Political Standoff Research Articles

WHY EFFECTIVE INTERGOVERNMENTAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ARE IMPORTANT BEYOND 2024

The relevance of local governments is frequently defended based on municipalities’ novel contribution towards the promotion of democratisation and also the intensification of community participation in decision-making due to its close proximity to its citizens. However, the departing premise hereto is also that the realisation of a democratic and accountable government likewise depends on the degree of functionality of every municipal council. Volatility in governance structures like councils can therefore adversely compromise democratic and accountable governance, for example in cases of hung councils. In recent years, local coalition governments have been seen more frequently, partly due to the number of hang councils in South Africa. This can indirectly be attributed to the decline of support of the current ruling party in the Republic and, equally, the inability of other parties to obtain a clear majority during local government elections (Netswera & Khumalo 2022:1). This article investigates the effectiveness of national and provincial mechanisms strengthening an accountable and democratic local government Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others matter. Through the doctrinal legal research, the authors used an analysis of primary sources on South African local government legislation and the impact the Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others; All Tshwane Councillors who are Members of the Economic Freedom Fighters and Another v Democratic Alliance and Others; African National Congress v Democratic Alliance and Others (CCT 82/20; CCT 91/20) [2021] ZACC 34; 2021 (12) BCLR 1406 (CC); 2022 (1) SA 16 (CC) (4 October 2021) case have on hung councils. The research benefitted from secondary sources such as research reports, publications, journal articles and books. It follows that successful coalition councils are founded on the principles of cooperation and trust. Therefore, interventions as solitary intergovernmental mechanisms cannot remedy accountability and governance failures in municipalities, caused by coalition fallouts. Still, when a break between coalition partners ensues, accountable governance suffers because of the resulting volatility caused by the political standoff. The intergovernmental governance mechanisms, in isolation, are ineffective in sustaining and ensuring an accountable and democratic local government. Whereas, coalitions governments are the primary cause of volatility and dysfunctionality in municipalities, it remains the responsibility of coalitions to step up and execute their constitutional obligations as responsible executive actors in the local government area, to ensure accountable governance. In the absence thereof, coalitions must be held liable for the failure to execute their constitutional responsibilities

Twenty - day Border Conflict in the No Man's Land

Due to the civil war in Syria, many Syrians have fled conflict areas in search of safety in other countries, resulting in a severe migratory problem. The situation in Syria grew increasingly complicated post-civil war due to the involvement of global powers and radical Islamist factions. In a significant incident, forces of the Assad regime launched an attack on Turkish soldiers in Idlib, resulting in the death of nine Turkish military personnel on February 27, 2020. The following day, Turkey announced its decision to open its borders to refugees heading to Europe, reversing its previous policy of border closure since 2016. This move is interpreted as Turkey's strategy to increase pressure on NATO and the European Union regarding the situation in Iblid and the demand for a no-fly zone. This paper focuses on analyzing the repercussions of the EU-Turkey Joint Action Plan and its implementation, the escalation of tensions leading to the opening of the Turkish border, and the potential use of Syrian refugees as pawns in a political standoff.

New Citizen Forms of Solidarity in Zimbabwe’s Crisis-Stricken Context

The real effectiveness of foreign aid or overseas development assistance is evident in the improvement of the livelihoods of the recipients for the better. There have been numerous debates and discussions around the extent to which foreign aid brings about true development for countries in the global south. In the case of Zimbabwe, foreign aid and its reduction have been linked to the political standoff between the country and the west, particularly after the implementation of the controversial land reform program. Coupled with a protracted economic crisis that has stretched for over 20 years, the expectation was for the country to completely collapse. However, this has not been the case. Citizens found ways or alternatives to continue with their lives and develop mechanisms of resilience and solidarity that allowed them to keep on going even amid the political and economic crises of the last 22 years. How did they do this and what role can this play in advancing a more inclusive society and approach to development This paper explores this question.

