Picture Of Ourselves Research Articles

Programi edukacije najmlađih u oblastima arhitektonskog oblikovanja, nasleđa, urbanističkog i prostornog planiranja

In professional circles, it often seems that the state of our urban environment and attitude towards the natural environment reflect a lack of attention devoted to educating all generations, and a lack of awareness raised on this topic. The picture of our settlements is actually a picture of ourselves. For this reason, and the desire to draw young people in and explain professional topics to them in an adequate and acceptable way, and to develop a love of the environment and awareness of the quality of life, several institutions and organizations have launched independent education programs. These programs and workshops are implemented partly voluntarily, or within activities related to specific events and projects and the regular activities of individual institutions, and they are designed as a supplement to educational programs in preschools, schools and universities. The paper analyzes known approaches, methods and techniques related to youth participation, shown through a selected review of the literature. Also cited are examples of several different educational workshops in some of Belgrade's professional institutions and organizations, based on architectural formatting, urban planning, the protection of built heritage and the preservation of ecological corridors. Based on the experiences acquired and the observed results, a series of recommendations are formed for the organization and implementation of this form of education. The aim of the research is to highlight the importance, possibilities and benefits of educating young people in terms of understanding and caring for the space that surrounds us, as well as others with whom we share that space. Participation in the creative process contributes to gathering observations, ideas, visions and expressing needs, with the possibility of their application.

Concerning Violence, Part 1: The People Are Missing

Concerning Violence, Part I:The People Are Missing Oscar Guardiola-Rivera (bio) Preface: The Apotheosis of War in Colombia Not even God would bother coming to look in here. During afternoons like this the city was lost to me. Turning its back, the city closed itself to my gaze as well as to the eyes of any of its inhabitants, humans and not. It surrounded me but never faced me. The surrounding solitude imposed upon me a background of meaning: the city was human but cried like a caged animal. It had become a black box. If so, I was the cat within it. The city was Bogotá, but it could have been any other city—a city in Germany, for instance. Many years ago I was a kid in Colombia who spent long afternoons during summer break doing work at my Aunt Clara's shop to buy himself a bicycle. The shop sold colors, creams, and slimming girdles that promised passersby all sorts of magical effects. In they came, dead city dwellers, to this small cube fitted with transparent shelves exhibiting alchemical potions; out they went, feeling made up, alive. In most cities, reality is defined by whether you are alive or dead. Not in Bogotá, certainly not back then. To begin with, it rains too much. The city turns gray and you can't see, for it rains [End Page 155] lead and heavy metals. The real vanishes in front of your eyes. Then there is the apotheosis of war. I use the term "apotheosis" in two senses. The first sense is deification. Ever since war became our true religion, no one in this city could be certain whether to count oneself among the living or for how long. Life and death are now matters of probability not so much in the sense of a game of chance or a throw of the dice but instead in the aesthetic sense that invented fables provided us with as much conviction as historical examples, if not more. Second, I use the term "apotheosis" to mean "quintessence." My reference here is to an 1871 painting by Basil Verestchagin that he dedicated to all conquerors, past, present, and to come. That image, more real than reality itself, evokes the quintessence of our reality. Like the painting, the reality of our war-torn cities consisted mainly of a pyramid of buried boxes with no remains, piled high like a massive monument in the central square or like an artwork of the future memorializing the zombie apocalypse. But the people are missing. That is what happens above, on the surface. But if you turn that surface upside down, you will see that the whole country was and still is a mass grave. Was our reality ever something other than a horde of destructions? This horde of destructions is a picture of ourselves, as Wallace Stevens says, "now, an image of our society."1 Let me call the subjective effect of a landscape torn apart by war and indebtedness, which becomes parallel to and more real than the objectivity of violence and plunder, "the upside," with a nod to Verestchagin and the 1980s nostalgia of the Duffer Brothers. That summer in the upside was a long, lonely, silent season. Customers were rare, friendly visitors more so. Boredom set in, an uninvited, speechless companion. During a hunting expedition to the back of the shop prompted by boredom, I found a stack of books: crime stories by Raymond Chandler and Edgar Allan Poe, Dashiell Hammet's The Maltese Falcon, a newspaper edition of Mike Hammer's series, two spy thrillers by John Le Carré, and a compendium of mysteries penned by one Horacio Bustos Domecq. The summer of solitude was about to be saved by pulp fiction. Then my cousin went missing. The People Are Missing It is common sense and logic to think that a missing person is either dead or alive. We call them desaparecidos, the disappeared. There were plenty of those during the apotheosis of the war in Colombia; my cousin Hugo was merely one of them. His mother, [End Page 156] my auntie, came to the shop and told me that in the...

