populist party. Turning to the role of emotions, we find that the populist framing of the issue led voters to report more discontent, despair, and anxiety, and these emotions mediate the positive influence of the populist message on mobilization. Thus, our study contributes to research on populism by highlighting the role of emotions in the mobilizing effect of populist discourse.

The ‘agropopulist shift’ toward authoritarianism: the conflict between the MAS government and coca growers from the Bolivian Yungas

ABSTRACT Progressive agrarian populist movements might walk the path toward authoritarianism under concrete hegemonic struggles, social class relations, and state-society dynamics. I propose the notion of the ‘agropopulist shift’ to draw attention to how these movements, when accessing state power, might deploy authoritarian tactics against their former class allies. To illustrate this argument, I analyze a case that demonstrates how, and the extent to which, the government of the former Bolivian president Evo Morales and his political party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS), shifted toward authoritarian populist politics to address the social dissent of the coca growers from Los Yungas region.

Populism and the New Radical Right: A Necessary Distinction

Populism and the New Radical Right: A Necessary Distinction

The Guardian State: Strengthening the public service against democratic backsliding

AbstractLiberal democracy has become vulnerable to illiberal political movements and the gradual erosion of democratic institutions. To safeguard liberal democracy, we propose the concept of the Guardian State, which embraces liberal principles while acting as a defensive barrier against illiberal tendencies. We need strong administrative institutions that uphold liberal democratic norms and resist pressures from populist politicians. Institutionalizing guardianship as the key norm within the civil service fortifies democratic institutions against backsliding. The principle of neutrality alone cannot ensure that only liberal citizens come to power. Structural measures at the individual and organizational levels are essential to fortify the foundations of the Guardian State and protect liberal democracy against evolving threats. Proactive efforts are necessary to defend and strengthen the public service to ensure the long‐term viability of democratic governance. The Guardian State places the bureaucracy in a key role in preserving the core principles of democracy.

Contesting Post-truth Chaos through Interdisciplinary Heterotopias

Abstract: Recent populist rhetoric and politics seek to undermine existing democratic institutions and efforts to make them more inclusive. Connecting new feminist scholarship that confronts the multidisciplinary implications of post-truth populist politics and discourse, especially for higher education, with exemplary heterotopic feminist responses to pandemonia over the past century, this essay considers how previous tactics might be recast to disturb and provoke the existing status quo, creating new strategies for countering contemporary anti-democratic practices.

Substantiating EU citizenship: an unintended route to anti-establishment support

ABSTRACT This study explores the relationship between European Union citizenship and support for anti-establishment parties across the EU’s older and newer, post-communist democracies. By conceptually linking EU support to substantive EU citizenship, this study identifies the contingent nature of EU citizenship’s effect on support for anti-establishment parties. We conduct a multilevel regression analysis across 22 EU member-states, using data generated by a Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2018. This survey counts on support for EU coordinated foreign policy, in addition to conventional EU support measures, enabling an analysis at different levels of EU politics. Findings show that citizens’ support at these different levels depresses their support for anti-establishment parties across old democracies, yet increases it across new democracies. Hence, the effect of EU citizenship emerges as being contingent on whether citizens are in an old or a new, post-communist democracy of the EU, and on where the borders of the EU are drawn. This contingency has potential to be an instrument of deepening the emerging transnational cleavage between liberal, cosmopolitan and traditional, authoritarian values for old democracies and of manipulation by inward looking parochial, populist politics for new democracies. This will affect the nature of European politics and the future of integration.

Disinformation, media literacy and journalism: proposals from journalists in Portugal

Recents studies suggest the existence of a European Public Sphere, especially in the face of events of significant importance. In the scope of the Covid-19 crisis, this paper aims to study the platformization of the discussion on European topics by political agents such as politicians and political parties. Focusing on four Southern European countries – Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – that have a common past history in their relationships with Europe (PIGS), we analyze political agents’ posts with the highest reach. The study was conducted on Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube over a period of three months, between September and November 2021. Regarding the platformization and the success of communication strategies, overall right-wing politicians tend to be more effective in capturing the attention and mobilising the participation of social media users on Facebook and Twitter. Different political groups stand out in the discussion of different European issues on different platforms. However, for most countries, the Economy, related to Europe, was the main subject with the highest reach addressed by the political actors, thus reinforcing the idea of Structural Europeanization. However, with most posts having a national scope, this does not contribute to strengthening the construction of a European Identity (Normative Europeanization). These findings are aligned with previous literature regarding European issues being first and foremost used as leverage for national political struggles, especially due to national and populist movements.

