Popular Consent Research Articles

Legitimising Occupation: The Quest for Popular Consent during the British Occupation of Germany, 1945–1949

This article explores the quest for legitimacy and popular consent during the British occupation of north-western Germany between 1945 and 1949. It does so through an analysis of two major propaganda campaigns that sought to publicly legitimise the British occupation at home and in Germany: ‘Germany under Control’, a large-scale exhibition put on display in London in 1946; and ‘Operation Stress’, the largest propaganda campaign in the British Zone, run in 1948 to legitimise food policies. Through an investigation of the internal rationale amongst British policymakers, the objectives behind the campaigns, the popular reception, and the broader outcomes, the article shows that both campaigns ended in failure and did not succeed in convincing the population of the need to maintain British rule in Germany. Propaganda was an ineffective tool to generate popular legitimacy at a time of austerity at home and severe material suffering in the British zone of occupation. As such, the British authorities encountered populations whose ‘moral economy’ and expectations from government were fundamentally opposed to the maintenance of the occupation. Both campaigns, therefore, epitomise the pitfalls of propaganda campaigns when facing bitter social realities and demonstrate the intricacies of the quest for legitimacy during military occupations.

Democracy in China?

Abstract On what basis can the People’s Republic of China remain a legitimate regime? Its current legitimacy rests on an increasingly distant Revolution. It cannot reasonably hope to sustain this by seamless practical success in government. Is there an oecumenical criterion for legitimate political power or is all legitimacy just de facto? Shorn of its cosmological validation, Confucianism cannot offer an alternative parochial basis for legitimacy. Both territoriality and law now require procedurally credible popular consent. This argument is practical and patriotic as well as normative. It is unlikely to convince the leadership of the ccp, but History might in the end prove it right.

Legal Adaptation for the Syrian Constitutional Committee Formed Based on UN Security Council Resolution 2245

Background: Presumably, constitution-making is a national process reflecting the state’s sovereignty and people's will. The severity of the conflict in Syria and its danger led the international community to intervene, and in 2015, the Security Council issued Resolution 2254 to settle the conflict. This resolution, in item 4, called for the start of the drafting process of a new Constitution for Syria; hereby, the Constitutional Committee was formed in Geneva in 2019 with the agreement of the conflict parties, the government and the opposition, and the consent of the international community represented by the United Nations. This research discusses the extent to which the intervention of the United Nations in the Syrian Constitutional Committee's formation and work in Geneva affects the principle of the Constitution's nationalism and state sovereignty. The research also discusses the legitimacy of the powers granted to this committee, whether in drafting a new constitution for the Syrian state or amending the current 2012 Constitution, and whether they conflict with the national sovereignty principle in considering the constitutional law principles. Methods: We relied on the analytical method to study the legal adaptation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee formed based on Security Council Resolution 2254. The impact of the United Nations intervention in the Syrian Constitutional Committee and whether it conflicts with the principle of national sovereignty depends on clarifying the role played by the United Nations in forming the committee and its ability to impose binding decisions on it. Achieving this objective requires analysing the powers of the Constitutional Committee in light of the principles and rules of constitutional law. This entails determining whether the committee possesses the full authority of the original constituent power to establish a new constitution for the state without referring to the people or if its jurisdiction is limited to drafting. Through this analytical method, we shall know whether the formation of the Constitutional Committee and the jurisdiction granted contradicts the principle of national sovereignty, which assumes that the Constitution is a national industry. Results and Conclusions: The formation of the Syrian Constitutional Committee, authorised by the United Nations through the Security Council Resolution 2254, does not detract from Syrian national sovereignty nor conflict with the principle of constitutional nationalism. Firstly, the formation of the constituent authority responsible for establishing the Constitution is not a legal issue but rather derives its existence from reality, and this applies to the Syrian Constitutional Committee, which derived its existence from the Syrian reality conflict and with the agreement of its parties, government and opposition. Therefore, one cannot say that the formation of this committee is illegitimate or inconsistent with the principles of constitutional law, given the absence of a legal framework governing the mechanism for forming the constituent authority, whether in Syrian constitutional law or comparative constitutional law. The Constitution is a result of the circumstances and situations that have accompanied its emergence and determined the method of its establishment. Secondly, the Constitutional Committee is not a full constituent authority because it does not have the power to approve a new constitution or an amendment to the current Constitution in its sole discretion. It might adapt as a technical consensus committee whose role is limited to formulating proposals that require popular consent. Thirdly, It is arguable that Security Council Resolution 2254 and the decision to form the Syrian Constitutional Committee constitute the legal framework from which this committee derives its legitimacy and work. Therefore, we can say that the issue of forming the Syrian Constitutional Committee and its work has become a legal issue governed by an international legal framework, marking a departure from its previous extrajudicial status under national constitutional law.

