Poor Voters Research Articles

Foreign Aid, Violence, and Electoral Support in Developing Countries: Experimental Evidence From the Philippines

Election-related violence is rampant in many developing countries that receive foreign aid. However, it is not well understood why voters often elect representatives who are associated with such violence. In this article, I investigate why voters might support politicians who resort to violence. I argue that the poor tend to vote for candidates who deliver tangible local benefits through foreign aid projects even when those candidates use violence during election periods. To support this argument, I conducted a nationwide survey in the Philippines that included an experiment about the effects of foreign aid and violence on voters’ electoral support for a candidate. I find that poor voters who reside in a region where basic public goods and services are deficient are more likely to support a candidate whose district has received foreign aid, regardless of her alleged electoral violence. This research sheds light on a mechanism that links poverty to electoral violence in less developed countries. It also reveals an unintended consequence of foreign aid: increasing the likelihood of electoral violence.

The Voter Experience Around the World: A Human Reflexivity Approach

ABSTRACT The experiences that voters have of elections are pivotal in the democratic experience of citizens. However, there has been relatively few multidirectional theorisations of the nature of this experience and the implications. This article reviews existing canonical approaches to understanding the voter experience which are informed by rational choice theory, behaviouralism and constructivism. It offers an alternative human reflexivity approach which anchors the voter experience in structure-agency relationships using realist social theory. The voter experience is defined as the simultaneous process of gathering and responding to knowledge, perceptions and emotions about the electoral process through observing and (non)participating in electoral activities. The citizen is reflexively situated in this experience and is involved in a process of interpreting, re-interpreting, and responding to stimuli, structures and other actors. Using cross-national data, the article identifies the overall global characteristics of the voter experience around the world. Older and more educated voters tend to have a more positive voter experience. Poor voter experiences are also found to lead to citizens ‘checking out’ of future elections or disengaging from the voting process. The article concludes by setting out the research agenda that arises from the new framework which the special issue takes forward.

Illegal Measures Influencing Voting Behavior in Traditional Communities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa District Dir Upper

The present study aimed to probe the illegal measures influencing voting behavior (VB) in traditional communities of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan. To obtain study objectives, a sample size of 317 respondents (212 males and 105 females) were picked from 12 randomly selected villages belonging to 06 selected union councils (UC) of 06 tehsils in District Upper Dir, KP. A conceptual framework comprised of illegal measures (independent variable) and voting behavior (dependent variable). Data was collected through a pre-tested interview schedule; chi-square and Fisher exact tests were applied to get the results. Based on chi-square test statistics, the association between VB and illegal measures attributes was found significant as dismantled as the use of legal and illegal means in an election (P=0.026); made wealth especially (P=0.008); converted the overall politics into money politics (P=0.007); to coax poor voters deny their role in the decision-making process (P=0.037) respectively. At the multivariate level, results dismantled the associations between illegal measures, and VB was non-spurious for both males and females (while controlling the gender of the respondents). Corrupt electoral practices, raising campaign funds by making promises of illegal benefits, provoking agents of influencing VB negatively in order to conduct elections in a very free and fair manner, effective policies along with the implementation of court verdicts along with some moral values in the code of conduct against illegal measures are the needs of the day in light of the present study.

Performance Evaluation Of Cloud Based Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Digital Signature E-Voting System For The Conduct Of Election In Nigeria

ABSTRACT Elections in Nigeria are characterized with poor voters’ turnout. One of the reasons attributed to this is the insecurity of the votes of the electorates. To resolve this, scholars have adopted various mechanisms and technologies, for example, the use of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Advanced Encryption StandardAES) and Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC). While these have added value to the body of knowledge in the conduct of elections in Nigeria, However, literature reveals that issue of insecurity of votes of electorate is still a current debate. The reason attributed to this, is due to the poor performance in terms of their key size, key strength and encryption time. This is addressed by using a Cloud based Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Digital signature (ECCDS) E-Voting system. The concept of the proposed system is to automatically encrypts, signs, decrypts votes and verifies the signed votes. The system is built on a hybridized security algorithms, these are; The ECC and Digital Signature Algorithm. This has a smart contractor that protect electorate votes against integrity modification in the cloud environment. The prototype demonstration is conducted during the students’ union election in Adekunle Ajasin University where the University ICT department is used as the cloud based network Infrastructure center. Three evaluation metrics are used. These are the key size, key strength and encryption time. The evaluation metrics shows a better performance of RSA, AES and ECC systems over the ECCD when considering the encryption time. The ECC and AES also perform better using the key size. For example, we recorded 167 bits for ECCDS, while RSA, AES and ECC algorithms recorded 163, 1024 and 64 bits respectively from one of the experiments under the key size. However, the beauty and the strength of good security system is the decryption time which is the key strength. From the experiment conducted using Key strength as the metric, we observed that ECCDS key strength is higher than that of AES, ECC and RSA. It means that it will take longer time for any intruder to decrypt the system when using the ECCDS model. This satisfy both the electorates and Electoral commission request and is very reliable and produces effective results. Keywords: E-voting, Integrity, Elliptic Curve, Cryptography, Digital Signature. CISDI Journal Reference Format Akingbesote. A.O., Babatobi, F.J. & Akinwumi, D. A. (2023): Performance Evaluation Of Cloud Based Elliptic Curve Cryptographic Digital Signature E-Voting System For The Conduct Of Election In Nigeria. Computing, Information Systems, Development Informatics &Allied Research Journal. Vol 13No 2, Pp 1-.14. Availableonlineathttps://www.isteams.net/cisdijournal. dx.doi.org/10.22624/AIMS/CISDI/V14N3P1

