Political Insiders Research Articles

State-owned enterprises and privatisation in Ghana

Between 1987 and 1999, Ghana's privatisation programme generated revenues for the government equivalent to about 14 per cent of GDP from a moribund public sector which had previously been dependent on state subventions, and thus succeeded in fulfilling a key role in easing the fiscal crisis and in fostering the Structural Adjustment Programme. The big question remained, however, whether the privatisation process would help the growth of Ghana's economy and help maximise political gains. This article reviews the experience of Ghana in privatising public enterprises, and assesses the impact of the ongoing privatisation programme on the Ghanaian economy. It suggests that, in spite of the high proceeds, the net direct revenues from privatisation have been relatively modest, due to the high outstanding credit sales, the high costs of divestiture and high outstanding liabilities of privatised firms. It also appears that the programme has placed too much emphasis on public finance rationalisation and faith in the market system, and too little on sociopolitical and regulatory issues. Equally, the inadequate attention given to post-privatisation regulation of privatised businesses, and the use of the divestiture programme as a political patronage instrument to reward the regime's friends and political insiders, has conferred limited success for privatisation in achieving its goal of enhancing efficiency, private sector investment and employment.

Sir Glyn Jones: A Proconsul in Africa (review)

Reviewed by: Sir Glyn Jones: A Proconsul in Africa Bryan Callahan By Colin Baker., Sir Glyn Jones: A Proconsul in Africa. (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2000.) Baker’s biography of Glyn Jones, the last British governor of Nyasaland (Malawi), provides many rich details on the inner workings of the “official mind” during the waning days of empire in central Africa. The book is not for a generalist audience, however, given that it provides very little background information on the broader social, cultural, and economic developments in Nyasaland that influenced Jones’ decision-making as a representative of the Crown in the early 1960s.Baker’s study commends itself to Malawi experts with an interest in examining a political insider’s perspective on the country’s violent transition to independence.It also provides a number of intriguing anecdotes about the volatile personality of Malawi’s first leader, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and the troubling moral concessions that Jones made as he gradually surrendered power to a man who displayed an eagerness to redirect the authoritarian machinery of the colonial state toward the arrest, imprisonment, torture, and public execution of his rivals. The book is structured around a standard chronological narrative.The first chapter traces Jones’ origins as the son of a lower-middle-class Welsh grocer from Chester and his rise to respectability through a program of careful breeding and education sponsored by his mother.Baker notes that Jones’ parents attended a Calvinist Methodist Church that conducted its services in Welsh, but they made a strategic choice to send their child to a nearby English-speaking congregation in an effort to train his accent for a higher social position.Family sacrifices secured the young Jones enrollment at a prominent day school and participation in the Duke of York’s youth camps.His academic and athletic successes subsequently opened a backdoor to Oxford – admission to a “non-collegiate” program in teacher training that was specifically geared toward men of humble upbringing. As a university student, Jones let his studies suffer at the hands of a schedule largely structured around football matches, and he finished with only a third-class degree.As Baker notes, however, Jones’ lack of scholarly achievement did not hold him back from a career in colonial service.In 1931, when Jones was first appointed to the Native Affairs Department of Northern Rhodesia, recruiters still tended to regard “character” as a stronger indicator than demonstrated intelligence of an applicant's suitability for the tough conditions of a rural African posting. Chapters two and three outline Jones’s career in Northern Rhodesia and summarize his postings to numerous outlying distrincts, including Gwembe, Mwinilunga, Balovale, Mongu, Ndola, and Petauke.While these pages occasionally offer engaging details about daily life as an isolated district officer – one memorable passage describes Jones trading bawdy jokes with a group of Catholic priests over bottles of mead – an Africanist will find them fairly sparse and disappointing. It is unfortunate that Baker relies almost completely on Jones’ personal diaries to reconstruct these years because it renders his portrait of his subject two-dimensional. Supplementary documentation collected from the National Archives of Zambia about the local events and conditions that shaped Jones’ administrative career might have allowed for a more textured analysis.For example, Baker notes that Jones developed into an ardent advocate of indirect rule, but he fails to examine how specific experiences, like Jones’ participation in the Balovale 1938 inquiry into inter-ethnic violence, shaped his perspective on traditional rule. In chapters four through seven, Baker analyzes the difficult years that Jones faced following his promotion to governor of Nyasaland in 1960.Banda’s Malawi Congress Party (MCP) had recently organized massive popular protests against Nyasaland’s subordinate status within a territorial federation dominated by Southern Rhodesia’s racist white settler regime, and Jones was called in to manage a smooth transition to African self-rule. While these chapters provide some interesting details on the process of decolonization, Baker’s lack of attention to social, cultural, and economic background details once again places limits on his narrative.Baker does not discuss the potent issues of ethnicity and church allegiance that divided Nyasaland’s nationalist movement into competing...

