Polish Political Elites Research Articles

Państwa sukcesyjne Austro-Węgier w dyplomacji polskiej (1918–1920)

Austria, Węgry, Czechosłowacja, Rumunia i Królestwo SHS, a także Polska to państwa nazywane krajami sukcesyjnymi monarchii habsburskiej, ponieważ powstały na jej gruzach. Artykuł koncentruje się na znaczeniu tych środkowoeuropejskich państw w dyplomacji polskiej w latach 1918–1920, czyli w okresie decydującym dla ich niepodległego bytu. Celem artykułu jest odpowiedź na pytanie o to, jak postępujący rozpad Austro-Węgier w roku 1918 był postrzegany przez polskie elity polityczne. W następnej kolejności istotne jest pytanie, jakie było stanowisko rządu niepodległego państwa polskiego wobec państwowości tworzących się po rozpadzie monarchii Habsburgów. Pod uwagę wzięte zostały wszystkie kraje, które w całości lub w znaczącej części zagarnęły tereny austro-węgierskie. Pośród nich wyjątkiem są Włochy. Rzym zaanektował również znaczące tereny habsburskie nad Adriatykiem, ale już wcześniej był uznawany za jedną z ważniejszych stolic europejskich i nowe nabytki jedynie zwiększyły jego potencjał. Istotne jest również zauważenie, czy omawiane państwa odgrywały jakąś rolę w polskiej polityce zagranicznej, a jeśli tak, to jak znaczącą. Podobne pytanie dotyczy całego terytorium Europy naddunajskiej. Jego polityczna i ekonomiczna jedność została zerwana po I wojnie światowej, co mogła wykorzystać rodząca się Rzeczpospolita, mając do czynienia ze słabszymi od siebie potencjalnie partnerami.

Ukrainian Attempts at State Building in 1917–1921 and the Idea of Intermarium: A Historiographical and Archival Note

This paper aims to shed light on the historiographical and archival component of an important topic – the efforts to build an independent Ukrainian state in the period 1917–1921. It also scrutinizes Polish Eastern Policy of that period to provide background for further research. The issues touched upon in this brief review indicate the need for further research in this thematic realm. The historiography given in this article captures the views of Polish political elites at the turn of the twentieth century. It could be argued that these elites were strongly focused on the resurrection of an independent Polish state. One of the strongest positions was formulated by the National Democrats, the so-called Endeks, led by the well-known political figure Roman Dmowski, who in his Thoughts of a Modern Pole (1903), or in Germany, Russia, and the Polish Problem (1908), as well as in his Polish Politics and the Rebirth of the State (1925) and other works stressed the idea of incorporating Ukrainian lands into the Polish state, and called Ukrainians an “ahistorical,” “non-state” nation, i. e. a nation with no right to have a state of their own. The Endeks believed that only those lands along its eastern border should be incorporated. These were lands that Poland could “digest” and gradually Polonize completely, thus becoming a monoethnic state. He considered Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Podillia to be such territories. Other Ukrainian lands according to the Endeks should belong to Russia and act as a counterweight to German hegemony. Simultaneously the idea of antemurale, of Poland being a bulwark of Christianity confronting the East, was seen as part of the great mission to protect Western civilization from the Bolshevik threat. Thus, in this part of the Polish political elite’s vision there was no place for an independent Ukraine.

Deklaracja lojalności ks. Floriana Stablewskiego wobec władz pruskich z 26 X 1891 – między ambicją, koniecznością i posłuszeństwem

The election of Florian Stablewski as Archbishop of Gniezno and Poznan was a result of many circumstances and decisions, directed mostly by the Prussian government. After Bismarck’s resignation in 1890, the Prussian authorities declared their readiness for ‘reconciliation’ (Versohnung) with the Polish political elites in the Prussian partition, but with only the smallest possible concessions on their part. The nomination of the Polish candidate for archdioceses orphaned after the death of Juliusz Dinder was to be the first test of both parties’ intentions. An experienced politician such as Rev. Stablewski perfectly understood this and after rejecting Likowski’s candidature, he made public gestures towards the authorities, which were taken as an explicit declaration of loyalty and willingness to cooperate. Political support or even an inspiration for Stablewski was the political camp of Poznan conservatives led by Jozef Kościelski, who personally undertook to force this candidate through at the Berlin court. The government, however, did not want to strengthen or make the Polish political camp independent. Therefore, upon expressing readiness to nominate Stablewski, they wanted to further maintain the status quo in Church and religious policy. A written commitment of the candidate to comply with these principles was to guarantee his full loyalty in the future. However, the declaration written by Stablewski was only an expression of his generally known and publicly expressed attitude of legality and loyalism. He reserved his full obedience only to his Church superiors: Cardinal Ledochowski and the Pope.

