Weimar Political Research Articles

After Individuality: Freud's Mass Psychology and Weimar Politics

This essay discusses Sigmund Freud’s Mass Psychology and the Analysis of the ’I’ (1921), within its historical, intellectual and political context. Freud’s argument, that masses are produced through processes of identification with authoritarian leadership, opens a new chapter in the history of crowd psychology. The essay asks how it is that Freud’s mass theory has been interpreted both as a theory of the psyche and as theory of society, and, as for the latter alternative, both as a theory of fascism and as a theory of social cohesion in general. Or: how come Freud’s definition of the mass serves both as a definition of totalitarian rule, the proto-fascist order of the primal father, and as a definition of society, held together by libidinal ties that Freud associated with Eros? Dissolving this apparent paradox, the essay shows that, for Freud, the mass occupies the same position as the unconscious. Being beyond any means of representation and language, the mass, like the unconscious, is for Freud society in its ”zero-degree” or ”raw” state, before being socially divided and politically organized. No wonder that such a theory would emerge in a historical situation like the Weimar period, when social divisions were contested and political institutions weak or defunct.

The Penumbra of Weimar Political Culture: Pacifism, Feminism, and Social Democracy

The Penumbra of Weimar Political Culture: Pacifism, Feminism, and Social Democracy

Timothy S. Brown . Weimar Radicals: Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance . (Monographs in German History, number 28.) New York : Berghahn Books . 2009 . Pp. xii, 213. $90.00.

Ever since the breakdown of the Weimar Republic, protagonists, observers, and scholars have been particularly interested in the violent clash between Nazis and communists. For a long time, however, rather simple narratives of this story were predominant. During the Cold War, the Marxist tale of “anti-fascism” competed with positions informed by the theory of totalitarianism. In recent years, this debate has changed. Today, neither the failure of the Weimar Republic nor the experiences of totalitarian extremism need to be pressed into service to validate political legitimization. The Weimar Republic no longer plays its earlier dominant role as a paradigm for a democracy's loss of power and the “pincer” attack of two anti-democratic movements. Timothy S. Brown's book fits well into this important tendency that focuses on cultural and actor-oriented aspects of Weimar politics. It is more concerned with argument, moral persuasion, and conversion than with the political history of Nazism and communism. Concentrating on the crucial period from 1930 to 1934, the key concept is that each of the radical movements tried to “stage elements of the radicalism associated with the other” (p. 5). In this perspective, the undeniable and much observed overlaps between Nazis and communists came from the effort of each of the two movements to appeal to the rank and file of the other side by performing their own political language and symbols. Nazis employed “leftist” notions like class, while communists tried to embrace “rightist” arguments and symbols based on terms like “nation” or even “race.” By trying to outbid each other on these platforms both movements contributed to the general radicalization of Weimar political culture.

With a Passion for Reason: Celebrating the Constitution in Weimar Germany

It has long been held that Weimar democracy lacked the symbolic appeal necessary to bind collective sentiment and to win popular support. While recent revisionist histories of Weimar politics and culture take their cue from Peter Fritzsche's argument that “Weimar is less a cumulative failure than a series of bold experiments,” the turn toward new approaches and perspectives is uneven and incomplete even in those studies that avoid conflating the fragility of Weimar democracy with the overall lack or absence of democratic identifications. Detlev Peukert, while admonishing his readers not to minimize the Weimar experiment in democracy, also argues that the first German republic had no founding ritual, and that this absence in national history attests to a general lack of legitimacy. Eric Weitz, in his eloquent survey of the republic's promises and tragedy, has little to say about the proponents and forms of Weimar democratic culture. Thomas Mergel, who shows that the Weimar parliament was marked by a cooperative atmosphere of pragmatic republicanism, attributes to the republican Left a certain tendency “toward a rationalistic understanding of politics, toward the underestimation of the emotional attachment to a flag.” This assessment is entirely in line with the earlier claim that the rationalistic optimism (Gotthard Jasper) of the republican forces led to a “consequential underestimation of the integrative power of state symbols” (Klaus Wippermann).

