0 d aded the country, it was claimed that generally statistics on fghanistan were “wild guesses based on inadequate data” Dupree, 1980). A report published in 2002 suggested that Afghanistan is one of the least researched countries in the orld. A dearth of pre-war data, the inherent difficulties f conducting research in a war zone and the low priority ccorded to Afghanistan before 9/11 by the international ommunity have all contributed to this problem” (Bhatia, oodhand, Atmar, Pain, & Suleman, 2002). It is a country hat is only now in the process of being popularly discovered y the international community. Even measuring a socially visible, if sometimes not easly accessible (at least from the ground), phenomenon like ultivated fields of opium poppy, remarkable for their bright olours while in bloom, is problematic. According to UNDC, in 2002 there were 74,000 ha planted with poppy opium cultivation and production in Afghanistan serve as crude indicators of the ground realities. One continuing problem is the tendency for politicians to seek ‘quick fix’ solutions to complex social problems, for journalists to seek fast and easy soundbites to sell stories, and for commentators to focus on the “success” of the Taliban ban in eradicating poppy cultivation in 2001 while ignoring the complex historical, political and socio-economic motivations and dynamics that led up to it in the first place. Not to mention the steady increase in opium cultivation and production that characterised the first 5 years of Taliban rule. Such unidimensional views run the risk of encouraging comparisons between Taliban methods then and their potential replication for current poppy reduction strategies in Afghanistan or elsewhere. To call the ban “the most effective drug control enforcement action of modern times” (Farrell & Thorne, UNODC, 2002) while for the same year the US claimed here were only 30,750 ha (US Department of State, 2003), ess than 50% of the UNODC figure. This also meant, accordng to US figures, cultivation had doubled by 2003 as their stimate for that year was 61,000 ha. For the same year UN2005) is disingenuous, as effectiveness must be premised on the use of methods and tactics acceptable within a framework of international law and human rights. Certainly focusing on whether opium cultivation and production figures for 1 year have risen or fallen makes little sense unless they are context o c p t t i v c DC estimated 80,000 ha, only an 8% increase from 2002. hile such discrepancies may be explained away by the use f different methodologies, the UN basing its figures on a ombination of comprehensive ground surveys and analysis f images from commercial satellites, the US on a sample