Value Creation Measurement and Management in Times of Radical Social and Technological Change

This article tries to deepen our knowledge on the nature of value creation and management in times of turbulent environments both for business management and academic research. The current uncertainties in our economy—coming from exogenous shocks (e.g., financial crises, political standoffs [US–China], pandemic and Ukrainian war) or from demand for more sustainable activities—affect existing companies and provide opportunities for new ventures. Both type of firms need to think of innovative and out-of-the-box ideas to keep generating value for all stakeholders, and particularly to their customers. The nuanced understanding of the factors describing the current economic situation and their effect on value creation and management affects management by, for example, efficient use of resources, and assists in strategy formulation and decision-making. Customer value creation is a dual concept: creating value for customers (value-to-customer [V2C]) as well as extracting some of that customer value at the same time to create value for the firm (value-to-firm [V2F]). While this might be known, it is rarely implemented. In order to deliver V2C, firms should look at the customer journey from a customers’ point of view rather than a firms’ point of view. Only then, the real revenue potential can be realized when thinking about monetizing the customer interface and, hence, developing the customer relationship options beyond the current business. Even if it exists for a long time already, customer lifetime value (CLV) und customer equity (CE) are the right techniques to measure and manage value in such times. Besides, in today’s environment, the gap between CLV and CE and shareholder value needs to be closed. Existing customer-based corporate valuation studies do exactly so and, more importantly, will become even more important in the future due to new business models.

European solutions for shadow oligarchic rule in Europe’s East: Do they work? The case of Georgia

This article looks at the EU’s intervention as the mediator in a domestic political stand-off in Georgia, triggered by the parliamentary elections of 2020. Believing the results of the elections to be fraudulent, the parliamentary opposition rejected them. European Council President Charles Michel then stepped in, initiating a mediation process between the government and the opposition in 2021 and securing a political agreement intended to end the crisis. Analysing the relevant geopolitical and policy framework for this intervention, and its successes and failures, presents fertile ground for understanding the EU as the foreign-policy actor in its neighbourhood and the implications of such a role for the Eastern Partnership initiative. This article argues that while the EU’s active leverage model for supporting democracy was applied in the case of Georgia, the shortcomings and miscalculations of the premises on which the policy model was built limited its success.

Kuwait Economy: Opportunity, Potential, Recovery (Expectation vs Reality)

Kuwait is a fairly rich country in which citizens have a very high per capita income. After a modest recovery in 2018, Kuwait’s economic growth slowed to 0,4% in 2019 as oil production declined and global hydrocarbon prices fell as a result. In 2020, the country’s economic growth falls to the mark (–8,1%), while IMF analysts predict a recovery in growth to 0.7% in 2021 and to 3,2% in 2022.Years of low oil prices have forced the government of Kuwait to almost use up its cash reserves, while the brewing political standoff has prevented it from borrowing on international markets. Kuwait provides a comfortable existence for 90% of local citizens who receive government wages, along with generous benefits and subsidies, from cheap electricity and gasoline to free health care and education. However, the COVID–19 pandemic, falling oil prices and a liquidity crisis forced the government to speak seriously about the crisis in the country for the first time. Thus, the Minister of Finance of Kuwait announced that soon the government would not be able to pay salaries, and the Central Bank of Kuwait in its reports indicated that the country’s budget deficit could reach 40% of GDP, which is the highest since financial losses as a result of Iraq’s invasion in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War.

The Peace Deal: The Formation of the Ingonyama Trust and the IFP Decision to Join South Africa’s 1994 Elections

ABSTRACT The territory once administered by the KwaZulu homeland, roughly 30 per cent of the current province of KwaZulu-Natal, belongs to the Ingonyama Trust. After South Africa’s first democratic elections of 26–28 April 1994, the other nine homelands were integrated into a unitary state. The land they administered came under the authority of the national government. KwaZulu was the only exception. How did 2.8 million hectares end up in a trust with the Zulu king as sole trustee? This article returns to the tense political standoff before the elections to reconstruct the informal negotiations that resulted in the Inkatha Freedom Party’s (IFP) decision to join elections and the transfer of KwaZulu land to the king. The peace deal emerged from a brief reanimation of an old working partnership between Pretoria and traditional authorities in KwaZulu, based on a confluence of interests among National Party conservatives and IFP moderates. Ultimately, the IFP decided to participate without the federalist guarantees it demanded. Instead, the inducement was land for the traditional authorities who formed the backbone of KwaZulu administration. Based on extensive interviews and archival research, this article excavates the Ingonyama Trust’s role in breaking a seemingly unsolvable political deadlock.