School Strikes in the Bytom Commune in 1906 and 1920

At the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries Upper Silesia was the arena of spectacular social and political movements. An experimental area in this regard was Bytom (Beuthen) along with its commune, where the Polish and German communities would clash and where even the tiniest of animosities were blown up to the scale of diplomatic scandals due to the propaganda. The school strikes in 1906 and 1920 had a significant impact on the awakening and formation of the Polish consciousness in Upper Silesia. The school strikes that took place in Upper Silesia in 1906 were aimed at introducing the teaching of religion in the Polish language. In the Bytom commune the strikes were incidental in character; they did not gain the support of the Polish political elites. As a consequence, no Polish minority schools were created in Bytom before World War 1. The situation changed significantly only during the twentyyear period between the wars. In 1919 a conference of teachers in Bytom gave rise to the Upper Silesian Teachers Association and in 1923 the Polish-Catholic School Association for Opolian Silesia was founded. The main objective of the former was to admonish the authorities about giving equal rights to the Polish language and the right to create Polish schools, while the latter aimed to work out a legal basis for a private and public Polish minority school system, organising courses for teachers as well as materially supporting youth organisations and creating scholarship funds. The authorities not fulfilling the postulates for organising regular classes in Polish became the direct reason for holding a strike in the summer of 1920. The strike also encompassed the Bytom commune with 11.4 thousand participants (34.3%).

Ukraine and Poland: Facing the 21st Century Challenges

Establishing a common strategic framework is a decisive factor in the Ukrainian-Polishrelations in the current social and political context. The complexity of the partnership between thetwo states arise from their geographical location on the borderline between civilizations, the site ofhistorical cataclysms. At the same time, national sovereignty of was always a high priority for bothpeoples. The recognition of Ukraine’s independence by Poland marked a new stage ofrapprochement between Warsaw and Kyiv, the act being evidence of maturity of the Polishpolitical elite. Poland made its best to promote the interest of Ukraine in the international politicalarena. The article suggests periodization in the history of the Ukrainian-Polish partnership.Ukrainian policy can be modelled on Poland’s experience of the transformation of society.Being a member of the European Union, Poland advocates the idea of European and EuroAtlantic integration of Ukraine. Increased economic cooperation is one of the aspects of theUkrainian-Polish partnership. Cooperation at regional level, between local government bodies isalso important for the relations between the two states. Step by step, visa regulations are beingliberalized, interpersonal contacts broadened. The beginning of the 21st century witnesses a changein political consciousness of Ukrainian and Polish people, who reconsider painful events from theirpast

Regulating Polish politics: “cartel” parties in a non-collusive party system

In the first stage of democratic transition, like in most post-communist countries, Poland adopted a more laissez-faire stance towards the regulation of political parties. These regulations, like the one adopted in 1990, were a natural response to the former Communist system and represented a rejection of its restrictions and a fear of a one-party system that could harass the opposition. By the mid-1990s, however, Polish political elite started to recognise the importance of political parties in a modern democracy and the problems related to their functioning and funding. A new development in regulating political parties gradually came about in 1997 as a result of the approval of a new Constitution and Law on Political Parties. This is the story of such legislative change as well as how it has affected the development of both political parties and the party system since 1989.

O cywilizacyjny awans Polski Roman Dmowski wobec idei modernizacji Polski 1918–1939

