Policy In Palestine Research Articles

Revisiting the Life and Thought of Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy

History had recorded many famous people struggling to achieve the independent of Malaya. Among them, the name Burhanuddin al-Helmy was the least known. Therefore, the objectives of this paper is to revisit the life and thought of this charismatic man as not many references were attributed to him, especially the ideology that he has faith in. What most books highlighted is his participation in the political arena. Even in the political arena, people knew more about Dato' Onn Ja'far although both of them belonged to the same time. The difference is that Dato' Onn belonged to the right wing (UMNO) while Dr. Burhanuddin is said to have belonged to the leftwing or the anti-establishment. Dr. Burhanuddin was probably among the early Malays who managed to attain his doctorate at times when his country was still colonized. He strongly advocates that Malaya and the Malay World should be independent from foreign encroachment. He experienced many ups and downs in the political field but he stand firmly with his own conviction. His leadership was particularly clear during his participation in Persatuan Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM) and Parti Islam seTanah Melayu (PAS). One thing that is clear, he was more of a nationalist than a reformist although the essence of his struggle was to reform the Malay's societies based in the mould of Islam, and especially using Tasawwuf.His LifeDr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy was born on 29 August 1911 in Cangkat Tualang, Perak, and died on 25 October 1969. His father is Haji Muhammad Nor who was well known by his friends as Melayu Jati (true Malays) and had studied under several famous Makkan scholars during his time (Saliha 1997). The name al-Helmy was derived from the recognition of people towards his father's personality by calling him Abi Halim. In his struggle and idealism, he tried to adapt to what he called as the Malay Personality (Keperibadian Melayu) which was prevalent in his attitude towards the foreigners. From his early childhood, Dr. Burhanuddin received his first education of al-Qur'an from his own father whom is belonging to the Naqshabandiyya Tariqat. Later on, he was sent to Sumatra to further his education but changed to another school in Padang Serai, Kedah, and finally to Madrasah al-Masyhor in Pulau Pinang. It was in this school that he was influenced by the Middle Eastern magazine; mainly al-Manar which had eventually gives him the progressive interpretation of Islam (Ramlah 1999).In 1928, he went to India to travel, as well as to further his education. Among his personal experience was observing the movement of Mahatma Gandhi, and meeting famous individuals such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pandit Jawharlal Nehru, and other notable Indian leaders (Kamarudin 1980). Dr. Burhanuddin furthered his studies on homeopathy and was awarded a degree of homeopathy by Ismaeliah Medical College, New Delhi. Later on, he pursued his other degree of Philosophy in Aligarh Muslim University (Kamarudin 1980). It was in India that he was exposed to the struggle of the Indian from the British rule, and also witnessing the tensions between Hindus and Muslims (Ramlah 1999). This experience had ignited the idea of liberating Malaya from the British and was deeply entrenched in his heart. Apart from that, his conviction became even stronger when he witnessed the British policy in Palestine in which he was a volunteer aide to the Palestinian refugee driven out from their homeland (Ramlah 1999).Upon his return in 1935, Dr. Burhanuddin taught Arabic language in al-Juned Arabic School in Singapore. He was also active in the Islamic movement in the island (Kamarudin 1980). In 1937, he published a magazine known as Taman Bahagia. One of his articles highlighted the misery of the Palestinian refugee as a result of British imperialism. After only one hour of its circulation, the British had him arrested, accusing him of threatening their importance in Malaya (Kamarudin 1980). After that incident, he opened a homeopathy clinic, having its branch in both Singapore and Johor. …

Third Parties and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Poliheuristic Decision Theory and British Mandate Palestine Policy

What role do third parties play in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to what extent do domestic political constraints shape this role? Answering these questions has important ramifications for understanding the interplay between domestic and international politics. One useful tool to conduct this research is the two-stage decision-making framework, Poliheuristic (Ph) Decision Theory, which eliminates options from the choice set that do not meet domestic political requirements. This paper applies Ph theory to a case study from the conflict's infancy, the British decision in 1922 to affirm the policy of a Jewish national home (based on the Balfour Declaration 1917) despite violent Arab opposition. It argues that the decision was based solely on domestic political needs and did not attempt to address tensions in Palestine. It concludes that Ph theory provides a highly effective theory of decision-making for assessing motivations and policy decisions of third parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

