Plato's Socrates Research Articles

Crowds and Crowd-Pleasing in Plato

AbstractPlato's antipathy to crowds is a commonplace that reinforces a prevailing portrait of the Socratic method as a practice that centers on individuals, to the exclusion of crowds and the many. This canonical view, however, comes into tension with the tendency of Plato's Socrates to conduct his dialogues in the presence of collective audiences. I argue that Plato's position on crowds is at once more complex and more ambivalent than has been commonly accepted. I distinguish between two distinct lines of critique that Plato develops against crowds: the argument that the incentive structures that move crowds are unconducive to philosophy; and a more ambiguous argument that crowds tend not to be as amenable to control as their portrayal in the Athenian democratic imaginary seems to promise. Plato's depiction of Socratic practice can be understood as an effort to explore an alternative vision of crowd control.

Tacit consent and political legitimacy

Though historically important, the notion of tacit consent plays little role in contemporary discussions of political legitimacy. The idea, in fact, is often dismissed as obviously implausible. The ambition of this paper is to challenge this assumption and show that tacit consent can become a key ingredient in a theory of legitimacy. Instead of defining tacit consent through residence (where, according to John Locke or Plato's Socrates, staying in the country amounts to tacitly consenting to its system of rule), the paper explores a different strategy, delimiting tacit consent as an absence of active dissent. The basic idea starts from the fact that widespread anti-government protests and demonstrations always carry a potent delegitimating force. Political legitimacy is therefore never permanent and unchangeable, regardless of the nature of the regime, and can be undermined at all times by active dissent from the population. Having established the relationship between dissent and delegitimation of political power, even the inverted, stronger claim is defended: the absence of active dissent (i.e., tacit consent) can, under certain circumstances, serve to legitimize political power. The paper sets up and defends several conditions that need to be met for the right normative mandate to be created by the population tacitly accepting the existing power arrangements. If those are fulfilled (especially when full freedom of expression and information is granted), tacit consent can become a vital element of political legitimacy.

Plato's Socrates on Socrates: Socratic Self-Disclosure and the Public Practice of Philosophy by Anne-Marie Schultz