Hong Kong’s Stand-off: Indigenous Dynamics and International Perspective

In February 2019, Administration of Hong Kong initiated Extradition Bill, which sparked mass protests in June. The scale of the protests was unprecedented in the history of the SAR and resulted in violent clashes between police force and young radicals organized by ‘localist’ groups. The authors present a short history of interaction between pro-Beijing and pan-democratic camps in the territory concentrated on the reform of the election system of the SAR. They conclude that exacerbation of the political stand-off in Hong Kong started in 2007 when the authorities promised a possible transit to universal suffrage in 2017. The demands for this transit were not satisfied in 2014 leading to ‘Umbrella revolution’ – the first manifestation of radical youth movements. Detecting the causes of the conflict the authors look into the concept of ‘Hong Kong identity’ as opposed to ‘Chinese identity’ popular in sociological studies of the public opinion in the SAR. They try to investigate other reasons for the growing distress and protests of young generation of Hongkongers, both indigenous and exogenous. The latter correlate strongly with a general trend towards deterioration in Sino-American relations. A wide picture showing interference of the US in Hong Kong’s political life and instigation of protests in 2019-2020 is presented. In the stormy 2020, however, political situation in Hong Kong became more stable following adoption of the Law on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong by the China’s parliament in late June. Closing some loopholes in the SAR legislation the Law facilitates the fight with radical groups. Still, a major healing in interaction of pan-democrats and loyalists is ahead to address gloomy economic and social situation in the territory.

Strategic Insights into the Cauvery River Dispute in India

For hundreds of years, conflicts in water sharing have existed all around the globe. Cauvery River, in the southern part of India, has been in the midst of such conflict for the last 130 years. Historically, the conflict has been about the right to use water and the states/provinces in conflict have used the water from the river for agricultural purposes. Due to industrialization in the late 1980s and increasing population, water availability in the region has become stressed. Climate change has exacerbated the region’s water availability issues. Faltering rainfall has caused unrest in the region, and the traditional methods of water sharing are dwindling under political pressure. Without a climate change strategy, the governments of these states will never be able to solve this complex issue at hand. The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) is applied to understand the nuances of this conflict. It models the preferences of the decision-makers (the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka) and the common option (goal) they can reach to potentially solve the conflict. Fuzzy preferences along with option prioritization is also applied to this conflict in order to account for the uncertainties in the decision-makers’ preferences. The purpose of this paper is to nudge decision-makers in a productive direction to overcome the long-impending political standoff, while introducing a new methodology of looking into this old conflict.

