Pontifical Council Research Articles

A New Pentecost?: Catholic Theology and “Baptism in the Spirit”

A New Pentecost? Catholic Theology and “Baptism in the Spirit” Ralph Martin (bio) One thing, however, is certain: the face of the Church of the third millennium depends on our capacity to listen to what the Spirit is saying to the Church of our time (cf. Rev 2:7). . . . It depends, therefore, on our capacity to be amazed by the charismatic gifts that the Holy Spirit is lavishing on the Church today with extraordinary generosity. And it depends on the wisdom and generous farsightedness of Pastors who do not quench the Spirit, but test everything and hold fast to what is good (cf. 1 Thes 5:12, 19–21). stanislaw cardinal rylko President of the Pontifical Council for the Laity 1 It has been more than forty years since the charismatic renewal in the Catholic Church first appeared and nearly that long since the first attempts to theologically understand the core experience of this renewal—“baptism in the Holy Spirit”—from a Catholic point of view. “Baptism in the Spirit” is the main terminology used in North America to describe an experience of the Spirit that is often accompanied by a deeper personal encounter with Christ, characterized by a glimpse of his Lordship, an experience of the Father’s love [End Page 17] that is personal and deeply liberating, and a new awareness that we are truly not orphans but that the Holy Spirit is truly present and ready to encourage, convict, guide, and help us understand the things of God.2 This vital experience of the Trinity brings with it a new or renewed desire for prayer, including in a special way praise, adoration, and thanksgiving; a new or renewed desire to read the Scripture, often described as “the scriptures coming alive”; and a desire to tell others about the goodness of God. It is also frequently accompanied by a desire to be in relationship with other Christians and by the manifestation of one or more of the charisms listed in 1 Corinthians 12, 1 Peter 4, and Romans 12. Fr. Francis Sullivan, SJ, offers this as a brief definition of the experience: “A religious experience which initiates a decisively new sense of the powerful presence and working of God in one’s life, which working usually involves one or more charismatic gifts.”3 It has been understood from the very first theological reflection, in 1969, that the term “baptism in the Spirit” had its primary referent to the giving of the Spirit in the sacraments of Christian initiation, its usage in the New Testament, and that it was only being used analogously to describe the experience of those already validly baptized and confirmed Catholics. “If we were to be more precise we would not talk of receiving the Baptism in the Holy Spirit, but of renewing the Baptism in the Spirit.”4 While the organized forms of this renewal have ebbed and flowed in various countries at various times, it remains one of the most widespread and influential of the movements in the Catholic Church following the Second Vatican Council and is present in more than 120 countries with more than 100 million Catholics to date experiencing what has been called “baptism in the Spirit.”5 The Catholic charismatic renewal is generally seen as part of a much wider phenomenon, the broader Pentecostal movement that began at the turn of the twentieth century and that now numbers more than 500 million participants.6 Since the appeal of Pope John XXIII that the whole Church pray [End Page 18] in preparation for the Second Vatican Council asking God to send us a “new Pentecost,” there has been a strong and continuing emphasis from the papacy on the need of the Church, and of each of us as individuals, to experience today the work of the Spirit as we see it described in the accounts of Pentecost in the Acts of the Apostles. Following the council, Pope Paul IV wrote in Gaudete in domino, Assuredly we have here a work of the Spirit, a gift of Pentecost. One must also recognize a prophetic intuition on the part of our predecessor John XXIII, who envisaged a kind of new Pentecost as...

The Promise of Interreligious Dialogue for a World in Conflict

Archbishop Michael L. Fitzgerald, M.Afr. until recently served as the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue in the Vatican. In February 2006 he was appointed by Pope Bendedict XVI to be the apostolic nuncio to Egypt and the Holy See's delegate to the League of Arab States. This address was delivered at the conference "In Our Time: Interreligious Relations in a Divided World," co-sponsored by the Center for Christian-Jewish Learning at Boston College and Brandeis University to mark the 40th anniversary of Nostra Aetate. It was given at Boston College on March 16, 2006. After reviewing regions of conflict in the world, Archbishop Fitzgerald first discusses what interreligious dialogue cannot do. He then explores the Catholic Church's understanding of dialogue as reflected in Nostra Aetate. He considers how a history of past conflicts can be overcome by (1) forgetting the past; (2) achieving mutual understanding; and (3)collaborating. Finally, he examines how dialogues can be encouraged through good neighborliness, through organized action, with intellectual backing, and with spiritual backing.

What the Catholic Church Has Learnt from Interreligious Dialogue

Archbishop Michael L. Fitzgerald, M.Afr. until recently served as the president of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue in the Vatican. In February 2006 he was appointed by Pope Bendedict XVI to be the apostolic nuncio to Egypt and the Holy See's delegate to the League of Arab States. This address was delivered at the conference "In Our Time: Interreligious Relations in a Divided World," co-sponsored by the Center for Christian-Jewish Learning at Boston College and Brandeis University to mark the 40th anniversary of Nostra Aetate. It was given at Brandeis University on March 16, 2006. In it, Archbishop Fitzgerald first discusses theological advances arising from interreligious dialogue, focusing on the interrelatedness of the Trinity as the basis and model for dialogue. He then turns to consider the necessary conditions for dialogue, the varied content of dialogue, the conduct of dialogue in its multiplicity of forms, and the structures necessary for the continuity of dialogue.

Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Bias, Decline, and Conversion Based on the Work of Bernard Lonergan (review)

Reviewed by: Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Bias, Decline, and Conversion Based on the Work of Bernard Lonergan Darren J. Dias Cyril Orji . Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa: An Analysis of Bias, Decline, and Conversion Based on the Work of Bernard Lonergan. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2008. Pp. 269. Paper, US$32.00. ISBN 978-0-87462-736-7. In Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa Cyril Orji is successful in his goal “to find ways of tapping into the rich resource of Lonergan’s work with a view to appropriating him into the overall project of peace and conflict resolution that is currently taking place in the African continent, sub-Saharan Africa especially” (220). Orji demonstrates that philosopher-theologian Bernard Lonergan’s thought addresses many in the lacunae [End Page 137] of contemporary analyses of ethnic and religious conflict in Africa, primarily in his development of Lonergan’s notions of bias and conversion. Orji begins with a historical study of the more “remote” causes of conflict in Africa: European colonialism, cultural imperialism, and the arbitrary establishment of borders by Western powers. Since the end of official colonization in the 1960s, the more “immediate” causes of upheavals are due to the exploitation of religious and ethnic differences, whether these are actual and real or strategically constructed, by political and military rulers for their own benefit (43, 53). Orji assesses official Roman Catholic teaching that comments on and responds to the African situation. He critiques some ecclesial statements as either unfamiliar with the African context (e.g., Pontifical Council on Justice and Peace) or lacking in attention to important factors such as African tribal religions (e.g., the Symposium of the Episcopal Conferences of Africa and Madagascar). Although the African bishops’ statements on ethnic and religious conflict are significant, they are inadequate on three fronts: they provide insufficient treatment for ethnicism/tribalism; there is no exploration of the root causes of social conflict; and they are unable to name the constitutive ingredients for healing and community building (11). Orji seeks to address these inadequacies. While Orji appreciates and develops Lonergan’s thought, he does note that “Lonergan was astonishingly silent” on bias and its relation to the issue of race, in spite of the fact that Lonergan lived though Nazism, segregation in the United States, and apartheid in South Africa (76). Orji contributes to the extension of Lonergan’s thought on this issue. Orji is concerned with the “unwarranted and irrational despising of others based on blind spots that condition or determine our view of them” (95). He argues throughout the book that at “the root of these political, economic, and social upheavals that plague Africa can be found in individual, group, dramatic, and general bias of common sense” (94). Orji furthers the Lonerganian enterprise in engaging the work of R. Doran and M. Rende and his correlation of conversion with bias and cycles of decline. Orji explores Lonergan’s notion of bias, cycles of decline, progress, and conversion, and their relationship to cosmopolis and the good of order. A key dimension of achieving the good of order in Africa is dialogue as the “instrument in advancing the common good” (182). Through dialogue “one discovers values that have not yet been discovered or uncovers values that have been uncritically accepted” (93). Without personal growth through dialogue, social, economic, political, and cultural transformations, conflict resolution, and ultimately peace are impossible. Orji engages a wide breadth of literature, including African and Western theology, philosophy, and theory, in addition to local Church documents, and papal and curial pronouncements. He selects suitable interlocutors to expand Lonergan’s thought, such as H-G. Gadamer, T. Hobbes, and K. Marx, as well as significant interpreters of Lonergan, such as W. Conn, M.S. Copeland, R. Doran, and K. Melchin. A clearer and more careful treatment of religious/affective conversion would have been beneficial, as would a deeper engagement with Doran’s work, which Orji cites as important to his own project. A small but pervasive distraction was the large number of typographical errors (21, 58, 92, 128, 132, etc.). Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Africa makes a significant advancement in Lonergan studies...

Relacje między lekarzem a pacjentem w świetle Karty Pracowników Służby Zdrowia

Artykuł ma na celu omówienie zagadnień etycznych, które powinny stać się podstawą dobrych relacji między lekarzem a pacjentem . Rozważania oparte są na pracach opisanych w Europejskiej Karcie Pracowników Służby Zdrowia opracowanej z inicjatywy Papieskiej Rady Duszpasterstwa Pracowników Służby Zdrowia i zatwierdzonej przez Kongregację Nauki Wiary. W artykule podjęto próbę przedstawienia postawy lekarza wobec palących problemów prenatalnym okresie życia ludzkiego, a także problemy dorosłych i osób starszych . Kwestie etyczne, takie jak nienaruszalne prawo do życia i szacunek dla ludzkiego życia, wydają się być ważne i uzasadnione w czasach komercjalizacji i szybkiego rozwoju usług medycznych, które tym samym potrzebują dalszej dogłębnej analizy.

