Iraq Policy Research Articles

Processing the War in Iraq While Learning About American Politics

When political knowledge is scarce, affective attitudes, which can consist of emotion-driven feelings regarding political figures, government, country, and foreign nations, often assist policy judgment. Based on pre- and postsurveys administered in Introduction to American Politics courses, fall 2003–fall 2005, this study examines how political learning affects the formulation of students' policy preferences on the war in Iraq. With political knowledge gains for our students, the relative impact of affective attitudes such as confidence in the President, trust in government, and enemy images of Iran declined with regard to Iraq policy preferences, while the relationship between issue preferences such as defense spending and Iraq policy strengthened. Our students' attentiveness and surveillance knowledge of contemporary political figures and facts was more significantly related to preferences on the current occupation than on the past decision to invade Iraq. Teaching methods with more extensive course integration of TV news and film clips had higher surveillance knowledge gains that reduced student's reliance on affective attitudes, wherein the learning impact appeared more influential than potential emotion evoked by heightened awareness of political figures and facts related to a contentious and contemporary debate.

Reform in Comparative Perspective: US and EU Strategies of Democracy Promotion in the MENA Region after 9/111

This article explores the origins of the different transatlantic initiatives in the field of democracy promotion in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, linking them to the international context, actors' interests and means, threat perceptions, and differentiated political cultures. This approach will be complementary to the discussion of the risks and opportunities of having further transatlantic cooperation on these issues. The article argues that, despite a recent history of divergent transatlantic approaches, the potential for further cooperation between the US and the EU is greater nowadays, especially following the failure of the neoconservative policies in Iraq and its destabilizing implications for the entire region. US initiatives appear to be moving towards what has been termed the ‘standard template’ of democracy promotion efforts, combining traditional grass-roots approaches with government cooperation in a way similar to existing European frameworks, whilst emerging European initiatives may seek to give greater importance to aspects of reform more political in nature.

Conflicted Americanism: The case of the Sacco-Vanzetti affair

Why do Europeans, and especially the French, hate America? That question has been at the forefront of intellectual debate since the war in Iraq and other policies of the Bush administration led to a massive decline of American popularity in most European countries. Many commentators have come to argue that anti-Americanism has little to do with America itself, that it is first and foremost a self-referential discourse, which is little affected by the ebb and flow of transatlantic relations. In his new book on the international reception of the Sacco-Vanzetti affair, however, Moshik Temkin throws a very different light on this issue. In fascinating detail, Temkin shows how the mistrial of two poor Italian immigrants in 1921 reverberated in France and other European countries. He explains how it can be seen as evidence not simply of anti-Americanism, but of a ‘conflicted’ Americanism, which was very much affected by what American policy-makers did or did not do.

Leadership and the Emotional Endowment Effect in Foreign Policy

Applying Kingdon’s (1995) work on multiple streams, I examine the emotional endowment effect in foreign policy. Why do governments continue to pursue the same policy even in light of mounting negative consequences? I argue when government and the public become emotionally vested in a particular policy, they find it difficult to change course. I offer two mechanisms that explain the persistence of feelings: novel events that evoke negative feelings have greater inertia than those evoking positive feelings; and under certain conditions, affect congruence processes overshadow cognitive thinking strategies. As a result, public policies are more likely to follow the outcome of states of feeling than any rational cost-benefit calculations. I emphasize the role that entrepreneurs play in manipulating emotion and cognition in two cases: the Greek attempt to block international recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) from 1990-93 and the Bush Administration’s policy in Iraq from 2001-04. The argument has implications for theories of leadership and foreign policy.