Painting Pictures of Ourselves: Researcher Subjectivity in the Practice of Feminist Reflexivity

In this article, I argue that researchers need to carefully distinguish the concepts of subjectivity and positionality in feminist reflexive practice, as an explicit focus on researcher subjectivity has the potential to provide additional insights into the research process that go beyond a focus on relational positionality. Drawing on examples from my own research, I argue that examining one's subjectivity as a researcher opens up a consideration of emotional reactions to research; lets us reconsider the importance of feelings of (dis)affiliation and (dis)comfort in the research process; and helps us to recognize that the dreams and desires of researchers about themselves and their research participants can play an important role in the research process. Moreover, researcher subjectivity attunes us to ways in which our subjectivities shift through the research process and are intimately connected to and mediated by the process of research and our interactions with our research participants.

Ethnography beyond the country and the city: Understanding the symbolic terrain of rural spaces

The 2012 London Olympic Games opening ceremony presented onlookers with a carefully choreographed vision of the British countryside. There were sheep, hillocks, trees, hedgerows and even working rainclouds. It was familiar, homely and bucolic and, according to the artist Danny Boyle, was intended to represent a humorous ‘picture of ourselves as a nation’ (Boyle, cited in Magnay and Heath, 2012). Condensing like the water droplets from the fake rain clouds suspended overhead, a moment of British culture was coalescing on the grass and tarmac of the east London Olympic Park; a stadium that was constructed painstakingly and expensively on the sanitized remains of centuries-old industrial brownfield that still smelled of wet coal (O’Hagan, 2012) and resonated with the echoes of long-closed warehouses and works. In place of ‘derelict and weedy’ came ‘green and pleasant’ – animated, magnified and given vibrant life against the roars and camera flashes of the assembled crowds. Despite the contemporary significance of the digital, virtual and the post-industrial, this pastoral spectacle served a timely reminder of the enduring significance of the rural landscape to identity and culture. A throwback to a simpler period of history, perhaps – a time when communities appeared to be more stable, authentic and ‘real’, or a time when people lived in close proximity with the land and other animals. Of course, many have questioned whether the countryside has ever really been a ‘green and pleasant land’. But this is to miss the point. Rural myths are both real and imagined – a juxtaposition and a blending of the ‘somatic’ and the symbolic; the fleshy and the representational – and they are given life through praxis, the many and varied doings that constitute human life-worlds. This is where ethnography – turning a Janus face to both naturalistic social interaction and academic rigour – makes its unique contribution.

Wittgenstein and the Possibility of Inexplicably Losing Certainties

Though Wittgenstein's On Certainty has been influential in analytic epistemology, its interpretation has been enormously controversial. It is true that exegesis has been mainly concerned with the proper characterization of Wittgenstein's very notion of ‘certainty’; however, some important questions remain unanswered regarding this notion. On the one hand, I am above all referring to the study of the possibilities we have of retaining a certainty when it has seemingly been placed into question and, on the other hand, of regaining a certainty once it has been lost. In this paper, I attempt to provide a detailed answer to both questions. In so doing, some important features of the picture of ourselves which emerges from Wittgenstein's On Certainty are also revealed.