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste Michael Leach (bio) On 30 August 2019, Timor-Leste hosted a major celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the 1999 popular consultation that saw it secure its independence from Indonesia. This significant date was also chosen for the exchange of notes between the East Timorese and Australian prime ministers, bringing the 2018 Australia–Timor-Leste maritime boundary treaty into effect. Meanwhile, Timor-Leste’s first experience of semi-presidential “cohabitation” saw the political impasse over the president’s refusal to appoint ministers continue throughout the year. The year 2018 had ended with a presidential veto of changes to the Law on Petroleum Activities, which was designed to lift the legislated 20 percent limit on state ownership and allow the East Timorese government to become a major joint venture partner. President “Lu Olo” Guterres—a senior figure of the opposition Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (fretilin) party—expressed concerns over the financial sustainability of the nation’s now us$17.7 billion petroleum fund (La‘o Hamutuk 2020b). For their part, some local nongovernmental organizations argued that changes to the law were actually aimed at preventing Timor-Leste’s Audit Court from reviewing large contracts—an accusation the government denied (La‘o Hamutuk 2018). Parliament successfully reversed the presidential veto on 10 January 2019, as the fretilin opposition staged a parliamentary walkout, allowing the government a rare opportunity to assemble the two-thirds supermajority required to reverse the veto. President Guterres then vetoed the 2019 budget on 23 January, arguing that it was gravely unsustainable and drew too heavily on the principal reserves of Timor-Leste’s sovereign wealth fund. This action placed the Greater Sunrise joint-venture payment in jeopardy, as the fretilin opposition has twenty-three seats— enough in normal circumstances to deny the government a parliamentary reversal of the veto. However, this tension was soon resolved on 31 January, when Parliament revised the 2019 budget to us$1.4 billion by removing the us$650 million joint-venture payment. The government was confident it could use the petroleum fund itself as the source of the payment, having altered the fund’s investment rules in the Law of Petroleum Activities amendments. Though opposition members of Parliament referred the legislation to the Court of Appeal, the changes were soon found to be constitutional, and the us$650 million was paid to Conoco Philips and Shell on 16 April (La‘o Hamutuk 2018–2020), making the government of Timor-Leste a 56 percent stakeholder in the Greater Sunrise joint venture. The revised 2019 budget was promulgated by the president on 7 February 2019, to the relief of business groups concerned about the economic impact of a possible return [End Page 605] to the reserve “duodecimal” budget system, which issues monthly installments of one-twelfth of the previous year’s budget and was widely blamed for economic contraction in 2017 and 2018. This particular fear would recur eleven months later as the year turned to 2020. Wider problems beset the Alliance for Change and Progress (amp) government throughout 2019 and came to a head spectacularly early in 2020. These tensions started in mid-2018, with President Lu Olo’s refusal to install nine ministerial nominees from the largest party in the alliance, the National Congress of the Timorese Reconstruction (cnrt), citing judicial inquiries into misconduct or “poor moral standing” (Leach 2018). The president’s stance produced a political standoff that persisted throughout 2019 and was in its eighteenth month as the year closed. This resulted in an executive government dominated by ministers from the two smaller amp parties, Popular Liberation Party (plp) and Kmanek Haburas Unidade Nacional Timor Oan (khunto), despite cnrt being the largest party of the parliamentary coalition. cnrt was frustrated by its lack of access to ministries and had not been satisfied that Prime Minister Taur Matan Ruak—the leader of plp—had adequately pursued this issue with the president. The disjunction between cnrt’s dominance of the parliamentary alliance and its limited presence in executive government was made worse by other tensions internal to amp itself: most notably the general absence from government decision-making of cnrt chairman and former independence movement leader Xanana...

Forty Years After the Islamic Revolution of Iran: An Indonesian Perspective

Following 40 years of Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution in Iran, how does Indonesia view Iran then and now? Is the exportation of the Revolution now relevant amid the contemporary political constellation in the Middle East and the world? Does Shia Islam remain to pose a sociopolitical problem today in the largest Muslim nation? In view of the current political standoff with the United States of America, will the system, based on Velayat-e Fagheh (Guardianship of the Jurist), remain strong against all odds? This article explores these questions based on personal reflections, experiential learning and continuous engagement in and with Iran.

Post-liberal and Post-populist Democracy: Rethinking Democratic Representation

The triumph of democracy over its authoritarian adversaries inaugurated a novel political scenario in the democratized world increasingly characterized by the confrontation between “liberal” and “populist” forms of democracy. Each model is predicated on a specific reading of what democracy is and each, respectively, proposes strategies to realize their democratic ideal. In a way, liberal and populist conceptions of democracy reflect each other’s shortcomings: liberals accuse populists of authoritarianism and lack of respect for established institutions, while populists regard liberal arrangements as intrinsically elitist and conservative. The outcome is an apparent theoretical and political standoff between two antagonistic visions of what democracy should be. A central argument of this article is that despite their differences, populism and liberalism share some common assumptions regarding the workings and nature of democracy. They both rely upon variants of an electoral approach to democratic representation. To overcome the apparent standoff between those two allegedly contrasting visions of democracy requires breaking with some of their shared assumptions to develop a stronger understanding of what democratic accountability means. That notion should move beyond: (a) a purely electoral understanding to democratic representation; and (b) a notion of accountability as limited government. In brief, a democratic notion of accountability should be predicated on both post-liberal and post-populist presuppositions.

