Abstract
This article examines how political strategies and institutional arrangements can shape the outcomes of debates over political finance reform. The article outlines two competing sets of assumptions about parties’ priorities regarding political finance regulations and explores the expectations generated by these differing assumptions. The central difference between these perspectives is whether parties view revenues primarily as a means to an electoral end, or whether they instead see fundraising as an end in itself. Each view yields slightly different predictions about the types of reforms various parties are likely to endorse under various political circumstances. The article then considers how these perspectives might illuminate actual party behavior by examining a series of political finance reform debates in Germany. Experiences here suggest that, even when scandals lend salience to the issue of party finance reform, parties will not necessarily sacrifice assured economic gains for possible political payoffs.
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