Reviewed by: Plato's Socrates on Socrates: Socratic Self-Disclosure and the Public Practice of Philosophy by Anne-Marie Schultz Doug Reed SCHULTZ, Anne-Marie. Plato's Socrates on Socrates: Socratic Self-Disclosure and the Public Practice of Philosophy. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2020. x + 141 pp. Cloth, $90.00; paper, $39.99; eBook, $38.00 The subtitle aptly sums up the twin projects Anne-Marie Schultz sets for herself in this book. One project is a detailed analysis of episodes in Plato's dialogues where Socrates shares his emotional state and personal history, especially his educational experiences, with his audience. Throughout the book, Schultz considers passages familiar to Plato scholars but does so with an eye toward a neglected aspect of the dialogues, namely, "Plato's presentation of Socrates as a philosopher who tells personal narratives." Through careful attention to the text and in conversation with up-to-date scholarship, Schultz makes the case that Socratic self-disclosure is a widespread and significant feature of these dialogues. In doing so, she gives the reader plenty to think about regarding Plato's portrayal of Socrates and other characters, Socratic method, as well as other philosophical and dramatic elements of these passages. The other project concerns public philosophy. Schultz asks us to consider why Plato should present Socrates as a self-disclosing philosopher and what we, contemporary academic philosophers, can learn about (public) philosophy by appreciating this feature of Socrates' practice. Ultimately, she makes the case that we should see Socrates as a model for a public philosopher, one who draws people in by letting them in and encourages the creation of a philosophical community. The book has a clear and straightforward style. Each of the six chapters (along with an introduction and postscript) is well structured with connections that are legible to the reader. In chapter 1, Schultz looks at instances of Socratic self-disclosure in the Theaetetus and by building on the work of Holger Thesleff and Harold Tarrant explores the possibility that Socrates narrated an earlier version of the dialogue. This discussion is worthwhile in its own right, but Schultz also uses it to begin making the case that Socrates employs autobiography and shares his emotions in order to "bring the listener into the experience of philosophical reflection by portraying the learning process as perspective changing, as life changing." Chapters 2 and 3 turn to the Symposium. In chapter 2 Schultz explores Socrates' self-presentation in the dialogue, arguing that he shares [End Page 829] his experiences with Diotima to model what it is to be an eager and engaged student with the aim of drawing his fellow symposiasts to philosophy. Chapter 3 looks at three imitators of Socratic narration in the Symposium : Alcibiades, Apollodorus, and Aristodemus. In addition to continuing the investigation of philosophical self-disclosure, this chapter offers a rich discussion of the frame of the dialogue, a sustained treatment of Alcibiades' speech, and a reevaluation of the two characters who transmit the dialogue to the reader, making it a valuable contribution to scholarship on the Symposium. Chapters 4 and 5 look at Socratic self-disclosure in the Apology and Phaedo, respectively. These dialogues are well known for including Socratic autobiographies. Given that Schultz is explicit that her aim is not to determine the historical reliability of Socrates' narratives, she does not consider any tensions between Socrates' two intellectual autobiographies in these dialogues. Instead, she analyzes them along with other instances of self-disclosure in the dialogues in order to show that Socrates deploys them to exhort his fellow citizens to philosophy and to nurture his intimate community with the hopes of extending philosophical reflection into the future. In chapter 6 Schultz offers a helpful summary of the book and shares examples of contemporary practitioners of Socratic narrative and public philosophy. In doing so, Schultz herself exemplifies Socratic self-disclosure by sharing her own intellectual experiences, which she continues in the postscript to the book. With each chapter, I became more convinced of Schultz's central interpretative claim that Plato portrays Socrates as a philosopher who shares his experiences and emotions openly. At times, though, an interpretive question occurred to me: Should we always take Socrates...

Problems with the Life of Pleasure: The Γένεσις Argument in Plato's Philebus (53c4–55a12)

At Philebus 53c4–55a12, Plato's Socrates identifies pleasure as an ontologically inferior "becoming" (γένεσις) rather than a "being" (οὐσία) and then uses this information to infer that pleasure, somehow, lacks value. This paper argues that Plato's γένεσις argument is not about the goodness of individual, particular episodes of pleasure but instead targets the identification of pleasure as the good around which we ought to organize our lives. It also shows that the argument is made up of two subarguments—the argument from finality and the argument from a life not worth living—both of which conclude that, as a γένεσις, pleasure cannot be the good our life as a whole is aimed at reaching. Read in this way, the much maligned γένεσις argument turns out to be more cogent and more interesting than is usually thought.

Теология в горизонте драматургии платоновских текстов

The so-called «dramatic approach» to the interpretation of Plato's texts provides us with some additional tools to explore his theological concepts. The article examines possible ways to connect with each other two "theologies" that are found in Plato's dialogues: static theology from the intelligible universe, and dynamic theology from the visible universe, which is in constant genesis. From the point of view of the «dramatic» approach, we must constantly keep in mind the various assessments of the problems posed by Plato's Socrates and other characters in the dialogues in order to have a complete picture of the analyzed matter. To reconcile these two "theologies", the description of the ambivalent nature of the human soul in «Lysis» plays a basic role, which is also confirmed in other Platonic texts.

