normally artificially separated: ethical theories of the obligations of states to protect strangers and the empirical study of refugee and asylum regimes in liberal democracies. Gibney's analysis makes clear why these two intellectual activities are normally kept apart. Juxtaposing them clearly reveals the tensions between the ideal and the real, the desirable and the possible, the just and the expedient. Most analysts, by temperament or training, lean toward one side of these dichotomies or the other. Yet, a political theory of refugee policy must, Gibney argues, have ethical force and practical relevance; it must identify both values and agency. Gibney believes that it is possible to combine abstract philosophical speculation with empirical study of actual cases to produce an ethically defensible guide to politically viable refugee policies, and that is his goal. The Ethics and Politics of Asylum begins with a prolonged look at various attempts to provide an ethical grounding for state refugee protection schemes. Gibney defines refugees as people in need of a new state of residence, either temporarily or permanently, because if forced to return home or remain where they are, they would--as a result of either the brutality or inadequacy of their state--be persecuted or seriously jeopardize their physical security or vital subsistence (p. 7). Gibney limits his analysis for the most part to entrance criteria. Although entrance issues are at the heart of political controversies about asylum in the Western world, this decision leads him away from a fuller consideration of alternative, nonentrance policies--such as assistance to refugees in place, subsidized resettlement in third countries, or policies designed to address the problems that produce refugees. Gibney divides theories of refugee protection into two broad camps, which he labels partialists and impartialists. Partialists argue that states have a special obligation to give preference to the needs of their members over those of strangers. Partialists derive their positions from a variety of philosophical traditions, including nationalism and conservatism, but perhaps the most important is communitarianism (see, for example Walzer 1983). Partialists defend the national state's prerogative to control access to the national territory, arguing (1) that identity is important to humans, (2) that states and cultures are critical to the formation of identities, (3) that culture and nationality play a practical role in facilitating collective political activity, and (4) that citizens of democracies often express a preference for such controls. Gibney points out, in turn, that states are more than cultures; they are also territories and actors. He asks by what right do states govern their territories, and are they responsible for the harm they do as actors?