Manifesto for a new journal

Academic publishing is in a parlous state. In the context of the rise of populist politics, the use of misinformation and the generation of mistrust in scientific expertise, the need for informed and reasoned counter-critique has never been greater. Yet, opportunities for undertaking and publishing such critique are diminishing with the increased commercialization of academic publishing and research (Speed & Mannion 2017). There is thus a very real need to hold onto the historical gains made in establishing spaces for critical engagement. In this editorial, we reflect on this context and set out a manifesto for maintaining a space for critique in this new journal.

Does being ‘left behind’ corrode government legitimacy? Tax morale and economic stress

By now we are familiar with studies which tie being ‘left behind’ to voter support for populist or other extreme views. In the UK case, this is seen in support for Brexit but can also apply to support of parties such as UKIP (e.g. Bolet, 2021; Ford and Goodwin, 2014). Comparative studies show that electoral support for populist parties in part reflects lowered trust in mainstream politics (e.g. Geurkink et al., 2020; Keefer et al., 2021; Mauk, 2020), which is seen as a behavioural indicator of slipping legitimacy. Political support for populist movements is interpreted as declining legitimacy of existing governments, and that decline is seen as being tied to economic stress and the ‘left behind’ areas. In this article, we ask whether economics stresses also have impact upon another and possibly more direct measure of government legitimacy – tax morale.

Populist politics and international business policy: problems, practices, and prescriptions for MNEs

Populist politics and international business policy: problems, practices, and prescriptions for MNEs

Being a believer: social identity in post-truth political discourse

ABSTRACT Analyses of so-called ‘post-truth’ discourse in populist politics have so far largely focussed on sorting it into cases of lying, bullshitting, bubble-like epistemic constraints, or alternative epistemic norms flouting objective truth. We review these proposals and point out problems with each. Some scholars, however, have recently drawn attention to how apparent assertions of facts in these contexts seem to be functionally entangled with expressing or affirming social identities. To get a clearer picture of what such an explanation might amount to, we differentiate four different ways in which social identities might be connected to apparently assertive discourse: signalling, expressive affirmation, dissonance reduction, and identity grounding. Distinguishing and deciding among these will matter not only for providing an accurate analysis of post-truth discourse, but also for determining the exact grounds on which it merits criticism and for what might be done about it.

From Sporadic Sympathy to Devoted Skepticism. Alternative Media Use as an Affective Sense-Making Practice

Alternative media users have long been an empirical and theoretical blind spot. This study addresses this gap by exploring the affective dimensions of alternative media use in the context of post-truth and populist politics. In doing so, the study employs a Q-sort task and in-depth interviews to analyze the news repertoires and epistemologies of 25 alternative media users in Flanders. The research findings indicate that alternative media users’ sense-making practices are deeply intertwined with feelings of (mis)representation and (dis)connection, which are shaped by dominant discursive constructions in the existing political and journalistic climate.

Populism as “Truth”: How Mediated Authenticity Strengthens the Populist Message

The rise of populism is often explained by political factors, economic factors, and media and communication factors. This article analyzes populism in the context of an increased focus on authenticity in political communication. The main aim is to discuss to what degree mediated authenticity strengthens the populist message and what consequences the nexus between authenticity and populism might have for the quality of democratic governance. As a theoretical backdrop, the article discusses the implications of increased valorization of authenticity in times of distrust, and how perforned truth is a key appeal of populism in representative democracies. The methodological approach is a systematic analysis of seven authenticity strategies identified in previous research: consistency, spontaneity, ordinariness, confession, immediacy, ambivalence, and imperfection. In addition to the theoretical analysis, the article offers a case study of the performance of Donald Trump, focusing on how mediated authenticity strengthens the populist message. The study is conducted in a mainly U.S.-context and includes material collected between 2016 and 2023. A key argument is that although performed authenticity can be both advantageous and disadvantageous, depending on the status of the candidate, there is lower risk involved for populist politicians than mainstream politicians because the strategies correspond more with the ideology. In conclusion, the article argues that performed authenticity might legitimize hate speech, conspiracy theories, and post-truth politics because populists claim to have a particular relation to the truth.