Poverty, social networks, and clientelism

Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors shield them from the influence of vote buying? We explore the role of both formal and informal social networks in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with private inducements. We argue that when the poor lack access to formal social networks, they become increasingly reliant on vote buying channelled through informal networks. To test our theory, we build the informal, family-based network linkages between voters and local politicians spanning a city in the Philippines. We then collect survey data on formal network connections, electoral handouts, and voting behaviour of 900 voters randomly drawn from these family networks. We show first that campaigns disproportionately target poorer voters. We then show that familial ties further influence targeting among poor voters. Finally, we show that access to formal networks such as workers’ associations mitigate voter fears of punishment for failing to reciprocate.

Who receives clientelistic benefits? Social identity, relative deprivation, and clientelistic acceptance among Turkish voters

ABSTRACT Why do voters accept clientelism? Previous research suggests that poorer voters are more likely to accept clientelistic benefits. However, identities may moderate the effect of poverty through identity-based economic comparisons across groups. The role identity plays in partisanship, and dense ethnic identity networks may make it easier for parties to enforce clientelism among specific groups. This paper presents evidence from a survey experiment in Turkey to argue that politicized Kurdish ethnic identity, combined with heightened perceptions of relative economic deprivation, explains why certain voter groups are more likely to accept clientelism. Additionally, experimental evidence shows that support for clientelism may depend on the quality of benefits rather than quantity. Focusing only on the amount of resources or the recipients’ economic conditions may fail to explain why certain voters accept clientelism more in the Turkish context.

Promoting civic and voter education through the use of technological systems during the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa

A human rights perspective to this article intertwines the rights to information and political participation. It deals with the intersections between the provision of civic and voter education (CVE), and the opportunities and threats pertaining to the feasibility of finding digital solutions for enhanced voter participation in democratic electoral processes during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in Africa. Under normal circumstances and while conducted through physical contact sessions, CVE is aimed at providing citizens with communication, general and life skills to constructively participate in democratic electoral processes. The greater the attendance in CVE events, the greater the conviction that a significant number of participants have been enlightened and encouraged to fully participate. As a result, electoral democracy becomes enriched and consolidated. However, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic render the physical training and dissemination of this crucial CVE information cumbersome, principally when considering the strictly-restricted number of attendants at events, consequently placing in disarray the enhancement of voter participation. Electoral management bodies, which are inherently charged with the responsibility for promoting CVE, confront the challenges for securing meaningful voter participation. Reliance on technological systems in the promotion of a consolidated electoral democracy during the COVID-19 pandemic emerges as a measure of last resort. Cognisant of the numerous developmental challenges encountered by many African countries, the feasibility of digital solutions in this instance could be far-fetched. More so, the digital divide and its impacts militate the empowerment of poor voters in remote rural areas where access to technological infrastructure and equipment is distantly slim.

Impact of political marketing strategies on the BOP voters in India

PurposeThis article aims to examine political marketing strategies adopted by the politicians operating in base of the pyramid (BOP) areas and their impact on the BOP voters using the tenets of the social influence theory.Design/methodology/approachThe authors resorted to a qualitative phenomenological inquiry for this study. The responses obtained from two qualitative studies were subjected to thematic analysis. Two thematic maps were integrated into a conceptual model.FindingsStudy 1 indicates that the politicians operating at the BOP resort to vote-bank segmentation, clientelism, mobilizing opinion leaders, short guerilla war against opposition and communication bombarding. Study 2 has elaborated on how poor voters perceive these strategies and form their opinions towards the party/candidate.Social implicationsThe findings of this study highlight the need for essential policy formulation to protect BOP consumers from deceptive political tactics.Originality/valueThis study develops a model of the effectiveness of voting strategies at the BOP. It also contributes to the literature on social influence theory by indicating how the three social influence processes (compliance, identification and internalization) result in different ways of accepting political influence.