For a civilizational development of Poland. Roman Dmowski in the face of the idea of modernization of Poland 1918–1939 The Roman Dmowski’s propositions of modernization of interwar Poland (1918–1939) can not be considered in terms of theories of modernization created after 1945 as a coherent, logic systems. For Dmowski the modern (modernized) Poland would be a „efficient” state with capitalist economy, free market and the respect for private property, with reduced social legislation, with developed industry and agriculture, with a strong middle class, with restricted bureaucratic machine; a national state with restricting the rights of national minorities, with low number of Jews, with the limiting the powers of the legislature and a strong executive, with association polishness with catholicism and strong emphasis on the presence of catholic religion in social life. Some ideas of Dmowski were not bad (e.g. save money and reduction of excessively developed bureaucratic machine, the development of industry and agriculture, the fight against speculation), however, the proposals were often too vague or unclear or were remarkably oriented to the free market and for this reason had no chance of implementation and popularity in the atmosphere of the 20s and 30s in interwar Poland (e.g. proposal of reduction excessively developed social legislation), some of proposals were expressly anti-Semitic. Similarly, in the area of the Polish political system and political life Dmowski offered „positive” solutions (recovery and moralisation of Polish political life, raising the niveau of political culture of the Polish political elites and Polish society, strengthening of executive power) and „negative” proposals (association polishness with catholicism and his instrumental use, desire to make Poland a national state, desire to move away from the rule of parliamentary, postulate of removing the excess of the Jewish population in Poland). The least controversial were proposals in the sphere of social and mental modernization of the Polish society (attachment to the rule of law, the cultural and civilizational raising of lower strata and classes, care for a family – according to Dmowski important institution for society, increasing hard work / diligence of the Polish population, learning of positive competition or skills competition, development of the awareness of the Polish population concerning social and economic problems, emphasis on its own – Polish creativity). It is impossible unambiguously assess all Dmowski’s proposals of Poland’s modernization – they were characterized by – similar to entire creative achievements of Dmowski – some „duality” – controversional ideas were mixed with interesting concepts, sometimes original.

Polska wobec wyborów parlamentarnych na Ukrainie w 2012 r.

This paper aims to analyze the attitudes of the Polish political elite and journalists to the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. It refers to the statements made by the leaders shaping Poland’s foreign policy, the President of Poland, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, MPs involved in the issues of Ukraine as well as political commentators and analysts. The broadly understood issue of the Ukrainian elections was to a limited degree addressed by such newspapers as Rzeczpospolita, Gazeta Wyborcza, Dziennik, and some online portals. The failed hopes to democratize Ukraine, following the orange revolution, made Poland withdraw from supporting a single political option in Ukraine. Polish politicians and journalists expressed little interest in the 2012 parliamentary elections in Ukraine. This made the diplomatic efforts of the President of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski, exceptional. In general, the Ukrainian election was perceived in the context of human rights, democratic standards and the geopolitical future of Ukraine. The fairly conducted election was to be a condition for the further support Poland would offer to Ukraine in signing an association agreement with the EU. Polish politicians and journalists would observe at the time that theforeign policy of Ukraine was ambiguous, being ‘suspended’ between Brussels and Moscow. The not entirely legitimate victory of the Party of Regions did not mean that Poland would block the integration of Ukraine with the West. It was concluded that despite the emergence of authoritarian tendencies in Ukraine, Poland should promote the rapprochement of its eastern neighbor with EU states. Looking atthis matter in this way was justified by the Polish raison d’etat and the need to create a pro-Western and democratically oriented Ukrainian society.

Book review: Włodzimierz Wesołowski, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow (eds), National and European? Polish Political Elite in Comparative Perspective

Book review: Włodzimierz Wesołowski, Kazimierz M. Słomczyński and Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow (eds), <i>National and European? Polish Political Elite in Comparative Perspective</i>

Структура сетей политических элит Республики Польша в 1993—2013 годах

To identify the structure of network ties within Polish political elites; to study the features of network ties formation and the impact that both primary and labour socialisation periods and diaspora characteristics have on this process; to describe the structural features of the resultant network structures over different periods of time and analyse the structural dynamics of political elites for the purpose of forecasting major trends in the structural transformation of Polish political elites. In the course of the study, biographical data on the presidents, ministers, advisors, and party leaders of the Republic of Poland was collected and processed. The work follows the network analysis paradigm and identifies the dynamics of the key network parameters: distance, density, transitivity, and compactness. The author analyses the dynamics of representation in the structure of political territorial diaspora elites, business community members, and ‘moral politicians’. The article identifies two periods of formation of political party networks in Poland: the first period (1993—2007) saw a transition from rather weakly integrated systems to high density and cohesion networks as early as the second electoral cycle, after which a gradual decrease in the key indices of network integration was registered. A new peak of network cohesion and integration was reached in 2007—2011; however, the death of some key members of political elites in a plane crash resulted in a decrease in the network integration indices to the level of 2001—2005. On the whole, the network structure of Polish political elite is characterised by unstable dynamics relating to the crisis events of the past. However, it is established that the elites have a pronounced diaspora core and an unstable periphery; the share of businesspeople directly participating in political processes is decreasing, whereas ‘moral politicians’ usually take an active part in the formation of political elites.

