Plural Agency Research Articles

Thought and language: association of groupmindedness with young English-speaking children’s production of pronouns

Shared intentionality theory posits that at age 3, children expand their conception of plural agency to include 3- or more-person groups. We sought to determine whether this conceptual shift is detectable in children’s pronoun use. We report the results of a series of Bayesian hierarchical generative models fitted to 479 English-speaking children’s first-person plural, first-person singular, second-person, third-person plural, and third-person singular pronouns. As a proportion of pronouns, children used more first-person plural pronouns, only, after 3;0 compared to before. Additionally, children used more 1pp. pronouns when their mothers used more 1pp. pronouns. As a proportion of total utterances, all pronoun classes were used more often as children aged. These findings suggest that a shift in children’s social conceptualizations at age 3 is reflected in their use of 1pp. pronouns.

Proxy social-speech acts: A particular case of plural agency

I focus on proxy acts' plural agency and argue that it is a particular case of plural agency, irreducible to that of collective agency. I start from Reinach's phenomenological account of proxy acts, according to which they are an eidetic modification of social-speech acts. I point out that as social-speech acts, proxy acts are also spontaneous acts and at least second-degree position-takings; but I argue that, unlike social-speech acts, their agency is modified. Such modification involves different agents at different times, different degrees of authorship, and different extensions of efficacy. I conclude that proxy acts' plural agency is constituted by several layers of agency that are bound together in the temporally expanded unity of the proxy act as a whole.

From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency

Abstract According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way.

Responsibility of corporations: organisational values, formal norms and managerial competencies

A generic cultural socio-cognitive theory of a plural agency is developed, which includes 'responsibility'. Interaction between social viable systems, i.e., normative personalities, is modelled. The general definitions of the terms 'responsible' and 'responsibility' imply that there is an action-outcome-consequence relation. Consequently, for modelling cybernetic systems there is need to address issues related to: reasons for action, actual actions taken, outcomes, observation of outcomes, assessment of outcomes, reconsideration and perhaps modification of earlier action. All action has outcomes: a direct effect (performance), side effects, and effects on other agencies. Thus, there is need to integrate into social viable systems models: 1) mutual interdependencies; 2) issues related to dependence on resources; 3) competition for resources; 4) impact on other's resources. The theory will provide guidance for analysis of interaction effects between agencies within their resource environments.

Eros Effect as Emergency Politics: Affective and Networked Politics of Agonistic Humanism in South Korea’s Sewol Ferry Disaster

This article examines how people, based on their personal reception of a crisis, come together and organize themselves to readdress the status quo in a state of emergency by exploring the sociopolitical power of affect, empathy, and spontaneity as a transformative movement mobilizer. Using Bonnie Honig’s notion of Emergency Politics, this article further conceptualizes George Katsiaficas’ notion of Eros Effect by reconsidering the transformative, constitutive power of people’s plural and contingent political agency in a crisis situation. Human affect, especially empathy to the devastated, coupled with communication networks, helps consolidate and spread what Herbert Marcuse called the New Sensibility of the human species as a transformative political power. This article further complicates Bonnie Honig’s claim on agonistic humanism by revisiting a dichotomy of mourning mothers and acting fathers. As an empirical case, this article investigates how the Korean people have organized themselves in a series of protests and rallies to take care of the victims of the Sewol Ferry after it sunk, killing more than 300 passengers, mainly high school juniors, on April 16, 2014.

“Go get a job right after you take a bath”: Occupy Wall Street as Matter Out of Place

Anthropological studies of purity reveal how notions of cleanliness influence political and social life. During its 2011 Zuccotti Park occupation in Lower Manhattan, Occupy Wall Street (OWS) contested spatial and symbolic manifestations of neoliberalism by re-inserting Otherness into sanitized and privatized space. But the demonstration provoked reactions from politicians and news media that entwined discourses of cleanliness and productivity (such as Newt Gingrich's riposte to the protestors: “Go get a job right after you take a bath”). This ethnographic study argues that such representations had spatial and political effects. In particular, our account illuminates the plural agency of Occupiers, where resistance to depictions of dirt and idleness existed alongside the use of such discourses to discipline each other. We trace a discursive legacy of these events as notions of productivity and cleanliness have circulated within activist responses to 2012's Superstorm Sandy and the 2014 Flood Wall Street mobilization.

