War Plans Research Articles

GÓIS MONTEIRO, BACKHEUSER E TRAVASSOS

Neste estudo, compreendemos a geopolítica1 da América do Sul na década de1930 e 1940 e, estudamos as análises motivadas por esse contexto do, à época,General de Divisão e Chefe do Estado Maior do Exército (EME) (1937-1943) GóisMonteiro2, do geopolítico civil Everardo Backheuser e do geopolítico e, à época,capitão do Exército Mario Travassos. Para isso, adotamos a metodologia de análisede conteúdo, através da qual estudamos o Plano de Guerra de 19383 cuja assinaturaé atribuída ao General Goís Monteiro, as obras Curso de Geopolítica Geral e doBrasil, de Everardo Backheuser, e, Projeção Continental do Brasil, de MárioTravassos. Em seguida, ensejamos um diálogo entre as contribuições dos autoresem busca da resposta à seguinte pergunta: Quais as semelhanças e diferenças
 entre as proposições geopolíticas de Backheuser e Travassos e o Plano de Guerrade 1938? Chegamos à conclusão de que os três autores concordaram que o maiorrival do Brasil era, à época, a Argentina e que, em diferentes níveis, apontaramque ações defensivas como a habitação da fronteira, o fortalecimento do Exércitoe a construção de rodovias e ferrovias deveriam ser implementadas pelo EstadoBrasileiro.

RAND Narratology

“RAND Narratology” looks at the unlikely historical and aesthetic overlap between narrative theory and strategic defense thinking in the middle part of the twentieth century. Looking at the many writings and frankly odd intellectual styles of nuclear war planners working at the RAND Corporation, the essay examines the unexpected play between the material facts of intellectual history, the obscure but nonetheless real force of narrative desire, and the unthinkable costs of nuclear war.

The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

<i>The Warsaw Pact Reconsidered: International Relations in Eastern Europe, 1955–1969</i>. by Laurien Crump, New York: Routledge, 2015. 322 pp. $168.00.

Początek szwedzkiej interwencji w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim w końcu 1701 roku

The article is devoted to the military situation in the northern part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the second half of 1701, with special emphasis on the cooperation between the Sapiehas and King Charles XII of Sweden and its impact on the war plans by the Swedish king.

The Kargil Adventure and Its Political Consequences

This paper studies the pre and post Kargil war events. It also elaborates the calculation and miscalculations of Kargil adventure from the top military brass and the Kargil clique. This paper also describes the question of civil military relations in Pakistan and actual corridor of the decision making. It also Provides Knowledge about the plan of Kargil war, doctrine of secrecy, the aftermath of that adventure, the big bang between the civil-military leadership, the failure of diplomacy, the impact of Kargil war on political system. This paper also highlighted the attempt to get Kargil at the rate of Kashmir. It is assessed that the kagril episode had some precious consequences related to the battlefield, warfare and the supremacy of army as an institution. This paper also showed the activities happened on the freeze heights of Kargil seriously affect, politics and civil-military relations in Pakistan.

Urban Planning as an Extension of War Planning

War-city relationships had long been studied by scholars regarding wars’ sudden impact on cities. Studies typically focused on one specific event’s impact on urban military, politics, economy, or society. This approach, however, treated war’s impact on cities as only temporary, hindered opportunities to reveal multiple political regimes’ spatial competition through war-oriented city planning and construction, which is crucial for city development, and their resultant urban form changes through time. In response, this study has examined city planning and construction activities during the short time gaps between multiple military conflicts, with various military objectives, and conducted by different political regimes in Shenyang, China. In accordance with archival research, a space syntax axis analysis has been used to quantify spatial dynamics throughout war-peace-war cycles to explore the impact of military-oriented planning on city-scaled development. We have found these planning strategies, initiated by specific military goals, acted as extensions of war planning, segregating the city and causing urban fragmentation. They also acted as a driving factor which promoted modernization of the city in the early 20th century. We conclude that wars oriented planning can alter a city’s development track and impact its structure and form through the creation of internally connected but isolated urban districts. Copyright © 2018 Journal Of Contemporary Urban Affairs.

İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti’nin İran Politikası

Avrupa'da yayın yapan bir aydın muhalefeti olarak yola çıkan ve sonunda ülke yönetimini bütünüyle ele alan İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Osmanlı Devleti'nin kadim komşusu İran ile kendi iç değişimlerine paralel ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. Başlangıçta yalnızca II. Abdülhamid'e atfedilen sorunlarla sınırlı bir bakış gözlenirken, sonraki yıllarda II. Abdülhamid'in politikasına benzer bir İttihad-ı İslam söylemi ve ardından siyasi dayanışma ve kurtuluş motifl erinin ön plana çıkacağı politik bir üslup belirlenmiştir. Özellikle Settar Han öncülüğünde Tebriz'de yürütülen direniş, İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ile İran'lı Meşrutiyetçiler arasındaki en önemli bağı oluşturur. Ancak bu olumlu bakış açısı özellikle sınır sorunları gündeme geldiğinde sorun çözücü olmaktan uzak kalmıştır. Geleneksel sınır ihtilafl arının aşılması iki ülkenin iyi komşuluk ilişkisi geliştirmenin yanında kendi siyasetleri ile ilgili farklı noktalara dokunduğundan Meşrutiyetçi dayanışma söylemi ile güncel siyasal zorunluluklar arasında sürüp giden bir mücadele yaşanmıştır. Bu çalışmada İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin İran'a yönelik politikaları iki farklı bakış açısı ile ele alınmaya çalışılacaktır. Öncelikle İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin başlangıcından, 1.Dünya Savaşına kadar olan dönemde geçirdiği değişimlerin İran'a yönelik politikasının belirlenmesine olan etkileri ele alınacak, ardından İran politikasının II. Abdülhamid yönetimi ile kesişen ve ayrışan tarafl arının neler olduğuna değinilecekir. Çalışmanın kapsamı Cemiyet'in ilk yayınlarından başlamakla birlikte 1.Dünya Savaşı'nın başlangıcına kadar olan dönemdir. Çünkü bu savaş içerisinde İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin İran'a yönelik tutumları, doğrudan doğruya savaş koşulları, cephe gereksinimleri ve Alman genelkurmayının öncelikleri doğrultusunda şekillenmiştir. Bu nedenle 1914'den sonraki süreci genel savaş planlarının içerisinde ele almak gerektiğinden, çalışmada 1913 yılındaki Trablusgarp Savaşına kadar olan dönemin olayları incelenmiştir.

삼국시대 ‘당항성 전투’의 역사적 실상

In the meantime, it has been extreme confusion in the documentary record and researchers discussions about the battle of ‘Danghang castle(党項城)’ in the Three Kingdoms period(三國時代). As a result of reviewing the related historical material from the basic point of view, the following history can be depicted In 643, Backje(百濟)s King Uija(義慈王) pushed the attack on the Danghang castle to block Silla(新羅)s lines of communication with Dang-China(唐). In order to overcome Sillas defensive network, which was concentrated on the traffic road around the Danghang castle, Backje`s King Uija cooperated with the Goguryeo(高句麗), who was monitoring the military and diplomatic trends of Silla at the Han River(漢江) and the Imjin River(臨津江) estuary toward the West Sea(西海), and prepared for a considerable period of time. Through this, the king Uija tried to raid Danghang castle. However, at the time when the three countries` secret war plans fiercely developed, such preparations had the adverse effect of releasing relevant information to Silla. Although Silla had already dispatched an envoy to Dang-China to ask for salvation, Silla sent another envoy to Dang-China to announce it. The delegation seemed to have delivered relevant information to Dang-China in November 643. And, as Baekje became aware of the information leak, the king Uija, who mobilized troops to attack Danghang castle in November 643, seemed to have stopped the attack, judging that the raid(surprise attack) was no longer possible. In other words, the king`s attack discontinuance on Danghang castle was based on his own military strategic judgment, not on Baekje`s relationship with Dang-China. Here, a part of Baekje foreign policy is revealed in this period. At that time, Baekje had been pushed foreign policies that pursued both ‘goodwill against China’ and ‘attack on Silla’. In this context, cooperation with Koguryo seems to have been maintained at the level of ‘strategic cooperation’ rather than ‘military alliance’. In the later days, Dang-China criticized Baekje for having had duplicity, but it was Baekjes foreign policy to maximize the security and purpose of self- country at that time. This was the result of inheriting his father`s ‘two-way policy(兩端策)’. The reason why Baekje was able to use this foreign policy seems to be that it did not assume that the Dang-China could directly penetrate across the sea, believing different geographical advantages from Goguryeo as King Dang-China Taejong(唐 太宗)`s commentary in 643.