Anti-liberalism, Civil War and dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and his intellectual influence on the Francoist ideologists (1939–1942)

ABSTRACT Carl Schmitt is the most important anti-liberal political theorist of the European interwar period (1918-1939). His theories on the state of exception, dictatorship, and his criticism of parliamentary democracy are very well known. However, what remains unknown to this day is how his ideas had a remarkable influence on the ideologues of the Francoist state between 1939 and 1942. During these years, a debate developed among Francoist jurists about whether Francisco Franco was a “sovereign dictator,” that is, a dictator legitimized by popular consent, or rather a new kind of “monarch” that emerged in the context of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). This paper aims to explain how two ideological factions formed in Francoist Spain. The “Decisionist Francoism” of Juan Beneyto Pérez, Francisco Elías de Tejada, and Luis Legaz Lacambra held that Franco emerged as a reaction to the process of “legalization” triggered by liberalism in Spain. The “Weberian Francoism” of Francisco Javier Conde held that Franco was a charismatic and traditional leader whose position emerged in response to the Civil War. I explain how three concepts of Schmitt's anti-iberalism inspired Francoist theorists: political theology, dictatorship, and the rejection of parliamentary democracy.

Schools for Statesmen: The Divergent Educations of the Constitution’s Framers by Andrew H. Browning

Detailed and compendious, Schools for Statesmen performs a valuable service. It breaks down every conceivable factor in categorizing the backgrounds of the fifty-five framers of the U.S. Constitution, who represented twelve states (Rhode Island boycotted the convention). Rather than simply analyzing eighteenth-century college life, Browning focuses at length on delegates who were largely self-taught in addition to those who had tutors or attended college, examining which group was the better prepared. That kind of boldness marks the strength of this book.What about the college experience? Classes were small and students—who entered at various ages, between thirteen and eighteen––were keenly aware of each other’s class status at the outset. Browning draws clear distinctions among America’s oldest colleges (Harvard, Yale, and William and Mary), showing next how the later emergence of Princeton and King’s College (Columbia) liberalized learning. He engages with the relative significance of church affiliation for curriculum, the outsize influence of college presidents, the uniform reliance on ancient authors (read in Latin), and the growing significance of Scottish moral philosophy on the younger delegates.Beyond its synthetic purpose, the book examines a range of affinities and individual quirks, venturing into what shaped the framers’ discordant personalities. Some of the framers exhibited provincial outlooks; others were more worldly. William Livingston (New Jersey), educated by his grandmother, later lived among the Mohawk Indians with his Yale-educated tutor. Those who breathed in the atmosphere of Oxford or went to Edinburgh or Glasgow to imbibe the spirit of moral philosopher Francis Hutcheson (regarding, most dramatically, popular consent and right of resistance) were forever changed by the experience.America’s early college presidents were all men of the cloth, but Scottish Presbyterians and Scottish thought contributed most to the republic’s founding. The straightforward statistics that Browning compiles tell a story: Four of the framers studied in Scotland; many more profited from their experience. After Princeton’s Edinburgh-educated John Witherspoon (nine of the framers, including James Madison, fell under his sway), came an unheralded schoolmaster named Francis Alison, a grammarian and an ethicist, whom Yale’s long-serving patriot-president Ezra Stiles called “the greatest Classical Scholar in America.” Alison, also a graduate of the University of Edinburgh, divided his time between Delaware and Philadelphia, teaching boys as young as seven—three of whom were to sign the Declaration of Independence, two to help frame the Constitution, and another to serve with distinction as secretary of the Continental Congress. At William and Mary, despite its Anglican affiliation, Virginians of Thomas Jefferson’s peer group benefited from the teaching of the Scot William Small, who lectured on ethics and belles-lettres. Gouverneur Morris and James Wilson, two of the most outspoken delegates, were especially responsive to Scottish political philosophy. A teenaged Alexander Hamilton, too, learned from a Scot.The threads that Browning connects are tantalizing. The touchy Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut), an unsung but influential convention delegate, hated Yale and transferred to Princeton. Ellsworth’s Yale classmate Waightstill Avery made the same switch, later moving to North Carolina, where he helped to establish the school that readied William Richardson Davie, a Revolutionary officer and future delegate (North Carolina), for Princeton.The connections that emerge in this book extend even to the next generation’s experiences. Future president Andrew Jackson received his legal training from Davie’s law tutor; not long afterward, he issued his first dueling challenge to attorney Avery. Early America was a small, peculiar world. Browning reports that five of the framers who had colleges named after them never attended a single class at any college.Schools for Statesmen is so well-constructed that it might at first appear to be a blueprint for political theorists and historians of education. But it has a more creative tenor than that: In supplying evidence of the role that school ties played at the Constitutional Convention, it offers a colorful palette, mixing personalities and painting a compelling picture of copyists who grew to be inventors of what these days counts as tradition.

