Political Attitudes Research Articles

Jewish Self-identification and Political Compromise: Evidence from the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict

This paper explores the relationship between Jewish self-identification and their attitudes to political compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, grounded in social identity theory. The multifaceted dimensions of Jewish identity, such as religious, cultural, and national ones, and their impacts on political stances and peace negotiations. Through semi-structured interviews, the study reveals that Jewish collective identity significantly influences their political positions and behavior. Most respondents held that their Jewish identity shapes their views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, mainly due to experiences of being persecuted and the establishment of Israel after the Holocaust, which lead them to a cautious attitude to political compromise, especially regarding security or sovereignty. Additionally, internal divisions within Jewish community (e.g., conservative to progressive) significantly influenced their attitudes to the conflict and a two-state solution. It emphasizes the important impact of recognizing and respecting Jewish identity on fostering inclusive dialogue, bridging ideological gaps, and promoting peace. It is necessary to pay attention to the crucial role of historical memory and cultural heritage in shaping political positions for effective conflict resolution strategies. This study offers insights but also exists limitations, suggesting future research, such as quantitative analysis and widening data collection to capture evolving political attitudes within the global Jewish diaspora.

Uprising of the young generation: exploring the association between social mobility belief and political engagement intention among Hong Kong youth

Civic engagement, particularly political engagement, is an important aspect of youth development. In response to rising youth activism, this study examined what was related to youth’s emerging intention to engage in both normative (legal) and non-normative (illegal) political actions through the lens of social mobility beliefs. Based on the reports of college students in Hong Kong (N = 1,033), the findings revealed that social mobility belief regarding average people (i.e., societal belief) rather than that regarding oneself (i.e., personal belief) was negatively related to youth’s intention to engage in normative political action. Furthermore, parallel mediation analyses showed two indirect effects of social mobility beliefs after controlling for sociodemographic factors, post-materialistic values and political interest. Specifically, youth who endorsed a stronger societal social mobility belief tended to perceive lower social injustice, and they were then less willing to engage in normative and non-normative political actions. Additionally, those who endorsed a stronger societal social mobility belief tended to report higher external political efficacy, and they were then more willing to engage in normative political actions. The findings highlight the importance of considering youth’s worldviews in the theorization of the development of political attitudes and behaviors.

Anchoring of political attitudes

This paper studies the malleability of individuals’ political attitudes to simple anchors. Using an online survey experiment, we provide participants with the policy preference of one anonymous previous survey respondent. We exogenously vary whether participants are shown a Republican-aligned or Democrat-aligned response. We demonstrate that anchoring has a significant effect on an individual’s stated political attitudes even with this minimal anchor. Our results support the susceptibility of individuals to be easily persuaded through strategic anchoring.

Trust and Political Attitudes of Public Service Media Audiences in a Polarized Society: The Case of Czech Television

ABSTRACT The paper addresses the role of Czech public service television in a polarized society. The research on public service media (PSM) is salient concerning their specific role; however, it is increasingly questioned in a fragmented and polarized environment. The paper builds on data from 27 semi-structured interviews and a survey conducted in 2019–2020 (N = 3,251). While for some audiences, Czech television is a trustworthy medium protecting exemplary sets of values, for others, it is biased and hostile. The study reveals the deeper interplay between political attitudes and media practices, potentially endangering PSM’s role and position in polarized settings.

The New Satanic Panic

Abstract A moral panic animated by conspiracy theories alleging ritual sex abuse swept through the United States in the 1980s. During that “Satanic Panic,” as it came to be known, people expressed fears of social change regarding gender and sexuality. Beginning in 2022, conservative politicians, pundits, and pastors in the United States levied similar accusations of child grooming, sex trafficking, and satanic sex abuse at the LGBTQ + community, teachers, liberals, and entertainment companies; these accusations were accompanied by repressive legislation and violence. Despite their political salience, little is known about the people who believe these accusations. Using a 2022 U.S. national survey (N = 2,001), we find that up to one-third of Americans believe accusations of satanic cult abuse, government sex trafficking, and an “agenda” to “groom” children into gay or trans lifestyles. These beliefs are correlated with a range of political attitudes (e.g., positive views of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and white nationalists) and policy preferences (e.g., overturning Roe v. Wade), as well as with normative (e.g., a desire to run for political office) and nonnormative (e.g., the acceptance of political violence) political intentions and behaviors. Regression analysis further reveals that these conspiracy theory beliefs are positively associated with dark psychological traits, antiestablishment orientations, and repressive views toward sex and gender. Our findings suggest that these accusations can spark dehumanization and deadly violence by mobilizing into politics people who possess strong feelings of political efficacy, but also antisocial traits, nonnormative tendencies, and a desire to undermine established political institutions.