Seeing Wittgenstein Anew (review)

Reviewed by: Seeing Wittgenstein Anew Chris Weigel William Day and Victor J. Krebs, editors. Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. xvii + 393. Paper, $27.99. William Day and Viktor J. Krebs' Seeing Wittgenstein Anew succeeds as an argument for the centrality of aspect-seeing in Wittgenstein's philosophy and as an argument for the more general philosophical importance of aspect-seeing to questions of mind, language, knowledge, and art. The worst that can be said about certain articles is that they merely use aspect-seeing as a springboard for an entirely different discussion, yet those discussions are fruitful and rich enough that it is difficult to see this as any sort of real fault. At best, the articles open a new path of inquiry, one that could not have been opened without the connection to aspect-seeing. For example, David R. Cerbone's "(Ef)facing the Soul: Wittgenstein and Materialism" gives a Wittgensteinian account of various post-Wittgensteinian theories of mind. It argues that part of the reason that the identity theory seems plausible is that intuitions used to support it smuggle in behavior, but not just the kind of behavior that would satisfy the behaviorist. Cerbone considers how hope is embedded in a human life, in gestures, facial expressions, and relationships. Cerbone's essay thus is an implicit argument that discussions of the extended mind hypothesis could benefit from seeing Wittgenstein anew. Cerbone also engages with eliminative materialism. He shows an important analogy between aspect-seeing and the propositional attitudes. For Wittgenstein, it is not the case that aspect-seeing is a phenomenon that arises when we add a subjective dimension to the neutral, objective data given by what is seen. Similarly, it is not the case that propositional attitudes can be understood as inferences or theories based on the neutral, objective, material facts. A longer treatment of this topic would explore the ways that Dennett himself explicitly appeals to Wittgenstein (in "Quining Qualia" for example); the essay as given, however, nicely opens pathways for understanding the direction in which such a discussion could go. Garry L. Hagberg's "In a New Light: Wittgenstein, Aspect-Perception and Retrospective Change in Self-Understanding" explores the relationship between aspect-seeing and a problem of autobiographical knowledge as exemplified in Iris Murdoch's contention, "Rethinking one's past is a constant responsibility." Hagberg's lucid explication of the middle-ground Wittgenstein steers between "intrinsic, property-reflecting brute perception" and "freely imaginative perception" does propel him toward his goal of showing "how we [End Page 262] can sustain an active or unfrozen engagement with our past" without descending into an understanding of our own past where "anything goes" and accuracy has no role to play. Like Cerbone's essay, Hagberg's essay constitutes an implicit argument for the relevance of aspect-seeing to seeing Wittgenstein anew in a contemporary debate, this time about personal identity. Thinking about the epistemological question of how to understand our own past could enrich the question of whether continuity involves empathic access, or coherent narratives, or any kind of psychological continuity for that matter. Hagberg's essay guides what it means "to make a life-defining picture of ourselves." A person's memory of an early separation trauma is neither a brute perception nor a subjective construction, on Hagberg's interpretation. Understanding our own past is central to understanding who we are, and understanding our past is aided by a clearer understanding of Wittgenstein's middle course. Lest one think that the focus on aspect-seeing in Wittgenstein is only a means to more contemporary philosophical ends, one ought to read Day's remarkable "Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language." Day considers the issue of aspect-blindness, arguing that universal aspect-blindness is impossible for beings with language. Specifically, he shows that a child's first attempt at language, at trying "bloh" for "ball," is neither an indication that the child sees the ball for the first time, nor an indication that the child is giving a first label for an object seen all along. Rather, he shows that this attempt is an indication of the dawning of an aspect. The...

To Secure the Blessings

The Constitution’s Preamble states, in part: “We the people of the United States, in order to… secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” While the word “blessings” in this context might mean simply benefits, it might have a more specifically ethical and dispositional meaning, such as benefits for which we should be grateful. Those who favor an evangelical reading of the Constitution might further specify the ethical and dispositional meaning, so that “blessings” recalls God’s promise to Abraham and Israel and the relationship that this promise initiates. On this evangelical reading, the Preamble’s aspiration to blessings fits within a familiar Biblical warrant for American exceptionalism.An ampler Biblical account of blessings (and curses), however, questions this warrant. The ampler account is ironizing; it tends to reveal incongruities throughout our picture of ourselves as blessed and as blessing others. Relocating or transposing the Preamble’s Blessings Clause into this Biblical frame has a salutary ironizing effect, enabling us to see the whole project of securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity in a more critical light. Without irony, what is otherwise virtuous – our disposition to gratitude – is tainted by the vice of complaceny. Without gratitude, the virtue in irony declines into a self-congratulatory sarcasm.Suppose we read the Preamble’s Blessings Clause in light of Biblical stories about how Jacob secured blessings to himself and his posterity. In this reading, the framers of the law (“fathers”) suppose that they “secure the blessings” to and for the generations to come, but the children actually “secure the blessings” from the “fathers” (by deceit if necessary). “To secure the blessings” it is necessary to overthrow the law (albeit for the sake of realizing it). Ultimately, the blessings are not “secure,” but instead open or at risk in a way that gives depth of significance to life and law. Life graced with blessings is not “secure,” and the prosperity or abundance in “blessings” offers no immunity against the human circumstances of pain, loss, grief, anxiety, and guilt. The ground and source of the blessings upon “ourselves and our posterity” require that “we the people” mediate blessings to all humankind; but we exchange blessings for curses if do not act with humility and in awareness of our limitations and mixed motives.