Collective emotion regulation in an organisation – a plural agency with cognition and affect

Purpose– While emotions and feelings arise in the singular personality, they may also develop a normative dimensionality in a plural agency. The authors identify the cybernetic systemic principles of how emotions might be normatively regulated and affect plural agency performance. The purpose of this paper is to develop a generic cultural socio-cognitive trait theory of plural affective agency (the emotional organization), involving interactive cognitive and affective traits, and these play a role within the contexts of Mergers and Acquisitions (M & A).Design/methodology/approach– The authors integrate James Gross’ model of emotion regulation with the earlier work on normative personality in the context of Mindset Agency Theory. The agency is a socio-cognitive entity with attitude, and operates through traits that control thinking and decision making. These traits are epistemically independent and operate on a bipolar scale; with the alternate poles having an auxiliary function to each other – where the traits may take intermediary “balanced” states between the poles.Findings– Processes of affect regulation are supposed to go through three stages: first, identification (affective situation awareness); second, elaboration of affect is constituted through schemas of emotional feeling, which include emotion ideologies generating emotional responses to distinct contextual situations; third, execution: in the operative system primary emotions are assessed through operative intelligence for any adaptive information and the capacity to organize action; and turned into action, i.e. responses, through cultural feeling rules and socio-cultural display rules, conforming to emotion ideologies.Research limitations/implications– This new theory provides guidance for framing multilevel interaction where smaller collectives (as social systems) are embedded into larger social systems with a culture, an emotional climate and institutions. Thus, it is providing a generic theoretical frame for M & A analyses, where a smaller social unit (the acquired) is to be integrated into a larger social unit (the acquirer).Practical implications– Understanding interdependencies between cognition and emotion regulation is a prerequisite of managerial intelligence, which is at demand during M & A processes. While managerial intelligence may be grossly defined as the capacity of management to find an appropriate and fruitful balance between action and learning orientation of an organization, its affective equivalent is the capacity of management to find a fruitful balance between established emotion expression and learning alternate forms of emotion expression.Social implications– Understanding interdependencies between cognition and emotion is a prerequisite of social, cultural and emotional intelligence. The provided theory can be easily linked with empirical work on the emergence of a cultural climate of fear within societies. Thus, “Affective Agency Theory” also has a bearing for political systems’ analysis, what, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.Originality/value– The paper builds on the recently developed Mindset Agency Theory, elaborating it through the introduction of the dimension of affect, where cognitive and affective traits interact and become responsible for patterns of behaviour. The model is providing a framework which links emotion expression and emotion regulation with cognitive analysis.

Collective Emotion Regulation in an Organisation A Plural Agency with Cognition and Affect

Purpose – While emotions and feelings arise in the singular personality, they may also develop a normative dimensionality in a plural agency. The authors identify the cybernetic systemic principles of how emotions might be normatively regulated and affect plural agency performance. The purpose of this paper is to develop a generic cultural socio-cognitive trait theory of plural affective agency (the emotional organization), involving interactive cognitive and affective traits, and these play a role within the contexts of Mergers and Acquisitions (MA with the alternate poles having an auxiliary function to each other – where the traits may take intermediary “balanced” states between the poles.Findings – Processes of affect regulation are supposed to go through three stages: first, identification (affective situation awareness); second, elaboration of affect is constituted through schemas of emotional feeling, which include emotion ideologies generating emotional responses to distinct contextual situations; third, execution: in the operative system primary emotions are assessed through operative intelligence for any adaptive information and the capacity to organize action; and turned into action, i.e. responses, through cultural feeling rules and socio-cultural display rules, conforming to emotion ideologies.Research limitations/implications – This new theory provides guidance for framing multilevel interaction where smaller collectives (as social systems) are embedded into larger social systems with a culture, an emotional climate and institutions. Thus, it is providing a generic theoretical frame for M&A analyses, where a smaller social unit (the acquired) is to be integrated into a larger social unit (the acquirer).Practical implications – Understanding interdependencies between cognition and emotion regulation is a prerequisite of managerial intelligence, which is at demand during M&A processes. While managerial intelligence may be grossly defined as the capacity of management to find an appropriate and fruitful balance between action and learning orientation of an organization, its affective equivalent is the capacity of management to find a fruitful balance between established emotion expression and learning alternate forms of emotion expression.Social implications – Understanding interdependencies between cognition and emotion is a prerequisite of social, cultural and emotional intelligence. The provided theory can be easily linked with empirical work on the emergence of a cultural climate of fear within societies.