Is there a rural-urban political divide in Britain?

ABSTRACT A rural-urban political divide, characterized by rural mistrust in politics, dissatisfaction with democracy, and support for authoritarian-populist leaders and parties, has been identified in many Western democracies. Yet there has been little investigation of the extent to which British public opinion is divided in this fashion. Using British Election Study data from 2016 and 2019 that combines large samples with finely-grained geographic identifiers, this paper investigates the possible presence and extent of a rural-urban divide in British political attitudes and values. We find that while rural Britons are more conservative on economic issues, and more supportive of the Conservative party than urbanites, the two groups have comparable levels of democratic satisfaction, political trust, and authoritarianism. As such, unlike in other Western democracies, we do not find any evidence that rural Britons are more resentful, dissatisfied, or “left-behind” compared to their urban counterparts.

Social media symbiosis: Understanding the dynamics of online political persuasion in social media ecologies

Research has noted that political content on social media, both accurate and fake, may lead users to reconsider their political opinions and be persuaded. This study contributes to this topic by examining how political attitude change in social media unfolds according to users’ perceptions. Our findings, based on in-depth interviews with 30 Spanish social media users, show how the centrality of social media in citizens’ everyday life nudges them into a persuasive relationship in these ecologies. We conceptualize this dynamic relationship as social media symbiosis, an analogy that draws on the biological concept of symbiosis, and that explains the characteristics of perceived online persuasion: (1) the primacy of social media persuasion over other information sources, (2) its gradual and evolutionary nature, and (3) the persuasive relationships in which users may engage: mutualism, in which both sender and receiver reciprocally benefit and persuade each other; and parasitism, in which fake news creators harmfully persuade receivers while benefitting. Our study contributes to extant literature by theorizing about the persuasive relationship in which users perceive to engage in social media, and the rationales that facilitate it.

Looking around the neighborhood: how subnational electoral politics affects voters’ perceptions of parties’ positions

ABSTRACT Local context has been shown to influence political attitudes and behaviors. We extend this research to argue that when a party performs better in a voter’s region or the region is more competitive, she will have more information on the parties and be better able to correctly identify the party’s positions. In addition, we argue that the strategy the party takes will also have an effect. To test our argument, we combine individual- and party-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and data on the party’s regional electoral performance from the European NUTS-Level Electoral Database from 1996 to 2021 for five federal or quasi-federal West European countries. Our results confirm our expectations. Our findings have important implications for understanding the multilevel nature of representation more generally, and how a voter’s local context shapes how she perceives parties’ positions and how parties can use local context to their advantage, more specifically.

Political ideology and attitudes towards Israel in Germany in the aftermath of the 10/7 massacres: a test of horseshoe theory

ABSTRACT This multi-wave study examined associations between political left-right ideology and attitudes towards Israel in Germany measured at the end of October and beginning of November 2023, as well as at the end of April and beginning of May 2024. Consistent with horseshoe theory, a curvilinear ∩-shaped relation was hypothesised between political left-right ideology (coded based on party preferences) and attitudes towards Israel. Data came from a large sample of more than 600 employed individuals in Germany, and results supported the hypothesis. The findings provide support for horseshoe theory following the October 7 terrorist attacks.

Socialism's legacy: the impact of political socialization on citizens’ conceptions of democracy

ABSTRACT Political culture literature asserts that congruence between the existing democratic system and citizens’ views and expectations of democracy is crucial for democratic stability. Consequently, citizens’ conceptions of democracy not only influence political attitudes or vote choice, but also the endurance of democracy. For the German case, research has shown that differences in political socialization in East and West have caused differences in what conceptions of democracy citizens hold, suggesting that attitudes of young generations socialized in re-unified Germany are converging. However, persistent disparities between East and West and a surge in support for the right-wing populist AfD, especially in East Germany, raise the questions of how sustainable political socialization effects are, and how a populist conception of democracy might be related to political socialization. Using ESS 10 data, the article tests cohort effects on a liberal, a social democratic, and a populist understanding of democracy in Germany. The results show that cohorts socialized in a socialist system are more committed to a socialist, but also to a populist conception of democracy, while attitudes of young people are indeed converging.