Making Sense of the Roman Catholic Directive to Extend Life Indefinitely

In November 2009, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops issued Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, requiring that all patients--including those in so-called persistent vegetative state--be provided with artificial hydration and nutrition if such care could extend life indefinitely. (1) The directives--particularly directive 58--prompted outcry from death-with-dignity movements and confusion within hospital ethics committees. Barbara Coombs Lee, president of Compassion and Choices, was quoted as saying that new directive could potentially create 300,000 Terri Schiavo cases, equal to number of feeding tubes inserted in United States each year. (2) Some hospital ethics committees debated whether their hospitals would be obliged to accept patients who refused such treatment as transfers from local Catholic hospitals. These discussions raise several questions with direct bearing on patient care: Do bishops have authority over Roman Catholic health care institutions? Do bishops' directives represent a departure from--or even a radicalization of--traditional Catholic teaching? How might these directives change clinical practice? The answer to first question is straightforward. U.S. bishops exercise spiritual and structural authority over Catholic institutions in their respective dioceses, but extent to which their authority affects institutions varies by bishop. Depending on influence of other interest groups, some bishops take a proactive role; others allow health care leadership to function autonomously. Next, a brief consideration of evolution of Catholic position on end-of-life care is warranted. In his 1957 Address to an International Congress of Anesthesiologists, Pope Pius XII spoke of obligation to provide ventilator support to unconscious patients without hope for recovery. He emphasized that physicians have a duty to provide ordinary (not extraordinary) treatments as necessary to preserve health and life. In contrast to ordinary care, a stricter obligation (defined as extraordinary) would be too burdensome for majority of patients and would impede what he described as a higher, spiritual good. In 1980, Congregation for Doctrine of Faith (the papal office overseeing Catholic doctrine) adopted a Declaration on Euthanasia that noted that due to technological advancement, delineation between ordinary and extraordinary means of sustaining life had grown muddled. However, declaration permitted physicians (with patient consent) to discontinue treatment if harm would outweigh benefit. The declaration was clear: patients who refused care in such circumstances were not suicidal; rather, they were accepting of human condition. Between 1980 and 2001, various groups within Church--including Pontifical Council on Health Affairs (1981), Pontifical Academy of Sciences (1985), and U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (1992)--continued to reflect on these issues, reinforcing notion that minimal care, including feeding, is obligatory. However, as 1992 U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops stated, the teaching of Church has not resolved question whether medically assisted nutrition and hydration should always be seen as a form of normal care. (3) In 2001, U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops issued directives for Catholic health care services that would be forerunner for directives of 2009. Directive 58 called for a presumption in favor of providing nutrition and hydration to all patients, including patients who require artificial means, as long as burdens do not outweigh benefits. (4) It was not until a 2004 address by Pope John Paul II on Life-Sustaining Treatments and Vegetative State that Catholic Church specifically addressed issue of medically assisted alimentation for irreversibly ill patients. …

Towards Future Developments in Penal Law: U. S. Theory and Practice. A Symposium held under the auspices of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, March 5–6, 2009

Towards Future Developments in Penal Law: U. S. Theory and Practice. A Symposium held under the auspices of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, March 5–6, 2009

Dugan, Patricia M., Towards Future Developments in Penal Law: U. S. Theory and Practice. A Symposium held under the auspices of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, March 5–6, 2009, Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur 2010, 245 S.

Dugan, Patricia M., Towards Future Developments in Penal Law: U. S. Theory and Practice. A Symposium held under the auspices of the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts at the Pontifical University of the Holy Cross, Rome, March 5–6, 2009, Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur 2010, 245 S.

What is the Personal Ordinariate? Canonical and Liturgical Observations

Questions have arisen as to the manner of the publication on 9 November 2009 of Anglicanorum coetibus, the Apostolic Constitution Providing for Personal Ordinariates for Anglicans Entering into Full Communion with the Catholic Church. What is clear is that the views of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, under Cardinal Walter Kasper, were given less weight than ought to be expected and that both the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster were informed at only a late stage. More assuring for the long term, Cardinal Kasper has stated that this provision is not a new form of ecumenism. Significantly, the Vatican statement following the meeting between the Archbishop of Canterbury and Pope Benedict XVI in Rome on 21 November reiterated ‘the shared will to continue and consolidate’ the relationship between the Roman Catholic Church and the Churches of the Anglican Communion and noted approvingly that the details of the third phase of ARCIC would be discussed at informal talks with Anglican representatives in the days following the Archbishop's visit to the Pope. Whatever else the Ordinariate may be, it is not a substitute for that ‘serious dialogue’ established by Archbishop Michael Ramsey and Pope Paul VI which has as its continued goal, despite obstacles ancient and modern, the restoration of ‘complete communion of faith and sacramental life’ between us.

Incapacity and Simulation: Mutually Exclusive Grounds or Key Juridic Facts Underlying Conforming Sentences?

