TN HIS Analytic Sentences, Benson Mates contends one is justified in saying that there are 'intuitive' notions of analyticity and synonymy.' This empirical hypothesis about the existence of certain phenomena or kinds of phenomena is tenable, so far as I can see. Mates has intuitive of synonymity; I have had several in my life, and there is reason to believe that all of them have much in common. On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that the various intuited entities are identical or near identical. If a is distinguished from a concept, a sentence of the kind person P has intuitive of synonymity may conveniently be made to imply nothing about P's definiteness of intention, whereas the use of the term concept instead of notion in that skeleton sentence may be made to imply a certain minimal definiteness of intention. Calling something an intuitive of x, where is a word or series of words borrowed from the natural languages, suggests that a certain designation is appropriate as a sign vehicle responsible for designating x in particular communicational events. That is, one suggests, if not implicitly asserts, something about the nature of the intuited entity and something about the use of the designation. Suppose, for example, x is the designation synonymity. The intuited entity would then not be considered the same as, for example, the intuited of heteronymity. This much may be inferred on the basis of plausible premises. But since the choice of one designation does not imply a rejection of all others, the entity which one author in one situation tries to refer to by the word synonymity, he or others may in some other situations refer to by means of sameness of meaning or even simultaneity-for all we know. In the following, however, we shall leave out of consideration any use that seems awkward to us.