Explaining Support for Border Closures During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Exposure, Political Attitudes, or Pandemic Policy Feedback?

Abstract The closing of national borders was one of the most far-reaching policy measures adopted to limit the spread of the virus during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Despite its unprecedented nature and far-reaching impact on individual lives, blocking almost all human movements not only into but also out of states, popular support for this measure was surprisingly high. How can this support be explained? Using an original 4-wave panel dataset across 11 countries together with cross-national policy data, we explore individual and contextual drivers of border closure support throughout 2020. We find that higher support can partly be explained by political attitudes related to cross-border mobility, such as distrust in foreigners or right-wing ideology. Primarily, however, support for closing borders is shaped by respondents’ evaluation of governments’ handling of the pandemic, as well as the intensity and timing of the constraining measures. We also find that support wanes over time, which may indicate a policy fatigue effect. Interestingly, health concerns (exposure to the virus) have almost no influence on support. Even in this exceptional situation, and when confronted with a new policy issue, citizens’ preferences are thus primarily a politically driven response to government measures.

A tale of two cities: spillover effects of electoral shocks in non-democratic regimes

ABSTRACT Electoral shocks have spillover effects in democracies, as they can change citizens’ political attitudes and political behaviour across national borders. Yet, electoral shocks also exist in non-democratic regimes. Do electoral shocks likewise lead to spillover within a non-democratic regime? To explore this question, I build on Lohmann’s idea of information cascade and study the spillover of the 2019 Hong Kong local election, in which the opposition won a landslide victory. Using a survey fielded in Macau during this event, I find liberalizing effects among middle-class citizens: after the electoral shock, their democratic commitment increases while their perceived electoral fairness decreases. Conversely, lower-class citizens experience backlash effects as they assess the electoral system more positively and briefly consider democracy as less important. However, these changes in political attitudes do not translate into changes in expressed vote choice and other types of political participation. Regarding the mechanism of the attitudinal change, I suggest such polarized reactions are related to the different information consumption among the two classes. I discuss how these findings contribute to the literature on non-democratic regimes, electoral shocks, and class politics.

Drifting further apart? Europe's trends of urban-rural political polarisation should not be overstated

Urban-rural polarisation in political attitudes is widely argued to have become a distinctive feature of many Western democracies. Yet, have urban-rural gaps grown over time, as is often suggested? And, if so, do trends in this regard differ across countries? We address these questions leveraging individual-level data from over 300,000 respondents from the European Social Survey over the period 2002-2020 in 25 countries. Overall, we do find evidence of moderate divergence in outlooks between more urban and more rural publics, examining in particular trust towards the EU and views on migration. We also find that there is divergence in terms of feelings of trust in relation to the political system and levels of satisfaction with democracy since the early 2010s, most likely because of the financial and sovereign debt crises. But these gaps have significantly reduced more recently. Furthermore, trends are heterogenous across countries. Overall, this paper demonstrates that value polarisation along the urban density divide should not be over emphasised as divergence between urban and rural Europe is more moderate than in the US, and very issue-based and country-specific.

All About China?

Combining international relations and critical geopolitics literature with a public opinion survey in Thailand that delves into some rarely explored and sensitive questions to understand respondents’ political views and attitudes, we examine the extent to which domestic political developments can be understood through a US–China great power lens. Are politically progressive Thais more likely to be pro-US, and more politically conservative Thais likely to favor China? While we find some relationship between liberal domestic political leanings and sympathy for the United States, we also show that conservative domestic political leanings do not automatically translate into support for China. To view election outcomes in a country such as Thailand as “wins” for one or other great power would be highly misleading.

Crafting Public Opinion

In the context of a diverse media landscape grappling with an increasingly stringent political climate, this study asks whether the Chinese government’s media-control policies shape public opinion. Drawing on online survey data collected between 2014 and 2018 and using regression models and inverse probability weighting, I find that in 2017, as Xi Jinping began his second term as general secretary, there was a noticeable conservative shift in the political attitudes of the Chinese public. While foreign media might have reduced support for the Chinese Communist Party’s stance and ideology among those with less exposure to the party-state media, state propaganda did shift public attitudes, offsetting the impact of foreign media. These findings underscore the Party’s effectiveness in using media censorship and propaganda to consolidate its legitimacy in the ideological sphere.

Do moral values change with the seasons?

