Political Frustration Research Articles

Religion, identity and politics in Tanzania

In Samuel Huntington's world of hostile civilisations, Tanzania would fall into the category of a torn country, a battle ground for the forces of African, Western and Islamic meta-cultures to expand their influence. On the surface, this might seem the case. Tanzania is an impoverished country where the benefits of economic liberalisation have reached only a narrow stratum and the fruits of political liberalisation are yet to be seen, placing severe strain on national social cohesion. There is certainly a possibility that pent up economic and political frustrations could be channelled into religious extremist movements. However, religion has not served as a primary fault-line for sustained political violence and conflict, although there are signs that this might be changing. In this paper we argue that uncovering and analysing these relationships elucidates how cross-cutting cleavages complicate the mobilisation of individuals and organised groups based on identity, not only in Tanzania, but in other societies as well.

Burma/Myanmar and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy

Prologue Burma/Myanmar(1) presents problems - problems of analysis and even data. Statistics are often whimsical, events are sometimes opaque, the complexity of the past clouds our thinking, information is filtered through skewed political lenses, propaganda is rife, and the future presents conundrums even for participants in the drama, let alone observers on the periphery. Burma/Myanmar is still, in spite of some openings, closed and secretive, where knowledge and information are power and are not readily shared, and where to understand these dynamics expatriate Burmese and foreigners are often reduced to reading the Yangon tea leaves, much as old China-watchers in Hong Kong or those Kremlinologists of yore were reduced to doing. The dangers of analysis are obvious; this is art, not science, not even social science. And as we all know, art is in the eyes of the beholder, so disagreement with any interpretation is inevitable because we all know what we like in art even though we cannot define it. However murky our crystal ball may be, the importance of attempting to predict the future becomes critical so that present policies may deal with future realities. Dante Alighieri in the Divine Comedy, however, consigns soothsayers and their ilk to one of the lower circles of hell, although political predictions today are a growth industry. The future of Burma/Myanmar may not equate to the present, but the present will endow the future with detritus that the poor, damned prognosticator ignores at his or her peril. History may not repeat itself but it often rhymes, as Mark Twain quipped.(2) Introduction The past year has been a gestation period of continuing, intensified confrontations between the Myanmar military authorities (now known as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC), and Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). What may be born from this heightened, painful labour is problematic. It is over a decade since the March 1988 student demonstrations began, for completely apolitical reasons, a dispute between students and a teashop owner that descended into violence. The ensuing upheaval, reflecting the intense and pent-up economic and political frustration of much of the population, soon spread to the general urban populations and continued for months, with loss of life estimated in the thousands until the coup of 18 September 1988, which brutally suppressed dissent. What we have witnessed in the past year is but a continuation of this prolonged struggle, albeit in somewhat different contexts, but no less potentially bloody and critical. If the foreign observer is frustrated by the political stasis and the paucity of balanced and nuanced information that seem all too evident in and about Myanmar, consider for a moment what all those involved must feel in relation to the current situation. The State Peace and Development Council which was formed in November 1997, the reincarnation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), must also be frustrated. In spite of joining ASEAN in July 1997 and the very modest additional legitimacy that derived from that membership, a legitimacy that the regime evidently sought and that the United States strove to deny, the military's primary objective in seeking affiliation was likely the expected inflow of foreign investment from member states. This has been denied to it, not because the ASEAN states would not take advantage of the opportunities in Myanmar if they could, but because of the unfortunate timing of the Asian financial crisis that has undercut the capacity of businesses in those states to invest.(3) Myanmar, probably unexpectedly to its delegation, was the obvious target of a liberalized Thai Foreign Ministry resolution, through ASEAN, to explore the internal affairs of member states, a heretofore inappropriate ASEAN consideration. The SPDC must also be frustrated by the reluctance of the multilateral financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to provide badly needed assistance; they have been prompted to withhold support in large part by the United States, whose sanctions on new investments are probably more of a moral than an economic force. …