The Origins of American Power in Iraq, 1941–1945

Utilizing archival sources in both the United States and Britain to describe the changes in American policy in Iraq during World War II, and tracing the emergence of the United States as an important factor in Iraq's politics and history, the authors challenge the notion that the United States was a passive bystander to events there during the war. Washington initially followed the British lead, but, beginning in 1942, the United States became more assertive in its relations with Iraq, with American diplomats, State Department officials, postwar planners, and intelligence officers promoting the ideals of the Atlantic Charter while simultaneously aiming to secure Iraq's petroleum and tying it into a network of Western alliances. Iraq's vital strategic position and its rich petroleum resources made it an important part, along with Saudi Arabia and Iran, of the American effort to secure, militarily and economically, the oil‐rich Gulf region for the West in the postwar era.

Bad strategies: how major powers fail in counterinsurgency

By examining the failures against insurgents in Algeria, Cyprus, Vietnam and Iraq, James S Corum offers rare and much-needed insight into what can go wrong in such situations - and how these mistakes can be avoided. In each case, Corum shows how conflict could have been avoided by the major power if it's strategy had addressed the underlying causes of the insurgency it faced; not doing so wastes lives, and weakens the power's position in the world. Corum's clear and practical prescriptions for success show how the lessons of the past apply to failed policies in Iraq, and how these can yet be turned round to gain a lasting peace.

Failures (and successes?) of neoliberal economic policy in Iraq

Arguments for the total overhaul of the Iraqi economy were grounded in neoliberal justifications and erroneous claims that the economy was moribund, inefficient and burdened by endemic corruption and thus, in need of rapid liberalization. The transition to a fully liberalized economy was implemented by Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) officials with little regard for how decades of war and sanctions had shaped the Iraqi economy and the consequences this would have on post-invasion economic policy. The multiple failures of the CPA's neoliberal economic policies originate in this fundamental misreading of the economy and the disregard of specific economic patterns that had developed over the previous decades. Critical evaluation of these phases suggests that economic policy has largely failed to initiate sustained development, reconstruction or rehabilitation of the economy as a result of economic planners' fundamental misunderstanding of the Iraqi economy at the time of the invasion. These failures are the consequences of ideologically-driven policies that emasculated existing state structures, institutions and policy capacities. Furthermore, economic policy has perpetuated and, indeed, deepened the structural dependency of the Iraqi economy on oil revenues rather than generating economic diversification.

A U.S. Holy War? The Effects of Religion on Iraq War Policy Attitudes*

Objective. Throughout the course of the Iraq War, the Bush Administration has consistently framed its war policy in religious language. Therefore, we investigate the extent to which public religiosity predicts neoconservative foreign policy attitudes.Method. We use the 2005 Baylor Religion Survey to estimate OLS models predicting the effects of religious measures on support for a neoconservative Middle East foreign policy.Findings. We find that support for U.S. Iraq policy is partially an outcome of what we call “sacralization ideology,” as measured by the belief that religious and secular institutions should be more closely in collaboration.Conclusion. We argue that the religious framing of U.S. foreign policy appeals to a certain religious type who is not fully Republican or conservative evangelical.

Doomed to Repeat

This article describes a tendency of news to isolate war policy outcomes from each other and from strategic goals and official responses. These predictable patterns of press coverage and policy developments are referred to as accountability gaps . We argue that professional norms and commercial pressures overwhelm whatever hesitancy news organizations have to alter their organizational and professional behavioral patterns that lead to predictable reoccurrences of accountability gaps. Habitual deference to White House officials means that positive frames are likely to prevail, regardless of conditions on the ground, while declining attention to the costs of war as they accumulate—and becoming less newsworthy-diminishes the weight of counterframes. As casualties and other consequences of policy in Iraq became routine, their news value diminished. As casualties became routine and other costs of war mounted in ways difficult to convey, official good news frames tended to dominate news narratives.

Examining the Case for War: Allegations of Iranian Interference in Iraq

Iran poses two fundamental challenges to the United States. First is its alleged program to develop a nuclear weapon, which is currently being negotiated and which might be managed and contained through concerted international action. Second, and more threatening in the long term, are its roles as a regional hegemon and as a participant in the political development of neighboring Iraq. Iran's policies in Iraq sometimes appear to be directly in conflict with US initiatives. In spite of considerable angry rhetoric, however, any actual evidence for Iranian hostile interaction in Iraq is highly speculative, and the White House has yet to make a case that Tehran's involvement is inappropriate or could serve as a casus belli.