The Affective Agency: An Agency with Feelings and Emotions

In this paper we develop a cultural socio-cognitive theory of plural affective agency. We integrate James Gross’ model of Emotion Regulation with our earlier work on Normative Personality within the context of Mindset Agency Theory. Through the Personality Theory we identify a necessary number of three bipolar normative personality traits, these referring to self-identification, self-regulation and self-organisation of a “living” social/organisational system, and two bipolar traits which regulate the interaction of an agency (an organisation) with its cultural and operative environments. Through this we modify and extend Gross’ approach and model the interaction between ‘reason and the emotions’. The Theory of the Affective Agency involves interactive cognitive and affective traits. These traits are epistemically independent (uncorrelated); and operate on a bipolar scale, the alternate poles having an auxiliary function to each other, where the traits may take intermediary “balanced” states between the poles.

Personality, pathology and mindsets: part 1 – agency, personality and mindscapes

Purpose– This paper aims to develop a new socio-cognitive theory of the normative personality of a plural agency like, for instance, an organisation or a political system. This cybernetic agency theory is connected to Bandura's theory of psychosocial function. The agency is adaptive and has a normative personality that operates through three formative personality traits, the function of which is control. The cybernetic agency theory is presented as a meta-model, which comes from cybernetic “living systems” theory.Design/methodology/approach– First, in this paper, the authors discuss the virtues of a normative cybernetic agency model in the light of issues related to normal states and pathologies of systems. Formative traits could be derived from Maruyama's mindscape theory or Harvey's typology. However, Boje has noted that with four mindscape types Maruyama's typology is constrained. Consequently, he projected the Maruyama mindscapes into a space with the three Foucault-dimensions: knowledge, ethics and power.Findings– The suggested cybernetic agency model with the three formative personality traits can provide a framing for a structural model that has the potential to distinguish between normal and abnormal personalities in the same framework.Research limitations/implications– The constraints of the Maruyama mindscape space, as identified by Boje, are suggesting that further research is needed to identify a formative three-trait-system which is theory based, was empirically applied, and is permitting to create a typology with eight extreme types, yet to be identified.Originality/value– The paper draws on earlier work undertaken in the last few years by the same authors, who in a new way are pursuing new directions and extensions of that earlier research.

Exploring Mindset Agency Theory

This paper develops a socio-cognitive theory of the normative personality of a plural agency like for instance an organisation or a political system. The personality is represented through formative cognitive traits that arise from the Sagiv-Schwartz cultural values study. To establish the traits the principles of Maruyama’s meta-theory of mindscapes are examined and related to Mindset Agency Theory. A Maruyama “mindscape” can be understood as a construct from which coherent sets of behavioural mind-sets can emerge. A specific set of goals, demands and behaviours would be typical for a social-cognitive system that is ruled by a single mindscape. However, pure mindscapes are extremes, and will likely be rarely observed to rule a single agency. In any self-referential, self-regulating, self-organising and pro-active social system different modes of thought (or paradigms) are prevalent and can be related to different mindscapes. As highlighted by Bandura, such interaction between prevalent forces can be modelled with cybernetic approaches, which can explain the internal dynamics of a system. This research creates a generic model that has the potential to distinguish between different types of personalities within the same framework and can illustrate the sources of the internal cultural dynamics of a system.

