Political Marketplace Research Articles

The struggle between managed care and fee-for-service practice.

In the ongoing struggle in the private marketplace to attract new patients to managed care, health plans continue to score impressive gains over fee-for-service physicians and indemnity insurers. In the political marketplace, however, the American Medical Association (AMA), some medical specialty groups, and like-minded legislators are urging Congress to move cautiously before it embraces managed care as the core mode of delivery in a reformed health care system. The disconnectedness between these two worlds stems from the reluctance of many politicians to limit the freedom of patients to select their own doctors. But it also derives from the gathering panic . . .

Japan's political marketplace

Journal Article Japan's political marketplace Get access Japan's political marketplace. By J. Mark Ramseyerand Frances McCall Rosenbluth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1993. 262pp. Index. £31.95. ISBN 0 674 47280 2. J. A. A. Stockwin J. A. A. Stockwin 1Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies, University of Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 70, Issue 2, April 1994, Page 393, https://doi.org/10.2307/2625354 Published: 01 April 1994

Japan's Political Marketplace

Japan's Political Marketplace

Japan's Political Marketplace.

Introduction Electoral Rules and Party Strategy Demographics and Policy Party Factions Party Organization Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives Bureaucratic Manipulation Political Structure and Judicial Incentives Judicial Manipulation Conclusion: Political Markets and Electoral Change Notes Reference Index

Japan's political marketplace

Introduction Electoral Rules and Party Strategy Demographics and Policy Party Factions Party Organization Political Structure and Bureaucratic Incentives Bureaucratic Manipulation Political Structure and Judicial Incentives Judicial Manipulation Conclusion: Political Markets and Electoral Change Notes Reference Index

The Politics of Higher Education:

This article uses the parallel political marketplace conceptualization to analyze the political environment in which colleges and universities operate. How the marketing decisions of the college or university as a political actor can be affected by the political activities of citizen/consumer groups is addressed. Other political actors such as advocacy organizations are considered as are the flows of favors and threats in a political system. The political roles that can be served by marketing are identifies and cooperation between marketing and public affairs for the achievement of a college or university's legislative and regulatory goals is discussed.

Below-cost timber sales and the political marketplace

Political pressures exist to increase the economic efficiency of timber management and production on the national forests managed by the USDA Forest Service. There is growing belief both outside and within the Forest Service that current levels of timber production, and most particularly uneconomic timber production, should be reduced. Many argue that eliminating uneconomic timber management programs will both save money and reduce environmental degradation. This article traces the political evolution of the focus on economic efficiency in timber production and explores the political-institutional factors that are shaping the current policy debate. The below-cost issue is less about economic efficiency than it is about political advantage and alternative political visions of the societal role of the nation's national forests now and in the future.

Japan's Political Marketplace

Japan's Political Marketplace

Revolving Doors, Corporate Performance, and Corruption of Markets

Much debate has surrounded the issue of revolving doors (RDs) between private and public employment. Defenders of the practice argue that RDs enhance the performance of the firm. Elite theorists dispute this claim and contend that RDs distort economic and political marketplaces. An examination of the RDs of 3,815 officers of the top 200 U.S. firms reveals little support for the argument for improved performance. In contrast, the market distortion view receives some support. High-RD corporations cluster in concentrated markets, forge more connections with economic elites, and engage in monopolistic or monopsonistic practices. They are also more involved in questionable political activities, especially bribery of foreign governments.

Agriculture in the Great Free Trade Debate: A Survey of Perceptions, Positions, and Revealed Preferences

In this short monograph the authors report the results of their survey of the perceptions of farmers, the position of the federal government and opposition parties and the revealed policy preferences of agricultural economists on the treatment of agriculture under the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA). Their conclusions on these important matters are drawn from an analysis of selected farm press items, government publications, political statements, research monographs, conference proceedings, and journal articles. The period covered is mainly 1985 to mid-1988. Although it is claimed that 'the political market place paradigm is adopted as the framework of analysis' (p.ii) this turns out to involve no more than the identification of some of the factors that affect the demand for and supply of protection in agriculture. The policy-making process is not addressed. After a brief introduction, the demand for protection is examined in Chapter Two. Individual farmer's wishes are determined from letters to the editors of farm news-

Toward a framework for evaluating the role of accounting and auditing in political markets: The influence of political competition

This essay addresses the incentives of elected officials to disclose their actions in the political marketplace. The analysis differs from prior studies of municipal accounting practices in that it presumes that incentives to use these practices derive from relationships between incumbents and their prospective competitors, rather than relationships between incumbents and their constituents. This perspective leads to an alternative interpretation for empirical results reported elsewhere that indicate significant relations between the use of standard accounting and auditing practices and measures of political competition.

Marketing and the Religious Right: An Application of the Parallel Political Marketplace Conceptualization

This article uses the parallel-political marketplace conceptualization as a framework for describing the use of economic and political power by the religious right in attempting to constrain certain marketing practices. The historic relationship between religious beliefs and political action in the United States is considered, and the various constituencies, advocacy organizations and agenda of the religious right are identified. The role of the marketer as a political actor in the parallel-political marketplace is also explored.