Political culture and economic decline

In societies with a political culture of rent seeking, social norms do not disallow the use of political office for privileged distribution. Societies with such norms tend be characterized by political insiders and outsiders. We describe the attendant contestability of rents in the two domains of rent seeking when insiders seek politically assigned benefits and outsiders seek to re-position themselves as insiders, and show how successive stages of political liberalization result in economic decline. The model is considered against the background of the political liberalization that occurred in the post-socialist societies and the observed tendencies for economic decline, and at times economic collapse, in various of these societies' economies.

The Evolution of American Nongovernmental Land Use Planning Organizations

Chester Arnold's oil painting The Onerous Developments of April 15, 1994 can be read as a metaphor for the kinds of land use mishaps that watchdog organizations strive to prevent. With most of the nearby trees cut down, the path from the cabin's front door no longer leading anywhere, and the landscape literally falling out from under foot, the figure peering over the edge may be contemplating why no one prevented him from developing in such an unstable area. And to make matters worse, taxes are due. The artist, who lives and works in the San Francisco Bay area, has been examining the tenuous relationship between people and their environment in large-scale works in oil for the past two decades. Thanks to the Elizabeth Leach Gallery in Portland, Oregon, for their help in securing use of this image. Nongovernmental land use planning organizations have emerged and evolved in the United States throughout the last few decades of the 20th century to assume a variety of roles in public planning processes. Beginning largely as “watchdog” organizations, and still maintaining that role to a large degree, these organizations have begun to assume other personae by sponsoring applied research projects and establishing coalitions with organizations outside the field of planning. This expansion has taken many groups beyond traditional confrontation advocacy to roles usually reserved for political insiders. As public concern about growth in American metropolitan areas continues to increase, the trend among nongovernmental land use groups towards building greater technical acumen and creating broader political bases seems likely to continue as well.

A Voice from the Wilderness: Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War, 1964–1966

Upon ascending to the presidency January 1969, Richard Nixon commented that he had inherited a war not of his making from his predecessor, Lyndon B. Johnson.(1) Admittedly, the United States faced an increasingly difficult situation Vietnam at the time of Nixon's election. Yet, Nixon was being too modest by assigning responsibility for the war Vietnam to the Johnson administration alone. Indeed, during his years in the wilderness as a private citizen following his defeat the 1962 California gubernatorial election, Nixon consistently criticized Johnson's Vietnam policy. As a respected voice foreign affairs and as arguably the Republican Party's leading spokesman on Vietnam, Nixon forced the administration to acknowledge and respond to his rhetoric, which spurred Johnson to greater involvement the war. Thus, Nixon should be held at least partially responsible for the situation he confronted on his inauguration; he helped to create it. Nixon's hawkishness on the Vietnam conflict during 1964-66 has been largely ignored by students of the war.(2) Given Nixon's role the denouement of the war--and indeed America's involvement Southeast Asia during virtually the entire period from Dien Bien Phu 1954 to the fall of Saigon 1975--an understanding of Nixon's views during the years preceding his election seems critical to a complete understanding of Nixon's presidential decisions on Vietnam. This article will address those issues, focusing specifically on Nixon as a critic of America's Vietnam policies during the Johnson administration's escalation of the American presence the conflict Southeast Asia. In addition, it will examine and reaffirm the importance of domestic politics the making and understanding of U.S. foreign policy.(3) Rising from the Ashes On November 7, 1962, Richard Nixon's political career appeared to be at an end. Having just been defeated by Pat Brown the California gubernatorial election, the former vice president declared, You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore, sounding like a man who planned to fade into the footnotes of history. Yet, Nixon returned almost immediately to the public spotlight and began his long journey back into contention for the presidency. First, he relocated to New York an effort to establish a base for his political ambitions. He then became the senior partner an old, conservative, and respected Wall Street law firm, which enabled him to rub shoulders with domestic and international VIPs from business and politics. Nixon also began to travel extensively, making contacts with foreign dignitaries, enhancing his knowledge of foreign affairs, and honing his rhetorical and campaign skills.(4) As a visible New York attorney, Nixon positioned himself an ideal situation for a political comeback. He could criticize political insiders without being responsible for the consequences of his actions. His nonincumbency gave him an important advantage over Johnson particular. He was free to state his objections to policy without having to account to Congress or the electorate. Nixon had the luxury of being forthright, unencumbered by the restraints of office.(5) As a result, he could rehabilitate his public image without running the risk of losing another election or being rebuked by an official constituency. In Lyndon Johnson, he had a convenient and stationary target. Constrained by the demands of the presidency and preoccupied with building the Great Society and other domestic political concerns, Johnson could not afford to devote all of his personal and institutional resources to foreign policy and Vietnam--and indeed did not want to do so.(6) Nixon, on the other hand, could hammer away at the administration's indecisiveness and lack of initiative. Despite these handicaps, Johnson retained the advantages of his office. The president of the United States has the ability to set the national agenda and to focus attention away from problems--if those problems do not become too critical or pressing. …

