Share Of Players Research Articles

Reference points in sequential bargaining: theory and experiment

AbstractWe introduce loss aversion in an infinite‐horizon, alternating‐offers model. When outside options serve as reference points, the equilibrium of our model follows that of the standard Rubinstein bargaining model (i.e., outside options do not affect the equilibrium unless they are binding). However, when reference points are given by the resources that players contribute to the pie, the bargaining outcome changes such that a player's share increases in her contribution. We test our model's predictions in the laboratory. As predicted, only binding outside options affect the division of the pie. Data also show that contributions matter for bargaining outcomes when they are activated as reference points, but not quite as predicted by our theory. Proposers gain a higher share of the pie only when they have contributed a higher share than the opponent has.

A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time

I conduct a bargaining experiment with discounting in continuous time. At any point in time, each of the two players can make a proposal. However, after making an offer, a player must wait for a specific duration of “waiting time” before she can make a new offer or accept the other's offer. In addition, the player's share is discounted by her discount rate for every unit of time. In the equilibrium, the agreement is reached immediately, and a player's share increases with her waiting time and decreases with her discount rate. Results show that a longer waiting time or a lower discount rate alone increases a player's proportion of the actual payoff, but the combination of the two factors has a weaker effect.

Equilibrium effort in games with homogeneous production functions and homogeneous valuation

AbstractIn this study, I analyze games in which the functions mapping a vector of efforts into each player's share of the prize and its value exhibit an arbitrary degree of homogeneity. I present a simple way to compute the equilibrium strategy and sufficient conditions for a unique interior symmetric pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium. The setup nests Malueg and Yates (2006), who exploit homogeneity for rent‐seeking contests with exogenous prize valuation, and shows that homogeneity can be used to solve (i) a wider range of rent‐seeking contests and (ii) other classes of games, like Cournot games with nonlinear inverse demand and possibly non homogeneous goods.

A network reliability approach to the analysis of combinatorial repairable threshold schemes

A repairable threshold scheme (which we abbreviate to RTS) is a \begin{document}$ (\tau,n) $\end{document} -threshold scheme in which a subset of players can another player's share in the event that their share has been lost or corrupted. This will take place without the participation of the dealer who set up the scheme. The repairing protocol should not compromise the (unconditional) security of the threshold scheme. Combinatorial repairable threshold schemes (or combinatorial RTS) were recently introduced by Stinson and Wei [ 8 ]. In these schemes, multiple shares are distributed to each player, as defined by a suitable combinatorial design called the distribution design. In this paper, we study the reliability of these combinatorial repairable threshold schemes in a setting where players may not be available to take part in a repair of a given player's share. Using techniques from network reliability theory, we consider the probability of existence of an available repair set, as well as the expected number of available repair sets, for various types of distribution designs.

Combinatorial repairability for threshold schemes

In this paper, we consider methods whereby a subset of players in a $(k,n)$-threshold scheme can "repair" another player's share in the event that their share has been lost or corrupted. This will take place without the participation of the dealer who set up the scheme. The repairing protocol should not compromise the (unconditional) security of the threshold scheme, and it should be efficient, where efficiency is measured in terms of the amount of information exchanged during the repairing process. We study two approaches to repairing. The first method is based on the "enrollment protocol" from \cite{NSG} which was originally developed to add a new player to a threshold scheme (without the participation of the dealer) after the scheme was set up. The second method distributes "multiple shares" to each player, as defined by a suitable combinatorial design. This method results in larger shares, but lower communication complexity, as compared to the first method.

Ideal social secret sharing using Birkhoff interpolation method

AbstractThe concept of social secret sharing was introduced in 2010 by Nojoumian et al. In the scheme of Nojoumian et al. (called SSS), the number of shares allocated to each party depends on the player's reputation and the way he interacts with other parties. In other words, weights of the players are periodically adjusted such that cooperative participants receive more shares compared with non‐cooperative parties. As our contribution, we propose an ideal social secret sharing in which the size of each player's share is equal to the size of the secret. This property will be achieved using hierarchical threshold secret sharing. We show that the proposed scheme is secure in a passive adversary model. Compared with SSS, our proposed scheme is more efficient in terms of the share size, communication complexity, and computational complexity of the “sharing” protocol. However, the “social tuning” and “reconstruction” protocols of SSS are computationally more efficient than those of the proposed scheme. Depending on the number of execution of social tuning protocol, this might be a reasonable compromise because the reconstruction protocol is executed only once throughout the secret's lifetime. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Sharing a Migrating Fish Stock

