Police Oversight Research Articles

Why Would a Government Establish a Strong Police Oversight Agency? A “Genetic and Diffusion” Perspective

ABSTRACT Why would a government introduce a strong external oversight mechanism over its own administration? Independent Police Oversight Agencies (POAs) have been established to better protect human rights. Using a novel data set of 27 POAs, we examine two dimensions of their strength: de jure and de facto independence. Their best predictors are the de jure independence of judges or prosecutors, the budget of the judicial system, and the push by the international environment. This lends support to a “genetic-and-diffusion” model for explaining the strength of POAs combining two logics (genetic/culture and diffusional/tactical) operating at two levels (national and international).

Police Oversight of Legality in Railway Freight Transport in Russian Empire During World War I

This article analyzes the activities of the gendarmerie railway police in ensuring compliance by freight carriers with prohibitions and restrictions on the export of certain raw materials and goods during World War I. Based on documentary materials, it reveals the content of the state policy of the Russian Empire regarding measures to halt the supply of essential resources to the Central Powers’ armies. The study of the administrative documentation of the railway police indicates that particular attention was paid to monitoring freight transport at border stations. The issue of police support for the stable functioning of railways under wartime conditions is explored. Gendarmerie officers facilitated the prioritization of military cargo movement along steel corridors. A critical responsibility of the gendarmerie was uncovering collusion among railway employees and shippers to manipulate train speeds for illicit speculative profit amid commodity shortages. The study concludes that the gendarmerie railway police played a significant role in overseeing the legality of freight transport during World War I. However, amid the disorganization of state mechanisms and deepening crises in Russian society, ensuring uninterrupted and effective railway operations proved impossible.

Police oversight in the Republic of Botswana: Challenges and prospects

ABSTRACT Notwithstanding Botswana’s reputation for adhering to democratic ideals and good governance, the nation has not established sound oversight mechanisms for the police service. Over the years, the Botswana Police Service has faced criticism over allegations of abuse of powers and functions, manifesting through violation of citizens’ rights. Various media houses have reported police excesses such as unlawful arrest and detention, illegal searches, torture and death of suspects while they are in police detention. Amidst all these allegations, there are no independent mechanisms in place to hold the Botswana Police Service to account. In the absence of external accountability mechanisms, citizens whose rights are violated by the police will have to depend on the same violators to investigate. In this paper, we explore the current police oversight systems in the Republic of Botswana. We also present arguments for the creation of an independent police oversight body in the nation.

Police oversight in practice: the Special Investigations Unit and civilian police oversight in Ontario, Canada

ABSTRACT The Special Investigations Unit (SIU) of Ontario is a civilian police oversight agency responsible for investigating serious incidents involving police officers and civilians, with the power to charge police officers with criminal offences. Created in 1990, the SIU is considered a pioneer in civilian-led oversight, however, little is known about how the SIU conducts investigations, the complainants in these investigations, and the routine work of this oversight agency. This article examines a variety of indicators to document the work and activity of the SIU, illustrating important aspects of the agency’s performance in the process. Important trends regarding the nature of police misconduct, violence, and use of lethal force are analysed. Our study uncovers previously unknown trends regarding complainants in SIU investigations, including the prevalence of certain characteristics like known mental health disabilities and the relationship between the substantiation of complaints by the SIU and the criminal activity of the complainant. This study empirically documents the nature of police cooperation with oversight. By analysing different indicators of agency performance and work, this study makes an important contribution to the study of police oversight in general, and the findings hold value for understanding police use of force, the nature of police criminality and misconduct, and the functioning of civilian police oversight in practice.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TASKS OF THE OMBUDSMAN AS PART OF THE INDEPENDENT BODY MONITORING INAPPROPRIATE POLICE ACTIONS

Police services and special services in a democratic state are geared toward providing the state and its citizens with security, i.e. protection against internal and external threats. However, one cannot forget that police activities, in their essence, significantly interfere with fundamental freedoms and human rights. The establishment of the civilian oversight is often a difficult process, with necessary factors such as political support, police cooperation, activist support, resources, management and leadership and public attitudes. The supervision of the police activities in the external system remains largely in Poland within the competence of the Commissioner for Human Rights. Commissioner for Human Rights is the constitutional authority for the legal control and protection, who safeguards human and civic freedoms and rights specified in the Constitution and other legal acts. In his/her activities, the Commissioner is integral and independent from other state authorities. The aim of this paper is to outline the general oversight of police mechanism, made by the Commissioner of Human Rights. The paper presents the reasons for the independent investigation of police complaints and for restoring confidence in the complaints system and in police. For this paper, the term oversight of police will be associated with the institutions outside the Police, which have power to control the way police departments handle complaints about the disputed police conduct.