The Frontier Effect: State Formation and Violence in Colombia

The Frontier Effect: State Formation and Violence in Colombia

Can Gordon Brown and Keir Starmer Save the UK ?

Can Gordon Brown and Keir Starmer Save the <scp>UK</scp> ?

DARE to Say No: Police and the Cultural Politics of Prevention in the War on Drugs

In the fall of 1983, the Los Angeles Police Department sent police officers into elementary schools to teach the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) Program. Within a decade DARE had become the nation's preeminent antidrug education program. Yet the DARE program accomplished much more than teaching kids to resist drugs. DARE shifted the responsibility of preventing drug use from social and public-health policy to local, police-led, educative projects that taught personal responsibility, the value of morally strengthened families, and respect for the authority of the police. By stressing the consequences of poor behavior and demanding respect for law and order, DARE attempted to cultivate popular consent for policies that divorced drug use from social and economic conditions. DARE's approach helped justify reductions in social welfare spending and the expansion of policing and incarceration during the 1980s and 1990s.

Modeling authority over a drowning coast

ABSTRACT As sea-level rise inundates the last vestiges of Louisiana’s “Working Coast” and protective wetlands, the state is embarking on controversial plans to redirect Mississippi River sediment into its degraded marshes. But in order to manipulate the Mighty Mississippi, state planners must not only marshal a proverbial army of resources, but somehow demonstrate the necessary expertise to do so. Here, I examine one such site of demonstration: the Lower Mississippi River Physical Model in Baton Rouge, La., where visitors can observe sediment diversions in action. I argue that this $18-million showpiece attempts to reinforce a particular imagined geography by the state over its landscape. Competent operation of the model dramatizes authority over the river itself, which presumably helps the State to build popular consent — in the face of entrenched resistance. This article demonstrates how seemingly technical instruments can function as political projects, which has wide-ranging implications for future climate action.

Culture wars and the making of authoritarian populism: articulations of spatial division and popular consent

This article considers the relationship between culture wars and the politically divisive landscape being shaped by contemporary forms of right–wing populism. It argues that culture wars should be understood as a technique through which the current Conservative government is seeking to shape and secure forms of what Stuart Hall termed 'authoritarian populism'. This mode of political intervention is being generated through mobilising particular spatial divisions and imaginaries. To develop this argument the article considers two particular elements within the culture–war discourse in Conservative politics, each of which depends on and mobilises different spatial divisions. The first section deals with the role of 'Levelling Up' discourses, while the second part explores the Tories' increasing emphasis on 'impunity' for British soldiers.