Stab Wounds Associated With Terrorist Activities in Israel

To the Editor. —I am amazed that a respected journal such as yours chose to publish such an ill-researched and poorly thought-out article as the one by Dr Hanoch and colleagues. 1 It is absurd to link the activities of the hashshashins with social and political frustration on the one hand and the Islamic concept of martyrdom on the other. The hashshashins were indeed an obscure sect, funded in part by their specialization in a form of contract killing. This was usually carried out under the influence of hashish—hence, the name—which both reduced any inhibitions on the part of the killer and provided the incentive, in the form of a further supply of the drug. Clearly this has nothing to do with the concept of sha'hid , which is all about earning forgiveness and hence paradise through sacrificing oneself in war against the enemies of the state. Significantly, one becomes a sha'hid by dying,

Social dealignment versus political frustration: Contrasting explanations of the floating vote in Germany

Abstract. The paper contrasts two notions of the floating voter: the ‘modern floating voter’ and the ‘frustrated floating voter’. In doing so, social modernization is contrasted with macro stimuli as explanations of volatility. The ‘modern floating voter’ emerges from social dealignment theories. These claim (1) an increase in volatility, (2) more frequent vote switching among the well educated and the new middle class, and (3) an instrumental view of politics among floating voters. Empirical tests on German data do not deliver any support for these dealignment hypotheses (employing log‐linear models on cross‐sectional and pooled‐cross‐sectional data and ANOVA). On the other hand, the model of the ‘frustrated floating voter’, which denotes vote switching that takes place in a mood of protest, receives some support in the data. Thus, the degree of political dissatisfaction of an electorate emerges as a potential predictor of volatility. In a final step, I test if the drop in political satisfaction between 1990 and 1993 can he attributed to social change, thus indicating an indirect effect of social change on volatility. The data do not support this hypothesis. The drop in satisfaction (and thus the potential increase in volatility) most likely should be attributed to macro stimuli. Thus, the results indicate that macro phenomena (which might be historic events, economic conditions, or the like) might be more fruitful in explaining volatility than social modernization.

Appalachian Studies and the Third Millennium

Who Will Speak for Appalachia? Appalachian Studies and the Third Millennium John B. Stephenson Twelve years ago there was a small conference at the University of Kentucky on which occasion we looked at the state of Appalachian Studies. Some of the papers were collected in a special issue of the Appalachian Journal (Winter-Spring 1982). It was at this meeting that Jim Wayne Miller referred to hard and soft Appalachian Studies, the Action People and the Creative Folk. And it was at this meeting that Loyal Jones defended Appalachian scholars by describing their work as "chasing hats in a high wind and getting them on the right heads," meaning our passions drive us in different directions and that we should not be too critical of the kind of work our neighbor is doing. I wrote at the time, in attempting to size up the state of Appalachian Studies, that it had gained considerable maturity in its short lifetime as a field of study, which, with the exception of a few dedicated but isolated pioneers, was about ten years. It was also clear at that time, twelve years ago, that Appalachian Studies, born in political frustration and anger, had developed a palpable tension between the scholars and the activists—and those who wished to claim to be both, of course. But all in all, it was still movement of sorts. There was much more conversation back and forth among an otherwise very individualistic set of competing scholars and activists. In summing up, I wrote: . . . We share beliefs that we need to get beyond distractive dualisms, that we need better theories, that we need to articulate visions for the region, that we need teaching and research methodologies which get us John B. Stephenson is president ofBerea College. At the symposium honoring Loyal Jones last November he gave the keynote address, in which he talked about the future ofAppalachia and asked who the leaders and speakers would befor the next generations. This article is excerpted from that address. 11 closer to the daily life of the people, that we need studies which allow us to bear witness to the complexities and ironies of social history and individual biography, and that we need to accomplish these things without relinquishing our impulses for democratic reform. What of Appalachian Studies today? The region certainly seems to have dropped from the conscience of America in general, to the extent that it was ever there. And there is some anxiety that Appalachia may fall off the policy table in Washington along with rural America in general. Additionally, most state-supported universities have suffered mid-year budget cuts in recent years and are anticipated to do so again this year, with the result that interdisciplinary programs may come to be defined as marginal, i.e., dispensable. Are we in a "trough" of inattention , neglect, and resource starvation in Appalachian Studies as well? How might we go about answering such questions? It strikes me that there are, among others, these two ways to assess Appalachian Studies today: by looking at the life and times of the Appalachian Studies Association, and by examining the health of campus-based programs. (In the course of the discussion of these two categories, I'll touch briefly on other matters such as the production of future Ph.D.s in the field, new areas of scholarly interest, and the extension of the campus into mountain communities.) First, the association, born right here in Berea at the initiative of Richard Drake and with the close guiding hand of Loyal Jones. Those with whom I have spoken over the past few months (in preparation for this presentation) agree that the nature of the association has changed, or at least that the structure and style of its meetings have changed. I'm not so certain that this has been a recent change, because even twelve years ago participants were lamenting two things: the meetings don't involve enough social action people, and they aren't as spontaneous and informal as they once were. Even in 1981 they were looking and sounding like a bunch of academics splintering into our subspecialties. Alice Brown remarked a few weeks ago that...