* Assistant Professor, School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington DC. 1 Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Instruction Dignitas Connubii 291§2, January 25, 2005 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005): “Aequivalenter seu substantialiter conformes considerantur decisiones quae licet caput nullitatis diverso nomine significent et determinent tamen super iisdem factis matrimonium irritantibus et probationibus nitantur.” Elsewhere in this issue John Foster illustrates the differences between formal conformity of sentences and substantial conformity. See John J.M. Foster, “Conformity of Sentences: Something OldYet Something New,” The Jurist 70 (2010) 270–301. See also, Joaquín Llobell, “El valor jurídico de la Instr. Dignitas connubii, su recepción eclesial, el objeto y la conformidad de la sentencia, y la certeza moral,” in Procesos de nulidad matrimonial: La Instrucción Dignitas connubii, eds. Rafael Rodríguez-Ocaña and Joaquín Sedano (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2006) 291–299. 327 The Jurist 70 (2010) 327–367 INCAPACITY AND SIMULATION: MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE GROUNDS OR KEY JURIDIC FACTS UNDERLYING CONFORMING SENTENCES? Sean O. Sheridan, TOR* Introduction Dignitas connubii 291§2 describes equivalent or substantial conformity of sentences in the context of a request for a declaration of the nullity of a marriage. Paragraph two provides: “Decisions are considered to be equivalently or substantially conforming when, even though they specify and determine the ground of nullity by different names, they are still rooted in the same facts rendering the marriage null and the same proofs.”1 In their commentary on Dignitas connubii, Klaus Lüdicke and Ronny Jenkins address the significance of this provision: Paragraph two (§2) describes the notion of equivalent or substantial conformity of sentences. Two decisions are said to be equivalently conforming when they, like formally conforming sentences, concern the same marriage between the same partners . However, with equivalent conformity, the two sentences use different grounds to establish the nullity, but arrive at their conclusions based on the same facts and proofs. The notion of equivalent conformity recognizes a certain degree of leeway with regard to the legal basis (grounds of nullity) that should be used to evaluate the same set of facts. For instance, equivalent conformity could result from the declaration of the nullity of a 2 Klaus Lüdicke and Ronny E. Jenkins, Dignitas Connubii: Norms and Commentary (Alexandria VA: Canon Law Society of America, 2006) 468–469. See also, Paolo Moneta , “Determination of the Formulation of the Doubt and Conformity of the Sentence,” in Studies on the Instruction Dignitas Connubii,” eds. Patricia M. Dugan and Luis Navarro (Montreal: Wilson & LaFleur Ltée, 2006) 105–113. 3 English translation from Code of Canon Law, Latin-English Edition: New English Translation (Washington, DC: Canon Law Society of America, 1998). All subsequent English translations of canons from this code will be taken from this source unless otherwise indicated. marriage based in one sentence on total simulation and in the other on the exclusion of indissolubility.2 Hence, in a nutshell, for two sentences to be in equivalent conformity, they must be decided on the same juridic facts even if the judges might disagree on the name to attach to the ground upon which the juridic facts lead them to reach their decision on nullity. In this article, we will consider the application of equivalent conformity to the canonical grounds of incapacity and simulation, two grounds that have traditionally been held to be mutually exclusive.As we will discuss in more detail infra, canon 1095 embodies the canonical requirements for determining whether an individual lacks the capacity to enter into a valid marriage. Canon 1095, which is likely quite familiar to those practitioners involved in marriage tribunal proceedings, provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: 1º those who lack the sufficient use of reason; 2º those who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be handed over and accepted; 3º those who are not able to assume the essential obligations of marriage for causes of a psychic nature.3 Thus, canon 1095 addresses those who lack the capacity to enter into a valid marriage due to a lack of reason, those who lack due discretion, and those who are unable to...

The Evaluation of Witness Testimony in Marriage Nullity Trials

The Jurist 70 (2010) 163–185 163 THE EVALUATION OF WITNESS TESTIMONY IN MARRIAGE NULLITY TRIALS Peter O. Akpoghiran* Witness testimony comprises one of the most important instruments of proof in marriage nullity trials in canon law.Already with the submission of a petition introducing the case, the petitioner is required to indicate not only the facts upon which the assertion is made, but also the proofs that will be adduced to support the petitioner’s claim. This includes naming possible witnesses who will support the allegations made (c. 1504, 2º). Since the burden of proof rests on the one who makes an assertion to the court, witness testimony forms a substantive body of evidence that either strengthens or weakens the petitioner’s claim or the respondent’s exception to it. Since proof by witnesses frequently plays a central role in a canonical trial, the procedural law of the 1983 code provides extensive norms governing their admission and examination, and the evaluation of their testimony . Furthermore, Dignitas connubii1 elaborates on the manner in which the norms of the code are to be applied in marriage nullity trials. These norms address, among other things, those who may function as a witness, the manner of questioning witnesses, and the evaluation of their testimony.As an instruction, Dignitas connubii clarifies the prescripts of law and elaborates on and determine the methods to be observed in fulfilling them (c. 34 §1). “[T]he procedural laws of the Code of Canon Law for the declaration of the nullity of marriage remain in their full force and reference is always to be made to them in interpreting the Instruction.”2 The purpose of this article is to discuss the norms governing the evaluation of witness testimony in both the code and Dignitas connubii. According to c. 1572: “In evaluating testimony, the judge, after having requested testimonial letters if necessary, is to consider the following: 1° what the condition or reputation of the person is; 2° whether the testimony derives from personal knowledge, especially from what has been * Judge, Diocese of Richmond Tribunal. 1 Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, instruction Dignitas connubii, January 25, 2005 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice, 2005). 2 Dignitas connubii, art. 17. 164 the jurist seen or heard personally, or whether from opinion, rumor, or hearsay; 3° whether the witness is reliable and firmly consistent or inconsistent, uncertain , or vacillating; 4° whether the witness has co-witnesses to the testimony or is supported or not by other elements of proof.”3 In addition to the above guidelines, Dignitas connubii stated that the judge, in evaluating witness testimony, should also consider when the witness came to know what he or she is asserting, especially whether it was tempore non suspecto, that is, when the parties had not yet considered introducing the nullity cause.4 This article will also discuss the evaluation of the testimony of a single witness. Although the testimonies of two witnesses are normally required to establish a judicial fact, there are instances when only one witness can be produced, a situation which the law also provides for. The purpose of the norms. The reason for these norms is not to limit the judge’s freedom, but to serve as guidelines to help the judge better to carry out his or her function .5 They indicate to the judge what he or she should consider in evaluating testimonial proof. They are guidelines to enable the judge to form a conviction in his or her mind regarding the probative value to assign to each testimony. However, during the code revision process, a consultor suggested that canon 1789 of the 1917 code, which corresponds to canon 1572 of the 1983 code, should be suppressed because it was a matter for textbooks and any pertinent material should be inserted in the schema on moral certitude . The other consultors, however, argued that experience has shown the canon to be useful in tribunal practice.6 On the other hand, a phrase in the proposed canon which stated that the judge should consider the principles of forensic psychology when weighing testimony was deleted because it was considered superfluous since the study of psychology is considered part of the professional...