What's at stake in the culture wars?

Recent outbreaks of culture war have posed questions about how to respond to them politically and analytically. In this conversation we explore the ways in which culture war strategies aim to create new articulations of politics, culture and power. They do so as part of an ongoing effort to create narratives that construct and solidify political blocs and produce popular consent. We reflect on the problems such strategies cause for Labour – and for the left more generally. These are recurrent problems, reflecting a long–running distinction between 'real' politics and the ephemeral distractions of 'identity politics' and the 'merely cultural'. We suggest that this restrictive view of what constitutes 'real' politics tends to ignore the left's roots in cooperative, associational, mutual and internationalist forms of politics, perhaps for fear of being branded as 'socialist', while marginalising or refusing a diverse array of social movements and their struggles for rights and redistribution. In contrast, we argue for the importance of recognising and contesting the field of culture as a site of politics and political mobilisations, highlighting the value of building a view of how culture, politics and power are entangled. As Stuart Hall argued, a progressive politics involves crafting an identity in which we can recognise ourselves as a collective political force.

Arab Authoritarianism, Arab Uprisings, and the Future

Arab Authoritarianism, Arab Uprisings, and the Future Saliba Sarsar (bio) Authoritarianism–a form of government that favors a strong chief executive; a limited separation of power; reduced rule of law; constrained voting; and weak pluralism–is alive and well in many Arab countries. Their transitions to democracy remain stalled.1 This article will examine this reality by first distinguishing between authoritarian regimes and democratic rule, second by examining three of the main causes of the Arab uprisings during the 2010-2020 period, and third by suggesting a more promising future in ruler-ruled relationships in Arab countries. Authoritarian Regimes versus Democratic Rule In authoritarian regimes, a single leader, usually supported by a small elite group, has wide control over state institutions and its processes. Constitutions are followed to serve and secure the governing body, not challenge it.2 The judiciary is present but there is no guarantee that the rule of law is applied in [End Page 121] an equitable and impartial manner. Legislatures or parliaments, if they exist at all, are more likely limited to have advisory and ceremonial functions, hardly impacting their governments' crucial decisions. Political rivals, potential or otherwise, are commonly neutralized. Opposition parties and movements rarely have wide latitude to cause major changes in policies. Civil liberties and political rights are restricted, and the public has little to no influence on state decisions. While elections are not always free or fair, they are held regularly for presidents and national parliaments. The executive branch closely monitors the status of election districts and those running for office to ensure results are always in its favor. Pluralism that makes room for citizens' differing choices–cultural, economic, political, religious, and social–and for inclusion is not fully embraced. Obviously, not all authoritarian states are alike. Two main regime types are monarchies and republics. In the context of the Arab Middle East, while the former is best illustrated by the presence of a king, sultan, emir, or sheikh, the latter is demonstrated by a president or prime minister.3 Both types have a monopoly on the instruments or mechanisms of military and financial power structures. In monarchies, political tenure is normally secured through heredity and lasts for life. In a presidential republic, acquisition of power is reached through the avenue of a political party win or a military overthrow of government. Political tenure is or becomes prescribed by the constitution but sometimes is extended through controlled elections or constitutional means. This occurred in Egypt in 2019 when the constitution was amended to prolong the tenure of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and ensure his consolidation of power. If a major leadership change is to happen before its due time, it results mostly from the abdication, overthrow, assassination, or death of the king or president. Arab monarchies are found in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Among the Arab authoritarian republics are those found in Egypt and Syria. In contrast, democracy enables citizens to utilize their public potential through civil liberties and political rights. It gives individuals space to practice their freedoms–political, religious, social, and economic. Citizens are empowered through voting, joining of political organizations, and holding public office. Their voice matters, as popular consent is a central element to [End Page 122] the legitimacy of rule. Essential attributes of a democracy are well-functioning legislatures, independent judiciaries, and a free media. It is suggested that "the more that people are free to govern and actualize themselves, the more democratic they become."4 The more that their democratic participation and human rights are respected, the more dignified they feel.5 Arab Countries and Arab Springs While Arab countries have engaged over the years in various efforts at liberalization or political reform toward good governance, political accountability, and transparency, which are among the key elements of democracy, these have been inconsistent or weak at best. In his evaluation of political reform in Arab countries two years prior to the Arab Spring, Marwan Muasher wrote: Though ad hoc programs to expand certain political freedoms had been undertaken here and there, no Arab country could claim a systematic process of political reform that would encourage the kind of...