US Secretary of State George C. Marshall's Losing Battles against President Harry S. Truman's Palestine Policy, January–June 1948

US Secretary of State George C. Marshall's Losing Battles against President Harry S. Truman's Palestine Policy, January–June 1948

The Armenians of Palestine 1918-48

For the Armenians of Palestine, the three decades of the Mandate were probably the most momentous in their fifteen hundred-year presence in the country. The period witnessed the community's profound transformation under the double impacts of Britain's Palestine policy and waves of destitute Armenian refugees fleeing the massacres in Anatolia. The article presents, against the background of late Ottoman rule, a comprehensive overview of the community, including the complexities and role of the religious hierarchy, the initially difficult encounter between the indigenous Armenians and the new refugee majority, their politics and associations, and their remarkable economic recovery. By the early 1940s, the Armenian community was at the peak of its success, only to be dealt a mortal blow by the 1948 war, from which it never recovered.

Church, State, and the Holy Land: British Protestant Approaches to Imperial Policy in Palestine, 1917–1948

British Protestants had long held to the notion of a legitimate Protestant interest in the Christian ‘Holy Land’, a concept that helped bolster Britain's political claim to Palestine in the aftermath of the First World War. Evangelical Protestant visions of the return of the Jews to their biblical homeland encouraged imperial support for Zionism and helped define the unique conditions of British mandate rule. But once the British actually assumed power over Palestine, British Protestants began to find themselves seriously at odds over their moral and political obligations in the new possession their interests had helped to shape. This article explores three broad Protestant attitudes towards the question of Britain's policy towards Palestine during the mandate period, demonstrating the ways in which Lambeth Palace, Protestant metropolitan mission institutions, and Protestant church workers in Palestine itself developed radically different conceptions of their religious and political responsibilities in what they regarded as their ‘Holy Land’.

Securing Zion? Policing in British Palestine, 1917–39

The British period in Palestine (1917–48) was fundamentally shaped by the commitment to promote the Jewish National Home (JNH) as originally stated in the Balfour Declaration (1917). The extent that that commitment shaped public-security policy in Palestine is examined in this article. While the need to reduce costs and the desire for a civilian (rather than military) force also shaped policy, the government's JNH policy was the key determinant in public-security policy in Palestine. It meant the police was specifically configured to protect the Jewish population and there were always a disproportionate number of British personnel in the force. This became more pronounced as British rule progressed. Following deadly riots in 1929, the number of British police was tripled; with the inception of the Arab Revolt (1936–39) that number more than quadrupled. Moreover, during the Arab Revolt the British increasingly relied on members of the Jewish community to assist with their protection. The majority of these Jewish forces were supposedly for defensive purposes; regardless, they were all members of the semi-secret underground Jewish army, Haganah. The British were well aware of this and tacitly approved. In doing so, the British made a significant contribution to the Zionist project.

‘Forthcoming three months represent best remaining opportunity for accomplishment’: Israeli diplomacy and the 1948 US presidential election (part II)

President Truman's de facto recognition of Israel on 14 May 1948 did not resolve the critical issues of de jure recognition, the new state's boundaries, the arms embargo, and financial assistance. In an ironic convergence with their frequent adversaries in the US State Department who often alleged that politics was driving Palestine policy, Israeli diplomats anticipated that favourable action from the Truman administration on these issues would be forthcoming in the course of that year's presidential election campaign. This article examines Israel's efforts to secure those objectives in the context of that year's presidential politics and the ongoing tug of war between White House and State Department. Despite persistent and determined advocacy, the mobilization of considerable support from American Zionists, and an apparently favourable political environment, Israel diplomacy was unable to overcome Truman's deference to State Department resistance to Israeli aspirations in the months leading up to his unexpected victory at the polls on 2 November 1948. It would be the success of Israeli arms, not the quest for Jewish votes, that proved to be the key to realizing the unfinished agenda of 14 May.

