Platform Entry Research Articles

Can You Gig It? An Empirical Examination of the Gig-Economy and Entrepreneurship

We examine how the entry of gig-economy platforms influences local entrepreneurial activity. On one hand, such platforms may reduce entrepreneurial activity by offering a stable employment for the un- and under-employed. On the other hand, such platforms may enable entrepreneurship by offering work flexibility that allows the entrepreneur to re- deploy resources strategically in order to pursue her nascent venture. To resolve this tension we exploit a set of natural experiments, the entry of the ride-sharing platform Uber X and the on-demand delivery platform Postmates. We examine the effect of each on crowdfunding campaign launches at Kickstarter, the world’s largest reward-based crowdfunding platform. Results indicate a significant negative effect on crowdfunding campaign launches, and thus local entrepreneurship, after platform entry. Strikingly, the effect appears to accrue primarily to un-funded and under-funded projects, suggesting that gig-economy platforms predominantly reduce necessity- based entrepreneurship by offering viable employment for the un- and under- employed. Finally, our results point to an associated increase in overall employment, suggesting the existence of significant economic spillovers that result from the influx of excess capital created by the platform.

Matching Platforms and HIV Incidence: An Empirical Investigation of Race, Gender, and Socioeconomic Status

Although recent work has examined the adverse implications of Internet-enabled matching platforms, limited attention has been paid to whom the negative externalities accrue. We examine how the entry of platforms for the solicitation of casual sex influences the incidence rate of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection by race, gender, and socioeconomic status. Using a census of 12 million patients subjected to a natural experiment in Florida, we find a significant increase in HIV incidence after platform implementation, with the largest effect accruing to historically at-risk populations (i.e., African Americans) despite documented lower rates of Internet utilization. Strikingly, our analysis reveals that HIV incidence increases in historically low-risk populations as well (e.g., individuals of higher socioeconomic status) and that men and women experience similar penalties. Identifying granular effects across subpopulations allows us to offer additional insight into the mechanisms by which matching platforms increase HIV incidence. We estimate the cumulative effect of platform entry over the five-year period of the study as 1,149 additional Floridians contracting HIV at a cost of $710 million. This paper was accepted by Lorin Hitt, information systems.

Experimental study on water entry of model catamaran sections

Marine vehicles may experience significant slamming loads due to water entry of hull sections in some unsteady regimes. This study focuses on a basic configuration consisting of two V-hulls connected with a flat-bottom platform. Drop tests on water of two-dimensional catamaran model sections with variable platform position and entry velocity have been carried out. Time-dependent acceleration signals and high-speed video records of the body falling into water were obtained. The acceleration peaks were identified and related to the chine wetting, spray hitting the platform bottom, and wetdeck slamming. The obtained results can be applied for validating mathematical models of water impacts and designing catamaran hulls.

Did federal regulation discourage facilities-based entry into US local telecommunications markets?

In the United States from 2001 to 2006, federal regulations allowed entrants to lease from incumbents at relatively low cost all of the network infrastructure necessary to provide local phone service. These platform entrants could then provide phone service without installing any of their own equipment. Advocates of this policy claimed that it was needed to provide an economically feasible means by which entrants could serve residential customers. Critics contended that the policy substantially deterred loop entry whereby entrants installed their own switching equipment. An analysis of panel data for each state over this period indicates that the policy's critics may have been correct. The cross-price elasticity of loop entry with respect to platform price was roughly 1.0. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that loop entry may have decreased by roughly 20% due to platform entry price reductions.