Appalachian Studies and the Third Millennium

Appalachian Studies and the Third Millennium John B. Stephenson Twelve years ago there was a small conference at the University of Kentucky on which occasion we looked at the state of Appalachian Studies. Some of the papers were collected in a special issue of the Appalachian Journal (Winter-Spring 1982). It was at this meeting that Jim Wayne Miller referred to "hard" and "soft" Appalachian Studies, the Action People and the Creative Folk. And it was at this meeting that Loyal Jones defended Appalachian scholars by describing their work as "chasing hats in a high wind and getting them on the right heads," meaning that our passions drive us in different directions and that we should not be too critical of the kind of work our neighbor is doing. I wrote at the time, in attempting to size up the state ofAppalachian Studies, that it had gained considerable maturity in its short lifetime as a field of study, which, with the exception of a few dedicated but isolated pioneers, was about ten years. It was also clear at that time that Appalachian Studies, born in political frustration and anger, had developed a palpable tension between the scholars and the activists. And more conversation back and forth among them. In summing up, I wrote: . . . We share beliefs that we need to get beyond distractive dualisms, that we need better theories, that we need to articulate visions for the region, that we need teaching and research methodologies which get us closer to the daily life of the people, that we need studies which allow us to bear witness to the complexities and ironies of social history and John B. Stephenson ispresident ofBerea College. He was keynote speaker on thefirst day of the symposium. individual biography, and that we need to accomplish these things without relinquishing our impulses for democratic reform. What of Appalachian Studies today? The region certainly seems to have dropped from the conscience of America in general, to the extent that it was ever there. And there is some anxiety that Appalachia may fall off the policy table in Washington along with rural America in general. Additionally, most state-supported universities have suffered mid-year budget cuts in recent years and are anticipated to do so again this year, with the result that interdisciplinary programs may come to be defined as marginal, i.e., dispensable. Are we in a "trough" of inattention, neglect , and resource starvation in Appalachian Studies as well? How might we go about answering such questions? It strikes me that there are, among others, these two ways to assess Appalachian Studies today: by looking at the life and times of the Appalachian Studies Association, and by examining the health of campus-based programs. (In the course of the discussion of these two categories, I'll touch briefly on other matters such as the production of future Ph.D.s in the field, new areas of scholarly interest, and the extension of the campus into mountain communities.) First, the Association, which was born right here in Berea at the initiative of Richard Drake and with the close guiding hand of Loyal Jones. Those with whom I have spoken over the past few months (in preparation for this presentation) agree that the nature of the Association has changed, or at least that the structure and style of its meetings have changed. I'm not so certain that this has been a recent change, because even twelve years ago participants were lamenting two things: Association meetings don't involve enough social action people; and they aren't as spontaneous and informal as they once were. Even in 1981 they were looking and sounding like a bunch of academics splintering into subspecialties. Alice Brown remarked a few weeks ago that the meetings used to be like family reunions. Jerry Williamson said he thought instituting concurrent sessions was the beginning of the end. Dwight Billings noted that the number of concurrent sessions had increased from twelve in the second year to thirty-six this year. Jean Speer observed that the meetings used to involve informal caucus groups but now had become academic conferences, with some important differences such as the youth conference...