Francis Crick (1916–2004)

Francis Crick (1916–2004)

Dance Culture and Statuary Politics: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Myth of Primitivism

Dance is often assumed to have universal values and to manifest a spirit of freedom, especially individual freedom. It is also the case that such freedom is perceived to be deeply rooted in the condition of humanity. In this article Gregory Sporton shows how these assumptions can mislead us about the basis on which dance operates. By citing the body as the original manifestation of expression, and linking dance practice to primitive experience, a sentimental picture of ourselves as dancers emerges. Taking dance practice in Taiwan as an example, the author shows how this ‘naturalist argument’ can be exploited by a political culture and in doing so divert questions of identity. For the visiting observer, dance appears to evidence political culture and social aspiration, identities that are fixed in the present rather than the archaic past. Gregory Sporton has had a substantial performing career in ballet, contemporary dance, opera, and performance art. He is Head of the School for Performance and Moving Image at the University of Central England.

A Life in Art (1)

Even as a very young child, I knew how to draw. One day in fourth grade, when I was nine, the teacher told us to draw pictures of ourselves the way we would look grown up. Most of the children filled their pages with childishly rendered cowboys, pilots, ballerinas, and mommies. But I was developing early, and not only artistically. I already needed a bra, and I thought grown up meant being like the full-figured women I saw on TV. Imagining one of those sophisticated secretaries, I drew myself wearing high-heeled shoes, a starched white blouse, and a tight sheath skirt. I knew how to make geometric objects look real by using shading. The breasts on my grown-up self, I decided, would be so three-dimensional, they'd cast a shadow. I was immensely pleased with how real the drawing looked and was so absorbed that I didn't notice the excited attention of the other

身体的行為と自己観察

In this paper I focus on the roles of proprioception and of perception in forming the cognitive picture of ourselves as physical agents in the world. Our proprioceptive awareness is plausibly characterized in terms of its distinctive epistemic unmediatedness and constancy, and this fact may seem to support the view that the primary core of our self-conception is constituted by our proprioceptive self-awareness, not by ordinary modes of self-perception. I criticize some main arguments for this view, and suggest that the proper understanding of the significance of proprioception needs the appreciation of its intricate involvement with our perceptual bodilyawareness. I conclude with the remark that the notion of basic action should be restored on this epistemological footing.

理性的動物

The recent anti-Lockean Animalists hold that the so-called problem of personal identity is a matter of persistence of a living organism and charge the traditional Lockean view with some ontological puzzles as to how we can be a kind of animals. This newcomer proposal, however, makes it difficult to understand the importance of our distinctive psychological nature, and results in analogous puzzles about the relation between an animal and its body. The problem is to bridge the gap between the mental and the biological so as to make an entire picture of ourselves, i.e. persons as a kind of animals essentially endowed with affluent psychology. A promising solution is to abandon the reductionist assumption prevalent in this controversy and to accept our persistence as primitive relative to both the psychological and the biological continuities.