‘Forthcoming Three Months Represent Best Remaining Opportunity for Accomplishment’: Israeli Diplomacy and the 1948 US Presidential Election (Part I)

President Truman's de facto recognition of Israel on 14 May 1948 did not resolve the critical issues of de jure recognition, the new state's boundaries, the arms embargo, and financial assistance. In an ironic convergence with their frequent adversaries in the US State Department who often alleged that politics was driving Palestine policy, Israeli diplomats anticipated that favourable action from the Truman administration on these issues would be forthcoming in the course of that year's presidential election campaign. This article examines Israel's efforts to secure those objectives in the context of that year's presidential politics and the ongoing tug of war between White House and State Department. Despite persistent and determined advocacy, the mobilization of considerable support from American Zionists, and an apparently favourable political environment, Israel diplomacy was unable to overcome Truman's deference to State Department resistance to Israeli aspirations in the months leading up to his un...

Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–1939

Italian involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine (1936–1939) was perhaps the most explicit example of Rome's attempt to destabilize London's position in the Middle East, prior to Italy's entry to the Second World War. This article examines the mechanisms of Fascist Italy's assistance to the rebels in Palestine, focusing on the secret contacts between Italian officials and the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. It describes the financial support given by Italy as well as the attempts to smuggle arms to Palestine. The article also analyses Rome's diplomatic manoeuvres in connection with Palestine and its pro-Arab propaganda. It is argued that Italian policy in Palestine was governed by, and subordinate to, wider considerations of Italian policy such as imperial competition with Great Britain and a desire to increase Italy's influence in the Middle East. In fact, Fascist involvement in the ‘first Intifada’ teaches us more about Italian foreign policy than it does on the course of events in Palestine during the Arab rebellion.

Palestine Country Profile: The Road Ahead for Palestine: Financial Policies Issues

In spite of the general unstable political and economical situation that existed in Palestine, the financial sector has witnessed a positive increase in the last ten years. It consisted of four groups: First: The banking system, which includes 22 Arab, foreign, and Palestinian banks with 135 branches (PMA, 2005). Second: Insurance sector, which includes nine insurance corporations. Third: Other financial institutions including moneychangers and microfinance firms. Fourth: The Palestinian stock exchange market dealing only with par- value common shares of 25 Palestinian corporations and one foreign corporation, among six private corporations operate as registered brokers. The size of banks operation in Palestine has grown significantly, as expressed by owner equity and total assets in the last decade. However, in spite of the significant increase in credit advances during the last period, it is still low compared to the value of deposits held by the banks. As for deposits, they have increased to $ 3976 millions in February 2005, which is equivalent to 90% of the Palestinian GDP, and it is more than most of the Arab states. Finally, various recommendations may be drawn regarding financial policy in Palestine. For example, to consider investments in local corporations as a part of the minimum requirements of credit to deposit ratio by the PMA, to encourage banks to invest in both primary and secondary markets in Palestine, to change the present legal entity of the PSE to a non -profit organization owned by insiders known as stakeholders, to issue the proposed law of companies.

Economic Separatism and Britain's Labour Policy in Palestine

Economic Separatism and Britain's Labour Policy in Palestine

The Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948 (review)