Timor-Leste

Timor-Leste Michael Leach (bio) From 25 January, when the president announced an early election for 12 May, it was clear that 2018 would prove an eventful political year in Timor-Leste. The May election followed a nine-month fretilin-led minority government, which proved unable to steer its program and budget through Parliament because the opposition parties formed a majority bloc a month after the government was installed (fretilin is the acronym for one of Timor-Leste’s major political parties, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor). The election brought the Xanana Gusmão–led Alliance for Change and Progress (amp) coalition back into office. Having returned to power, the new government soon found itself mired in a standoff over ministerial appointments with the president, fretilin’s Francisco Guterres, in the first genuine experience of cohabitation under Timor-Leste’s semi-presidential system. The year also saw a historic agreement between Timor-Leste and Australia that fixed maritime boundaries at the median line in the Timor Sea (Leach 2018), ending a long-running dispute between the two nations. The year was capped off by the government outlining its bold vision for resource sovereignty, and its plan to purchase a majority share in the Greater Sunrise joint venture, to advance its ambitious goal of downstream processing oil and gas on the East Timorese south coast. The July 2017 election saw the opposition fretilin party emerge narrowly ahead of the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (cnrt) in terms of seats but unable to establish the alliances necessary to form a majority. With no alternative majority coalition then being proposed, in September President Guterres appointed the first minority government in Timor-Leste’s short constitutional history: a thirty-seat minority coalition with the Democratic Party. But events moved rapidly, and a political standoff emerged in October when three opposition parties—the cnrt, the Popular Liberation Party (plp), and Enrich the National Unity of the Sons of Timor (khunto), together controlling thirty-five of Parliament’s sixty-five seats—rejected the government’s program. Having failed to pass a budget rectification measure needed to fund new programs, the state reverted to a duo-decimal system based on a monthly allocation of one-twelfth of the previous year’s budget. The extended use of this reserve budget system lasted until a new budget was passed in September 2018, and it depressed the national economy, which remains heavily reliant [End Page 563] on government-led expenditures. Rather than installing the opposition amp coalition as the government, President Guterres instead announced a new election, with the fretilin– Democratic Party executive acting as a caretaker government in the meantime. Meanwhile, in the realm of international relations, maritime boundary negotiations with Australia continued under the aegis of a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (unclos) compulsory conciliation process, which was triggered by Timor-Leste. Following twelve months of negotiations that saw “confidence-building measures” enacted—including the termination of the Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea treaty, which purported to delay maritime boundary determination for fifty years, and Timor-Leste’s cessation of a separate espionage case against Australia—Timor-Leste and Australia jointly declared that they had reached an agreement on “central aspects” of a maritime-boundary determination in late 2017 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2017). Once ratified by both parties, the agreement, which was finally revealed on 6 March 2018 (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2018), will create permanent maritime boundaries and revised resource-sharing arrangements in the yet-to-be-developed Greater Sunrise oil and gas field. Timor-Leste secured a median-line boundary in the Timor Gap, creating a permanent maritime boundary for the first time. The median-line boundary will place 100 percent of the existing Joint Petroleum Development Area in Timor-Leste’s waters, where current treaties divided the revenue 90 to 10 in its favor. As these fields are nearing the end of their life, far more financially significant is the renegotiated revenue split over the as-yet-untapped Greater Sunrise field, worth in excess of us$40 billion, which straddles the eastern lateral (or side) boundary of the Joint Petroleum Development Area. The renegotiated agreement...

Chasin' the Dream: The History, Politics, and Economics of Immigration in the United States

The first segment will discuss a brief history of United States immigration. The second part will discuss the political standoff behind this issue. Finally, we’ll conclude the series with some economics, which could help round out your thoughts on immigration and its effect on our wallet.