Politicized Megaprojects and Public Sector Interventions: Mass Consent Under Neoliberal Statism

Scholars have argued that megaprojects’ turn away from issues of employment, and mass housing are among the core traits of neoliberalism. Turkey, though once seen as a paragon of neoliberalism, problematizes this generalization. Erdoğanist megaprojects have created jobs and residence for millions, and garner consent. ‘Embedded neoliberalism’, a concept frequently used to explain increasing state involvement under neoliberalism, sheds light on the governing AKP’s power, but is insufficient in explaining its core dynamics. Whereas the ‘embedded neoliberalism’ literature downplays the role of the government as a producer, the ‘state capitalism’ literature, as applied to Turkey, overrates the extent to which this country has moved away from neoliberalism. The concept ‘neoliberal statism’ (which puts the emphasis on the consent-generating and political aspects of the new economy) better captures the AKP’s path. Megaproject-driven growth and popular consent, however, are restricted by vulnerabilities that also afflict neoliberal statism as a broader growth strategy.

Il riscatto dell’eroe. Storia sociale del monumento di Lugo a Francesco Baracca

Francesco Baracca (1888-1918) was the most famous Italian aviator of the Great war. He was killed in action in June 1918. His fame was already remarkable during his lifetime due to his personal record of 34 air duels victories. However, the emphasis of nationalist rhetoric and the instrumental propaganda of the Fascist regime employed his figure to promote the myth of Italian air force power which led to create a new standard of national heroism. Only in 1936 Domenico Rambelli dedicated a huge monument to Francesco Baracca in Lugo. This memorial represents a noteworthy case study as we consider how the identity of Francesco Baracca was first seized by the regime and then gradually returned among the popular consent of his community.

Rightful Bargaining: Rural Women Making Claims for Social Provisions in China’s Targeted Poverty Alleviation Program1

Previous studies of claims‐making on authoritarian states have focused on how the aggrieved use episodic protests to challenge the state’s authority or adopt alternative group strategies to circumvent repression. Few studies have thus far applied these insights regarding groups’ innovative strategies and their interactions with the state apparatuses to explore individuals’ claims‐making at the microlevel. Based on 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork in southwest China, this study analyzes how rural ethnic minority Qiang women actively engage various levels of government officials to demand enhanced social provisions. These women play off stereotypical gender assumptions about them to appear as nonthreatening subjects who accommodate state priorities for poverty alleviation and social stability. They also engage state officials and exploit (not always successfully) the government’s official rhetoric and internal divisions to secure much‐needed social provisions. I call this type of gendered individual claims‐making “rightful bargaining.” Yet, paradoxically, the study also reveals that, because the state’s legitimacy is founded precisely on economic growth and the appearance of popular consent, the incremental material gains these women achieve inadvertently reinforce the authoritarian regime’s overall legitimacy, domination, and control.

Laboring for the State: Women, Family, and Work in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959–1971

Laboring for the State: Women, Family, and Work in Revolutionary Cuba, 1959–1971

Unleashing the Political Economy of Land Expropriation in Ethiopia, beyond the Rhetoric: Flower Farms’ in Amhara Region in Focus