The Concept of the Apolitical: German Jewish Thought and Weimar Political Theology

Peter Eli Gordon The Concept of the Apolitical: German Jewish Thought and Weimar Political Theology INTRODUCTION: WEIMAR POLITICAL THEOLOGY RECENT YEARS HAVE SEEN CONSIDERABLE DEBATE OVER THE CONCERNS of political theology and the question as to how the concepts and cate­ gories that inform political association may have derived historically from, or logically depend upon, prior concepts of religion. Debates over this question are partly normative: Does politics require theology, in the sense that theological concepts furnish the only possible warrant for our political commitments? Or, by contrast, does politics only come into its own if theology is dismissed? But the debate is also historical: Did politics only emerge as a transformation or worldly application (“secular­ ization” in the precise sense) of terms originally operative in a theologi­ cal context (as Karl Lowith claimed)? Or does politics, especially in its modem form, only claim its legitimacy by virtue of its attempt (as Hans Blumenberg argued) to place modernity itself on entirely new founda­ tions? These debates may seem especially urgent today given the resur­ gence of political movements, both East and West, that claim to derive their legitimacy from religious principles: Christian, Jewish, Hindu, and Islamic. But for intellectual reasons alone it seems worthwhile to revisit some of the foundational debates out of which the current discussion of political theology was bom .1 social research Vol 74 : No 3 : Fall 2007 855 It is difficult to isolate one discrete historical moment since the attendant themes have an ancient lineage that stretches at least as far back as Saint Augustine’s reflections on the harmony or potential strife between the earthly city and the city of God. It is well known, however, that political theology underwent a dramatic resurgence of attention in Weimar Germany in the years following World War One. In those debates certain names recur with great frequency: Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, Franz Rosenzweig, Ernst Bloch, Ernst Kantorowicz.2 But in the specific context of Weimar political theology one name is almost never heard: Hannah Arendt. The question I would like to pose in this paper is admittedly strange because its form is negative: Why does Arendt’s conception of political life not conform to the terms of political theo­ logical debate? The beginnings of an answer—and a beginning is all I can attempt here—can only be found by revisiting some of the politi­ cal-theological alternatives that appeared on the scene during Arendt’s formative years in Weimar Germany. LEO STRAUSS AND THE THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PROBLEM In 1962 the political philosopher Leo Strauss, now living in Hyde Park on the flanks of the University of Chicago, drafted a new preface to the English translation of his 1930 book, Die Religionskritik Spinozas. The pref­ ace begins by naming what Strauss considered the central problem of modern philosophy: “This study on Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise was written during the years 1925-28 in Germany,” Strauss writes. “The author was a young Jew born and raised in Germany who found himself in the grip of the theologico-political predicament” (Strauss, 1965:1). Just what was the theologico-political predicament? While the details or possible merits of Straussian doctrine will not be my focus here, a general characterization seems crucial especially if we wish better to understand the general history of German-Jewish thought over the last century.3 For present purposes, we should first recall that Strauss himself was born in 1899, just seven years before Hannah Arendt, whose centennial we honored this past year. Both were German 856 social research Jews steeped in classical and modern philosophy. And both found in Martin Heidegger an early inspiration for their own work, though it must also be noted that their initial phase of enthusiasm soon turned to disenchantment when Heidegger, like so many of his German contem­ poraries, moved to embrace National Socialism. Disenfranchised by their native government, both eventually sought refuge in the United States—Strauss in 1937, Arendt in 1941—where they took up teaching positions, at the University of Chicago and the New School for Social Research, and laid the foundations for two ofthe most enduring schools of political thought. A comparative study of these two...

Puzzles and Solutions: Appreciating Carl Schmitt's Work on International Law as Answers to the Dilemmas of his Weimar Political Theory