Relativizacija pravde kroz retoriku - Platonov dijalog "Gorgija" kao paradigma

Through analysis of the works of Plato, particularly his dialogue Gorgia, the authors attempt to perceive prospective of rhetoric as the art of persuasion which could relativize truth and justice. The authors firstly try to solve a preliminary issue about qualification of participants in the dialogue as sophists or as rhetors. After examination of different attitudes on that issue in the current theory, the authors take stand that, at least in Gorgia, Plato's Socrates is combating with rhetors (Gorgias, Pollus and Callicles), and not with sophists. Zone of accordance between Socrates and rhetors is, without any doubt, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, but they do not agree on the outcomes to which that persuasion leads. The tendency to achieve absolute truth (justice), knowledge, is the goal of the philosophers (as Socrates states), which contradicts to the chief aim of the rhetors - a belief or creating a conviction of the truth (justice). The authors also draw attention that Socrates is all the time aware of all the weaknesses of philosophy which, contrary to rhetoric, could not handle real life problems due to the lack of pragmatism. The authors underline that those who are undoubtedly considered as sophists (like Hippias and Antiphon) as their starting principle place the idea of innate equality of people, while those who are predominantly rhetors (as Callicles and Trasimach) start from the concept of natural inequality of people and uphold natural right of the stronger. In that way rhetoric appears as an art which leads to accomplishing the natural right of the stronger. Finally, having in mind examples from antiquity, the authors take position of value relativism. They find that rhetoric stays morally neutral even today and that it has great potential to morally justify (or only to show as just) any desired outcome.

“‘Courtship-by-Correspondence’: Seduction through Mentoring”

Seduction through mentoring has a long history within Western rhetoric. Plato's Socrates, for instance, can be seen as attempting simultaneously to educate and seduce Phaedrus. In considering this topic, this essay analyzes the mid-nineteenth century correspondence of Louise Clappe and Alexander Hill Everett. Clappe was a young New England woman who later authored The Shirley Letters from the California Mines, 1851-1852. Everett was a prominent diplomat, orator, and writer. The study examines the explicit lessons conveyed, the ways the correspondence enhanced Clappe's civic understanding as well as her social and literary skills. In addition, it explores the implicit lessons Clappe learned through navigating constraints associated with seduction, including the ability to challenge gendered expectations and the capacity to negotiate power and even benefit from it.

Critical Thinking in Higher Education, and Following the Arguments with Plato's Socrates

Critical Thinking in Higher Education, and Following the Arguments with Plato's Socrates

The Solonian Legacy in Socrates

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] But before he is dead, wait, and do not yet call him happy, but fortunate. --Solon (1) Prologue What does the history of philosophy look like from the perspective of psychoanalysis? In the present essay, I propose to consider a specific moment in the history of philosophy, namely, the intervention of eros in the historical transition from Herodotean inquiry to Platonic philosophy. If psychoanalysis makes a difference as to how we understand the history of philosophy, what can it tell us about the significance of eros for the tradition of philosophy initiated by Socrates? In asking this question, my aim is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate that a psychoanalytic approach to the history of philosophy not only is plausible, but that by virtue of its insight into the wishes and fantasies that motivate human behavior, it can help us to understand how eros intervenes to motivate the Platonic account of the Socratic unity of happiness and philosophy. Where the historical significance of this account is at stake, we shall have to investigate both the prehistory of the Socratic tradition and its major connection to a Platonic account of the eros for philosophy. Hence my second aim: to demonstrate the central importance of Plato's Symposium in this psycho-historical drama. My argument is not simply that the Symposium is amenable to psychoanalytic interpretation, as readers like Jacques Lacan (1991 [1957]) and Jonathan Lear (1999) have already demonstrated. (2) Rather, my argument is that psychoanalysis offers a powerful vocabulary for understanding the genesis of philosophical eros, and that the Symposium is likewise a key resource for illuminating the prehistory of Socratic philosophy precisely because its account of the eros for philosophy is traceable to the Herodotean inquiry concerning Solon's role in an ancient quarrel about the meaning of happiness. My argument, in short, is that the eros for philosophy has its source in an all too human dynamic of seduction, and that the psychoanalytic theory of seduction is uniquely capable of elaborating the account of philosophical seduction in the Symposium--precisely because the psychoanalytic and Platonic accounts share the same fundamental structure. To be clear: I am not arguing that either Solon or Herodotus is the sole antecedent to the Socratic tradition, nor that one cannot find older or more diverse sources for the constellation of themes that link Herodotus to Plato through what I shall call the Solonian legacy in Socrates. Rather, my argument is concerned to show that a certain collection of themes converge in the figure of Solon, and that by virtue of their transformation in the Symposium, it is possible to consider both Plato's indebtedness to the Solonian teaching, as well as the specific terms of his divergence. For introductory purposes, I cite four fundamental themes that define the appearance of Solon's legacy. (3) 1. A tension between olbos and eudaimonia in the text of Herodotus, and a related connection between happiness and seeing the whole, which anticipates the valorization of eudaimonia as the highest expression of philosophy in Plato. 2. A transformation in the relation between happiness and death from Solon to Socrates. Whereas Solon commands us to call no one happy until dead, the practice of dying or being dead is itself the expression of happiness for Plato's Socrates. 3. A consideration of jealousy as an impediment to happiness. Whereas the jealousy of the gods points, for Solon, to the fluctuations of fortune that ruin human happiness, in the Socratic teaching human happiness requires a special kind of endurance with respect to those same dire elements. Coupled with the teaching of Diotima, this endurance will define human happiness in terms of friendship with the gods. 4. A reference to Solon's famous injunction to continue learning even while growing older. …

SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN XENOPHON'S <em>MEMORABILIA</em> 4.2

Whereas Plato's Socrates discusses the Delphic maxim “Know Yourself” frequently, Xenophon's Socrates does so only once (Mem. 4.2.24), in his conversation with Euthydemus, a confident young man zealous about leading the city. Previous scholars have read Socrates as equating “knowing yourself” with “knowing your powers.” But knowing your powers is only one condition of self-knowledge, as a closer reading of Mem. 4.2 shows, in particular Socrates' analogy about judging a horse for purchase. Knowing yourself means coming to act on the basis of your knowledge of justice and goodness, and acting on this basis frees you from a self-imposed enslavement. Xenophon's understanding is thus richer and more philosophically sophisticated than is usually assumed.

Theoretical Responsibility

1Ethics as first could mean that the conscious taking up of burdens is precede theoretical inquiry, or it could mean that is the area of inquiry with which the theoretical enterprise should commence. We can then ask: in which of these two senses is Levinas's philosophical ethics? Is it the theoretical description of ethics, or is it an attempt take up the burden in lieu of or before the theoretical-ontological proj- ect? What is the relationship between life and the theoretical enterprise?Levinas claims throughout Totality and Infinity that the relationship is not one of knowing; and in his preface Outside the Subject Levinas claims that the subject precedes erudition.1 Levinas often says that is something other than knowing, where to know would rather appear be the task of philosophy.However, of course, Levinas made a career and lifelong pursuit of philosophy; and in Otherwise than Being he says that it is the task of philosophy convey the Saying, the moment of language, in a Said, in the ontological dimension of language, with the least betrayal possible. Still, it is unclear whether this itself constitutes an attempt take up the burden, whether that task is ethical, or philosophical and theoretical. No more illuminating is Levinas's claim that his own philosophy is an attempt describe the meaning of rather than prescribe an ethical program.2But there is good reason think that for Levinas as first philosophy is intended say that one ought begin the theoretical enterprise with an inves- tigation of the topic ethics. In a Talmudic lecture Levinas recounts a story in which a rabbi slights another in a trivial, forgettable way, but is never forgiven. As a wise sage-as an erudite and learned person-he should have known bet- ter than commit even such a small infraction. Likewise, Levinas adds in an often-quoted passage, it is difficult forgive Heidegger.3 But in what sense should Heidegger have known better than most? Why should he have been especially responsible-Heidegger who never developed an ethics? Surely as a brilliant (as the unforgiven Rab is described) ontologist. Thus although precedes knowing such that knowing (erudition, learnedness, ontology) is either extrane- ous or contrary ethics, we would apparently demand that Heidegger be more responsive an burden than most on the strength of his prowess in the ontological sciences.The strange inverted case is in Levinas's quasi-ethical repudiation of Socratic maieutics and Plato's doctrine of recollection. Despite the fact that Socrates (the historical and Platonic versions, seemingly) is invested in nothing above the face- to-face relation, he is censured for holding a theoretical model of learning that suggests that in the last instance absolute truth does not come from the other but from within the subject or the same. Plato's Socrates would seem be ethi- cally committed the other but is yet rebuked on account of his ontology. His apparent attempt be responsible the other falls short for his holding certain theoretical-ontological views. This could be thought mean that ethics as first means that the first task of philosophy is work out a theory of meaning.I will inquire into the relation between and ontology, or between responsibility and the philosophical enterprise that will seek articulate such an burden. I will do so by way of an account of the development of Levinas's philosophy of language throughout his oeuvre, which I see as the locus of both and philosophy. It is with his articulation of the Saying and the Said that Levinas is most engaged in the question of how the philosophical enterprise relates an relation the other. In a later interview Levinas claims that Philosophy is primarily a question of language. …