Ben-Gurion's Diary for the 1967 Six-Day War: Introduction and Diary Excerpts

THE FOLLOWING ENTRIES TO BEN-GURION'S 1967 Diary have been divided into three sections. The first part, 18 May to 4 June, deals with political maneuvering prior to the Six-Day War that led to the appointment of Moshe Dayan, a key member in an aggressive opposition party, as Defense Minister. The second part, 5 June to io June, provides Ben-Gurion's intimate and personal perspective of the war. The third, ii June to 17 June, contains Ben-Gurion's outlines for Israeli policy in radically new circumstances. In these Diary entries, one can observe how, in less than one month, Israel was transformed from a country that perceived its survival threatened, into a secure and confident state facing choices that would shape its own future and that of its neighbors. When the Six-Day War broke out, Ben-Gurion was almost eighty years old. Although he was no longer the Prime Minister, having resigned four years earlier in June 1963, he was still a Member of Knesset and the leader of Rafi (the List of Israel Workers and Non-Partisans), a new party he formed with devoted followers drawn largely from the ranks of Labor. Nevertheless, he possessed enormous authority within both the Israeli public and a large body of political insiders, including leading politicians of other parties., Indeed, he was at the center of the opposition to Levi Eshkol, who replaced him as Prime Minister. The issues that divided them derived from diverging ideas on how to handle "the Lavon Affair," an espionage fiasco carried out in Egypt by Israeli intelligence operators in the mid-I95os. For reasons still murky, plans went awry and the spy ring was captured; the Egyptians executed two members of the spy ring and imprisoned the remainder. Several committees attempted to locate responsibility for the fiasco, but failed to reach an explicit and unambiguous decision. In the mid-I950s, public attention to the scandal began to wane. But in the early I960s, Pinhas Lavon, the Minister of Defense at the time of the operation and the person who had borne the burden of blame for the

An Oral History of Abraham Lincoln: John G. Nicolay's Interviews and Essays.

John C. Nicolay, who had known Lincoln in Springfield, Illinois, served as chief White House secretary from 1861 to 1865. Trained as a journalist, Nicolay had hoped to write a campaign biography of Lincoln in 1860, a desire was thwarted when an obscure young writer named William Dean Howells got the job. Years later, Nicolay fulfilled his ambition; with John Hay, spent the years from 1872 to 1890 writing a monumental ten-volume biography of Lincoln.In preparation for this task, Nicolay interviewed men who had known Lincoln both during his years in Springfield and later when became the president of the United States. When it came time to write their massive biography, however, Burlingame notes, he and Hay made sparing use of the because they had become skeptical about human memory. Nicolay and Hay also feared Robert Todd Lincoln might censor material reflected poorly on Lincoln or his wife.Nicolay had interviewed such Springfield friends as Lincoln s first two law partners, John Todd Stuart and Stephen T. Logan. At the Illinois capital in June and July 1875, talked to a number of others including Orville H. Browning, U.S. senator and Lincoln s close friend and adviser for over thirty-five years, and Ozias M. Hatch, Lincoln s political ally and Springfield neighbor. Four years later returned briefly and spoke with John W. Bunn, a young political insider from Springfield at the time Lincoln was elected president, and once again with Hatch.Browning shed new light on Lincoln s courtship and marriage, telling Nicolay Lincoln often told him that was constantly under great apprehension lest his wife should do something which would bring him into disgrace while in the White House. During their research, Nicolay and Hay also learned of Lincoln s despondency and erratic behavior following his rejection by Matilda Edwards, and they were subsequently criticized by friends for suppressing the information. Burlingame argues this open discussion of Lincoln s depression of January 1841 is perhaps the most startling new information in the Springfield interviews.Briefer and more narrowly focused than the Springfield interviews, the Washington interviews deal with the formation of Lincoln s cabinet, his relations with Congress, his behavior during the war, his humor, and his grief. In a reminiscence by Robert Todd Lincoln, for example, we learn of Lincoln s despair at General Lee's escape after the Battle of Gettysburg: I went into my father s office ... and found him in [much]distress, his head leaning upon the desk in front of him, and when raised his head there were evidences of tears upon his face. Upon my asking the cause of his distress told me had just received the information Gen. Lee had succeeded in escaping across the Potomac river. . .To supplement these interviews, Burlingame has included Nicolay s unpublished essays on Lincoln during the 1860 campaign and on Lincoln s journey from Springfield to Washington in 1861, essay s based on firsthand testimony.

