The Japanese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) formerly issued a standard audit fees table in accordance with the Certified Public Accountants Law. This table was intended to serve as a reference for the determination of audit fees, but in practice, the standard fees were applied frequently as substantive upper limits. The table was criticized and blamed for low fees and, thus, inefficient audit services. In response to this criticism, the Certified Public Accountants Law was amended in 2004, and the JICPA discontinued the issuance of the table, and audit fee pricing was no longer quasi-regulated in Japan. In this work, we examine the effects of (de)regulation on audit quality in this institutional setting. We specifically investigate the effects of low audit fees on audit quality prior to deregulation and the effects of higher fees on audit quality after deregulation. We use the accrual quality measure of Dechow and Dichev to capture audit quality. The results show that high fees, not low fees, correlate with poor accrual quality during the period of regulation and accrual quality decreases when audit fees increase after implementing deregulation.
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