Fantasy and Politics: Visions of the Future in the Weimar Republic.

Defeated in World War I, living in a troubled and insecure peace, Germans under the Weimar Republic were a ready audience for visionary writers who indulged in elaborate fantasies of victorious wars of revenge and of German renewal through wondrous technological inventions. Largely ignored by the literary establishment, these writers created an immensely popular mass literature, the Zukunftsroman (novel about the future), that was a potent ingredient in the simmering stew of resentment, frustrated nationalism, political irrationalism, and economic distress so important in the Nazi rise to power. In Fantasy and Politcs, Peter S.Fisher explores the popular culture of the Weimar Republic. He establishes common motifs and themes of the more influential fantasy novelists, sets them in the context of political events and ideas, and examines their popular influence. German fantasy novels provide invaluable perspectives on the ideological and psychological roots of the Weimar Republic's highly emotionalized politics, especially some of its uglier racist and Messianic strands. The Zukunftsroman was largely the province of the German right wing - the ultranationalists. Leftist writers shared many of the economic and political frustrations of the right, but contemporary socialist thinking discouraged them from engaging in utopian fantasies. Thus it was the visionary writers of the right who were able to tap the emotional wellsprings of Weimar thought and fill the explosives spiritual vacuum at its core. Unwilling to accept the defeat of 1918, the ultranationalists prophesied a second world war that would usher in a new and glorious Germany, stripped of corruption and renewing a mystical sense of national unity. Their preference for the world of fantasy over reality was paralleled by an inclination to value action over thought and emotion over reason. Technological visionaries, less ideologically rigorous, less militaristic, were nonetheless intellectual fellow travellers of the radical nationalists. Moving beyond the boundaries of traditional literary history, Fantasy and Politics focuses upon German thought and emotion as expressed through mass literature in the years between the two world wars, when the forces that have shaped so much of the modern world were beginning to take form and become political reality.

Decline of governmental authority, political cynicism and political inefficacy in Hong Kong

The authority of the Hong Kong government declined continuously during the last decade. The people had become less trustful of and less deferential to public authorities. Public evaluation of governmental performance had also dropped. Political cynicism was on the rise, and the government was increasingly seen as colluding with the business sector to pursue its own interests. A sense of political efficacy also prevailed. However, the people did not perceive viable alternatives to the incumbent government. Consequently, the combination of political cynicism and political inefficacy had produced feelings of political frustration and alienation, but it did not generate serious political instability in Hong Kong.

Bismarck and the Development of Germany

The Period of Fortification, 1880-1898The burst of capitalistic expansion that accompanied German unification came to an abrupt end with the crash of 1873, which opened a period of economic depression. Volume III describes the continuation of Bismarck's efforts to cope with the resulting economic and social problems that hindered his quest for a new national consensus in support of the Prussian-German establishment. It also brings to a climax theauthor's account of Bismarck's mounting political frustrations, their psychopathological consequences, and the struggle of his doctors to convert him to a healthier life-style. The final chapters deal with the fascinating story of Bismarck's conflict with Wilhelm II. The work ends with an account of the Bismarck legend that endures to this day and may yet influence Germany's current quest for reunification. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Responses to the Gulf crisis in the Maghreb

Governments in the Maghreb (northwest Africa) have generally opposed the military offensive against Iraq while condemning the invasion and calling for withdrawal. Even Morocco, which initially sent a small contingent of troops to Saudi Arabia, has moved closer to its neighbours in the Union of the Arab Maghreb which has been active in pressing for a negotiated settlement. Popular responses throughout the Maghreb have been strongly in support of Iraq and against the war; huge demonstrations have taken place in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Fuelled by widespread and growing political frustration and by deteriorating conditions, popular resentment at Western (and particularly US) intervention in the region and in Arab affairs has grown dramatically since the war started in January and is likely to provide the basis for political instability in the Maghreb over the coming months and even years.