Abstract The sharing of a migrating fish stock between two players is considered. Data on the Northeast Atlantic mackerel are used to model the fishery. A growth function is estimated, and random fluctuations in growth and recruitment are used to simulate the fishery. Three different migration models are considered: i) deterministic, ii) stock-dependent, and iii) purely random. With deterministic migrations, the minor player has a disproportionate bargaining strength and must be offered a relatively large share of a cooperative solution. The minor player's bargaining strength is weak if the migrations into his economic zone are stock-dependent, but strong if they are purely random. The risk of extinction is shown to be high without stock-dependent unit cost of fish, and to get a viable Nash-Cournot equilibrium the major player's share must be well above one half. JEL Classification Codes: Q22, Q28, C72

Equilibrium conditions in corporate tax competition and Foreign Direct Investment flows

We consider a collection of countries which attempt to maximize their corporate tax revenue, the latter being viewed as a function of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow and the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) which each country sets for itself. Under a model that assumes a direct influence of tax differentials on the flow of FDI, each country's decisions are naturally ‘coupled’ to those of others, leading to a non-cooperative game in which countries–players compete for FDI inflows by sequentially altering their tax rates. Their decisions are made via a differential equation-based model used to predict the effect of tax rate changes on a player's share of FDI inflows. Our model, calibrated using empirical data from 12 OECD countries for the period 1982–2005, combines FDI inflow and tax-rate differentials to arrive at a “steady-state” FDI inflow share for each player, given its competitors' corporate tax rates. We explore the game's equilibrium, including the question of whether equilibrium necessarily implies a ‘race to bottom’, with low corporate tax rates for all players.

Sharing Musical Expression Through Embodied Listening: A Case Study Based on Chinese Guqin Music

IN THIS STUDY WE REPORT ON THE RESULT OF AN experiment in which a guqin music performance was recorded and individual listeners were asked to move their arm along with the music that they heard. Movement velocity patterns were extracted from both the musician and the listeners. The analysis reveals that the listeners' movement velocity patterns tend to correlate with each other, and with the movement velocity patterns of the player's shoulders. The findings support the hypothesis that listeners and player share, to a certain degree, a sensitivity for musical expression and its associated corporeal intentionality.

Disagreement and the Allocation of Control

I study how to allocate control (over one or multiple projects) when people may openly disagree on the optimal course of action. I first show that, in the efficient allocation, complementary decisions should be decided by the same person, while substitute decisions should be decided by different people. Furthermore, people who are confident about the right course of action and have a large stake in the outcome should get more control, while no decision should be left to chance. The model then derives an intuitive self-reinforcing mechanism for the co-location of income and control: as a person gets more control rights, she values (by revealed preference) income rights higher, so that it is optimal to give her more income rights; as a person gets more income rights, she values control rights higher, making it optimal to give her more control rights. Different projects, however, should often be allocated to different people. While appealing, I show that these intuitions do not hold in an analogous model with private benefits but common priors. First, all players then value residual income identically. Second, an increase in a player's share of residual income may make him value control less, since the decisions necessary to maximize residual income may conflict with his private benefits. I also study a competitive allocation of control and show that while the efficient and competitive allocation coincide in the differing priors model, they often do not in the analogous private benefits model. I finally suggest how the framework can be used to explore the role of veto-rights or majority voting.

Repeated bargaining and the role of impatience and incomplete contracting

This paper develops a model of firm/union bargaining in which bargaining is repeated. If contracts specify the values of all variables of interest, a player's share of the surplus will decrease as that player becomes more impatient, but impatience has a much weaker effect than in static games. When the contracts do not specify the values of all relevant variables, this result can be reversed and the firm's bargaining power could become greater as it becomes more impatient.

Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a mess causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game. As the probability of a break-down in negotiations becomes small (or discount factors become large), these bounds collapse on the subgame-perfect equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers C70, C78.