Voting for security: evidence from a Maoist-affected region in India

ABSTRACT Do perceptions of insecurity from politically motivated violence affect the decision of poor voters to re-elect incumbents in Indian elections? This article examines this question in the empirical context of the Maoist-affected Junglemahal region in the state of West Bengal in eastern India. Exploiting original survey data collected in 38 Maoist-affected villages in Junglemahal prior to the 2019 Lok Sabha election, I show that respondents (a) were able to discriminate between politically motivated violence and other governance-related issues, (b) were more inclined to vote for the incumbent the greater the importance attached to the provision of public goods, but (c) were less inclined to vote for the incumbent the greater the importance attached to politically motivated violence. In auxiliary tests, I find that the effect of the perceived threat from politically motivated violence was mediated by feelings of fear, anger, and worry about the general direction in which the state was going. I also present evidence showing a positive relationship between the level of campaign contact by the opposition party and the level of negative emotions experienced by voters.

The Rise of Swedish Social Democracy

AbstractWe examine the rise and mobilizational dynamics of social democracy, employing data reported by the Swedish authorities on the distribution of voting eligibility, turnout and partisan vote in local elections during the 1910s at a high level of disaggregation (by narrow income segments and administrative units). In line with the existing literature, we show that electoral socialism depended on both the extension of the suffrage to its ‘natural’ electorate, that is, the urban working class, and the organizational capacity of trade unions and other civic associations. In addition, we show that socialist support was not uniform within the working class – even for a highly homogeneous society. Instead, the social-democratic vote was initially stronger among low- to middle-income workers, only expanding to poor voters later in time. We complement our local data with an interwar panel analysis of socialist vote and post-war survey data.

A Quantitative Analysis of the Health, Education and Security Perspectives of Election-Related Violence in Nigeria

Election Related Violence (ERV) constitutes one of the major challenges facing democracies around the world and is mostly common among developing countries with young democracies, these countries are often left with debilitating effects from ERV. While there are many dimensions of ERV, this quantitative study explores the health, education and security perspectives of ERV. A total of 500 questionnaires were administered and 287 questionnaires were received, female participants constituted the minority (32%) while participants within the age bracket of 31-40 made up over a third (38%) of the respondents, furthermore, majority (38%) of the respondents possessed a Bachelor’s degree while a strong majority of the respondents (76%) were senior civil servants between the grade levels of seven to fourteen. Over a third (40%) of the respondents agreed that various types of trauma were the most common health challenges of those who experienced ERV. Another majority (60%) of the respondents believe that the absence of viable political education among the masses was largely responsible for ERV. Over a third (40%) of the respondents opined that the security lapses from security agents was one of the key factors responsible for ERV. The results drawn from the study indicated that ERV in Nigeria may have been amplified by poor voter education among the masses and shortfalls in the provision of adequate security structure employed for the purpose of the peaceful conduct of elections, the study also showed that there was a dearth of adequate health policies that would have helped address the attendant health related aftereffects of ERV. This study provides insights on the health, education and security perspectives of ERV. This could help in creating a deeper understanding of the ERV phenomenon as well as the development of strategies and policies that could lead to the effective control of ERV in areas where it is prevalent.

Income changes do not influence political involvement in panel data from six countries

AbstractThe income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. Based on nine panel datasets from six countries, this research note asks whether income changes trigger short‐term effects on political involvement. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid random effects models, fixed effects models with lags and leads, and error correction models), there are few significant short‐term effects of income changes. In conjunction with earlier research, this finding suggests that the income gradient in political participation is likely to reflect stable differences between rich and poor voters emerging early in the life course.

Rich Voter, Poor Voter, Red Voter, Blue Voter: Social Class and Voting Behavior in Contemporary America. By Charles L. Prysby. New York: Routledge, 2020. 188p. $128.00 cloth, $35.96 paper.

Rich Voter, Poor Voter, Red Voter, Blue Voter: Social Class and Voting Behavior in Contemporary America. By Charles L. Prysby. New York: Routledge, 2020. 188p. $128.00 cloth, $35.96 paper.

YET ANOTHER REASON TO CURB INEQUALITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL SPILLOVERS

Inequality is one of the main issues in economics and policymaking. One of the main policy tools to deal with inequality is the tax system, which may be used to redistribute income. However, if taxes are determined by the collective decision of voters, they will not necessarily maximize welfare. We show that when voters have different capital endowments, and capital has a long-lasting spillover effect, a poverty trap may arise. Poor voters opt for low capital taxes to benefit from the spillover when others invest in capital, but this effect is weakened if agents are impatient and receive at least part of that spillover in the future. Hence the voting equilibrium may exhibit large capital taxes, hurting investment. This reduces the accumulation of capital with a public good nature in poor countries, where low capital stocks typically lead to high interest rates, implying a large discounting of future payoffs.