An Introduction to Mindset Theory

The plural agency is a self-referential, self-regulating, self-organizing, adaptive, pro-active and culturally stable collective, having a normative personality belonging to a psychosocial framework of the collective mind. The agency can be characterized by Mindset types, a derivative of Maruyama’s Mindscape meta-theory -- a little known but powerful epistemic approach that can anticipate an agency’s patterns of behavior and demands. A Mindscape is a construct from which coherent sets of behavioral mind-sets can emerge. However, Mindscape theory lacks generative transparency, and the Mindset theory we develop changes this. Mindset Theory is based on the Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) cultural values study from which eight Mindset types are generated that individually or in combination can characterize personality and anticipate behavior.

An Introduction to Mindset Theory

This paper develops a socio-cognitive theory of the (normative or organisational) personality of a plural agency. To do this we first explore the principles of Maruyama’s meta-theory of mindscapes, and establish a directly related Mindset Theory that gives mindscape theory a broader modelling capacity with greater transparency, and both are superior to the more empirically derived approaches like Myers-Briggs Type Inventory (MBTI). A “mindscape” can be understood as a construct from which coherent sets of behavioural mind sets can emerge. A specific set of behaviours and demands would be typical for a social-cognitive system that is ruled by a single mindscape. However, pure mindscapes are extremes, and will likely be rarely observed to rule a single agency (any culturally anchored social). In any self-referential, self-regulating, self-organising and pro-active social system different modes of thought related to different mindscapes are prevalent. As highlighted by Bandura, such interaction between prevalent forces can be modelled with cybernetic approaches, and we create a typology to show the capacity of different cybernetic theories to model personality. The interaction referred to is also the driver for the internal dynamics of a system. Boje (2004) has shown that Maruyama-mindscapes are a constrained set of personality mind set types that can be assigned to a personality (or in the context of a social, a “normative personality”). Boje intuited that Maruyama's mindscapes could be explained through three Foucaultian trait dimensions: knowledge, ethics and power which could operate as a trait basis for mindscape modes. This approach has led him to the creation of a means by which mindscapes can be broadly related with Myers-Briggs Type Inventory cognitive types. The lack of empirical basis for Boje’s traits has led us to create an alternative trait basis that arises from the extensive empirical work on cultural values undertaken by Schwartz (1994). The result is the creation of what we call Sagiv-Schwartz (2007) Mindset Types. We then elaborate on this through the development of agency theory within which we discuss the role of cultural and social environments with respect to the internal and external dynamics of social systems. A culturally based socio-cognitive agency meta-model is then introduced that sits on “living systems” theory. The agency is adaptive, has a normative personality, and an epistemic state determined by its formative traits, the function of which is control. These traits can take bi-polar epistemic values called enantiomers that combine together to give 8 different possible cognitive types that define the personality type mind-set. The personality type is influenced by the culture that the agency is bound to. The traits can be used to explain the what, why and how of dynamic agency behaviour in complex situations. This research creates a generic model that has the potential to distinguish between normal and abnormal personalities in the same framework, something that appears to be missing from the literature, and for which there is a call.

Communicating about nuclear events: Some suggestions to improve INES

This paper provides a critical analysis of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) and its use, both from an epistemic and an ethical perspective. As very few papers have been dedicated to this subject, our critical analysis is mainly based on the INES 2009 User's Manual and on technical information issued by different nuclear agencies. Our critical analysis leads to suggest several elements, which could contribute to the improvement of the INES scale and thereby to a better communication about nuclear events. First, we show that multiple criteria are used to assign an INES rating, which could lead to an insufficient differentiation between events. In order to avoid this issue, we suggest to clarify the criteria that are used to assess the level of the event. Then, we show that level 7 of the INES scale is ill-defined as it does not allow to properly take differences in severity between disasters into account. In this regard, we recommend to use an open scale instead. Moreover, we highlight the fact that INES is able to take into account neither events with long-term evolution nor events involving multiple initiators. In this respect, we suggest providing additional guidelines and reflecting about the data on which to rely, in order to assess an INES level. Furthermore, we reflect on who should be rating a nuclear event and we recommend that, for severe events, an independent and plural agency should be in charge. Finally, we show why INES appears to be insufficient for a global communication, and we suggest to complement the INES rating with additional information in parallel.