Political Finance Reform Research Articles

Political Finance and Party Systems in the Normative Theory of Partisanship: Toward a Civic Model

Abstract Political finance in liberal democracies is often regarded as a source of pathology accompanied by demands for reform. But on what principles and values should political finance reform be grounded? The existing scholarship provides no more than sketchy advice on such matters. To address this gap, this paper presents a normative framework to evaluate political finance rules, which proposes (a) that the design of such rules should take account of the party system in which the financing rules will operate; (b) that both political finance rules and party systems should be evaluated in terms of three normative dimensions of partisanship (collegiality, systemic voice, and systemic accountability); and (c) that political finance reforms ought to counterbalance the pathologies inherent to different party systems. A set of political finance rules that satisfies these three conditions is an instantiation of what we describe as the ‘civic model of political finance’.

Competition, scandal, or ideology? A congruence analysis of Australian political finance reforms (1980–2020)

Although studies into political finance reform have become commonplace, many questions remain unanswered in this area. Studies into links between scandals and political finance reform have provided conflicting findings, while little is known about why incumbents force through self-serving reforms in some instances, but cooperate with rivals in others. The ‘General Theory of Campaign Finance Reform’ reconciles inconsistencies by situating reform processes within the context of party competition. Observing that this framework has not yet been empirically tested, this study undertakes a Congruence Analysis to apply the model to a 40-year period of Australian political finance reform. Hansard is used to document inter-party interactions, in conjunction with quantitative indicators of party competition, organization, and ideology, which outline the changing contexts of reform. Findings indicate that party competition, scandals, and changes in incumbency are influential drivers of reform, while ideological factors play an inconsistent role. Providing insights into causal processes of reform, this article bridges the gap between theoretical and empirical literature on political finance.

Do Political Finance Reforms Reduce Corruption?

AbstractReformers claim that public subsidies and regulation of political finance reduce corruption in politics, while observers worry that they have no impact on corruption, or even increase it. Despite national-level debates and billions of dollars spent, few studies have tested this relationship. The authors argue that political finance reform mitigates corruption by reducing private money's importance in politics and increasing the sanctions for corrupt behavior. Elite interviews from Paraguay's political finance reform illustrate the argument and elaborate the theoretical mechanisms. The study evaluates the argument using an original dataset measuring political subsidies from 175 countries from 1900–2015, as well as disaggregated corruption measures from the Varieties of Democracy project. The findings support the thesis that political finance reform reduces corruption, even in countries where such reforms are unevenly implemented.

Political Financing Reform: Politics, Policies and Patronage in Malaysia

ABSTRACTThis article analyses the evolution of political finance reform debates in Malaysia, one of the world’s most durable electoral authoritarian regimes. While the reliance of the dominant party, UMNO, on unfettered resources remained unchanged, crises in Malaysia’s political environment allowed civil society actors to concretise abstract debates over reform into specific proposals. Drawing from interviews, public statements and observation, two distinct periods in this reform debate are analysed: after Najib Razak assumed power in 2009, following the unprecedented electoral success of the opposition during the 2008 general election; and after the 1MDB scandal broke in 2015. In both periods, civil society actors took advantage of new political dynamics to present specific proposals for political finance reform. These proposals laid the groundwork for government-led reform recommendations, though key provisions were excised that would curb UMNO’s power. Reform efforts stalled when the government resisted deeper reform while opposition parties offered little support for the proposed changes. This article reviews an under-researched area of policy interactions in electoral authoritarian regimes involving not just the ruling party and the opposition, but also civil society. A postscript considers the trajectory of this debate following the 2018 national elections which toppled UMNO from power.

Electoral volatility and political finance regulation in Colombia

This article examines the relationship between electoral volatility and political finance regulation in Colombia. The author argues that recent political finance reforms in this country (e.g. chang...

Party Finance Law in Australia: Innovation and Enervation

Abstract The drivers (and inhibitors) of political finance reform are complex and overlapping. The case of Australia is an intriguing one. By international standards, regulation of political finance at the national level in Australia is laissez-faire and inertial. Since 2010 however, half the states and territories have adopted holistic party finance systems designed to limit the influence of money in electoral politics. These reforms have included caps on expenditure and donations, generous public funding and tighter donation disclosure. This article explores both the emerging constitutional constraints on—and political drivers of—this flourishing of reform. Whilst there is evidence of party machines seeking security in enhanced public funding, there is limited evidence to support the cartel thesis. Overall these developments highlight the potential for experimentation and cross-fertilization in a federal system, suggesting that reform is episodic but infectious, rather than a manifestation of any inexor...

Political Finance Regimes in Southeast Asia: Introduction

ABSTRACTThe three articles in this themed collection investigate the interplay between political finance regimes and the quality of democracy in Southeast Asia. Andreas Ufen's piece on political finance in Malaysia and Singapore argues that the semi-authoritarian regimes in both states have blocked the reform of campaign and party funding regulations in order to keep their opposition in check. The article on Indonesia, authored by Marcus Mietzner, showcases the country's dysfunctional political finance system as a major hurdle toward further democratization. In their contribution on Thailand, Napisa Waitoolkiat and Paul Chambers show that weak political finance regulations have contributed significantly to the shallowness of Thai parties. Overall, the collection demonstrates that without meaningful political finance reforms, Southeast Asia's democratic stagnation is likely to persist for many years to come.