Introduction: Carl Schmitt and his impressive oeuvre have become focal points of today's academic interest, whilst his work on international law and international relations does so far not conjure intense discussions. It seems common to deem Schmitt's turn to geopolitics awkward and abrupt or to consider it a mere tactical maneuver to overcome academic and political isolation. Schmitt's early and deep-going entanglement with Nazi Germany and his prominent role as the Kronjurist of the Third Reich not only made him a persona-non-grata on the international parquet or in Germany's post-War scholarship, but already before the end of the Second World War had the German jurist been isolated in Nazi circles. To report an anonymous commentator, whose view seems to prevail today: Schmitt 'seeks a new field of activity in which he would like to avoid his complete marginalization, hoping eventually to regain his momentum.' Somewhat ironically, this view is not referring to the contemporary disregard for Schmitt's turn to foreign affairs, but the anonymous commentator served as an operative for the Nazi secret service. In this article, I intend to challenge the contemporary academic indifference for Schmitt's reflections about the international arena. I will not argue that Schmitt's ideas on the international realm are worthwhile being introduced into contemporary debates on how to reframe the global architecture; rather, I will submit that his foundational works on international law and international relations provide answers for various dilemmas and puzzles that pervaded and even dictated his Weimar pieces on domestic political theory.

Gustav Stresemann and the Verband Nationaldeutscher Juden: Right-Wing Jews in Weimar Politics

Gustav Stresemann and the Verband Nationaldeutscher Juden: Right-Wing Jews in Weimar Politics Get access Jonathan Wright, Jonathan Wright Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Peter Pulzer Peter Pulzer Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Leo Baeck Institute Year Book, Volume 50, Issue 1, January 2005, Pages 199–211, https://doi.org/10.1093/leobaeck/50.1.199 Published: 01 January 2005

Preface

Preface Volume 12 of the Goethe Yearbook is dedicated to its founding editor, Thomas P. Saine. Volume 1 was published in 1982 and expressed the hope that the Goethe Yearbook "would come to be viewed as a natural home for Goethe and Goethe Period studies written in English. . . ." That it has. Through the ten volumes he edited with a combination of openmindedness and editorial rigor, Tom enriched the world of Goethe studies with over 120 contributions with a distinctively North American flavor. If David Wellbery's opening essay on "The Specular Moment" and Hans RudolfVaget 's "Der Schreibakt und der Liebesakt," both in volume 1, set the standard for innovative, risk-taking scholarship, subsequent volumes did not disappoint. To name a few highlights: Géza von Molnár's study of "Goethes Studium der Kritik der Urteilskraft" in volume 2, Suzanne Zantop 's essay on the "Bekenntnisse einer schönen Seele" and Jocelyne Kolb's "Presenting the Unpresentable: Goethe's Translation of Le Neveu de Rameau" both in volume 3, W. Daniel Wilson's "Weimar Politics in the Age of the French Revolution" on Goethe and the Uluminati (vol. 5), J. Hillis Miller's Wahlverwandschafien essay (vol. 6), and Jane Brown's "The Queen of the Night and the Crisis of Allegory in The Magic Flute" (vol. 8). These are just a few examples of the pathbreaking scholarship Tom published, regardless of the authors' theoretical inclinations. Of course, Tom may be prouder of other risks that he took, such as publishing the first essays of young authors and advanced graduate students whose articles improved thanks to his assistance and advice. Through his editorial leadership, the Goethe Yearbook won recognition in North America, Germany, the UK and elsewhere. It has become a standard for Goethe scholarship and has certainly more than met the hopes Tom and the founding members of the Goethe Society of North American cherished for it in the early 1980s. In the preface to volume 1, Tom expressed his thanks to "the founding mothers, fathers, aunts and uncles, especially Ehrhard Bahr, Victor Lange, Meredith Lee, Christoph Schweitzer, and Hans R. Vaget." I trust Tom will be pleased that these (to the extent possible ) and many more are among the contributors to volume 12. If we have difficulty imagining a world without the Goethe Yearbook, it is because of Tom. And that in itself is a monument to his editorship. This volume is a token of our thanks. Simon Richter ...

Human Rights: Universalism and Cultural Relativism

Much mainstream legal comment on human rights law presents an unhelpfully crude picture of disagreement concerning the significance that should be attached to human rights in particular cultural co...