Time and punishment: Blame and concession in political standoffs

Political negotiation frequently looks like two sides staring each other down, waiting for the other to blink. In these showdowns, neither side wishes to concede, claiming that doing so would incur the wrath of voters. Whether this consideration of potential punishment influences behavior during stalemates is not well understood, and little theory or evidence exists to explain how voters allocate blame for different outcomes. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate two interrelated questions: how does anticipation of blame drive behavior, and how do observers with a stake in the outcome allocate blame? In our experiment, we adopt a dynamic war of attrition to model a negotiating situation in which concession time is the key choice variable, and our design compares versions of the game with and without an observer (whose payoffs depend on the outcome and who can punish the players). We find that the presence of the observer shortens the duration of standoffs and leads to outcomes that favor the observer. We also find that observers tend to punish the winning player and that the level of punishment depends on the alignment between the observer and players. The experimental data are qualitatively consistent with instrumental punishment, but the magnitude tends to be less than optimal, possibly reflecting subjects’ behavioral or emotional responses.

THE VALUE CHAINS OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS AS FACTOR OF FORMATION OF THE REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP

This article analyzes the value chain of high-tech products in Asia and the role of this phenomenon in the further consolidation of trade blocs and alliances in the region. The presence of these chains and their gradual transition from a vertically integrated model to a system of horizontal linkages and interdependence leads to the formation of mechanisms of economic de-facto integration (so-called regionalization process). The East Asian region has demonstrated unprecedented high rates of economic growth in recent decades. The countries are actively developing mechanisms of multilateral cooperation, involving partners from across the Asia-Pacific region. Particular features of a new regional architecture of economic relations are becoming more tangible, and the essential element of this architecture is the intra-regional integration. The author presents an assessment of further developments of the Regional comprehensive economic partnership (RCEP) using the structural-functional approach and analytical instruments of the international political economy, The creation of this trade block will help less advanced countries of ASEAN to accelerate economic growth and improve the conditions for integration into global value chains. For advanced economies, participation in the RCEP seems controversial, because production chains have well-established formats within the framework of ASEAN +. The political standoff between Washington and Beijing has an impact on dynamics of regional integration. The split among the East Asian countries was galvanized by the Trans-Pacific Partnership Project (TTP), because TPP has objectives that are very similar to those of RCEP (trade liberalization and economic integration). The author concludes that the extension of this partnership in the ASEAN countries can seriously complicate the operation RVEP and enhance the impact of political factors on economic cooperation. In this case, the value of production and supply chains of high-tech products will decline, which may affect the economic cooperation in the region as a whole.

SAARC Geopolitics and Trade

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region is bestowed with geographical, historical and cultural continuity and yet it remains one of the least integrated regions of the world. This article attempts to analyse the factors inhibiting the economic integration of the region. The intra-SAARC trade is analysed in view of the existence of a free trade agreement between the member nations. The socio-development, infrastructural and economic indicators of the nations are also compared. The reasons for the existence of mistrust and hostility between the SAARC countries are discussed, from India’s evident dominant position in the group as a cause for insecurity among other members to the political standoffs between the member nations. While there exists immense potential for greater economic integration and gains from trade, the lack of basic transport-transit connectivity, technical harmonisation and non-tariff barriers are found to reinforce trade costs and inhibit legal trade. Ensuring better connectivity is recognised as a prerequisite by the nations unanimously; however, their political differences have kept them away from making much headway in this regard.