Стан теоретичного дослідження питань кримінальної відповідальності за пропаганду, планування, підготовку, розв'язання та ведення агресивної війни

Стан теоретичного дослідження питань кримінальної відповідальності за пропаганду, планування, підготовку, розв'язання та ведення агресивної війни

Policy and prophecy. The legend of the last emperor and the iconography of the ruler crowned by angels in Wallachia

The article analyses the occurrence of the iconography of the ruler crowned by angels in Wallachia in the mid-sixteenth century, a late revival of a Byzantine iconographic model with no examples known in Wallachia prior to this date. In the nave of the infirmary chapel of Cozia Monastery (1543), voivode Radu Paisie is depicted crowned by an angel and blessed by Saint Methodius of Patara, an iconographical hapax. The key for decoding the scene is provided by the Pseudo-Methodian Apocalypse, where a coronation by angels episode is found in the legend of the Last Christian Emperor. The frescoes were made in a political climate when anti-Ottoman war plans intensified in Central Europe following the occupation of Buda.

Russian Planning a War against the Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Turkey Coalition in 1878

The article considers Russia planning a war against the coalition of Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Turkey in 1878. When the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 was over, the Russian high military command attempted to resolve the Eastern Question and seize the Strait of Bosphorus and Constantinople. Having faced the opposition from Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, the Rus-sian command hesitated to capture Constantinople and the Bosphorus, which led to Russia's failure at the Congress of Berlin. War plans worked out by the General Staff and two-star general N.N. Obruchev, meant to help conduct military operations in the Balkans and Galicia were never realised.

ПЛАН ВЕДЕННЯ ВІЙНИ «ДРОПШОТ»: РЕАЛЬНИЙ ДОКУМЕНТ АМЕРИКАНСЬКОГО СТРАТЕГІЧНОГО ПЛАНУВАННЯ ТА ЙОГО ВІДОБРАЖЕННЯ В РАДЯНСЬКІЙ І СУЧАСНІЙ РОСІЙСЬКІЙ ПРОПАГАНДІ

The paper deals with one of the most significant issue of the Cold War, – the plan “Dropshot”. The article analyzes the content and history of the creation and adoption of the US national war plan “Dropshoot”, as well as how it was reflected in Soviet and contemporary Russian researches. It is determined that both in the USSR and in modern Russia, the same theses (developed in the works of several Soviet researchers) are applied to “Dropshot” plan. Obviously, this is done in the interests of propaganda and justification of specific political interests, that have not changed in Russia since the collapse of the USSR. One of the more fascinating aspects of the plan that its target was Soviet (Russian) society which are very sensible concerning “belligerent the USA and the West phobia”. The article is built on comparative analysis of the key documents which are reviewed and evaluated in the context of Russian and US approaches concerning the issue. It also explores the ways of fulfillment of the plan as they were imagined in the USSR. After a detailed comparison of these Russian theses with the contents of the “Dropshoot” plan and an analysis of the events, in the context of which the plan was elaborated, a conclusion is drawn about their inconsistency. Both in the USSR and in Russia, the data on the decision to create mass armies for rapid offensive operations in Europe, adopted in early January 1951 in Moscow with the direct involvement of Stalin, remain secret. Instead, the “Dropshot” plan planned military operations against the USSR and its allies after their conquest of continental Europe. We prove here that the plan was mostly defensive and its offensive features were invented by Soviet propaganda. The Pentagon did not possess enough nuclear bombs to make it a reality and such called “preventive war” against the USSR was not possible. The only Soviet strategists and Stalin personally had strategic views to expand Soviet influence in Europe by all means.