An Interview with Farah Jasmine Griffin

An Interview with Farah Jasmine Griffin Charles H. Rowell This interview was conducted by telephone on June 16, 1999, between Charlottesville, Virginia, and Hartford, Connecticut. ROWELL You have written on a variety of subjects, including pedagogy and literary texts, and migration and African-American literature, and different issues in feminist studies. And you have also commented on autobiographical narratives, film, travel literature, visual art, and other African-American expressive forms. You ended your first booklength study “Who set you flowin’?”: The African-American Migration Narrative (1995) with a seminal description of Toni Morrison’s novel Jazz, a comment which I think could also apply to jazz itself as a musical form. You refer to the novel Jazz as a “portrait of a people in the midst of self-creation, a document of what they created and what they lost along the way.” I’m almost inclined to argue that such is your project, your intellectual project: to show that black people in the USA have been made objects, to deconstruct those objects, and in the process to restore black people to their humanity, their agency, while recovering and (re)presenting their subjectivity. That seems to me to be your project, especially in light of your focused interest in recovering and restoring black women and their texts. Your recovery work, especially the letters (between Rebecca Primus and Addie Brown) you edited in Beloved Sisters and Loving Friends (1999), should make a significant impact on the historiography of black New England. GRIFFIN You’re very astute. When I wrote that last line, initially I wrote it about Morrison’s text. But I thought, I hoped, that’s what Who set you flowin’? would do also; I hoped that what I was saying about Jazz would be true of the critical book that I just finished writing as well. At the time I wasn’t thinking about the broader project, the work that was to come, but now that I hear you say it, I think that it certainly applies to the other project or the larger project in general. ROWELL Will you talk about your academic project in general? GRIFFIN I think that for the most part mine is a project that is very interested in the agency of black people (especially African Americans)—their political, social and creative agency. I’ve been very much interested in the effects of white supremacy and the ways that black people have tried to counter that, particularly in our art, in our music, and in our literature. When I say white supremacy, I don’t just mean the kind [End Page 872] of horrific things that were done to our bodies physically. But also the psychic scars caused by white supremacy—and in terms of the ways that we might have internalized some of the negative things that came out of the white supremacist venture. I think that our artists especially have been at the forefront of trying to give us a different picture of ourselves. When I say artists, I mean that in the broader sense: the writers, the musicians and the visual artists as well. I think that has been the driving force behind a lot of the critical work that I’ve done, the critical question that has shaped what direction I would go in. How have we as a people managed not only to survive but to thrive in the face of this massive onslaught of physical and discursive violence against us? In addition to that I think I also try to demonstrate how complex our experience has been, to complicate understandings of that experience. You know, if our notion of migration is just of forced movement from Africa through the Middle Passage or of the Great Migration then I am interested in other kinds of mobility—travel for leisure, education, missionary work and the like. If our notion of 19th-century black life is determined by the institution of slavery, then I’m very interested in what life looked like for those people who were not slaves, who did not live in the South. ROWELL Please talk about your work as an editor—i. e., Beloved Sisters and Loving Friends...