“Family Trouble”: The 1975 Killing of Denise Hawkins and the Legacy of Deadly Force in the Rochester, NY Police Department

This paper examines the lineages of police violence, family trauma, and police reform through a case study of the Rochester police killing of Denise Hawkins in 1975. Michael Leach, a 22-year-old, white police officer, responded to a “family trouble” call involving a domestic dispute between Hawkins and her husband. When the 18-year-old, 100-pound Black woman emerged from the apartment, she held a kitchen knife. Within five seconds, Leach had shot and killed her, later claiming she endangered his life. Though Hawkins’ name is included in lists of Black women killed by police, little is known about her life and legacy. Using newspapers, police records, and oral history, we examine activists’ attempts to scale the call for justice for Denise Hawkins to the national level, the police department’s defense of Leach as the true victim in the incident, and the city leaders’ compromised efforts to establish a civilian oversight of police. Within the context of Rochester’s robust history of resistance to police violence, we argue that the reform efforts of the late 1970s ultimately failed to redress the police use of deadly force. Furthermore, when Michael Leach killed again in 2012—this time shooting his own son, whom he mistook for an intruder—his defense attorney successfully depicted Leach as the sympathetic figure. In shifting the focus to Denise Hawkins, this work contributes to the Black feminist call to memorialize Black women killed by police and suggests that the policies that protect the officers who use deadly force cause widespread, intergenerational harm to officers and their victims.

Constitutional accountability for police shootings

AbstractConstitutional accountability for police shootings is imposed in part through civil rights lawsuits alleging Fourth Amendment violations, but little is known about how judges evaluate these claims. I introduce original data on all federal circuit court decisions resolving Fourth Amendment excessive force claims in police shooting cases over three decades. The quasi‐random assignment of a majority‐Republican panel substantially increases the probability of circuit courts finding a police shooting to be constitutional. Capturing law's influence by mapping case facts to the three‐part analytical framework delineated by the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, I find that active resistance and threat immediacy are associated with increases in the probability of finding police shootings to be constitutional, but crime severity is not systematically associated with outcomes. In addition, there is evidence that law conditions the effect of politics, with increases in latent Fourth Amendment reasonableness narrowing the partisan outcome gap in constitutional assessments. The quasi‐random assignment of a Black judge does not impact outcomes. The results have important implications for police oversight and longstanding debates in judicial politics over the prevalence of panel effects and the extent to which law influences decision making.

Police Supervision — The Case of Kosovo

Background: The development of social relations in the democratic state of Kosovo necessitates quality regulation by the police. Therefore, the question of developing and implementing the police supervision system in Kosovo is relevant. Objectives: This research aims to explore the principles underlying the monitoring of police officers in Kosovo, to describe the historical development of the Kosovo police and to charac- terise the prerequisites for the development of police oversight. Furthermore, it aims to draw a comparative analysis between the experiences of Kosovo and the United States in the context of monitoring police performance. Methods: The research uses methods of analysis (to explore the Kosovo police as a law enforce- ment agency), synthesis (to explore the stages of policy development), comparison (to explore the similarities and differences between the activities), generalisation (to describe the effectiveness of different supervisory institutions), and formal legal analysis (to study the content of the main regulations governing activities). Results and Conclusions: The research has established that in Kosovo, such a body is represented in the context of the Police Inspectorate. The research highlighted the main areas of activity of internal and external oversight mechanisms designed to combat unethical and illegal behaviour of police officers. It examined the main regulations that establish the rights and obligations of Kosovo Police officers and inspectors and proved that the control mechanisms complement each other in the course of police supervision. In addition, the research examined the experience of police oversight in the United States. The research has established that to increase the effectiveness of monitoring police activities, it is necessary to involve public representatives. It was found that the police system consists of an internal and external mechanism that allows for covering vari- ous areas of police activity and timely detection of violations in them. Also, within the internal control, there are special departments that are part of the police system. The research findings should be used to prepare reforms and strategies to improve police performance.