Utvrđivanje granice sa Albanijom na teritoriji Kosovske divizijske oblasti

With the Italian annexation of Albania including the outbreak of Italian-Greek war, the danger of the deterioration of the South-Western frontier of Yugoslavia increased. The fortification of the frontier with Albania was approached in the autumn of 1939, and in the zone of the Kosovo Division District two directions were fortified: Prizrenski and Djakovički. The fortification of this boundary front was done by the placement of lightweight objects, first of all, machine guns nests, antitank trenches, and obstruction of roads by hedgehogs and escarps in accordance with the configuration of soil. A considerable part of the foreseen objects were built until the beginning of fight actions in April 1941. The system of Djakovički and Prizrenski direction could not come true due to war plans which had foreseen the onslaught from the territory of Kosovo and Metohija into Albania.

Uncivil Warriors: The Lawyers' Civil War by Peter Charles Hoffer

Reviewed by: Uncivil Warriors: The Lawyers' Civil War by Peter Charles Hoffer Thomas C. Mackey (bio) Uncivil Warriors: The Lawyers' Civil War. By Peter Charles Hoffer. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018. Pp. ix, 228. $27.95 cloth; $27.95 ebook) On September 25, 1860, lawyer and Republican presidential candidate Abraham Lincoln wrote back to John M. Brockman who had asked him about the best method to becoming a lawyer. Lincoln warned Brockman that the study of the law was "laborious, and tedious" and that he should immerse himself in the study of the legal treatises such as William Blackstone's Commentaries and Joseph Chitty's Pleadings. Lincoln then warned that "work, work, work, is the main thing." Lincoln, as the Attorney-in-Chief, as well as the nation's 101,000 lawyers lent their specialized skills to the war effort for both sides of the United States Civil War. In Uncivil Warriors: The Lawyers' Civil War, Charles Peter Hoffer identifies and interprets just how much work the nation's lawyers accomplished during the war years. The book details how individual lawyers responded to the crisis of Civil War and assessed how lawyers as a group with the situation. In the Preface, Hoffer admits his biases saying the book was about "professional counsel who plotted the course of the war from the seats of power." Thus, the work of local and regional lawyers is not assessed unless their issues rose to the national public policy level. Hoffer also admits his "pro-Union bias" as the work "focuses primarily on the Union side, because as we shall see, lawyers were a more important part of Union war planning and implementation than lawyers in the Confederacy" (p. viii). As a result, the Prologue, six chapters, the Epilogue, and the conclusion resonate with the heaviest hitters of the Union war effort together with a good faith effort made to include [End Page 607] Confederate attorneys such as Benjamin P. Judah. Through this prosopography approach, Hoffer crafts a work that "is a combination of the history of professions, political history, and legal history in the Civil War Era" (p. viii). Starting with Lincoln, Hoffer raised and assessed the contribution of a "who's who" in the Civil War legal professional. A short list of the attorneys analyzed include Roger B. Taney, Benjamin R. Curtis, Stephen Douglas, Samuel Tilden, James Buchanan, T. R. R. Cobb, Alexander Stevens, Robert Toombs, Reverdy Johnson, Francis H. Wardlaw, Jeremiah Black, Patrick Cleburne, William Whiting, Francis Lieber, Humphrey H. Leavitt, and others. Hoffer did a good service in providing future students and scholars a starting point for a more in-depth assessment of not only these high-level policy makers, but also the tertiary, local, and regional attorneys who contributed to their respective war efforts. While engaging and useful for students and general readers, Hoffer makes statements that might concern more critical readers. For example, he concedes neither Lincoln nor Douglas could have anticipated the dangers of secession, however, "They should have." (p. 20). While both men were steeped in the over-heated political rhetoric of the 1850s, they "should have" foreseen the future stretches credulity. At another point in the work assessing Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, Hoffer argues that the sermon-like quality to that address can be explained by understanding that "Lincoln was so weary, physically, psychologically, and intellectually, that he was no longer the wily lawyer" (p. 164). Perhaps, but Lincoln's speech and his positioning himself for the up-coming issues in Reconstruction suggest that Lincoln, the lawyer, still possessed his legal savvy. Thus, Hoffer's assessment receives the Scottish verdict of "not proven." Still Uncivil Warriors suggests how much is still left to research, interpret, and assess on the home fronts, in the courtrooms, and in the seats of policy making in the era of the United States Civil War. [End Page 608] Thomas C. Mackey thomas c. mackey teaches in the history department, the Brandeis School of Law at the University of Louisville, and is at work on the limits of political dissent in wartime during the Civil War. Copyright © 2020 Kentucky Historical Society