Conformity of Sentences: Something Old Yet Something New

The Jurist 70 (2010) 270–301 270 CONFORMITY OF SENTENCES: SOMETHING OLD YET SOMETHING NEW John J. M. Foster* Where two or three tribunal officials are gathered together, the topic of first instance-second instance relationships is sure to come up sooner or later. In some cases, the first instance canonists might express frustration that, after heeding the advice of the Apostolic Signatura to use grounds other than those for incapacity found in canon 1095, their second instance courts will not accept as proven any cases but those judged on canon 1095. Conversely, second instance canonists sometimes express exasperation at seeing from their first instance courts cases decided using only the incapacity to consent to marriage validly. The following scenario illustrates some aspects of this frustration: Betsy, a twenty-year old college student living at home, has experienced a good bit of abuse from her parents the past few years. She and her boyfriend Aaron have dated since meeting during freshman orientation. Despite a rocky courtship for several months, Betsy agrees to Aaron’s proposal of marriage. Seven months after the wedding, the parties divorce . For the purpose of this illustration, the court of first instance, which Betsy approaches sometime later to clarify her status in the Church, formulates the doubt on her incapacity to consent to marriage because she suffered “from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning the essential matrimonial rights and duties mutually to be handed over and accepted.”1 In rendering its affirmative decision on this ground, the tribunal states that the abuse Betsy endured at home became so intolerable that, at the time of consent, she was psychologically at her wits end and was left incapable of discerning marriage with Aaron. When the acts and sentence of the case are transmitted to the duly appointed court of second instance, the officials there do not see Betsy as having been incapable of consenting to marriage. Rather, they see three other grounds as worthy of follow up. First, if the abuse at home was directed at pressuring Betsy to marry Aaron, then force and fear (c. 1103) might be appropriate, since, believing her parents’ threats to disown her, * School of Canon Law, The Catholic University of America 1 Codex Iuris Canonici auctoritate Ioannis Pauli PP. II promulgatus (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983) c. 1095, 2°; hereafter cited as 1983 code. conformity of sentences: something old, something new 271 2 Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Instruction Dignitas connubii (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005); hereafter this source will be cited as DC followed by the article number. she could see no other way to escape the abusive pressure than to marry. Second, perhaps Betsy viewed marriage to Aaron as the way to escape the abuse at home, in which case she chose not marriage but escape. Total simulation might be the proper ground here (c. 1101 §2). Finally, if Betsy entered the marriage with the intention that she could regain her freedom to marry after an eventual divorce, then partial simulation contra bonum sacramenti might be more appropriate (c. 1101 §2). Inasmuch as the affirmative decision rendered by the court of first instance must be “confirmed at the appellate grade either by a decree or by a second sentence” before Betsy can enter a new marriage (c. 1684 §1), the procedural options available to the second instance court are limited. The first instance decision can be ratified by decree, or the case can be admitted to an ordinary examination (c. 1682 §2). In these options, the second instance court judges the case on the same formulation of the doubt decreed by the court of first instance (see c. 1639 §1). The court of second instance, however, also has the option of admitting a new ground and adjudicating it “as if in first instance” (tamquam in prima instantia; c. 1683). Given the facts presented here, the second instance court cannot confirm the first instance sentence by decree. Thus, the case must be opened to an ordinary examination. At this point, the higher court might decide that canon 1095, 2° was simply not proven and give the case a negative decision. Betsy then would have the option of...