The Americanization of Zionism, 1897-1948, by Naomi Cohen. Hanover and London: Brandeis University Press, 2003. 261 pp. $35.00. In The Americanization of Zionism, Naomi Cohen expands on a theme that has previously been explored both by herself and by scholars such as Ben Halpern and Melvin Urofsky: from its earliest years, has been shaped by uniquely factors that set it apart from traditional ideology of European Zionism. in United States was fashioned according to the needs of Jews in America, including their desire not to differ too much from the stand of government and the demands of public opinion (p. 1), she contends. This meant jettisoning such concepts as inevitability of massive antisemitism in diaspora and personal obligation of every Zionist to settle in Palestine. Most Jews have always regarded United States as their home, never believed that substantial antisemitism will erupt here, and never seriously considered relocating to Middle East. Nor would they want what Cohen calls American public opinion to suspect that they regard United States as a country that will eventually persecute them and drive them out. Cohen explains at start that The Americanization of does not purport to be a synthetic history of Zionism (p. 2). Rather, she presents eight separate episodes, some revolving around key events, others around key individuals, that illustrate her central theme. Every chapter features same crisp writing style and high level of scholarship that made her earlier books sparkle. It is impossible to finish any single section of book without gaining some fresh insight or new information. The book begins with a study of earliest U.S. Zionist monthly, The Maccabaean, exploring how it presented Zionist ideas to fledgling Zionist movement and how, in turn, it reflected perspective of emerging movement. Subsequent chapters deal with such disparate topics as unsuccessful attempt to build a Conservative synagogue in Jerusalem in 1930s, efforts by Jewish social worker Maurice Hexter to influence British policy in Palestine, conflicts between Zionists and State Department over immigration to Palestine during 1930s, ill-fated Jewish Conference, and 1940s debates over within Conservative Judaism's Jewish Theological Seminary. Her chapter on Reform Judaism's evolution from anti-Zionism to non-Zionism (that is, support for a Jewish refuge although not a sovereign state) brings into sharp focus multiplicity of factors at work in shaping that movement's attitude towards Palestine. England's Balfour Declaration, soon endorsed by U.S. government, legitimated Zionism in eyes of Reform rabbis (p. 62). If they did not have to fear dual loyalty accusations, Reform leaders could feel comfortable with idea of Palestine as a refuge for downtrodden European Jews, even if they were slow to embrace notion of Jewish territorial sovereignty. Later, rise of Nazism cemented Reform's acceptance of idea of Palestine as a haven for European masses. Self-preservation was also a factor: Reform rabbis had to face reality that by interwar years, most Jews were nationalist-minded eastern European immigrants (p. 62) (or their offspring) to whom a strongly anti-Zionist brand of Reform Judaism would not appeal. …

For all the Wrong Reasons? Re-evaluating Truman, Domestic Influences, and the Palestine Question

This essay is a re-evaluation of President Harry Truman's foreign policy in Palestine and whether his decision-making was influenced by domestic issues, events and attitudes. The article both weighs in on the current debate of whether Truman was susceptible to electoral influences and the Jewish vote, and argues that Truman never knowingly placed American interests in jeopardy by going against the recommendations of his State Department. Rather, the advice of his closest aids convinced him that a pro-Zionist policy would not detriment American interests in the Middle East. Thus, Truman could then seek to gain political and electoral advantages from a policy that he believed was already in America's best interest. In addition, I will argue that American anti-Semitism and a revival of nativist attitudes in America resulted in an environment in which America would not accept its share of the displaced persons. As a result, Truman advocated a policy of refugee Zionism with regards to the Palestine Question, which ultimately undermined the British, who were too weak to uphold the Palestine Mandate following the war. Thus, the influence of American domestic issues took many forms and was one integral factor in the eventual outcome of the Palestine Question.

HARRY TRUMAN'S RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL

Historiographical accounts of Harry Truman's recognition of Israel have placed undue importance on this apparently sudden act on 14 May 1948. US Palestine policy has not been placed in the correct historical context of the Cold War. As a ‘Cold War consensus’ developed in Washington in the early post-war period, Palestine emerged as a secondary issue to the major concern that was the ‘Northern Tier’ of Greece, Turkey, and Iran. The US was guided by broad but clear objectives in Palestine: the attainment of a peaceful solution, a desire not to implicate US troops, and the denial of the region to the Soviets. Disagreements between the White House and the State Department were all expressed within these broad policy objectives. Israeli sources have been significant by their absence in the existing historiography of recognition. These sources reveal that for the Jewish community in Palestine, diplomatic victories were of secondary importance to the practical achievement of statehood. From both a Washington perspective, and the perspective from Palestine, US recognition was not regarded as a crucial issue at the time. It was a decision taken within the context of broad US objectives in Palestine, and it did not influence the decision of the Yishuv to declare statehood.