Socrates, Augustine, and Paul Gauguin on the Reciprocity between Speech and Silence in Education

While most educational practices today place an excessive amount of attention on discourse, this article attaches great importance to the reciprocity between speech and silence by drawing from the writings of Plato's Socrates, Augustine, and Paul Gauguin for whom this reciprocity is of the essence in learning. These three figures teach that we learn to speak, listen, and act in relation with the silence of our thoughts. This article claims that Socrates' dialectic is nothing but inward or silent dialogue, which reappears in or is advanced by Augustine, and which is also shared by Paul Gauguin. Yet its manifestation differs one from the other: in Socrates, it manifests itself as silence of thought; in Augustine, as inner vision or contemplation; and in Gauguin, as creative thought or activity. By neglecting or separating speech from silence, today's educational methods do not prepare students to respond to life's questions; neither do they enable students to infuse their conversation with an appreciation of life's beauty.

Socratic Method and Political Science

This article advances a novel theoretical account of what a “method” is and what makes one “rigorous,” and shows how it could advance contemporary debates in political theory and empirical methodology. Plato's Socrates invented the notion of method, and his characteristic practice of immanent refutation through questioning escapes key problems in more familiar views. Socratic method is (1) antifoundational, (2) non-algorithmic, and (3) indirect and relative to competing hypotheses, and it (4) develops its own standards of objectivity from the logic of asking questions. The article reconstructs Socrates’ method from the Platonic texts and shows how it provides reasonable criteria for judgment while remaining critical, sensitive to difference, and open to innovation. Socratic method avoids a forced choice between universalism and particularism in political theory, and it provides a common language for evaluating both quantitative and qualitative methods by drawing out a critical logic of empirical inquiry shared by both.

Plato and the Talmud (review)