The Hupphaasawan Movement: Millenarian Buddhism among the Thai Political Elite

Buddhist millenarian movements previously described in Thailand have been associated with peasant rebellions against central Thai authority. However, the Hupphaasawan movement, formed by the spirit medium Suchaat Kosonkittiwong in the 1970s, differed from this pattern in that it attracted followers from among the most senior and powerful sections of the Thai political establishment. The Hupphaasawan movement nevertheless did share many features in common with earlier millenarian movements and demonstrated the continuing potential for the development of millenarian religious movements in Thailand. Key factors identified as contributing to the development of millenarian movements in Thailand are a high degree of political frustration; lack of access to institutional expressions of power; attachment to traditional spiritualist beliefs; and a heightened sense of political, economic, or cultural threat.

The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The second economies of the Soviet Union and other East European countries derive from structural inadequacies in the socialist planning system and from the cultural and historical evolution of each East European society. This article combines the structural and cultural approaches to the second economy and focuses on four of its most prevalent forms: peasant household production, the shadow economy within socialist enterprises, the underground factories of Soviet Georgia, and the hidden economy within the retail and service sectors. In all cases, social linkages and cultural values provide frameworks for economic activities. The second economy helps to alleviate consumer shortages and bureaucratic bottlenecks in all these societies. It also acts as a social mollifier, channeling dangerous political frustrations into consumerism, swindling, or petty corruption. Yet the overall effect of the second economy is a corrosive one: as a surrogate reform, a second economy tolerated by the authorities only reproduces the fundamental flaws of the formal economy. Moreover, it exacerbates the gap between society and the state, between “us” and “them.”

The Last Dictatorship: Betrayal or Consummation?

HAT the final dictatorship of Simon Bolivar in Gran Colombia added little, if anything, to his glory while embittering his days with personal disappointments and political frustration is a proposition that admirers and detractors alike can readily accept, however much they may differ as to the reasons why. Somehow, as Alvaro Valencia Tovar expressed it, those last years were aios que sobraron en la vida del Libertador.1 Bolivar's admirers show a natural tendency to dwell on other aspects of his life and times, so that in the memorable collection of citations that enrich El culto a Bolivar, by Germ'an Carrera Damas,2 it is striking how few make reference to the period in question. Nevertheless, the Bolivarian dictatorship that constituted the last phase of the Gran Colombian experiment in unity as well as the penultimate stage in the life of the union's creator is something that neither Bolivar's biographers nor other historians of the early national era can ignore altogether. And the way in which they approach it reveals, incidentally, perhaps more clearly than the treatment of any other aspect of Bolivar's long and remarkable career, the historiographical and ideological leanings of the authors. A preliminary detail on which contemporary observers and later historians have sometimes disagreed is the precise chronological dimensions of the dictatorship. When Bolivar resumed the presidency at Bogota in September 1827-after settling, he thought, the rebellion of Jose Antonio Paez in Venezuela, which had been his first concern on returning from Lima the year before-his political opponents in New Granada feared that he would at once establish a regime of military repression whose victims they would be. A few went into hiding, and though they soon emerged, there did occur some arbitrary actions by the government or

The African Press in Kenya, 1945–1952

This paper discusses the African press in Kenya in the years between 1945 and 1952. The growth of an extensive vernacular press was caused by the political frustrations suffered by Kenya's Africans and the political, social and ethnic divisions which separated them. The press can be divided into three major categories: moderate nationalist, regional vernacular and populist newspapers. The moderate nationalist newspapers were edited by members of the educated elite who campaigned for constitutional change and social reforms. The regional vernacular papers were concerned more with local than national issues. The populist press was edited by semi-educated men active in politics at the grassroots level who came to reject the moderate leadership. All these papers publicized the activities of the Kenya African Union and demanded an improvement in the political and social position of Africans in Kenya. But they also expressed the ethnic, political and social hostilities which divided their editors. The decline of moderate leadership was reflected in the closure of their newspapers. The radicals who seized power in K.A.U. in 1951 were supported by the populist press and began new newspapers in 1951 and 1952.Some of the African newspapers achieved quite large circulations, were distributed by agents throughout the towns of Kenya and attracted some advertising revenue. But they all suffered from lack of money and found it difficult to find and pay a printer, and they suffered also from the lack of experience of their editors. Many newspapers lasted only a short time. But throughout these years there were always a number of newspapers published. These were widely read and were politically influential. The populist press played a direct role in stimulating militant resistance. Government attempts to curb the African press and to replace it with government newspapers were not successful. Only in 1952 when a State of Emergency had been imposed and the government had assumed powers to refuse printing licences and to suppress newspapers could the African press be silenced.