The Effect of Police Oversight on Crime and Misconduct Allegations: Evidence from Chicago

Abstract Does police oversight increase crime? Studies examining this relationship often rely on major scandals as shocks, but the simultaneous effect of public outrage on officer behavior and crime contaminates the results. Using a framework distinguishing oversight and outrage, we identify two events that increased oversight but elicited no public reaction. We find that despite a subsequent decline in reported misconduct, these oversight increases likely did not significantly impact crime or officer activity, suggesting oversight can reduce misconduct without increasing crime. However, a major policing scandal likely increased crime but did not increase arrests and decreased stops and uses of force.

Losing control is not an option. Resource allocation to police oversight agencies in Western states

AbstractIndependent police oversight is a specific government delegated function that has been neglected by scholars of regulation. The main goal of this article is to understand the allocation of state resources to independent police oversight agencies (POAs) in the post delegation stage. We test whether the aim of delegation is better governance in complex areas to increase police agents' accountability (“policy complexity”) or to avoid political costs of agencification (“agency losses”). A survey of 27 POAs in Europe and Canada shows that POAs tend to receive significantly fewer state resources when they have a high level of formal independence or strong legal empowerment. Resource allocation seems more congruent with an “agency losses” logic than with the goal of making regulation more efficient. Our findings have notable implications for international norm‐setting bodies (the UN, the Council of Europe), who have not sufficiently codified the allocation of resources.

Civilian Oversight of Police Through the Lens of Polarities of Democracy

Following the murder of George Floyd, the U.S. Congress called upon the National Organization for Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) to play a role in the reimagining of policing in America, including a transformation of policing from a warrior to a guardian mentality. In turn, NOBLE partnered with the Institute for Polarities of Democracy (the Institute) to conduct an analysis of the <em>21st Century Policing Report</em> (the Report), which focused on addressing a myriad of issues that challenged the relationship between the police and communities. The Report determined there were six “pillars” necessary for effective policing in America, including (1) Trust and Legitimacy; (2) Policy and Oversight; (3) Technology and Social Media; (4) Community Policing and Crime Reduction; (5) Training and Education; and (6) Officer Wellness and Safety that encapsulated areas in need of attention. This review was an in-depth analysis conducted with support from the Walden University Center for Social Change through its strategic alliance with the Institute. In this article, we summarize the results of the Institute's initial review of Pillar Two of the Report, Policy and Oversight, with a specific focus on civilian oversight of police. Information to support this article was taken from original data that supported the compilation of the Report. The Institute’s analysis of a sampling of responses (from the participants against a survey question) was identified as correlating with polarities of democracy values. Additionally, a separate comprehensive critical analysis was conducted by comparing various principles believed necessary for effective civilian oversight of police against individual polarities of democracies value sets. Finally, the 5-Step SMALL Process (Seeing, Mapping, Assessing, Learning, and Leveraging) was identified as a tool that could be used to implement recommendations contained in the Report. From this tool, Polarity Maps for Justice and Due Process, as well as Participation and Representation, were developed to graphically depict the correlation of the polarities of democracy value sets with the preconditions for effective civilian oversight of police.

Oversight and accountability for serious incidents in Canada: Who polices the police?

AbstractThis study examines the agencies responsible for investigating when a member of the public is seriously injured, is killed or experiences other serious and potentially criminal actions at the hands of police officers in Canada. The article takes a comprehensive approach by examining all police oversight agencies that are responsible for responding to and investigating allegations of police criminality—eight organizations, across nine jurisdictions. The study integrates insights from public administration and police accountability literature and examines the structures and administration of the agencies. The study provides a critical assessment of the state of police oversight for serious incidents in Canada, it identifies agency outputs (including case substantiation), levels of independence, efforts at transparency, and considers the challenges in attempting to hold police accountable in Canada.

