Pollution-intensive Industries Research Articles

The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation

We know that the average person has experienced a decrease in air pollution levels over the past two decades, but we do not know much about the distributional effects of regulation-induced reduction. Have the poor, as well as the wealthy, significantly reduced their exposure to pollutants? Are minorities paying the cost for these regulations as pollution-intensive industries cut their workforce or move away? In California between 1980 and 1998, Hispanic pollution exposure fell sharply and exposure differentials between richer and poorer people fell sharply. In 1998, only particulate matter exposure is much higher for the poor in comparison with the wealthy. Given the overall trend in improvements for certain demographic groups, it appears that regulation under the Clean Air Act has helped, and not economically harmed, the have nots.

Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy

This paper constructs a model of international oligopoly with negative externalities in production, in which optimal environmental policy responses to foreign emission tax and subsidy programs can be calculated. It is shown that by granting subsidies for abatement efforts or for a heavily taxed polluting input, domestic net welfare is improved by capturing a greater share of the world market. Since the subsidy programs are supposed to improve the quality of the global environment, they can be justified on environmental grounds. In addition, we show that a Pigouvion emission tax restores efficiency in natural resource allocation, whereas subsidy programs are in principle used as instruments in imperfectly competitive international markets.

Trade Policy and Industrial Pollution in Latin America: Where Are the Pollution Havens?

It is commonly assumed by economists and environmentalists alike that greater economtc "openness" will lead to increased industrial pollution in developing countries. This paper challenges the "pollution haven" hypothesis, arguing that liberalization of trade regimes and increased foreign investment in Latin America have not been associated with pollution-intensive industrial development. From case studies and econometric evidence, we conclude that protected economies are more likely to favor pollution intensive industries, while openness actually encourages cleaner industry through the importation of developed-country pollution standards.

Review of the literature on international location of pollution-intensive industries

Review of the literature on international location of pollution-intensive industries

Theme issue of the Norwegian Journal of Geography

The debate on whether industries will relocate to the South (Third World) when environmental regulations become stricter in the North, reaches back to the mid-1970s. It is not a widespread debate with many participants. Almost all the studies are either mainly empirical, showing cases of relocation of pollution-intensive industries, or hypothetical, refuting the likelihood of an ‘xodus’ of manufacturing from rich to poor countries (Walter 1975, Castleman 1979, Knodgen 1982, Ives 1985, Pearson 1987, Leonard 1988, UN 1988, UN 1990, UNIDO 1990, Knutsen 1991).

The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares

The method for measuring the effects of environmental regulation on the size distribution of industrial plants and the distribution of factor shares described in this paper focuses on the 20 industries with highest per unit pollution abatement costs and the 20 with the lowest costs. The study finds that compliance with environmental laws has not only reduced the number of plants in the affected industries, but has placed a greater burden on small rather than on large plants. Besides redistributing within-industry market shares, environmental regulation has increased the use of capital relative to labor. Although the disproportionate burden placed on small plants in the high abatement cost industries may have been unintended, it is likely that large firms will be less vocal opponents of environmental regulation than are small firms. 22 references, 12 tables.