Campaign Finance Laws and Political Efficacy: Evidence from the States

The decline of political efficacy and trust in the United States is often linked to the rise of money in politics. Both the courts and reform advocates justify restrictions on campaign donations and spending as necessary for the improvement of links between the government and the governed. We conduct the first test of whether campaign finance laws actually influence how citizens view their government by exploiting the variation in campaign finance regulations both across and within states during the last half of the 20th century. Our analysis reveals no large positive effects of campaign finance laws on political efficacy. Public disclosure laws and limits on contributions from organizations are in some cases associated with modest increases in efficacy, but public financing is associated with a similarly modest decrease in efficacy. ∗Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and 2003 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. We thank Barry Burden, Dick Niemi, the editors, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Thanks also to Matt Jacobsmeier and Matt Stiffler for research assistance. †Department of Political Science, University of Rochester, Harkness Hall, Rochester, NY 146270146; 585-273-4779; david.primo@rochester.edu; Fax: 585-271-1616 ‡Department of Economics and Truman School of Public Affairs, University of Missouri, 118 Professional Building, Columbia, MO 65211; 573-882-5572; milyoj@missouri.edu; Fax: 573-882-2697

Explaining Political Finance Reforms

This article examines how political strategies and institutional arrangements can shape the outcomes of debates over political finance reform. The article outlines two competing sets of assumptions about parties’ priorities regarding political finance regulations and explores the expectations generated by these differing assumptions. The central difference between these perspectives is whether parties view revenues primarily as a means to an electoral end, or whether they instead see fundraising as an end in itself. Each view yields slightly different predictions about the types of reforms various parties are likely to endorse under various political circumstances. The article then considers how these perspectives might illuminate actual party behavior by examining a series of political finance reform debates in Germany. Experiences here suggest that, even when scandals lend salience to the issue of party finance reform, parties will not necessarily sacrifice assured economic gains for possible political payoffs.

The Political Process after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002

47 POLITICAL FINANCE REFORMS are not neutral. Instead, they are used as instruments to achieve political goals. They change political institutions and processes, sometimes in unforeseen, and not always salutary, ways. Their consequences are often unintended, but even when intended, may have unexpected impact. In the case of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),1 its provisions were put forth in ways that will seriously curtail the political parties while enabling interest groups to continue their soft-money issue advertising at times not blacked out for the crucial thirty days before a primary and sixty days before a general election; in addition, these interest groups can use hard money under political action committee regulations during the blackout periods for independent expenditures. Although 45 percent of party soft money at the state level—where most of it was spent in the 2000 elections—went to issue advertising mainly on television and radio, the remaining 55 percent of such soft money, related to partyoriented activities: registration and get-out-the vote drives, direct mail, bumper strips, telephone banks, administration and fund raising.2 Thus the legislation directed against soft money and issue advertising will have the side effect of curtailing voter-related activities, the prime purposes of which can be summed up as party-building efforts. And the main purposes of party-building activities are to work toward the American ideals of increasing levels of voting, and encouraging volunteer citizen participation in the political arena. Although it is not fashionable to say so these days, volunteer citizen participation includes the freedom to contribute money to favored candidates and party and political committees, and to help raise the money necessary to the smooth functioning of the political system. Because the BCRA seeks to control soft money at the state and local levels as well as at the federal, it has the effect of federalizing state parties and state-level campaigns. In the effort to control soft money that might affect federal campaigns, the federal law contains far-reaching language that impinges on state party committees. United States parties have traditionally been confederations, with much state autonomy. The BCRA reverses course, by wiping out gains in recent years—brought about by soft money relationships—toward national, state, and local party cooperation. Now all splintering tendencies will be magnified and cooperative actions curtailed. The BCRA even regulates generic campaigning urging voters to vote Republican or Democratic if the message refers to a federal candidate. The new law regulates even registration and get-out-the vote campaigns if they refer to federal candidates. It limits to $10,000 per individual source of soft money funding for generic activities, if permissible under state law, and the money cannot be raised or spent jointly in two or more states, or be transferred to another state.

Toward state funding of elections in india? a comparative perspective on possible options

This paper explores the issue of introduction of state funding of elections in India, focussing on the incentive structures of electoral finance reforms. After summarising the main points in the history of political finance reform in other democracies, and in India, the historical pattern of fund-raising and election expenditures of major parties in India is surveyed. Six electoral finance reform options for India are outlined. It is argued that the time is now ripe for state funding of elections from the point of view of the incentives facing parties and donors.

Public Interest Litigation and Political Finance Reform

More than any other individual or group actor, Common Cause shaped current law regulating election finances. It managed to do so by developing and carrying out a craftsmanlike strategy which blended litigative, legisla tive, and publicist tactics into a coherent and mutually advantageous whole. Without litigation, the need for new laws might well not have become obvious. Without legisla tion, the court suits could have left campaign finance reform unconsummated. Together, they constituted an im pressive example of a citizen lobby operating resourcefully and productively to benefit the public interest.