ANALISIS PUTUSAN PENGADILAN NOMOR: 11/PID.PRA/2022/PN. KARAWANG TENTANG PENYIDIKAN YANG TIDAK SAH SEBAGAI ALASAN PENGAJUAN PRAPERADILAN YANG PUTUSANNYA DIKABULKAN HAKIM

This study aims to ascertain whether an investigation is appropriate as a basis for pretrial submissions on the validity of suspects and/or immoral acts, and whether the judge's considerations are appropriate in imposing a sentence. bad decision. refers to kuhap as a benchmark. This research uses normative legal methods, and the literature collected using case studies examines cases against decisions The power of law remains against the decision. The results showed that the Reported Party's interview was invalid, because the Reported's interview did not contain an interview protocol. There is no documentary evidence of the investigator's planned investigation of the case, which has been made public. attention when carrying out a case title without summoning the police oversight function, the complainant was not notified, and the complainant was not ordered to open an investigation, so that it was observed and determined that the Petitioner did not meet material and formal aspects. Based on the reasons the applicant submitted a pretrial and the considerations of the pretrial judge, it was decided that Asep Aang Rahmatullah was recognized as a plaintiff against the Karawang Police Chief, Head of Criminal Investigation Unit of the Karawang Police. Karawang Police as a defendant at the Karawang District Court. Decision on Case Number: 11/Pid.Pra/2022/PN. Karawang that the determination of the suspect is illegal according to law and is not legally binding

A scoping review of police civilian oversight literature 1992–2022

PurposeThis study's aim was to systematically review available literature related to the establishment, purpose, operation, and effectiveness of civilian police oversight entities in the United States and to gain a deeper understanding of support, opposition, academic, public, and police expectations concerning their utility.Design/methodology/approach A Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) was used to analyze police civilian oversight literature published between 1992 and 2022.FindingsThe authors find racially biased policing, political investment, police resistance, oversight structure, scope, and authority are key components that determine how oversight is perceived.Research limitations/implications Based on the methodology, the results may not be generalizable. Future researchers should consider expanding public oversight research beyond the parameters, which constrained this paper.Practical implications This article contains implications that should be considered by jurisdictions seeking to develop, restructure, or eliminate public oversight entities and for recognizing the concerns of advocates and opponents of public oversight.Social implications Civilian oversight has long been considered a potential method for public inclusion if not a means for greater public control of police. Over the past few decades, a resurgence of interest in civilian oversight has emerged.Originality/value This article synthesizes literature that spans 30 years of research on public oversight.

Jurisdictional overlap: The juxtaposition of institutional independence and collaboration in police wrongdoing investigations

Introducing multiple layers of “independent” structures has become a go‐to strategy for public agent oversight. The question remains whether such decentralized, overlapping structural arrangements of oversight reduce regulatory uncertainty and produce better policy outcomes. Using the case study of Ontario, Canada, I examine the consequences of institutional layering for the specific and broader goal of independent oversight and democratic policing, respectively. Semi‐structured interviews with oversight officials and other key stakeholders as well as past governmental reports that led to the police oversight reform are analyzed to study the gap between the policy intention and outcome. I found that multiple “independent” investigatory agencies are meant to operate concurrently within an integrated system to ensure a responsive and comprehensive oversight system. However, their structural separation obstructs collaboration among the external agencies, causing various dysfunctional bureaucratic behaviors that undermine the overarching intention. The disconnect among different oversight authorities exacerbates their reliance on internal police‐led procedures for all police misconduct inquiries. Implications of my research extend beyond policing and further the study of overlapping regulatory oversight and structural reform through institutional layering.

The fourth power. A mapping of police oversight agencies in Europe and Quebec

ABSTRACT Independent police oversight bodies are advocated by human rights organisations to be the most credible and effective solution to address the misbehaviors and systemic malfunction. They have emerged in parallel with independent regulatory agencies in various economic sectors, thus signalling a new trend in governance interpreted as the rise of a ‘fourth power.’ Still, comparative knowledge is scarce about the nature of delegation of power to police oversight agencies (POAs) and their actions. By analyzing 25 POAs in 20 countries, this article seeks to precisely describe their features in Europe and Quebec (Canada): the timeline of their birth, the scope of delegation (remit, formal independence, powers, resources), and the variations in how they execute their mandate. We unveil a profound heterogeneity across countries. In terms of national patterns, the main divide is between specialised (police only, limited formal independence, more abundant resources) and non-specialised (all public administrations, strong formal independence, limited resources) agencies. The latter tend to act as a public fire alarm to compensate for their lack of resources. Our mapping also contrasts European countries’ oversight mechanisms, which rely on professional agencies that are mostly established at the national or state/regional level, with local civilian oversight boards in the US. And, while our results confirm that the 1990s marked a watershed, they question the notion that agencification in the police sector has been a vector for revolution in its governance, since no POA incorporates all the traits required for them to be the fourth power just yet.