Associations of the Faithful in the Antepreparatory and Preparatory Phases of Vatican II

The Jurist 70 (2010) 86–113 86 * St. John’s Seminary, Brighton, MA 1 In Christifideles laici Pope John Paul II observed that “we can speak of a new era of group endeavors of the lay faithful . . . so great is the richness and the versatility of resources that the Holy Spirit nourishes in the ecclesial community, and so great is the capacity of initiative and the generosity of our lay people.” Pope John Paul II, post-synodal apostolic exhortation Christifideles laici, December 30, 1988, n. 29: AAS 81 (1989) 444. English translation in Origins (1988–89) 575. 2 Joseph Ratzinger, “The Ecclesial Movements: A Theological Reflection on Their Place in the Church,” in Movements in the Church: Proceedings of the World Congress of the Ecclesial Movements, ed. Pontifical Council for the Laity (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1999) 23–51. This talk was also published as “The Theological Locus of Ecclesial Movements,” Communio 25 (1998) 480–504 3 Pope Benedict XVI, “Encounter with the German Bishops,” L’Osservatore Romano (August 26, 2005) 15. ASSOCIATIONS OF THE FAITHFUL IN THE ANTEPREPARATORY AND PREPARATORY PHASES OF VATICAN II Robert W. Oliver* As the integration of associations of the faithful into the life and mission of local churches continues to be debated in the Church, many observers have been watching carefully for signs of the course Pope Benedict XVI intends to take. As is well known, Pope John Paul II gave much encouragement to the new ecclesial communities and movements.1 Pope Benedict has also expressed support, as evidenced by his detailed reflection on the theological locus of new associations at the 1998 Pentecost gathering of ecclesial movements.2 At the closing of WorldYouth Day in Cologne inAugust 2005, the pontiff encouraged the German bishops that “the Church must value these realities, while guiding them with pastoral wisdom, so that they might contribute their own gifts to the building up of the community in the best way possible.”3 Questions advanced today concerning the relation of associations and particular churches are rooted in a broad range of theological and canonical debates over the past one hundred years. This article analyzes several issues in these debates as they were raised during the antepreparatory and preparatory phases of the Second Vatican Council. The former provides a fascinating panorama of the situation of associations in local churches on the eve of the council. This situation is examined in the first section of this study through the lens of the letters sent to the Antepreparatory Commission by bishops, pontifical faculties of theology and canon law, Roman dicasteries, and several episcopal conferences. The second section analyzes how the material on associations was developed during the preparatory phase, particularly in the work of the two preparatory commissions that received a synthesis of the antepreparatory material on associations, the commission “On the Discipline of the Clergy and the Laity” and the commission “On the Apostolate of the Laity in Everything that concerns Catholic Action, Religious and Social Action.” These examinations provide a basis for interpreting the development of these issues during the subsequent work of the council. The Antepreparatory Phase of Vatican II Shortly after announcing the convocation of an ecumenical council, Pope John XXIII appointed theAntepreparatory Commission to conduct a worldwide consultation of bishops, major superiors of religious institutes , pontifical faculties of theology and canon law, and dicasteries of the Roman Curia.4 The president of the commission, Secretary of State Domenico Cardinal Tardini, sent letters inviting proposals and suggestions concerning areas of doctrine, discipline of the clergy and the Christian people, “matters of greater importance” (negotia maioris momenti), and any other areas which the respondents thought needed to be expounded or clarified by the council.5 Responses to this invitation began to arrive in July 1960 and, by early 1961, soon stretched to more than 1500 pages.6 The responses also included letters from several conferences of bishops, which had not been on associations of the faithful 87 4 Pope John XXIII, “Ad E.mos Cardinales in Urbe praesentes habita,” January 25, 1959: AAS 51 (1959) 65–69. For a critical text of this allocution, see Alberto Melloni, ‘Questa festa ricorrenza.’ Prodromi e preparazione del discorso di annuncio...

Bailing out humankind from its social insensitivity

Ahost of world leaders met at UN Headquarters in New York on 12 and 13 November 2008 for an interreligious and inter-cultural dialogue on a “Culture of Peace”, at the initiative of King Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia. Among the Heads of State and Government, including senior officials, from some 60 countries who spoke were UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, King Abdullah, President Shimon Peres of Israel, President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, Jean-Louis Cardinal Tauran, President of the Pontifical Council for Inter-religious Dialogue of the Holy See, Prime Minister Salam Fayyad of the Palestinian National Authority, President George W. Bush of the United States and President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan.

Risto Jukko, Trinity in Unity in Christian–Muslim Relations: The Work of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, History of Christian–Muslim Relations, Volume 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007). Pp. 373. $199.00 cloth.

Risto Jukko, Trinity in Unity in Christian–Muslim Relations: The Work of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue, History of Christian–Muslim Relations, Volume 7 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007). Pp. 373. $199.00 cloth. - Volume 41 Issue 3