Reviewed by: Plato and the Talmud David Janssens Plato and the Talmud, by Jacob Howland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 282 pp. $68.00. The most important word in this book's title is in (or near) the middle. Indeed, many would argue that it should be "or" instead of "and," since there is an unbridgeable gulf between the theoretical life of free inquiry as exemplified by Plato's Socrates and the practical life of faithful obedience to divine authority as embodied by the Talmudic rabbis. Indeed, the notion of a fundamental incompatibility and even animosity between "Athens" and "Jerusalem" appears to find support in both traditions. Thus, the second-century philosopher Celsus rejects the tenets of both Judaism and Christianity as obscure fables, while asserting that "things are stated much better among the Greeks" (quoted in Origen, Against Celsus, VI.1). Conversely, according to the Babylonian Talmud's famous assertion, "Cursed be the individual who raises pigs, and cursed be the father who teaches his son Greek wisdom" (Tractate Sotah, 49a, quoted [End Page 152] on p. 8). Finally, even the apostle Paul points out the difference, albeit only to stress Christianity's own distinctiveness vis-à-vis the two opponents: "For the Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: But we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling block, and unto the Greeks foolishness" (1 Corinthians 1:22-23). While the author of the book acknowledges the relative truth of this view, he makes a compelling and well-documented case for not resting satisfied with it. Generally speaking, his approach consists in calling into question the differences and exploring the affinities between the putative contenders. Thus, he argues that the religious faith of the Talmudic rabbis, far from precluding rational enquiry, actually requires and fosters it. And similarly, Socratic dialectic proves to be based on a specific piety that includes an acute awareness of the limits of human reason. In both cases, the critical application of the intellect to the relationship between the human and the divine is an indispensable ingredient to living the good life: "Plato and the rabbis, I maintain, regard thinking that is in the broadest sense theological—that reflects on our relationship to God or the gods, and to human beings in the light of this relationship—as an activity no less sacred than traditional rituals of prayer and sacrifice" (p. 19). And in both cases, what is at stake is promoting an ethos, a way of life that is exemplary, both theoretically and practically. In fact, the clear-cut distinction between the theoretical and the practical dissolves. As the book argues, Plato and the Talmud teach by example: they not only depict distinctive and exemplary figures—Socrates and the prophets—in action, but they also deploy a number of literary devices designed to puzzle and provoke their readers to carefully examine the text, as well as their own lives, in light of the examples. To make this point, the author, who is equally at home in the labyrinth of the Platonic dialogues and in the intricacies of the Gemara, develops a careful and fascinating comparative interpretation of Plato's Apology and Euthyphro and the stories of Honi HaMe'aggel and Elazar in Ta'anit 3. From the latter, it appears that the Talmud accords an important role to prophetic outsiders whose greater intimacy with the divine puts them at odds with the community as well as with the emerging rabbinical tradition. However, this intimacy also enables them both to test, challenge, and criticize divine power and authority and to save the community in times of emergency. In his reading of Plato, on the other hand, the author ably argues that Socrates's philosophizing cannot be properly understood without taking seriously his claim that it is a specific form of piety. His attempt to refute the Delphic oracle's famous assertion springs from a fundamental trust in the veracity of the god: "In brief, Socrates makes it clear that the Delphic oracle arouses, authorizes, and focuses his desire for wisdom, and that it is able to do so only because he [End Page 153] is prepared from the outset to acknowledge...

Plato's Socrates: One Among Many, but Preeminent

Catherine H. Zuckert has written a monumental work on Plato's corpus that offers a new framework for understanding his dialogues. Not only does she trace Plato's presentation of Socrates' development over time, but she also shows how Plato uses other philosophic interlocutors to contribute to his philosophic project. Central themes include Socrates' discovery of erôs, the unity of virtue, and the place of teaching in philosophy, and the relation between intelligible ideas and sensible experience.

Plato's Socrates: Mouthpiece or Implied Author?

Plato's Socrates: Mouthpiece or Implied Author?