Change at the Top: The Necessity of Transitional Leadership Provisions in the Laws of Independent State-Based Institutions

Abstract The leadership of independent state-based bodies is critical to their independence and proper functioning. Where leadership ends, either within or outside of the term of office, legislation must ensure that the institution can continue to function. Transitional leadership provisions provide for the continuation of the powers of office in the event of the absence of the mandate holder. Through a textual analysis of the legislation of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and ombudspersons from 85 jurisdictions, this article identifies a lack of provision for transitional arrangements in enabling laws. It also discusses the problematic aspects of these legislative arrangements where they are present. It identifies the core requirements to ensure there is no leadership gap for an institution. The findings of the article are relevant for a broad range of state-based institutions including anti-corruption and data protection commissions, equality bodies and police oversight bodies, because all state mandated institutions risk their ability to function being undermined where legislation fails to account for a gap in leadership or does not include sufficient protections, such as immunity, for transitional office holders. This article calls for more robust focus on comprehensive transitional provisions in international standards on NHRIs and ombudspersons, and for the inclusion of such transitional provisions in the enabling laws of all legislatively mandated independent state-based institutions.

From 9/11 to the POST Act: democratic oversight of police surveillance technologies in New York City

ABSTRACT September 11, 2001 resulted in the drastic expansion of intelligence and surveillance capacities in the New York City Police Department (NYPD) and the NYPD has continued to adopt emergent surveillance technologies. These tools have investigative applications beyond counterterrorism and many worry their use is outpacing oversight and regulation. The transformations of the NYPD in the early 2000s were followed by major – if lagged – changes to the external oversight of police and surveillance tools, including the 2013 establishment of an Office of the Inspector General for the NYPD and the Public Oversight of Technology (POST) Act in 2020. This article tracks these developments and their capacity to mitigate information asymmetries, enhance transparency, and ultimately influence the use of police surveillance technologies in New York City.

The adoption of culturally contentious innovations: The case of citizen oversight of police

AbstractCultural contentiousness is defined as an attribute of innovation due to which it encounters resistance because of its incompatibility with hegemonic cultural assumptions. I argue that culturally contentious innovations are likely to be adopted when antecedents have productive symbolic force, i.e., they reveal contradictions between dominant cultural assumptions and the material outcomes of existing institutions or empower social actors to resolve such contradictions. However, antecedents with incapacitative symbolic force tend to obfuscate the above contradictions or decrease social actors’ capacity to resolve them, encouraging the adoption of less contentious innovation. Applying these arguments to citizen oversight agencies (COAs) for the police, I examine the antecedents of contentious (i.e., investigative) as opposed to less contentious (non‐investigative) COAs. In support of the above argument, I find that productive antecedents (e.g., a consent decree, an increase in civil rights nonprofits) are associated with adopting investigative COAs. In contrast, incapacitative antecedents (e.g., a Law Enforcement Officer Bill of Rights, an increase in the violent crime rate) are associated with adopting non‐investigative COAs. The findings broadly demonstrate that policy adoption scholars ought to distinguish policies in terms of cultural contentiousness and account for the symbolic force of antecedents. Further theoretical contributions are discussed.

Empowerment and capacity of external police oversight: The paradox of the Control Yuan in Taiwan

Abstract Prevailing scholarly literature generally suggested the significance of an externally empowered oversight agency to ensure the public accountability of the police. As an electoral democratic regime, Taiwan’s model of police oversight is characterized by the parallel existence of both internal and external investigative bodies. The Control Yuan is a constitutionally empowered ‘super ombudsman’ to monitor the integrity management of civil servants including the police. This thematic research studies the reflection of ‘insiders’—the Control Yuan members who have taken part in police misconduct hearings, on this mechanism that is uncommon in western democracies. Paradoxically, the respondents generally questioned the effectiveness of this powerful establishment with both abundant human resources and legal authorization. The technical competence among investigators and party politics in agenda setting are also perceived as structural limitations of the current mechanism.