Violent radicalisation is a complex problem, complicated by the lack of a clear terrorist profile and variation in the risk factors that predict violent extremism across individuals and groups (Campelo, Oppetit, Neau, Cohen, & Bronsard, 2018; Carlsson et al., 2020; Desmarais, Simons‐Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling, & Hoggan, 2017; Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd, & Hasisi, 2019). While models of understanding radicalisation vary (Borum, 2015; Christmann, 2012; Desmarais et al., 2017; Horgan, 2008; Koehler, 2017; Kruglanski, Belanger, & Gunaratna, 2019; Sarma, 2017), it is broadly defined as the process by which a person adopts extremist views and moves towards committing a violent act (Irwin, 2015; Jensen, Atwell Seate, & James, 2018). Radicalisation has been linked with individual and group engagement in terrorist attacks against innocent civilians (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010), as well as individuals entering conflict zones to join formal extremist groups to engage in violent combat (Lindekilde, Bertelsen, & Stohl, 2016). As a result, radicalisation has become a key focus for counterterrorism and violence prevention interventions. The complex and varied nature of individuals' progression from radicalisation to violence presents challenges for designing and evaluating appropriate interventions and policy responses (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Helmus et al., 2017; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Horgan, 2008; Jensen et al., 2018; Kruglanski et al., 2019). This level of complexity has driven national counterterrorism policy agendas to adopt intersectoral and multiagency responses that aim to address various radicalisation processes and risks (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016). These multiagency responses often involve partnerships and collaborations between various different agencies and entities (Hardy, 2018), such as governmental agencies, private businesses, community organisations and service providers.
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