Canon Law and Ecumenism

The Jurist 69 (2009) 171–189 171 CANON LAW AND ECUMENISM1 Walter Cardinal Kasper* Four years ago the Church commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the closing of the Second Vatican Council. In these days the Church commemorates the twenty fifth anniversary of the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law. These two events are intimately and intentionally linked to each other; and it is the task of this paper to reflect on the relationship between the two of them regarding the ecumenical commitment promoted by Vatican II and canon law. This presentation will focus in particular on the Church’s commitment to restore the unity of all Christians as one of the guiding principles of the council. The author will ask how this commitment was received in the Code of Canon Law and in the later juridical activities of the Church. The intention of this paper It is not the author’s intention to reflect on specific norms in the Code of Canon Law or on other post-conciliar legislative texts that address particular ecumenical questions, such as inter-confessional marriages, ecclesiastical funerals for baptized non-Catholic marriage partners, or the ecumenically crucial problem of communicatio in sacris. These questions are surely important for the everyday life of the Church and of many Christians, especially those who live in inter-confessional marriages and families, a notable problem especially in those local churches where there is a large number of non-Catholic faithful. But such kinds of questions, which were officially addressed in the 1993 Ecumenical Directory, are not within the area of the author’s direct professional competence. The author will concentrate rather on questions of principle, such as the general relation between ecclesial doctrine, in our case the doctrine * President of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. 1 The present text was originally a lecture entitled “Diritto canonico ed ecumenismo” given by Walter Cardinal Kasper on January 11, 2008 at the Pontifical Salesian University (Pontificia Università Salesiana) on the occasion of the twenty fifth anniversary of the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law. The editor of The Jurist is especially grateful to Cardinal Kasper for permission to translate the text into English and publish it here. He also thanks Father Markus Graulich, SDB and Bishop Johan Bonny of Antwerp, Belgium for their invaluable assistance in preparing the translation. 172 the jurist of the Second Vatican Council, and canon law, especially insofar as canon law has an impact on ecumenism. The author will not enter into the problems raised by some of our ecumenical partners coming especially from a Protestant tradition, who ask whether it is possible or even permissible to translate the gospel and ecclesial doctrines into juridical terms at all.2 According to the Catholic understanding codification is legitimate and even helpful for the purposes of a concrete realization and application of the gospel and ecclesial doctrines within the body of the Church and in its everyday life. Nevertheless, even for Catholic doctrine there remain open some questions regarding theology and canon law. For example, one may ask: in what sense and to what degree can and must canon law be understood as a juridical interpretation and application of church doctrines? Or can one perhaps note a transformation from one level to another level through canon law, a displacement that is not simply terminological? The author does not intend and is not in a position to give final answers to all these questions and to the questions which will be raised subsequently . Rather he desires to reflect concretely on the question: What does it mean for the Church’s juridical life that the Church at Vatican II committed itself explicitly and irrevocably to the promotion of the unity of Christians (UR 1, Ut unum sint [UUS] 3)? The purpose of this paper is to discover not only how the interpretation, drafting, and application of juridical norms can contribute to the implementation of the ecumenical thrust of the council, but also, and above all, how canon law itself can foster the restoration of the unity of Christians. The Commitment to Ecumenism The author’s intention to speak about the “commitment to ecumenism ” in relation to canon law...

The Ecclesiology of the Ravenna Agreed Statement: Analysis and Correction

The Thomist 73 (2009): 437-54 THE ECCLESIOLOGY OF THE RAVENNA AGREED STATEMENT: ANALYSIS AND CORRECTION ANSGAR SANTOGROSSI, 0.S.B. Our Lady of Guadalupe Seminary Denton, Nebraska IN OCTOBER 2007 the Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church published "Ecclesiological and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church: Ecclesial Communion, Conciliarity and Authority." The document has been greeted with much satisfaction insofar as Orthodox agree with Catholics that the bishop of Rome is the first of the "patriarchs" in the universal Church. Moreover, in comparison with previous documents which strongly if not exclusively emphasized the Church as sacramental communion (in baptism, Eucharist, and episcopal ordination), the Ravenna statement gives a higher profile to the necessity of canonical legitimacy in the episcopate. One may hope for future agreement on the nature and consequences of the primacy of the bishop of Rome in the universal Church. However, the Ravenna statement also opines that there cannot be an ecumenical council in the strict sense as long as the Churches are divided. This assertion is both problematic and a consequence of unresolved theological tensions that characterize the document as a whole. The present article will examine these tensions and suggest that they arise from deeply rooted presuppositions in recent ecclesiology that need to be re-examined in light of the integral Tradition of the Church. 437 438 ANSGAR SANTOGROSSI, O.S.B. I Noticeable in the Ravenna statement is a tendency to conceive the Church's being and nature as sacramental in such a way that baptism, "apostolic succession" understood as episcopal ordination, and Eucharistic celebration suffice to make "the Church" be. The consequence of this sacramental sufficiency is language that views "canonical" structures as only "expressions" of the mystery of koinonia. The overall tone of the document is set in the following passage: On the basis of these common affirmations of our faith, we must now draw the ecclesiological and canonical consequences which flow from the sacramental nature of the Church. Since the Eucharist, in the light of the Trinitarian mystery, constitutes the criterion of ecclesial life as a whole, how do institutional structures visibly reflect the mystery of this koinonia? Since the one and holy Church is realised both in each local Church celebrating the Eucharist and at the same time in the koinonia of all the Churches, how does the life of the Churches manifest this sacramental structure? Unity and multiplicity, the relationship between the one Church and the many local Churches, that constitutive relationship of the Church, also poses the question of the relationship between the authority inherent in every ecclesial institution and the conciliarity which flows from the mystery of the Church as communion.1 To say only that "institutional structures" must "reflect" the communion of the Church tends to superpose "institution" over "communion," such that the Church would exist essentially as communion, while relations of hierarchical subordination would be accidental, no matter how normal or desirable. Despite the diffusion of statements in modern theology such as "The Church is a communion before it is an institution," such a theory does not do justice to authentic Christian life in the Church. Communion in the mystery of Christ necessarily includes subordination to his visible representatives, the successors of the apostles, and not only in the time of liturgical celebration. For a Catholic, there is no licit sacramental communion without 1 "Ecclesiological and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church," par. 3-4 of the Ravenna statement, available in English on the Vatican website (www.vatican.va), under the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, "Dialogo con le Chiese Ortodosse di tradizione bizantina." ECCLESIOLOGY OF THE RAVENNA AGREED STATEMENT 439 hierarchical communion with the pope; the communion of the Church is essentially hierarchical and canonical as well as sacramental. The Ravenna statement seems to defend the contrary when it says that authority is an aspect of every ecclesial "institution," while conciliarity is said to derive from the Church as communion. The Catholic would ask, isn't the authority instituted by Christ, the once visible and now invisible head of the Church, also an invisible reality accepted in faith...