Freya Stark in America: Orientalism, Antisemitism and Political Propaganda

Between November 1943 and May 1944, Freya Stark, the noted writer, Arabian adventurer and wartime propagandist, undertook a publicity tour of the United States on behalf of the British Ministry of Information. The objective of her trip was to defend Britain’s wartime Palestine policy, especially the 1939 White Paper and its severe restriction on Jewish immigration into Palestine. Since its implementation, the White Paper had been subject to criticism and attack from the entire Jewish world, not only the Zionist movement. Indeed, Stark’s trip was initiated, organized and sponsored by Whitehall as an attempt to counter anti-White Paper agitation in the United States which, by this time, was being blamed for strains on the Anglo-American alliance. Stark’s dedication to her task of spreading pro-White Paper propaganda among the general public, the media and political élite highlights her fiercely anti-Zionist position as well as her negative attitude to Jews and Judaism in general. But her trip also clearly shows the determination of the British foreign policy élite to make the fight against Zionism a wartime priority, in stark contrast to its indifference and insensitivity towards the annihilation of Europe’s Jewish populations that was occurring at the same time.

YOUSSEF CHAITANI: Dissension among Allies: Ernest Bevin's Palestine Policy between Whitehall and the White House. 1945–47. 156 pp. London: Saqi Books, 2002. £25.

YOUSSEF CHAITANI: Dissension among Allies: Ernest Bevin's Palestine Policy between Whitehall and the White House. 1945–47. 156 pp. London: Saqi Books, 2002. £25.

The Wars in Syria and Palestine of Thutmose III

Thutmose III's (15th c. B.C.) suitable and sensible new policy lay the basis for Egypt's empire in Syria and Palestine. Main source of our knowledge on this formative period stems from the so-called Annals of this king in the inner chambers of the great Karnak temple of Amun. Part One contains a new collation of these Annals, along with a hand-copy of the inscription, textual analysis and commentary. In Part Two the reader will find new translations together with commentary on additional sources bearing on the wars: the king's speeches, royal encomia, and private biographies. The volume concludes with an historical commentary, and places the wars in their historical context. A comprehensive, illuminating and accessible assessment of Egypt's policy in Syria and Palestine.

The 'Haifa Turning Point': The British Administration and the Civil War in Palestine, December 1947-May 1948

On 14 May 1948, the mandate which had been awarded to Britain by the League of Nations to govern Palestine expired. The run-up to the end of British rule was marked by long months of a Palestinian civil war between Jews and Arabs, which significantly affected the manner in which Britain concluded its mission in Palestine. The war, which lasted from December 1947 until May 1948, was inevitably influenced by the fact that British rule, including the civil administration, the police, and the army, continued to exist formally until the middle of May. The prevailing argument in the research literature on this period is whether British policy during the civil war was a defined intention, and whether it was also implemented by the Administration in Palestine until the very day of the evacuation. Some have claimed that the British blatantly supported the Arabs, though others believe that they backed the Jews. A number of studies maintain that the British sought to bring about a situation of chaos, which would show up the irrelevance of the United Nations' partition plan. Be that as it may, all agree that Britain exercised a crucial impact, which was deliberate and conscious, on the events.' The research, primarily Israeli and British, on Britain's place in the Palestine war has come a long way, to the point where the question of whether the British supported the Jews or the Arabs is no longer addressed. Avi Shlaim is right when he says that during the war the British pursued a policy in Palestine that was neither anti-Zionist nor anti-Arab, but proBritish. British research (contrary to Israeli or Arab studies) also touches on the helplessness of Britain in the face of the war, although as a marginal issue, a kind of calculated risk, which was under control, that Britain assumed at the time. If a sense of helplessness manifested itself, Roger Louis, the prominent historian of the end of the British mandate of Palestine, mentions it as no more than a local weakness. Shlaim explains that it was an

The Making of Israeli Militarism (review)