A Genome Sampler

All genomes share critical features of composition, replication, and information management. However, despite these commonalities unifying plants, animals, and microbes, genomic information is also key to the incredible diversity that exists on this planet. This special section presents a sampling of progress in the genome analysis of a variety of organisms. Although the flowering plant Arabidopsis thaliana averages less than 20 centimeters in height, it has become of prime importance in plant biology as a model representative of higher plants. (See the [foldout chart][1] summarizing the state of the Arabidopsis genome project and the Review by [Meinke][2] et al. ) Knowledge generated by this project already shows promise in improving agronomic features such as yield and drought resistance in important agricultural crops and is leading toward development of “plant factories” that can produce new products such as biodegradable plastics. Realization of the potential of plant model systems depends on how far comparative genomics can be stretched, and [Gale and Devos][3] discuss its strengths and limitations. Whether we will reach the full potential of what one researcher has called the golden age of plant biology will also depend on budgets; see the News story by [Pennisi][4] about the recent infusion of funds into plant genomic research and the projects that are being planned. Funding for generating genomic information on some other model systems ( Escherichia coli , yeast, Caenorhabditis elegans , Drosophila , and mouse) and humans has primarily been coordinated under the Human Genome Project. Representatives of the National Institutes of Health and the Department of Energy present the second 5-year plan ([Collins][5] et al. ) for the project. The focus of this endeavor has evolved from mapping to an all-out push on sequencing, and doing it better, cheaper, and faster. This latest plan also contains a clearer view of the next stages, with an emphasis on providing tools and resources that will enable researchers to ask more far-reaching questions. Even with all the progress made, uncertainties remain. The ramifications of ramping up the sequencing effort remain unclear. Assembly and finishing of the sequence present unique challenges. And once we have this “book of life,” will we be able to read it? As [Gelbart][6] points out, we are still functional illiterates when it comes to interpreting what the genome has to tell us. How we organize the flood of data that is being generated is a key component of beginning to decipher it. However, excitement about the future is undeniably building. Chu et al. (p. [699][7]) present a functional genomics study that is an example of the shape of future analyses. The availability of the complete sequence of the yeast genome allowed them to increase by an order of magnitude the number of genes known to be associated with spore formation. See also the Report by Deloukas et al. (p. [744][8]) on the newest version of the physical map of human gene-based markers and the Report (Stephens et al. , p. [754][9]) and Perspective (Hatch, p. [638][10]) on the complete sequence of Chlamydia trachomatis . The social and ethical ramifications of generating these quanta of genomic information are complex. How do we decide what kinds of research are appropriate and what kinds of research products to release into the environment? How will genomic information change our understanding of concepts such as race and ethnicity? (See the News story by [Marshall][11].) In his Editorial (p. [625][12]), Greely makes a point that should never be lost in the excitement of finding more and more sequence and looking for the genes associated with human diseases and traits: Respect for the people and cultures taking part in these studies should be of prime importance. An appropriate combination of scientific advances and consideration of social and ethical issues will allow us to achieve the full potential of plant biotechnology to feed and supply the world's population and of the Human Genome Project to give new dimensions to medicine and our picture of ourselves. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.663 [2]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.662 [3]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.656 [4]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.652 [5]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.682 [6]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.659 [7]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.699 [8]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.744 [9]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.754 [10]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.638 [11]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.654 [12]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.282.5389.625

Petrarch: the Canzoniere, or Rerum vulgarium fragmenta

Petrarch's characterization of the hapless lover has become an archetype of modern individualism. Indeed, in many of his poems on the pain and the bitter pleasure of love, we inevitably recognize a vivid and timely picture of ourselves. Humble sinner, aesthete, contemplative, man of the world, secretly tormented spirit, droll observer and advocate of life, Petrarch's protagonist is as richly complex as the age in which he lived.The poems of Petrarch's Canzoniere represent one of the most influential works in Western literature. Varied in form, style, and subject matter, these scattered rhymes contain metaphors and conceits that have been absorbed into the literature and language of love.

A Message Without a Code?

A Message Without a Code?

Alice Through the (Convex) Looking Glass

OH, wad some power the giftie gi’e usTo see oursels as others see us,It wad frae mony a blunder free us,And foolish notion;in which case it is probable that wars would cease. During the last few years we have had glimpses of ourselves through the spectacles of the Central Powers; occasionally through the telescopes of the French, the Italians, or the Russians, and in the near future we are likely to get a good many pictures of ourselves as we appear to the last-named people. We are apt to think that our own view of ourselves is the only true view, and all other images are in error just as they differ from our own standard. Naturally other nations adopt the same course, and we are free to believe that in many cases their vision of themselves is far more at fault than our own self image. In this respect a study of Alice and her standards might be not without profit to the nations. When we want to see ourselves, or, at least, our faces, we usually employ a mirror, and what we see depends very much on the mirror we use. Sir George Greenhill was the first professor of Applied Mathematics at the Eoyal Indian Civil Engineering College, Coopers’ Hill. He told us that at the end of the first session a reception was held and the science departments were on view. A young lady entering the physical laboratory and seeing an inverted image of herself in a large concave mirror naively remarked to her companion, “They have hung that looking glass upside down.” But those who fixed the mirror were not to blame, as the lady would have discovered had she advanced past the centre of the curvature. The reply of modern mathematics to the prayer of Eobert Burns is the Theory of Relativity I have some doubt whether Burns would have appreciated the answer. As a rule, we use a plane mirror to inspect ourselves. This reverses certain spatial relations which can be expressed best, perhaps, by stating that it presents a right-handed screw as a left-handed screw and vice versû, or changes a wine screw into a beer screw, as Clerk Maxwell would say, referring to the tendrils of the vine and the hop.