Jews in the Christian Gaze: Munich's Churches before and after Hitler1

Kauders sets out to examine three interrelated topics: the nature of antisemitism after the Second World War; the continuity in thinking about the Jews in the twentieth century; and the problem of responsibility inherent in any analysis of the events surrounding the Holocaust. In what follows, emphasis is placed on the Catholic and Protestant churches in the Bavarian capital of Munich, whose reactions to Jew-hatred before 1933 and after 1945 are studied in some detail. Several conclusions emerge from this investigation. Both churches embraced völkisch thinking before 1933, without approving of violent manifestations of racialist thought. Both Catholics and Protestants, whenever they defended the Jews before the rise of Hitler, did so in order to safeguard Christian dogma, and in particular the value of the Old Testament as well as the Jewish origins of Jesus and Paul. After 1945 clerics employed language that ignored events between 1933 and 1945, describing the ‘Jewish question’ as if the issue was still embedded in Weimar politics; they did so because they assumed that a majority of Germans had been innocent of any wrongdoing, so that a pre-1933 image of ‘the Jew’ (which did not allow for extremism and violence) could be re-adopted with impunity after 1945. Christian views began to change in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when Jews were increasingly seen as Others who were to be respected as such. Although German-Jewish irreconcilability was thereby cemented, this shift also entailed an acceptance as opposed to a denial of the Jew as different from Christians and ‘Germans’.

Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory and Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism

Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law is a historical analysis of competing doctrines of constitutional law during the Weimar Republic. It chronicles the creation of a new constitutional jurisprudence both adequate to the needs of a modern welfare state and based on the principle of popular sovereignty. Peter C Caldwell explores the legal nature of democracy as debated by Weimar's political theorists and constitutional lawyers. Laying the groundwork for questions about constitutional law in today's Federal Republic, this book draws clear and insightful distinctions between strands of positivist and anti-positivist legal thought, and examines their implications for legal and political theory. Caldwell makes accessible the rich literature in German constitutional thought of the Weimar period, most of which has been unavailable in English until now. On the liberal left, Hugo Preuss and Hans Kelsen defended a concept of democracy that made the constitution sovereign and, in a way, created the 'Volk' through constitutional procedure. On the right, Carl Schmitt argued for a substantial notion of the 'Volk' that could overrule constitutional procedure in a state of emergency. Rudolf Smend and Heinrich Triepel located in the constitution a set of inviolable values of the political community, while Hermann Heller saw in it a guarantee of substantial social equality. Drawing on the work of these major players from the 1920s, Caldwell reveals the various facets of the impassioned constitutional struggles that permeated German legal and political culture during the Weimar Republic. This book will be valuable for historians, political theorists, constitutional lawyers, and students and scholars interested in the continuing problems of democracy and constitutionalism.

Germany after the First World War

German society during World War I wartime planning for postwar demobilization the return of the soldiers the demobilization of the economy demobilization and labour demobilization and housing demobilization in the countryside the postwar transition and the moral order the legacy of World War I and Weimar politics.

Political leaders in Weimar Germany: a biographical study

This book presents and English language biographical dictionary of the most prominent and significant political leaders in the Weimar period in Germany. The book includes information on over 100 individuals at the heart of politics, including Bruening, Ebert, Hitler, Loeb, Dietrich, Schiele, and Wissell. Details are included of background, career, significance and contribution to Weimar politics between 1918 and 1933. Where appropriate, reference is also made to other sources of information such as relevant biographies, autobiographies, memoirs, diaries and speeches.

Multiple Restorations: German Political Traditions and the Interpretation of Nazism, 1945–1946

Inthe longer continuity of German history, the year 1945 will always, in part, represent the “Stunde Null” (zero hour), of catastrophic military defeat and complete moral disgrace and bankruptcy following Nazism and the Holocaust.1The term “Stunde Null” evokes the need for a new beginning, a moral and political break with disastrous and ultimately criminal national traditions. Yet, because the Third Reich lasted only twelve years, and because there were non- and anti-Nazi traditions and leaders that survived in inner and external emigration, the postwar rejection of Nazism took the form ofmultiple restorationsof these still extant German political traditions. In the first postwar years, the turn away from Nazism in both Germanies, as well as the break with totalitarian dictatorship in general in Western Germany, was taken by political leaders who had been active in Weimar politics and who returned to take center stage in German politics after 1945.2To be sure, they were all deeply affected in their lives and thinking by the Third Reich. But what changes it did bring about in their political views amounted to rearrangements and different emphases of long-held convictions rather than to wholly new beginnings.