Ideological Foundations of Revolution in Kwilu

The Kwilu rebellion of 1964 belongs within a little studied species of political violence: the aborted rural revolution. Political change in Africa marked by violence seems endemic—historically, revolts and resistance to colonial intrusion; international conflict during the two world wars and along borders since independence; civil strife in many countries; a plethora of military coups d'etat; anomic violence of several forms, including urban riots, hut burnings, and women's uprisings. Yet one form of political violence appears conspicuous by its absence. Political revolution has been rare in recent African history. To be certain, events in Algeria, Rwanda, and Zanzibar entailed profound social and political transformations, making them revolutionary in import (Humbaraci, 1966; Wolf, 1969; Lemarchand, 1968 and 1970; Lofchie, 1965). These are exceptions. Even a society as polarized as that of the Republic of South Africa appears to negate the standard explanations of revolution (Adam, 1971; Daniel, 1975; Van den Berghe, 1965). Understanding the aborted rural revolution in Kwilu thus will enable us better to grasp the obstacles to sweeping political change in Africa south of the Sahara. For much of 1964, young maquisards controlled an area nearly the size of Belgium in the Western Congolese province of Kwilu. Leader of the uprising was Pierre Mulele, briefly a cabinet minister under Patrice Lumumba, and later an official of the breakaway Gizengist government. The rapid initial success of the partisan fighters testified to widespread political and social frustration among many Kwilu residents, to popular support for Mulele's efforts at violent and extensive change, to the coercive inadequacies of the national armed forces, and to the mobilizing effects of an ideology that interwove indigenous and Marxist threads. Only with the major reorganization of the Congolese military (including the recruitment of foreign mercenaries) was the uprising quelled and Mulele forced into exile. How the Mulelist fighters gained their popular support and initial military success are questions of great concern to analysts of African politics.

The Temperance Career of Joseph Chamberlain, 1870-1877: A Study in Political Frustration

The temperance efforts of Joseph Chamberlain during the 1870's have been a largely ignored facet of the great Birmingham politician's career. The latest of his biographers, Dr. Peter Fraser, did not feel that the temperance aspect of his subject deserved even the attention of a citation. Perhaps the fact that Chamberlain's program of temperance reform was so easily defeated explains this general sketchiness of historical treatment. It is the contention of this paper, however, that the defeat of Chamberlain's proposals would exercise an important — if malevolent — effect on the future of the Liberal party.These temperance proposals of Chamberlain exhibited many of the characteristics described in the Nineteenth Century Revolution in Government literature. While mayor of Birmingham, Chamberlain created a public house inspectorship when he discovered that the average constable could not be trusted within the walls of a drink shop. As part of his vision for central Birmingham, the Corporation next purchased 120 public houses. Although civically owned, these houses were leased to private management. And finally as a fledgling M.P. in 1877, Chamberlain argued for the complete municipalization of the drink trade. He now felt that the city should become a monopolist in both ownership and management of alcohol. Socialization of the drink traffic would offer two advantages. In the first place, abolition of the profit motive would lessen drunkeness; the customer would no longer be pressured into “drinking for the good of the house.” Secondly, elimination of over-entry and excess competition through public ownership would make the municpalized trade a lucrative source of civic revenue.

Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration

Journal Article Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration Get access Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration. By Karl M. Schmitt. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1965. 290 pp. Bibliog. Index. $6. Irene Nicholson Irene Nicholson Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 1967, Pages 204–205, https://doi.org/10.2307/2612608 Published: 01 January 1967

Communism in Mexico. A Study in Political Frustration.

Communism in Mexico. A Study in Political Frustration.

Communism in Mexico. A Study in Political Frustration

Communism in Mexico. A Study in Political Frustration

Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration

Communism in Mexico: A Study in Political Frustration