Planted Clique Research Articles

Nuclear norm minimization for the planted clique and biclique problems

We consider the problems of finding a maximum clique in a graph and finding a maximum-edge biclique in a bipartite graph. Both problems are NP-hard. We write both problems as matrix-rank minimization and then relax them using the nuclear norm. This technique, which may be regarded as a generalization of compressive sensing, has recently been shown to be an effective way to solve rank optimization problems. In the special case that the input graph has a planted clique or biclique (i.e., a single large clique or biclique plus diversionary edges), our algorithm successfully provides an exact solution to the original instance. For each problem, we provide two analyses of when our algorithm succeeds. In the first analysis, the diversionary edges are placed by an adversary. In the second, they are placed at random. In the case of random edges for the planted clique problem, we obtain the same bound as Alon, Krivelevich and Sudakov as well as Feige and Krauthgamer, but we use different techniques.

How Hard Is It to Approximate the Best Nash Equilibrium?

The quest for a polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) for Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, which emerged as a major open question in algorithmic game theory, seeks to circumvent the PPAD-completeness of finding an (exact) Nash equilibrium by finding an approximate equilibrium. The closely related problem of finding an equilibrium maximizing a certain objective, such as social welfare, was shown to be NP-hard [Gilboa and Zemel, Games Econom. Behav., 1 (1989), pp. 80–93]. However, this NP-hardness is unlikely to extend to approximate equilibria, since the latter admits a quasi-polynomial time algorithm [Lipton, Markakis, and Mehta, in Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, ACM, New York, 2003, pp. 36–41]. We show that this optimization problem, namely, finding in a two-player game an approximate equilibrium achieving a large social welfare, is unlikely to have a polynomial-time algorithm. One interpretation of our results is that a PTAS for Nash equilibrium (if it exists) should not extend to a PTAS for finding the best Nash equilibrium. Technically, our result is a reduction from the notoriously difficult problem in modern combinatorics, of finding a planted (but hidden) clique in a random graph $G(n,1/2)$. Our reduction starts from an instance with planted clique size $O(\log n)$. For comparison, the currently known algorithms are effective only for a much larger clique size $\Omega(\sqrt{n})$.