Iraq and the Next American President

The original justification for the invasion of Iraq, the incompetence displayed in its aftermath, and the high costs of the occupation have undermined the possibility of bipartisan agreement on Iraq. The danger for both US policymakers and the long-suffering Iraqi people is that American politics will continue to shape Iraq policy well beyond the next US presidential election on 4 November 2008. While both candidates have presented starkly different plans for Iraq, those seeking to influence the political and military strategy of the next US president have been held hostage by domestic party concerns. The hazard for the next president is that his Iraq policy will owe much more to bitter and ideologically driven arguments in Washington than the actual situation in Baghdad. In order for the next president to avoid yet another Iraq debacle, both candidates’ policies need to be held up against the Iraqi realities they wish to shape.

The War in Iraq and the Academic Study of Religion

We can gain valuable new perspectives on the Bush administration's policies in Iraq and the domestic response to them by applying the historical and analytical-descriptive methods of academic religious studies. The article analyzes the work that has already been done along these lines, placing it in the context of broader studies of American religion and culture that cast the U.S. role in the Iraq war in a new light. These works provide a model of scholarship as good citizenship, helping American society understand itself better in a time of war, stimulating the kind of thoughtful debate that is the lifeblood of democracy.

Outcome Commitments in Third Party Intervention: Theory and Application to U.S. Policy in Iraq

This paper presents a model of strategic interaction in which a third party intervenes on behalf of a government in its conflict with insurgents. It examines whether it is better for the intervenor to adopt an input-based strategy (i.e., specify the total resources it will spend) or an outcome-based strategy (i.e., specify the goal that it will achieve), and it shows that outcome-based strategies are better for the intervenor than input-based ones if and only if in the absence of intervention the insurgents are stronger than the government. A system of benchmarks that are tied to the efforts of both parties outperforms both input-based and outcome-based strategies. Lessons from the theory are applied to U.S. strategy in Iraq.

RECONCILIATION AND IRAQ: FAITH-BASED ADVICE FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT

Iraqi factions are divided by ethnicity, religion, ideology, resentments, hatreds, and desires for revenge rooted in history. The U.S. and Iraq need a jus post bellum, an ethic for building peace in Iraq. This ethic—reconciliation—is a holistic project of six interlocking practices to restore persons, relationships, and political orders. These include just and inclusive structures, acknowledgement, reparations, apology, forgiveness, and accountability. A religious rationale, especially one that overlaps with Islamic values, can increase the legitimacy of U.S. policy in Iraq, andthe next president would do well to heed the resources of religion.

Taming the hegemonic power: SCIRI and the evolution of US policy in Iraq

This article discusses the historical development of the United States' special relationship with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI also known as SIIC or ISCI), one of the Shi'ite religious parties of Iraq. It surveys SCIRI's ideological heritage from the 1980s onwards, with particular emphasis on SCIRI's long-standing principle of subordination to the supreme leaders of Iran through the concept of wilayat al-faqih. The article then goes on to discuss the modalities by which the United States came to choose the most pro-Iranian of the Iraqi political parties as its preferred partner in Iraq after 2003. SCIRI managed to achieve this status by playing on the superpower's predilection for an ethnosectarian reading of Iraqi politics, by emphasizing professionalism in all its dealings with Washington, by exploiting the United States' lack of knowledge about how power works in Shi'ism, and by playing down its links to Iran. As a result of these manoeuvres, the Bush administration has chosen to sideline the other Iraqi Shi'ite parties (which historically have far weaker ties to Iran), and has ended up with a partnership that in the long term will probably mean a marked strengthening of Iranian influence in Iraq.

