Player Expectations Research Articles

The problematic space between art, ambition, and gameplay: The Medium and the issues concerning difficult subject matter and gameplay in games.

This article identifies and examines a couple of selected issues regarding speculative digital games which endeavor to deal with serious subject matter. Due to the fact that speculative games are exceptionally well suited for symbolic representation of sensitive topics, they allow their creators to conceive ambitious projects that aspire to be great works of audiovisual art. However, because game texts belong to a very specific medium, it is not always possible to realize this ambition in the context of gameplay. For reasons of space and focus this article uses one particular game, The Medium (2021), to serve as the primary example of how the problems which occur in the process of combining specific, engaging gameplay with serious, sensitive subject matter, lead to situations in which a game can fail to fulfill the player's expectations. By analyzing the structure, gameplay, and storytelling tools employed in The Medium, the article places emphasis on the significance of the possible tensions between the intention of the designers of the game experience and the experiences, ideas, and interpretations the players themselves bring to the game text.

An Automatic Scenario Control in Serious Game to Visualize Tourism Destinations Recommendation

In the field of tourism, serious games are a pedagogical media application that helps players develop travel knowledge and expertise based on game content. A tourism serious game requires a scenario control system to visualize an attractive travel scenario. This paper proposes an Automatic Scenario Control in the serious game to visualize travel recommendation scenarios choice according to the player's expectations of potential tourism destinations criteria. There are two stages in system development, namely scenario design and scenario selection. In the scenario design stage, we use the Hierarchical Finite State Machine to translate challenge-based stories according to the type of attraction. While at the scenario selection stage, Dynamic Weight Topsis is a method for selecting one of the player's recommended scenarios. This study uses tourism destinations recommendations as to alternative variables, characteristics of tourism destinations as criteria, and players' expectations of tourism destinations' characteristics as weight criteria. In the implementation phase, the tourism serious game uses the content of tourism destinations in Mojokerto Indonesia. The test results show that Automatic Scenario Control generates a preference value for each alternative as a reference for choosing tourism destination scenarios for the player. Three things affect the scenario choice results, including the choice of month of tourist visits, player expectations of tourist destinations, and alternative input from the recommender system.

On the Future Parameter

1. IntroductionWhen people make decisions, whether consciously or subconsciously, the decisions are made according to some rule or principle. Let us call this the decision principle. There are various kinds of decision principles in decision theory that are derived from game theory, for example, Wald's maximin principle, the maximax principle, Hurwicz's optimism-pessimism index principle, and Savage's minimax regret principle, etc. (French, 1986; Takahashi, 1993). A random choice of alternatives is also one of the typical decision principles (Takahashi, 1997a).The minimax theorem proves that in a zero-sum two-person game, as long as one player chooses a strategy according to Wald's maximin principle, the same principle should be the optimal decision principle for the other player as well. However, in a non-zero-sum two-person game, despite the existence of the Nash equilibrium, even if both players choose their strategy in accordance with maximin principle, they will reach the Nash equilibrium point. On the contrary, an attempt to explain the Nash equilibrium solely by economic rationality has been unsuccessful (Kandori, 1997). Rather than explaining the economic rationality of the equilibrium, it is better to analyze path dependency when multiple equilibria exist.It has been said that the Japanese have no decision principles; however, this is highly doubtful-the Japanese have decision principles. If their behaviors were guided by decision principles, people and companies of Japan would be able to predict each other's actions, and any kind of social life would become impossible; however, this is the case. Indeed, their actions are being led by some kind of principle. The decision principle commonly observed in many Japanese companies appears to be different from typical decision principles in game and decision theories.Generally, a person's choice of strategy depends on the decision principle he or she adopts. When two people use different decision principles, it is difficult for a player to imagine or understand what kind of decision principle the opponent is using, particularly when the opponent's choice upsets the player's expectations. Therefore, it appears to non-Japanese people that the Japanese have no decision principle. However, they do have decision principles, although different from well-known typical principles. So then, what types of decision principles lead the Japanese people's actions? This paper proposes a hypothesis to answer this question.2. Prisoner's DilemmaThere exists a non-zero-sum two-person game having an unconvinced equilibrium. A particularly well-known example is the prisoner's dilemma. By associating not to and confessing to the prisoner's dilemma game is often generalized in the following cooperation/ game (Axelrod, 1984, pp. 7-8).(a) Each player must choose either (C) or defection (D).(b) Each player must make the choice without knowing what the opponent will do.(c) Regardless of the opponent's choice, yields a higher payoff than cooperation. However, if both players have defected, both get lower payoffs than if both had cooperated.The dilemma here is (c). In other words, two players (two prisoners in the classic version of prisoner's dilemma) faced the dilemma where despite mutual cooperation having more benefit than mutual defection, if both players yield to the temptation to sell out their opponent in a one-sided defection, the result will end in mutual defection.If the prisoner's dilemma game is played a known finite number of times, theoretically, the game will never end in cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Luce 85 Raiffa, 1957). This is because as long as the number of moves is known and finite, on the last move, the game will result in mutual since there is no future; this is the same as playing the game once. On the next-to-last move, both players defect since they can expect mutual on the last move. …

Attitudinal vs. Normative Messages: An Investigation of the Differential Effects of Persuasive Communications on Behavior

Several hypotheses about the influence of persuasive communication on behavior were derived from Fishbein's extension of Dulany's theory of propositional control and tested using a two-person Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the theory, a persuasive message will influence a player's behavioral intention (BI), and hence his behavior (B), only if it affects either A-act, his toward the act, and/or NBs(Mcs), his normative beliefs (i.e., his perception of the other player's expectations), multiplied by his motivation to comply with the norms. Two types of persuasive messages were given, one directed at A-act, the other at NBs. Orthogonal to the message type, two motivational orientations were created, cooperation and competition. Consistent with earlier findings, A-act was found to be more important than NBs(Mcs) in predicting BI and B under competition but less important than NBs(Mcs) under cooperation. It was therefore predicted that the attitudinal message would change behavior more effectively in the competitive than in the cooperative situation while the normative message would be more effective in cooperative than in competitive groups. The results supported this hypothesis. Most research in the area of communication and persuasion has centered around attempts to change attitudes toward some target object (cf. Hovland, Janis, and Kelley, 1953). Underlying these efforts has been the implicit assumption that behavior toward the object will change automatically with the attitude. The stipulation of a direct attitude-behavior relaionship, however, has become increasingly untenable. Indeed, as McGuire (1969) has pointed out, attitude research has long indicated (Festinger, 1964; LaPiere, 1934; Mann, 1959; Saenger and Gilbert, 1950) that the person's