Theodore H. White and journalism as illusion

In this groundbreaking study, Joyce Hoffmann examines critical twenty-five-year period in the work of one of the most influential journalists of the twentieth century. Theodore H. White was already celebrated reporter when Jacqueline Kennedy summoned him for an exclusive interview in the aftermath of her husband's assassination. With her help, White would preserve what the First Lady claimed had been John F. Kennedy's vision of the New Frontier as an incarnation of that wistful, romantic kingdom--Camelot. Over the years, friends and advisers to Kennedy declared that they had never heard the president speak of Camelot. But White's article, which ran in Life magazine, created myth that still endures in the popular consciousness. That story was just one of many by Theodore White that had lasting impact on the nation. As correspondent for several of the country's most popular magazines, he covered the crucial events of the 1940s, '50s, and '60s. His best-selling book The Making of the President 1960 changed political reporting forever. A gifted and likable man with remarkable skill for ingratiating himself with others, White earned the confidence of key political, military, and diplomatic leaders. First in the Far East, later in Europe, and finally in Washington, D.C., he became confidant and adviser rather than an adversary to the figures he covered for the news, following pattern set by elite journalists. Even as he played the impartial reporter, White kept secrets in order to maintain access to his important sources, and he occasionally allowed his subjects, including John F. Kennedy and Nelson Rockefeller, to make changes in his work before publication. Clinging to the illusion of objectivity, White--like other leading journalists in the postwar years--wrote about the world not as it was but as he believed it ought to be. Hoffmann relates the little-known episode in White's career when he intentionally obscured the truth about Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt and inept Nationalist government because he believed that undermining China's cause would be a disservice to democracy. No other book so thoroughly documents how first-rank journalist can become political insider and distort the news without losing the gloss of impartiality that is supposed to accompany the profession. Impressively researched, skillfully written, Theodore H. White and Journalism as Illusion is an unflinching look at key figure in the history of American journalism and at the profession itself.

Inside Moves and Outside Views: An Australian Case Study of Elite and Public Perceptions of Political Corruption

The search for a definition of political corruption that adequately captures the nuances of governmental activity has been a long one. This article defends social or attitudinal definitions of corruption against some recent criticisms. It examines the value of Arnold Heidenheimer's widely cited distinctions among “black,”“gray,” and “white” corruption using empirical evidence from an interview study of over 100 Australian politicians and 500 voters. The results show that the broad dimensions of corruption — the official, the donor, the payoff, and the favor — identified by John Peters and Susan Welch affect the views of both politicians and voters alike.Nonetheless, elites and the public come to judgments from different perspectives, and they judge some acts differently. Put another way, some corruption is gray. Politicians judge actions more subtly than do voters, who are more likely to see corruption in all acts. As Michael Johnston has suggested, the different experiences of political insiders and outsiders explain this disparity in their moral outlooks. Insiders are socialized to see at least some actions as functional and therefore not corrupt. Outsiders, unaware of the insiders' rules, tend to judge political action by moral absolutes. Thus the structure of liberal democratic government contributes to conflicting elite and public views of political right and wrong.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME PROBLEMS: INSIDERS AND THE USE OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS

ABSTRACT Competing claims about crime problems are made by political insiders and outsiders. Those working within the policymaking process, the insiders, are “owners” of established problems and therefore gain support for their claims by demonstrating the credibility and utility of those claims to policymakers. Official statistics are widely used by insider claims-makers for this purpose. This paper presents examples of cases that demonstrate how government-based political insiders use statistics 1) to encourage the diversion of resources to favored programs and 2) to provide support favored policies.

Getting Elected in Canada; A Political Insider Demystifies the Canadian Election Process de Tom Brook, Stratford, The Mercury Press, 1991, 253 p.

Getting Elected in Canada; A Political Insider Demystifies the Canadian Election Process de Tom Brook, Stratford, The Mercury Press, 1991, 253 p.. Un article de la revue Politique (Numéro 22, automne 1992, p. 5-173) diffusée par la plateforme Érudit.

The state and economic stagnation in Tropical Africa

Politics, while only one strand in the explanation of Africa's massive economic problems, is nonetheless a significant factor. A central conundrum facing postcolonial political leaders is how to govern and hold together unintegrated peasant societies in the absence of legitimacy. “Personal rule,” a particular mode of patrimonial governance, provides an answer, permitting regime survival and the advancement of political insiders. But personal rule has an economically destructive tendency that only shrewd political leadership and propitious world economic conditions can check. If uncontrolled, certain political practices corrode bureaucratic and legal rationality and promote the misallocation of scarce public resources. The result can be a downward spiral of interrelated political and economic decline that is increasingly difficult to reverse.