The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics, and British War Planning, 1880–1914, by David G. Morgan-Owen

The history of British strategy and war planning in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is hardly terra incognita. Its location at the intersection of multiple important historical discourses, including the ability of the modern British state to adapt to modernity, imperial decline and the origins of the First World War, would guarantee interest, even were there not irresistible parallels with the present-day struggles of the USA to avoid or manage what Paul Kennedy called ‘imperial overstretch’. While some fine scholars, such as David French, John Gooch and Matthew Seligmann, have mapped this landscape with impeccable care and a good feel for nuance, other louder adventurers have chosen to slash and burn their way through its thickets. David Morgan-Owen has done well: refusing to be intimidated by possible bullying from the latter group, he has produced an impressive debut monograph which finds a fresh approach, meets the high standards of the former and establishes him as a historian to watch.

Threat of Limited Nuclear War

The article addresses the contemporary risks of limited nuclear war and its threat for societies. It offers a critical analysis based on the difference between the strategy of a global destructive war following classical application of standard nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the new political military plan of limited nuclear war, without its global continuation, on the other. First, the article explains the problems connected with the new US strategic documents pursuing limited nuclear war. Second, within this context of the risks of limited nuclear war, it explains conflicts of political (potentially democratic), corporate, and technical military interests in global capitalism which can lead to the limited nuclear war. Third, it concludes by clarifying the historical trajectory of debates concerning the strategies of possible nuclear war, and stresses the current real danger of limited nuclear war and its possible global escalation.

The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics and British War Planning, 1880–1914. By David G. Morgan-Owen

The Fear of Invasion: Strategy, Politics and British War Planning, 1880–1914. By David G. Morgan-Owen

No blood for oil, revisited: The strategic role of oil in the 2003 Iraq War

Abstract ‘It has nothing to do with oil, literally nothing to do with oil’, said US Defense Secretary Rumsfeld in 2002, of the planned attack on Iraq. Politicians and conservative commentators in the United States and United Kingdom were insistent on this point, even while it felt obvious to many in their countries, and in Iraq itself, that oil objectives were central. This article will review what we now know about discussions of oil that took place during the war planning and execution, based on documents that have been released in the fifteen years since. It will examine the nature of the strategic objectives, how the US and UK governments planned to achieve them and how they decided to talk about them in public. Reflecting on this evidence will allow us to revisit the question: was oil a major reason for the war?

The Hazards of Operations Involving Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War

This article provides an overview of the perils of U.S. and Soviet nuclear war planning during the Cold War. In particular, the article discusses instances of false alarms, when one side or the other picked up indications of an imminent attack by the other side and had to take measures to determine whether the indicators were accurate. None of these incidents posed a large danger of an accidental nuclear war, but they illustrate the inherent risks of the war preparations that both the United States and the Soviet Union took for their immense nuclear arsenals.

Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War

Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of “entanglement” between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: “misinterpreted warning” or the “damage-limitation window.” The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.