Abstract The recognition of commercial agricultural investment unfolded the allocation of land to investors for the production of different cash and food crops in Ethiopia. But anti-expropriation voices and subsequent vandalizing of investment sites have been mushroomed and become far reminder occasions in Ethiopia. This study, thus, tried to uncover the Political-Economy of land expropriation in Ethiopia: a focus on flower farms in Amhara region. A mixed research design was employed by involving primary and secondary sources of data gathered via interview, focused group discussion, questionnaire and document review. Then, the data were presented, analyzed and interpreted through statistics-by-themes and side-by-side jointly. In the study, land expropriation was carried out without genuine public consultation, ascertaining popular consent and written notification. And, compensation was paid to evictees albeit the valuation process was full of uncertainty and jumping. Moreover, flower farms have negatively affected the livelihood and food security of peasants, which in turn brought violence, tenure insecurity and strained government-society relations. This indicated that the expansion of commercial farming was not made vis-à-vis empowering the displaced people. Thus, evictees should be part of the development process for the sustainability and success of farms.

Partha Chatterjee’s concepts of civil society and ‘uncivil’ political society: Is the distinction valid?

ABSTRACT Partha Chatterjee's distinction between civil society and 'political society' in post-colonial countries has provoked much debate and discussion. This has remained controversial in the current literature on post-colonialism in respect of democracy, development and politics. In this article I contest his distinction by pointing out, first that his conception of civil society is limited and abstract (and universalist) that leaves out the vast rural life in India. Second, I question the conceptual and empirical validity of his concept of political society, and argue that his original concept of political society was an urban space of illegality and criminality, but his subsequent shift to cover rural India does not explain how original conception works out in rural India. The empirical evidence available suggests that his so-called political society in rural India is actually part of civil society such as rural clubs, NGOs and other associations that operates in the interface of state, politics and society. In conclusion I seek to restore the political society as the space of the nation-state based on, following Locke, the right to life, liberty and property; trust (contract), definite and codified laws, impartial judiciary, separation of powers, limited government by popular consent and the people's right to revolt.

Fostering justice and stability: rights protection and national sovereignty in the Honduran zones for employment and economic development

Honduras's Zonas de Empleo y Desarrollo Económico ("Zones of Employment and Economic Development"; "ZEDEs") are new, independent governing institutions for designated zones of the country, established by popular consent and international best practices for governance. Honduras’s National Congress approved the ZEDEs’ legal framework as a solution to confront the institutional instability, corruption, and violence that have undermined the protection of basic human rights. Given their novelty and their troubled emergence against a backdrop of institutional failure, ZEDE critics have voiced concerns about individual rights, Honduran sovereignty, and exposure of the Honduran people to abuse and exploitation by foreign companies. This paper addresses the question of whether the ZEDEs are consistent with Honduran sovereignty and human rights. It constructs a general rule for ZEDE autonomy that defines the scope of what a ZEDE can legally do. It begins by highlighting contemporary challenges in Honduras. It then analyses the laws creating the ZEDEs to formulate the general rule of ZEDE autonomy. It details the human rights safeguards that ZEDEs must comply with and the relationship between ZEDE autonomy and Honduran sovereignty. The paper clarifies the ZEDE’s legal obligations regarding human rights and national sovereignty, thus helping define the scope of ZEDE autonomy.

As time goes by, the same sentiments apply? Stability of voter satisfaction with democracy during the electoral cycle in 31 countries

Popular consent is an essential element for success and stability of democracies. Research has repeatedly demonstrated that “electoral winners” (i.e. voters casting a ballot for government parties) are more satisfied with democracy than supporters of the opposition parties. However, little is known about the dynamics of satisfaction during the electoral cycle: Do winners become happier and losers even more discontent over time? We approach this question by utilizing an interview date in the European Social Survey (rounds 1–8) to position individuals within the different stages of electoral cycle. The results based on 199,207 responses from 199 surveys in 31 countries suggest that satisfaction with democracy stays relatively stable during the electoral cycle across various electoral systems if the political development is predictable. However, if actions of the parties are uncertain, namely the alternations of governments tend to be frequent, partial, and opened to all parties, and hence neither winners nor losers know how steady their status is with respect to the political development in the country, their satisfaction tend to fluctuate over time. Therefore, the conclusion reached is the more stable West European democracies have limited generalizability to the low-predictable systems in Central and Eastern Europe.