Moral values guide consequential attitudes and actions. Here, we report evidence of seasonal variation in Americans' endorsement of some-but not all-moral values. Studies 1 and 2 examined a decade of data from the United States (total N = 232,975) and produced consistent evidence of a biannual seasonal cycle in values pertaining to loyalty, authority, and purity ("binding" moral values)-with strongest endorsement in spring and autumn and weakest endorsement in summer and winter-but not in values pertaining to care and fairness ("individualizing" moral values). Study 2 also provided some evidence that the summer decrease, but not the winter decrease, in binding moral value endorsement was stronger in regions with greater seasonal extremity. Analyses on an additional year of US data (study 3; n = 24,199) provided further replication and showed that this biannual seasonal cycle cannot be easily dismissed as a sampling artifact. Study 4 provided a partial explanation for the biannual seasonal cycle in Americans' endorsement of binding moral values by showing that it was predicted by an analogous seasonal cycle in Americans' experience of anxiety. Study 5 tested the generalizability of the primary findings and found similar seasonal cycles in endorsement of binding moral values in Canada and Australia (but not in the United Kingdom). Collectively, results from these five studies provide evidence that moral values change with the seasons, with intriguing implications for additional outcomes that can be affected by those values (e.g., intergroup prejudices, political attitudes, legal judgments).

Do wars abroad affect attitudes at home?

Can foreign conflicts affect attitudes in nonbelligerent countries? A large literature studies the effects of conflicts and wars on countries that are directly involved, without considering the potential consequences for other nonbelligerent countries that might nevertheless be threatened. To address this question, we examine how the Russian invasion of Ukraine affected 12 economic and political attitudes using survey data covering eight European countries. We use a natural experiment whereby the timing of the invasion overlapped with the fieldwork of a cross-national individual-level survey in these eight countries. We find that the war increased support for democracy, redistribution, support for Europe, and immigration, while it reduced authoritarian attitudes. Our findings highlight the impact of foreign conflicts on a wide range of attitudes in countries that are externally threatened, but neither directly involved militarily, nor necessarily very close to the conflict.

From Politicization to Vigilance: The Post-war Legacies of Wartime Victimization

Following regime change, how does wartime victimization shape political attitudes and participation in the long run? I argue that it increases post-war political vigilance: greater sensitivity to illiberal politics and poor governance, but with dampened effects on participation under authoritarianism due to greater fear of harm. I examine Protected Villages (PVs) in the Zimbabwe Liberation War (1972–1979). PVs, a Rhodesian counterinsurgency strategy, was a large-scale and violent resettlement program that intensified politics’ role in civilian lives. I map PV-affected areas within pre-war and current-day administrative divisions, and estimate a difference-in-discontinuities regression to identify PVs’ long-run effects. PV-affected areas report greater sensitivity to the country’s illiberal politics and are more critical of poor government performance today. Contrary to existing literature however, I find no evidence of increased political participation and pro-social behavior in the long run, nor hardened support for the ruling party—whom these areas had once supported during war.

On the Internet, No One Knows You’re an Activist: Patterns of Participation and Response in an Online, Opt-in Survey Panel

Recent years have seen a dramatic increase in surveys of online respondents who participate absent random selection. Using an uncompensated, opt-in panel of 11,000 Pennsylvanians (2020–2022), we benchmark self-reports against vote histories, campaign contributions, election returns, and Census data. Ours is among the first such benchmarking exercises in more than a decade, a period when online survey research has transformed. It is also among the first analyzing a longitudinal panel. Our panelists are approximately balanced on partisanship; attrition is limited. Notably, respondents are very politically engaged, with high rates of turnout, campaign contributions, and rally attendance. Ethnic/racial minorities are under-represented. Political attitudes show high over-time stability, and an experiment uncovers few partisan differences in response rates. Such survey samples are cost-effective ways to track the views of highly engaged citizens over time, but less engaged citizens prove hard to recruit, even with supplemental efforts. Survey participation is itself a political behavior.

Competing against Erdoğan, collaborating with the state: why did Kiliçdaroğlu fail as the main opposition leader in Turkey?

ABSTRACT The main argument in this article contends that a primary reason why Erdoğan has managed to stay in power in the last decade despite failure in resolving numerous social, domestic, and foreign policy crises stems from Kılıçdaroğlu’s insistence on sustaining a collaborative relationship with the state. This article chronicles Kılıçdaroğlu’s political attitude and his loss of CHP leadership in the wake of his ignominious defeat in the 2023 national elections. The article uses case examples that highlight and analyze his efforts at collaborationism during his term as the leader of the CHP.