The Making of Israeli Militarism, by Uri Ben-Eliezer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 278 pp. $35.00. The election of former IDF chief of staff Ehud Barak as Prime Minister, and the inclusion of retired generals on Barak's personal staff, have prompted renewed interest in civil-military relations in Israel. Indeed, Uri Ben-Eliezer's The Making of Israeli Militarism is only the latest contribution to an impressive body of literature on this topic.1 What distinguishes this book from earUer works is the author's determination to apply to the civil-military paradigm the assumptions and methodologies associated with the new, critical generation of Israeli historiography and sociology. Specifically, BenEliezer sets out to explain the existence in Israel of a sociological phenomenon that he variously terms cultural militarism, politics, nation-in-arms, positive militarism, or civilian militarism, and which he defines as the institutionalization in Israeli political culture of the propensity to solve all national problems through military force. Interestingly, the author does not attribute this phenomenon to a military coup or praetorianism, i.e., the unsolicited intrusion of military commanders into the political affairs of the state. Rather, he attributes it to a complex arrangement established in the pre-state period between the Yishuv's older generation of European-bom political leaders and the younger native-bom generation, who were by the late 1930s becoming increasingly impatient with the policies of selfrestraint (havlagah) and static defense adopted by the Jewish Agency and the Hagana in reaction to both Arab terror attacks and the anti-Zionist drift of British policy in Palestine. For Ben-Eliezer, the major protagonist in this civilian-military entente was David Ben-Gurion. Although part of the older generation, Ben-Gurion was nonetheless disposed toward the more activist approach demanded by sabras like Yigal Allon, Moshe Dayan, and Yitzhak Rabin. Ben-Gurion also saw parochial advantage in establishing close ties with this group, by pre-empting political challenges to himself and his dominant Mapai party from such groups as Revisionist Zionism (and its paramilitary offshoots, the Irgun and LEHI), the socialist-Zionist Mapam party, and the Ahdut Ha'avodah kibbutz movement that was the major breeding ground for the Palmach, the Yishuv's semi-autonomous strike force. Finally, Ben-Gurion saw accommodating the new military elite as an integral step toward implementing his concept of statism (mamlakhtiuf), premised on tight centralized control over all instruments of authority in the nascent country. Ben-Eliezer attributes most important developments in Israel's early history to the influence of cultural - including the decision by the Zionist leadership (at the Biltmore Conference of May 1942) to end all cooperation with the British Mandatory authority; the significant degree of autonomy accorded to field commanders in the 1948-49 war to encourage the permanent evacuation of Arab villages; and the Altalena affair (of June 1 948) in which the civil-military establishment used lethal force against Irgunists to signal that no challenge to state authority would be tolerated. Similarly, the build-up to the 1956 Suez War is attributed to positive militarism. The author claims that a cadre of elites - most notably, Ben-Gurion and his proteges, Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres - conspired to eliminate all options other than a military one for responding to the threat posed by Egypt' s Gamal Abdul Nasser (a threat which, it is implied, was deliberately exaggerated by Ben-Gurion & Co. in order to satisfy their militaristic thirst for war). According to Ben-Eliezer, militarism dominated Israel's response to the crisis preceding the June 1967 Six-Day War - to the extent that all non-military options for calming border tensions with Egypt and Syria were rejected out of hand - and also characterized Israel's relations with West Bank-Gaza Palestinians and with the Arab states after the war. …

15 Opposition and Crisis: January to July 1947

When Headlam resumed keeping a diary at the start of 1947, the Labour government was facing a serious crisis due to the combination of an unusually severe winter and a shortage of coal, resulting from low productivity in the recently-nationalised mines.Wednesday 1 January 1947 I gave up keeping a diary in the autumn of ‘45 and I don't quite know why I am starting one again this year. I doubt very much whether I shall succeed in keeping it going – or whether, indeed, there is any real point in doing so. However, I find my old diaries rather interesting reading – interesting to me that is to say – and so one might as well try and continue the series for one's few remaining years – they can only make the funeral pyre of my life's records a wee bit bigger. … I have neither the energy nor the inclination to publish my life's history, or to advertize my views about men and things – after all, what have I done worthy of note? and of what value are my opinions?Friday 3 January Things do look too gloomy for words both in this country and all the world over. The Terrorists in Palestine are at it again – and one wonders what the Government can do to repress them? Surely they will come to some kind of decision on policy before long? As things are now, no one has the least idea of what our policy in Palestine is … One sign of the times is that synagogues in London are being set on fire – in any other country there would be a pogrom of Jews if Jewish terrorists were allowed to behave to people as they are behaving to our troops and police and officials in Palestine today.