Bush's Stealth United Nations Policy

been a hallmark of George W. Bush’s foreign policy in such strategic states as Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, and Russia. Yet in the midst of this bleak landscape, there has been one success for Bush. Looking back on the almost eight years of his presidency, the one arena where Bush has shown some mastery in international affairs is, counter-intuitively, the most unlikely place on the planet—namely, the United Nations. For good or ill, Bush has attained more victories in that body than in any other forum or country—an intriguing fact, given that from the start of his White House service, Bush has treated the UN as the bete noire of global politics. Most Americans are unaware of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Bush administration and the United Nations. Indeed over the past eight years, the public clamor of angry voices and the harsh accusations which have passed between the administration and the UN seem to have drowned out much of what Bush and his diplomats have quietly been doing behind the scenes in that building on New York’s East River. Even today, the public impression of the Bush administration in its relations with the UN has been one of a broken diplomacy, in which each side has shown a hostility, indifference, or contempt toward the other. Much of this notion derives from the openly unilateralist policies of President Bush, from the refusal of the UN to back the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, from Congressional anger over the UN scandals like the Oil-for-Food program, and from a general antipathy, especially among the Republican Party’s ultra rightwing, toward any international organization that might erode U.S. sovereignty. However, the true tale turns out to be quite different from what would appear to be a profile of failure. In fact, in its nearly 92 months in the White House, the Bush administration has pursued a conservative but pragmatic mission at the United Nations under a stealth cover that has seen it carefully selecting its causes and focusing its energies, whether as a routine participant in the demarches at the UN Security Council; as a sponsor of numerous UN resolutions, sanctions, and other initiatives; as a regular contributor to the UN’s upkeep; or as an overseer of policies and appointments within the departments of the UN. This has been especially true with respect to American policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. For the most part, the United States has diligently pursued goals at the UN when it Stephen Schlesinger is an adjunct fellow at the Century Foundation and the former director of the World Policy Institute. He is the coauthor of Bitter Fruit about the U.S. coup in Guatemala, author of Act of Creation about the founding of the United Nations, and coeditor of Journals 1952–2000, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Japanese Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Balancing Economy and Security

Although the quest for oil has long been a central concern for resource-poor Japan, its foreign policy in the Middle East does not simply reflect a mercantilist interest in the region's resources. Its desire to remain close to the United States during the North Korea crisis and its nascent competition with China are also critical factors in Japan's Middle East policy. However, Japan lacks an integrated strategy toward the Middle East and as a result the various components of its policy are not always compatible. Hence, while Japan has firmly backed the Bush administration's Iraq policies, and begun discussing a possible free-trade agreement with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, it has also, until quite recently, simultaneously pursued closer relations with Iran. In lieu of coherent regional strategy, Japan instead possesses a clearly prioritized sense of its interests in the region.

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Vietnam: Historians at War

By the early 1990s, when I began studying the Vietnam War, the American public had largely lost interest in the history of that conflict. The Civil War and World War II were the wars that historians were advised to cover if they wanted to reach the public. Among government officials, military officers, and political scientists, Vietnam was considered irrelevant, because the United States would never get caught in protracted counterinsurgency warfare again. Iraq changed all that. Ever since the outbreak of insurgency in the former empire of Saddam Hussein, people of all persuasions have been mining the history of Vietnam for information that will support their preferred Iraq policies. Hundreds of thousands of American troops sent to Iraq and Afghanistan have received more instruction on Vietnam than on any other historical subject. Although more than thirty years have passed since the end of the Vietnam War, historians today are as divided on what happened as the American people were during the war itself. During the 1960s and 1970s, huge numbers of antiwar Americans entered academia and the media, while few Vietnam veterans and other supporters of the war obtained jobs in those professions, in many cases because veteran status or pro-war sentiments were considered unacceptable. As a result, most academic and journalistic accounts of the war written during and shortly afterwards depicted Vietnam as a bad war that the United States should not have fought. Antiwar history of the Vietnam War thus acquired the label of “orthodox” history.