The Most Vulnerable Poor: Clientelism Among Slum Dwellers

Are slum dwellers more involved in clientelistic arrangements than other (urban poor) voters? While poverty is a key predictor of clientelism, some urban poor voters are more involved in clientelistic arrangements than others. Insecure tenure, lack of access to public resources, and location in areas exposed to environmental shocks increase the vulnerability of slum dwellers. This vulnerability is used by politicians and brokers, who politicize access to scarce resources, and thus make slum dweller more exposed to clientelism. The qualitative literature has long highlighted how clientelism provides a strategy for slum dwellers to cope with their vulnerability, but this population is often excluded from quantitative analyses of clientelism. Using survey data from Argentina and a matching technique that allows us to compare slum dwellers with similar non-slum dwellers, we find that there is indeed a higher prevalence of clientelism among the former. We use a survey experiment on monitoring and sanctions to show that this different exposure to clientelism is consequential. We find different responses across similarly poor slum dwellers and non-slum dwellers regarding the potential consequences of defecting from clientelistic arrangements. Our findings suggest that including slum dwellers in quantitative analyses would improve our understanding of clientelism.

Class Altruism and Redistribution

AbstractWhy do tax rates vary so much across countries? We study the role of other-regarding preferences and ethnic fragmentation in redistribution. A government is elected by altruistic voters and chooses a redistributive income tax. Altruism is directed towards social identity groups. Three main factors yield low levels of redistribution: (i) strong in-group altruism among rich voters—referred to as class altruism; (ii) weak universal altruism—in particular among the rich; and (iii) ethnic fragmentation among poor voters. We document survey evidence that the pattern of altruism in the United States and the European Union is consistent with the observed differences in taxes.

Capital Meets Democracy: The Impact of Franchise Extension on Sovereign Bond Markets

AbstractBy giving political rights to poor voters, do democratic political institutions pose a risk to concentrated wealth held in the form of financial capital? This article draws lessons from the reaction of sovereign bond markets to franchise extensions between 1800 and 1920. If franchise extension transferred political power from economic and financial elites to workers, as redistributive theories of democratization suggest, then this should have resulted in a fall in the market price (increase in the yield) of a country's bonds. Exploiting the asynchronous timing of franchise reforms across countries, we provide evidence that franchise extension contributed to large increases in the premium demanded by investors to hold sovereign debt, reflecting investor fears of default. However, bond markets became less sensitive to franchise extensions over time, a pattern potentially due to the structure of inequality and the strategic adoption of institutions which protected financial interests.

Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy

ABSTRACT Inequality is shown to shape public policies with significant redistributive ramifications. As a measure of the poor median voter's dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, some scholars argue that it is an indicator of redistributive pressure. Yet for others, it is a proxy for the power asymmetry between the rich and the poor in policymaking. How does inequality affect redistributive tax policies? We offer an explanation based on policymaker ideology. We show that when inequality rises, left-leaning policymakers craft more redistributive policies while right-leaning policymakers suppress them. Using the top income shares for inequality, we analyse two datasets to corroborate our argument: (1) cross-national inheritance and income tax data; and (2) U.S. Senate votes on redistributive tax bills.

Do anti-poverty policies sway voters? Evidence from a meta-analysis of Conditional Cash Transfers

Since the 1990s, many governments in middle and low-income countries have used conditional cash transfers to alleviate poverty. However, the evidence of the electoral consequences of this type of anti-poverty intervention remains inconclusive. Do voters reward politicians when they implement conditional cash transfers? This study conducts a meta-analysis using a sample of 10 randomized controlled trials and regression discontinuity designs (35 estimates from six countries in Latin America and Asia) to address this question. The result shows a positive effect of conditional cash transfers on voter support for the incumbents and no evidence of publication bias in the selected sample. Estimated effect sizes tend to be larger in observational studies, unpublished manuscripts, and articles published in political science. These results provide more conclusive evidence that poor voters also respond to non-clientelistic strategies of electoral targeting in developing countries.

Income Changes Do Not Influence Political Participation: Evidence from Comparative Panel Data

The income gradient in political participation is a widely accepted stylized fact. This article asks how income effects on political involvement unfold over time. Using nine panel datasets from six countries, it analyzes whether income changes have short-term effects on political involvement, whether effects vary across the life-cycle, and whether parental income has an independent influence. Irrespective of indicator, specification, and method (hybrid models, inclusion of lags and leads, error-correction models), we find neither significant short-term effects of income changes nor life-cycle variation in these effects. However, parental income does seem to affect political socialization. Descriptive evidence and latent-growth-curve modeling based on household panels show that participatory inequality by parental income is already large before voting age. Poorer voters do not catch up with their richer peers in their twenties. This implies an urgent need for research on (political) inequality in youth and childhood.