Elementy tradycji byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego w piechocie Wojska Polskiego Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej

Traditions are very important element of mass conciousness, which should characterize both society and army. Until recently on the European continent military traditions were one of important and carefully cultivated. One of the elements in the multithreaded traditions functioning in Polish armed forces before 1939, was the ethos of former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and thus the memory of the relationship between the Crown and Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As well, building the consciousness of those traditions in the military was convergent with the official policy of Polish political elites. One of the ways in which in the years 1921–1939 the Polish armed forces operated in the ethos of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addition to native Polish, and military traditions of the lands forming part of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania were cultivated. In the course of training some conscripts from this lands an educational content recommended by the chief military authorities was used. Important components of this tradition were the bosses and the names and branches of the Polish Army and elements of symbolism and even departmental banners or commemorative badges. Therefore, the author tried to present the history of all infantry formations of the Polish Army in the years 1918–1939, which were cultivating ethos of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania. As well described how these facts were externalized in symbolic representation of those formations: banners, own names and commemorative badges. In addition, author gives information how these facts were used in the process of training and education of soldiers serving in these regiments.

The Position of Polish Political Elites on Future EU Enlargement

The Polish political elite favours further EU enlargement. They support to different degrees the European aspirations of individual countries. The priority is the EU enlargement eastwards and the strategic goal of the accession of Ukraine. It is argued that the Polish position on the prospects of the accession of that country to a large extent determines the attitude towards the whole process of EU enlargement. It is unlikely that this general support will change in the near future. However, it cannot be ruled out that the attitude of the Polish political elites towards the EU membership of individual states (especially Turkey and the Balkan countries) may be redefined.

Who is willing to die for the constitution? The national debate on the constitutional treaty in Poland

This article analyses the Polish debate on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) as reflected in mass media coverage of the ratification, crisis and reflection periods between October 2004 and October 2005. Despite the importance of the institutional reforms that the TCE introduced and the ratification referendum envisaged for Poland, a rich public debate did not evolve: The European constitutional project proved to be a low-key issue in Poland. This article explains the phenomenon by arguing that Polish political elites did not communicate the TCE to the public mostly because of their instrumental attitude to the document. On the one hand, despite the fact that public opinion surveys show that the Polish public felt under-informed in these matters, the majority of people supported the TCE believing that it fostered the general idea of European integration. On the other hand, among the political elites a rather instrumental and sceptical attitude to the TCE predominated, based on national – and partisan – rather than European interests.

Beyond conditionality: EU enlargement, European party federations and the transnational activity of German political foundations

This article deals with the mechanisms and the impact of the enlargement process on the identity of Polish political elites. This process is closely related to the evolution of EU governance; new political partners will have ‐ and already have had ‐ an impact on the decision making process at different levels of the EU. We start off with a review of the theoretical literature on the EU's normative impact on the work and role of political parties. This is followed by an analytical study of European party federations, EU enlargement and the interrelationship between the ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of expected consequences’. The article provides a case study of one non‐governmental actor which has been particularly active in the field of transnational communication, namely, the German political foundations. Our empirical evidence calls into question the notion of conditionality as the major explanatory factor of EU‐induced change.

“Frenzy and Ferocity”: The Stalinist Judicial System in Poland, 1944–47, and the Search for Redress

InMay and June 1992, the Polish political elite, deeply divided and mired in fractional struggle, devoured itself in the lustracja, a resolution passed by the Polish parliament to root out alleged Communist agents and collaborators then in state service. This spectacle hastened the downfall of the Center-Right government of Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, whose parliamentary supponers organized this political witch hunt. Completely dominating the political arena in Poland, it overshadowed other resolutions aimed at, broadly speaking, historical justice. Legislation aimed at reducing the retirement pensions of persons who had been employed in repressive state institutions, upgrading the retirement benefits of victims of state repression, and revising the statute of limitations on crimes committed during the Stalinist period, that is, between 1944 and 1956, languished. The unifying theme in these projects was redress for wrongs committed during the process of sovietization after World War Two.