Ralph Cohen and the Dialogue between Philosophy and Literature

Ralph Cohen and the Dialogue between Philosophy and Literature Martha Nussbaum (bio) Philosophy and literature have had a very uneasy relationship throughout the Western philosophical tradition. Already in the Republic (c. 380–370 BCE), Plato's Socrates refers to a "quarrel of long standing" between the poets and the philosophers—which he then pursues, expressing both a deep love of literary art and a reluctance to admit it into the instructional plan of the ideal city. So central was this debate to subsequent Greek and Roman philosophers that one could write the history of at least the ethical portion of those traditions as an extended conversation about this theme.1 Later philosophers in the Western tradition continue the conversation, never without considerable ambivalence, but usually with a lively sense of the ethical insight that literature may possibly offer. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger—all these major Western philosophers, and many others, have contributed to keeping the conversation alive. Only in twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy has the relationship between the two disciplines been virtually neglected. Analytic philosophers sought to write in a nonliterary style and rarely discussed the contribution of literature to understanding; literary authors and writers about literature felt, with much justice, that philosophy offered little that was relevant to their concerns. With the exception of figures such as Iris Murdoch and Stanley Cavell, always treated as eccentric and marginal, there was little sustained cross-disciplinary conversation. Today, all of this has changed. Young philosophers working on ethics are likely to have a keen interest in works of literature—not just as grab bags of examples, but as sources of ethical insight in their own right. Particularly in the part of the discipline known as "virtue ethics," concern with notions of character, ethical vision, and virtue, as well as a preoccupation with relationships of love and friendship, lead almost every participant in the subfield to turn to literature. Meanwhile, writers about literature are far more likely to discuss the ideas of moral philosophers than they were before. Conferences that bring critics and literary historians and theorists together with moral philosophers are [End Page 757] reasonably common, and joint dissertation committees are very common indeed. What produced this remarkable change? One major factor, at least, was a bold enterprise of Ralph Cohen's: an issue of New Literary History on the theme "Literature and Moral Philosophy." The issue was a typical example of Ralph's uncanny ability to identify significant debates that ought to occur, and then to set the stage for their occurrence—to lead fashion, rather than to be led by it. In recognition of his remarkable insight and courage, I shall devote this essay to telling the story of how that issue came into being, and then to some reflections on the changes we have seen since then. I can't avoid telling the story from the point of view of my own involvement in the issue, but I hope to make it clear that other thinkers played a generative role. Around my fifth year of teaching, in 1980 or 1981 (for I can find no documentary evidence of what exact year it was), I was invited to present an Invited Paper at the American Philosophical Association's Pacific Division meeting in San Francisco. Despite the general absence of interdisciplinary conversation, prior to Ralph's intervention, I had long had an interest in the relationship between literature and moral philosophy, and had made a point of teaching, every year, one course that was not in ancient Greek philosophy (the primary area of my appointment). One of the courses I offered was "Philosophy and the Novel," and I had been working out some ideas about Henry James and Marcel Proust, and their relevance to moral philosophy. I discussed those issues with Ralph when we first met on a visit I made to Virginia in around 1980, and he had already given me encouragement and advice. When the invitation arrived, without restriction of content, I decided, now or never. That is, if I didn't take this opportunity to stick my neck out as a philosopher, addressing questions not connected to ancient Greek philosophy, I...

The Limits of Rationality: A Critical Analysis of the Practices of Plato's Socrates

In our tradition, Socrates, as he figures in the work of Plato, stands for rationality. In one way, of course, the tendency to treat him as rationality incarnate is not too far of the mark; for Socrates does indeed introduce into our thought and discussions a demand for argument, for stringency and consistency. However, the manner in which Socrates carries out his historically influential elenctic activity belies the shortcomings of this oft-quoted and inspirational picture. It is these irrational features of the figure of Socrates in Plato's early dialogues that shall concern us in this article. Although we shall see that a certain sort of interlocutor is required for Socratic questioning to get off the ground, heavily irrational features are brought to the activity from Socrates himself. Furthermore, Socrates’ irrationality is no extraneous matter in relation to the very notion of dialectic rationality, but results from certain features of rationality itself understood in the mode of critical dialogue.1

The Role of Emotion in an Existential Education

Emotion is usually conceived as playing a relatively external role in education: either it is raw material reshaped by rational practices, or it merely motivates intellectual Drawing upon the philosophy of Hegel and Plato's Socrates, I argue, however, that education is a process of existential transformation and that emotion plays an essential, internal role therein. Through an analysis of Hegel's master and slave dialectic, I argue that emotions have their own logic and that an individual can be propelled to increasingly rational emotional stances (her emotions can be educated) by the demands of the emotional situation itself, even in the absence of any intellectual reasoning or rational training. Appealing also to the structure and content of Socrates' conversations, I argue that intellectual reasoning can lead to self-overcoming only insofar as it involves a particular emotional orientation towards the emotional challenges of genuine learning, that is, insofar as it is conscientious reasoning.

Did a biased jury convict Plato's Socrates?

Did a biased jury convict Plato's Socrates?