Women in Weimar Politics

Women in Weimar Politics

Nazi “Coordination” of Technology: The Case of the Bavarian Polytechnical Society

Research Note NAZI “COORDINATION” OF TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE BAVARIAN POLYTECHNICAL SOCIETY DONALD E. THOMAS, JR. In recent years a number of studies have dealt with the fate of technology and the engineering profession under National Socialism. The most exhaustive of these works is Karl-Heinz Ludwig’s Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich, which examines, among other things, the Nazi “coordination” {Gleichschaltung}' of professional engineering societies and the cooperation of engineers with both peacetime and wartime policies of the Third Reich.2 While Ludwig has studied the process of coordination on the national level, it may be of interest to test his results on the local level by looking at one of Germany’s Dr. Thomas is professor of history at the Virginia Military Institute arid author of Diesel: Technology and Society in Industrial Germany (University, Ala., 1987). He thanks Dr. Michael Davidis, now of the Landesmuseum fur Technik und Arbeit, Mannheim, for suggesting research on the coordination of the Polytechnical Society, and the staff of the Deutsches Museum, Munich, who aided his research, especially Frau Margret Nida-Rümelin of the Research Institute, Dr. Rudolf Heinrich of the Special Collections Department, and Frau Zdenka Hlava of the Public Relations Office. He is further indebted to the VM1 Research Committee for financial assistance, to Dr. Paul Wilson of Fairfield, Virginia, and to the Technology and Culture referees for their insightful comments. 'Gleichschaltung was the Nazi expression for the destruction of independent political, social, economic, or other institutions and their incorporation into Nazi-controlled front organizations. Interestingly enough, it was originally “an engineering term meaning ‘putting into the same gear’ ” (Cordon Craig, The Germans [New York, 1982], p. 326). Tarl-I Icinz Ludwig, Technik und Ingenieure im Dritten Reich (Düsseldorf, 1974). Ludwig has also discussed the history of the German Engineers’ Association (VDI) under the Nazis in two essays: “Der VDI als Gegenstand cler Parteipolitik 1933 bis 1945,” and “Vereinsarbeit im Dritten Reich 1933-1945,” in Karl-Heinz Ludwig and Wolfgang Kônig, eds., Technik, Ingenieure und Gesellschaft: Geschichte des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure 1856-1981 (Düsseldorf, 1981), pp. 407-54. Two other works that deal in part with engineers and the Nazis are Gerd Hortleder’s book on the VDI, Das Gesellschaftsbild des Ingénieurs: Zum politischen Verhalten der Technischen Intelligent in Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1970); and Jeffrey Herf's Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1984).© 1990 by the Society for the History of Technology. All rights reserved. 0040-165X/90/3102-0003$01.00 251 252 Donald E. Thomas, Jr. foremost regional technical organizations, the Bavarian Polytechnical Society (Polytechnischer Verein in Bayern). The Polytechnical Society was not strictly speaking a professional engineering organization, but many of its members were engineers, and a number of its objectives, such as furthering technological development and advising in patent matters, were similar to those of engineering groups. The fate of the Polytechnical Society is an instructive example of Nazi policy toward local technological organizations and the response of such organiza­ tions to dictatorial control. According to Ludwig, the attitude of professional engineering societies to the Nazi takeover in 1933 was one of accommodation. In return for being allowed to maintain their professional identities and independence, groups such as the German Engineers’ Association (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, or VDI) were willing to vote Nazis onto their governing boards and to give verbal backing to Nazi ideas such as the “fiihrer” principle. The professional organizations were able to avoid further Nazi coordination in 1933—34, partly because the Nazis themselves had not developed a firm plan for such a takeover and also because the Nazi bureaucrats fought among them­ selves for control of the engineers. The Nazi economic theorist Gottfried Feder, who was himself a civil engineer, wished to include engineers in an anticapitalist technologi­ cal front. Feder’s ideas were too radical for a regime trying to win the confidence of industrialists and engineers for the upcoming rearma­ ment program. He was finally removed from his offices in late 1934. In late 1933, Robert Ley, head of the German Labor Front (Deutsche Arbeitsfront), also tried to assume control of German technological organizations. His...