Intermunicipal Competition, Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats, and the Level of Suburban Competition

Government in the United States is often perceived as being too large. Theoretically, competition in the political marketplace is a corrective to such overly large government. For example, competition between municipal governments in metropolitan regions long has been identified as a potential means to limit the size of local government by simulating a quasi market for public goods and services. In this article I identify several sources of intermunicipal competition in polycentric metropolitan regions. I test empirically the effects of such competition on the size of suburban municipal budgets. I find that competition, as reflected in a greater number of alternate providers and by a wider range of choice in the tax price of local government, does in fact act as a restraint on the size of government by increasing the ability and incentives for residents and politicians to control the budget-maximizing tendencies of local bureaucrats.

A public choice theory of the great contraction

A public choice theory of the great contraction

THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: CONCENTRATED COSTS, DIFFUSE BENEFITS—AN INVERSION OF PUBLIC CHOICE

The public choice paradigm asserts the superior force of concentrated benefits over diffuse costs in the political marketplace. Vote‐seeking politicians exchange favors for support to members of special interest groups, whereas the public at large places fewer demands on and have less clout with politicians. The historical evolution of the federal income tax fits the public choice paradigm. Each provision in the tax code benefits primarily a narrow interest. Little incentive exists for anyone to represent such general interests as a broad‐based, low‐rate, simple tax system.The Tax Reform Act of 1986 inverted the public choice paradigm. The general interest, in the form of lower tax rates, prevailed over legions of special interests—which lost their prized deductions. The reason for this inversion lay in the power of an idea—the political and economic appeal of a low top rate. Deductions were simply worth less at lower deductible rates, and the benefits of higher after‐tax income were readily apparent. A coalition of liberals seeking the abolition of special breaks for the rich and conservatives favoring the enhanced incentives in sharply lower tax rates together defeated the community of special interest groups.

The political economy of the agricultural policy of industrial countries

The agricultural policies of industrial countries bring financial strain to their economic welfare. This paper argues that the problem results from the conflict between social attitudes which abhor change and an economic system and agricultural technology which is constantly changing. Within the boundaries defined by these forces, agricultural pressure groups, bureaucrats and politicians have considerable freedom to manoeuvre, and their interaction typically leads to increasing amounts and complexity of farm support. This outcome results not just from equilibrium in the political market-place, but also from the `process? by which decisions on agriculture (and other issues) are taken.

ACORN in the Political Marketplace

Articulates the concept of market segmentation and examines, critically, how the main segmentation procedures lead to the conclusions that the main concern ought to be the classification of people in terms of usage of product and attitudes. Examines a new tool available to management (ACORN) a classification of residential neighbourhoods. States that in the UK 1983 General Election it emerged that nearly 40 per cent of the electorate did not vote for the party of their social class. Discusses segmentations in the electoral marketplace, which is preceded by a literature review. Concludes that the application of modern marketing techniques is ongoing in the electoral marketplace with regard to the UK. Finds that ACORN group findings of field research, undertaken to test claims, establishes that political attitudes changed regarding them during election campaigns.

Quality, quantity and total expenditures on publicly provided goods: the case of public mental hospitals

This paper proposes a positive model of public sector resource allocation for goods where quality, as well as quantity, is a salient dimension. The model views decisions about quality, quantity, and total expenditures as occuring within a ‘zone of contention’, bounded by minimum requirements for quality and quantity - reflecting technological, regulatory and legal constraints - and a maximum ceiling on total expenditures. The model is consistent with a number of alternative views of the political market place. It is formally derived from a Stone- Geary-type objective function. For purposes of estimation, the model can be transformed into a special case of the CALM model [Fischer and Kamlet (1984)]. The identification requirements for the CALM model are derived. The model is then applied to state expenditures on mental hospitals.

Optimism and pessimism in political and market institutions

Buchanan and Faith1 have demonstrated that the introduction of subjective elements into the individual choice calculus behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance can lead to differences in predictions among arrays of institutional alternatives. Their analysis implies that when individuals make subjective predictions concerning the working properties of alternative institutions, there will exist a bias toward 'pessimistic' control in the selection of the basic rules of the game. We seek to extend the analysis of subjective evaluations to democratic institutions where outcomes are determined by simple majority voting rules and individual wealth positions are known prior to voting. It is our purpose to contrast the impact of subjectiveevaluations on market and political institutions. We will argue that diversity of beliefs systematically affects political institiutions in a different manner than they affect market institutions. In particular, we contend that uncertainty with respect to either costs or benefits of new governmental programs, will determine whether the optimists or the pessimists control the outcome. Our theory offers an alternative explanation for the growth of government in our economy, and counters the Downsian conclusion that government will be too small in a democracy.2 We analyze aspects of political behavior that cannot be explained solely with reference to special interest theory. In the political marketplace we demonstrate that there is a tendency for 'extreme' opinion to dominate and, in particular, for optimists to have a disproportionate impact on the outcome of public decisions.

The Politics of Marketing: Analyzing the Parallel Political Marketplace

While marketing theorists emphasize the importance of negotiating favorable exchange agreements with powerful external stakeholders, such as regulatory agencies or trade associations, little attention has been given to the nature of these exchange processes or to the role that the marketing function assumes in this process. Extending the political economy framework, the concept of the parallel political marketplace is offered for exploring the exchange relationships that span both economic and political market domains.