Letter from the Pontifical Council of Culture

Letter from the Pontifical Council of Culture

Actuación del defensor del vínculo en el proceso de nulidad matrimonial. Consideraciones sobre su función a la luz de la regulación codicial y de la Instrucción Dignitas Connubbi

The Instruction Dignitas Connubii, from the Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, has introduced important novelties in the canonical process of matrimonial nullity. Some of these novelties deal with the criteria and faculties of the Defender of the Bond in the development of matrimonial proceedings. This article studies, taking into account the dynamism of the process, the performance of this Public Ministery though the proceeding for the declaration of matrimonial nullity, analysing those novelties introduced by the Instruction Dignitas Connubii that may cause problems of interpretation, like the attribution of functions of counselling to the judge in the admission of the plea or in the conclusion of the cause, novelties that may break the balance between public and private parties in the process. The article also intends to deduce, from the present norms, the criteria than must guide the performance of the Defender of the Bond in matrimonial proceedings, with special attention to those questions than may cause difficulties in the practice of Eclesiastical Courts.

A Certain Rectitude of Order: Jesus and Justification According to Aquinas

The Thomist 72 (2008): 45-66 A CERTAIN RECTITUDE OF ORDER: JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION ACCORDING TO AQUINAS J. MARK ARMITAGE Durham, United Kingdom BRIAN DAVIES OBSERVES that justification, for Aquinas, "is a matter of God making us more godly."1 But how exactly does Aquinas understand this process of "making us more godly"? The key concept in Aquinas's teaching on justification is that justification denotes a movement towards "rectitude of order": Justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order [rectitudo ordinis] in the interior disposition of a human being, in so far as what is highest in humans is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls 'justice metaphorically speaking'.2 In this article I wish to explore the Christological and soteriological significance of Aquinas's understanding of justice as "a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human being." Firstly, I intend to examine his treatment of original justice and original sin, especially in so far as these denote a relation to "ordinateness." Secondly, in the light of the close connection between the questions of law and justification in Pauline theology, I intend to explain why it is for Aquinas that the 1 Brian Davies, O.P., The Thought ofThomas Aquinas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 337. 2 STh I-II, q. 113, a. 1. All quotations from the Summa Theologiae are taken, with appropriate adaptations, from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920-25). 45 46 J. MARK ARMITAGE Old Law is incapable of justifying-that is, of producing "a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human being." Finally, I intend to show how the justice of Christ-Christ's own personal justification and interior rectitude of order-is the ground for all human redemption and justification. Although this study is expository rather than speculative, I do not plan to offer either a detailed account of the relevant question from the Summa Theologiae (STh 1-11, q. 113) or an assessment of whether or not Aquinas's argument there is successful.3 Neither do I intend to discuss in great depth the twin issues of justification by faith and of the relationship of grace and justification.4 In the light of the Reformation, these issues have become, together with the debate as to whether justification is imputed (Lutheranism) or imparted (Catholicism), central to the discussion of justification whether this is conceived polemically or ecumenically, and they are, understandably, issues that feature prominently in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification by the Lutheran World Federation and the Catholic Church.5 However, there has emerged over the last thirty years or so (primarily in the Englishspeaking world) a current of thinking in contemporary Pauline scholarship to the effect that Paul's teaching on justification needs to be interpreted not along the customary post-Reformation lines, but in the light of his understanding of Old Testament covenant theology and of the shape of biblical narrative.6 This "new 3 For an analysis of Aquinas's synthesis, see Eleonore Stump, "Atonement and Justification," in Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., eds., Trinity, Incarnation, andAtonement: Philosophicaland Theological Essays (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 178-209. 4 The classic themes of justification through faith, justificati_on and grace, and justification as forgiveness are beyond the scope of this study. For a good introduction, see Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 335-39; Daniel A. Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and Divinization in Thomas Aquinas," in Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction (London: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 139-58. 5 Available on the Vatican web site (www.vatican.va) under the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. 6 See especially N. T. Wright, Paul: Fresh Perspectives (London: SPCK, 2005); also N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People ofGod (London: SPCK, 1992); Ben Witherington III, The Paul Quest: The Renewed Search for the Jew of Tarsus (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1998), 230-62. JESUS AND...