Smek for President by Adam Rex (review)

Reviewed by: Smek for President by Adam Rex Karen Coats Rex, Adam Smek for President; written and illus. by Adam Rex. Disney Hyperion, 2014 [272p] Trade ed. ISBN 978-1-4847-0951-1 $16.99 E-book ed. ISBN 978-1-4847-1057-9 $9.99 Reviewed from galleys R Gr. 6-9 Fans of Tip and J.Lo (from The True Meaning of Smekday, BCCB 2/08) will be excited to herald their return in this savvy, silly sequel. Alien J.Lo is determined to clear his name with his people, and human Tip is feeling rebellious now that her mother is back home and acting like a mom with rules and such, so they decide to head to New Boovworld aboard Slushious, the Chevy-turned-spaceship that carried them around the first book. Upon their arrival, they learn that Smek has both a legitimate and a sleazy challenger for president of New Boovworld, and J.Lo becomes a pawn in a political standoff. From there, the plot is pretty much an extended chase scene, buoyed by Tip’s hilariously deadpan narration of her navigation through Rex’s goofily clever imaginary world. All the best comic sci-fi tropes are here, including galactic dumpster diving, sentient but outwittable weaponry, low-gravity bounding, and adorable artificial life-form sidekicks. There’s even an appendix that explains the Boovish sport of Stickyfish (a tongue-in-cheek nod to Quidditch?). Like its predecessor, this contains some accessible if low-level satire of contemporary national concerns, and it will thus serve as a humorous antidote to the inevitable civics lessons on offer during election seasons, but readers don’t [End Page 326] need to make that conscious connection to enjoy the show. While not quite as well plotted as the first book, this will nevertheless please fans whose attachment is to the characters anyway, especially since Tip and her mom have a rousing heart-to-heart reconciliation and J.Lo decides to remain on Earth with his new family after all. Copyright © 2015 The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Sovereignty at sea: the law and politics of saving lives in mare liberum

This article analyses the interplay between politics and law in the recent attempts to strengthen the humanitarian commitment to saving lives in mare liberum. Despite a long-standing obligation to aid people in distress at sea, this so-called search and rescue regime has been marred by conflicts and political standoffs as states were faced with a growing number of capsising boat migrants potentially claiming international protection once on dry land. Attempts to provide a legal solution to these problems have resulted in a re-spatialisation of the high seas, extending the states’ obligations in the international public domain based on geography rather than traditional functionalist principles that operated in the open seas. However, inadvertently, this further legalisation has equally enabled states to instrumentalise law to barter off and deconstruct responsibility by reference to traditional norms of sovereignty and maritime law. In other words, states may be able to reclaim sovereign power by becoming increasingly norm-savvy and successfully navigating the legal playing field provided by the very expansion of international law itself. Thus, rather than being simply a space of non-sovereignty per se, mare liberum becomes the venue for a complex game of sovereignty, law and politics.

The EU-Turkey Energy Relations after the 2014 Ukraine Crisis: Enhancing the Partnership in a Rapidly Changing Environment

Over the last two decades energy has emerged as an increasingly important component of the overall EU-Turkey relations. In particular, the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC) and its flagship project, Nabucco, soon became the pivotal element of the EU-Turkey energy relations. After years of strong cooperation, the failure of Nabucco and the emergence of TANAP have ultimately outlined a divergence in the way the EU and Turkey perceive not only the SGC but also their energy relations. This divergence represents a serious risk for the strategic interests of both the EU and Turkey, and for this reason there is a need to rethink the EU-Turkey energy relations. This need is now particularly urgent, as the market and political environment on which Nabucco was conceptualized is rapidly changing, potentially opening up new opportunities of energy cooperation for the EU and Turkey. On the supply side, new major gas reserves have been discovered in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and in offshore Israel, while on the demand side the unprecedented political standoff between the Western world and Russia resulted by the 2014 Ukraine crisis might reinvigorate the EU’s quest to diversify its gas supply portfolio. These developments can potentially converge to reshape the EU-Turkey energy relations. In fact, in this scenario the SGC could eventually gain a new momentum, with the gas reserves of the KRI and Israel as primary target. However, after the failure of Nabucco the unconditional support of Turkey should not be taken for granted by the EU, as the country might prefer to secure its own energy supply on a bilateral basis with gas producing countries. In order to avoid the risk of a further fragmentation of the SGC, a new “EU-Turkey Natural Gas Initiative” -such as the one proposed in this paper- seems to be urgently needed, for the benefit of both the EU and Turkey.