Left Populism and the Education of Desire

AbstractThis paper mobilises the psychoanalytic concepts of desire and enjoyment to better understand how processes of education aimed at extending and defending democratic life might respond to and engage with populist politics. I approach this task by engaging with a particular vector of Mouffe and Laclau’s political philosophy, moving from a critique of liberal democracy’s rationalist pretensions to their insistence that left populism and its passionate construction of a ‘people’ is the central task facing radical politics. This attention to the libidinal basis of political identification locates them in a community of Left Lacanian thinkers who reframe the problems of democratic politics in terms of desire and enjoyment rather than miseducation or its lack. Whilst this position might suggest a binary choice between different analytical frames, I inquire into what insights are generated by theorising left populism as an ‘education of desire’. The paper is organised into four main parts: the opening discussion clarifies my understanding of education by engaging with the literature on educational agonism. The second section lays the groundwork for a critique of the way in which education is fetishized, in different ways, by liberals and radicals as a panacea for populist politics. The third section reframes democratic crisis as an enjoyment problem in order to better grasp the relationship between the liberal democratic disavowal of its own irrationality and the structure of right-wing populist enjoyment. The fourth section applies these insights to develop a critical analysis of what is at stake when we explicitly consider the left populist construction of a ‘people’ as an educational task. I conclude by drawing together and summarising the main features and considerations of left populism understood as an education of desire.

Radicalization to the right, secular (ish) pandemic politics and the normalization of the Greek Cypriot far right

AbstractOne of the many dimensions of the global tussle surrounding the Covid‐19 pandemic has been the rise of right‐wing radicalization. In this article, we investigate whether the pandemic offered an opportunity for the Greek Cypriot far‐right party, ELAM, to increase its visibility as an opposition force and in what ways. We also explore the transformations in populist rhetoric and practices in the Republic of Cyprus, seeking to identify patterns of persistence and evolution, particularly in how they handle scientific matters in their political stances. Similarly, we delve into the impact of far‐right populist politics on the political dynamics in Cyprus. Our findings indicate that pandemic politics were not the exclusive or primary factor in the normalization of the far right but rather served as an accelerator of preexisting trends. The party's handling of the pandemic and scientific principles signifies the diversity within the far‐right phenomenon rather than pointing to a universal pattern.

Populism, post-Marxism and Iran: an essay towards a decolonization of knowledge

This essay is an exposition of the philosophy of populism, a philosophy by and large inspired by Michel Foucault to herald the New Discourse called ‘post-Marxism' a term made famous by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe which would lay the foundations for not so much the secular New Social Movements comprising multiple issues like gay rights and environment, but ironically would be an apologia for right-wing populist movements based on messianic theologies. It claims that while post-Marxism wanted to jump over Marxism, in actuality it became partner to radical messianic politics as in the case of Foucault's ardent support for radical Shiite Islam in Iran. This essay concentrates on the theory of populism and connects it to the politics of messianism in Iran claiming that these theories of populism are theories created in Western universities comprising Eurocentric ideas based on the uncanny combination of the theory of the ‘essential spiritualism of Asia' and ‘biopolitics'. This essay claims that the contemporary politics of Shiite Islam in Iran have less to do with the internal history of Iran, and more to do with a form of ‘manufactured Islam' where Islamic radicals picked up Ali Shariati's existential rendering of ‘authenticity’ as jihad and martyrdom (shahadat) in order to mobilize the masses first against the shah and then in the bloody war against Iraq. It argues for a decolonization of knowledge that leads to the decoupling of the nineteenth and twentieth century European ideas of spiritualism and biopolitics in order that one is able to see non-Western societies as they are and not as they are imagined by Orientalist scholarship.

We Got Our Guy!: Populist Attitudes after Populists Gain Power

Research on populist attitudes and populist leaders’ narratives has largely overlooked what happens to populist attitudes after a populist is elected, especially among the populist’s supporters. Existing literature points to two possible directions of change. On one hand, if populist attitudes stem from a perceived lack of representation, then we would expect people’s populist attitudes to decrease once their preferred candidate is in power. On the other hand, scholars have observed that populist politicians in power continue to deploy populist rhetoric, suggesting that their supporters’ populist attitudes should stay constant or even increase. In this project, the author focuses on Donald Trump and his supporters to explore this mechanism. Drawing on a national survey conducted around the 2016 and 2020 elections, the author shows that Trump’s supporters saw a significant decrease in populist attitudes after he came into power compared with both other American voters and other Republicans. The author also demonstrates that this decrease in populist attitudes is associated with changes in the level of “feeling represented.” On the basis of these findings, the author argues that populist attitudes are driven by feelings of lack of representation over other mechanisms.