Weimar Politics in the Age of the French Revolution: Goethe and the Spectre of Illuminati Conspiracy

W. DANIEL WILSON Weimar Politics in the Age of the French Revolution: Goethe and the Spectre of Illuminati Conspiracy Adam Weishaupt is really the father of Bolshevism — not Karl Marx. [...] Thejacobins of the French Revolution were controlled by the Bavarian Illuminati. [...] The "Conspiracy" today controls communism.1 These wild notions were pronounced in an American right-wing journal in 1965. Equally bizarre are the claims by Robert Welch, the founder of the John Birch Society, that the German Illuminati of the eighteenth century were ultimately responsible for "everything in the way of 'security' legislation, from the first Workmen's Compensation Acts under Bismarck to the latest Medicare monstrosity under Lyndon Johnson," as well as centralized banking, a graduated personal income tax, both World Wars, the Russian Revolution, the expansion of Communism, the breakup of colonial empires, and the formation of the United Nations.2 The seeds of this theory were sown in the period of the French Revolution itself; in the words of one of its most rabid adherents, in 1793: Nicht die Franzosen sind [...] die eigentlichen Erfinder dieses großen Projects, die Welt umzukehren; diese Ehre kommt den Deutschen zu. [...] [D]en Franzosen gehört nur die Ehre daß sie mit der Ausführung den Anfang gemacht haben. [...] Aus dem in Deutschland entstandenen, und noch ganz und gar nicht erloschenen, sondern nur Verborgenen und um desto gefährlicher sein Wesen treibenden Illuminatismus sind also die Comités politiques entstanden, die dem Jacobinerclubb sein Daseyn gegeben haben.3 The Germans have been accused of many things, often with good reason, but the idea that they instigated the French Revolution evokes only ridicule in most of us today. But this idea stands out from the host of modern conspiracy theories because of its ideological impact: it played a major role in 164 W. Daniel Wilson nineteenth-century politics, and the Nazis were guided by it in their persecution of Freemasons.4 In fact, it can even be found haunting the pages of reputable modern scholarship, two hundred years after the beginning of the Revolution.5 More important for our purposes, it was one of the most important conservative discourses of the revolutionary period itself. My topic is the extent to which this theory infected and frightened the literary elite, some of whom had themselves been Illuminati, and what this phenomenon means for our understanding of subjectivity, especially in times of repression. Adam Weishaupt and his followers were the subject of intense debate in Germany in the late 1780s and the 1790s. He founded the secret society of Llluminaten at Ingolstadt in 1776; within a fewyears it had grown to over two thousand members, not only in Bavaria but in Northern Germany and the Rhineland. While generally the goals of the Illuminati were of a broadly Enlightened and moral-pedagogic nature, some of their writings pointed the way to an eradication of the state: "[...] Fürsten und Nationen werden ohne Gewaltthätigkeit von der Erde verschwinden," Weishaupt wrote in a speech meant only for the highest ranks of the order. Such statements were less radical than they seemed to outsiders, since Illuminati tactics involved a very long-term process of moral improvement — their goals were not revolutionary , but rather an expression of the illusionary ideal of enlightened absolutism: moral influence on an absolutist ruler, resulting in reform ('revolution from above').7 Still, the Illuminati operated by infiltrating the government, clandestinely recruiting (often through Masonic lodges) the highest civil servants and even rulers, and this process seemed very conspiratory. When the Illuminati were suppressed by the Bavarian and other governments in 1784-1785, and when some confiscated documents were published in 1786 and 1787, most Germans were stunned at what they felt was a plot against the political and social order; some even predicted a revolution led by Illuminati.8 When the French Revolution did break out in 1789, conservatives and even moderates almost automatically associated the Illuminati with it.9 Two of the German conspiracy theorists later claimed that when they heard the news of the storming of the Bastille, they looked at each other and said in unison : "Das ist das Werk der 44 [= der llluminaten],"10 and such conclusions hardly...

Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Jeffrey Herf

Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Jeffrey Herf

Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich

Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich

The Great War in German Memory: The Soldiers of the First World War, Demobilization, and Weimar Political Culture

The Great War in German Memory: The Soldiers of the First World War, Demobilization, and Weimar Political Culture