Piaget's Genetic Epistemology Research Articles

Toward a Neuroscience of Adult Cognitive Developmental Theory.

Piaget's genetic epistemology has provided the constructivist approach upon which child developmental theories were founded, in that infants are thought to progress through distinct cognitive stages until they reach maturity in their early 20's. However, it is now well established that cognition continues to develop after early adulthood, and several “neo-Piagetian” theories have emerged in an attempt to better characterize adult cognitive development. For example, Kegan's Constructive Developmental Theory (CDT) argues that the thought processes used by adults to construct their reality change over time, and reaching higher stages of cognitive development entails becoming objectively aware of emotions and beliefs that were previously in the realm of the subconscious. In recent years, neuroscience has shown a growing interest in the biological substrates and neural mechanisms encompassing adult cognitive development, because psychological and psychiatric disorders can arise from deficiencies therein. In this article, we will use Kegan's CDT as a framework to discuss adult cognitive development in relation to closely correlated existing constructs underlying social processing, such as the perception of self and others. We will review the functional imaging and electrophysiologic evidence behind two key concepts relating to these posited developmental changes. These include self-related processing, a field that distinguishes between having conscious experiences (“being a self”) and being aware of oneself having conscious experiences (“being aware of being a self”); and theory of mind, which is the objective awareness of possessing mental states such as beliefs and desires (i.e., having a “mind”) and the understanding that others possess mental states that can be different from one's own. We shall see that cortical midline structures, including the medial prefrontal cortex and cingulate gyrus, as well as the temporal lobe, are associated with psychological tasks that test these models. In addition, we will review computational modeling approaches to cognitive development, and show how mathematical modeling can provide insights into how sometimes continuous changes in the neural processing substrate can give rise to relatively discrete developmental stages. Because deficiencies in adult cognitive development can result in disorders such as autism and depression, bridging the gaps between developmental psychology, neuroscience, and modeling has potential implications for clinical practice. As neuromodulation techniques such as deep brain and transcranial stimulation continue to advance, interfacing with these systems may lead to the emergence of novel investigational methods and therapeutic strategies in adults suffering from developmental disorders.

Goldmann e o estruturalismo genético

Resumo: O presente artigo é resultante de palestra proferida pelo Professor Michael Löwy na PUC-SP em 1985 sobre a obra de Goldmann, em particular do conceito de estruturalismo genético, inspirado na obra de Marx, para designar o método dialético. O estruturalismo genético é um conceito amplo, compreendido enquanto método que busca analisar totalidades estruturadas, e observar qual é a dialética entre o todo e as partes. Goldmann foi influenciado pela obra de Lukács, pela epistemologia genética de Piaget, enfatizando o processo histórico de constituição do objeto na sua totalidade e de constituição de sujeitos coletivos, na qual as classes sociais apresentam centralidade. O conceito tem aplicação no terreno particular da cultura, mas também como definição de método das ciências sociais e de aplicação em todos os terrenos do conhecimento social.

Piaget's genetic epistemology and Hegel's dialectics

Piaget's genetic epistemology and Hegel's dialectics

Squeak Etoys na modalidade 1 para 1: programação e autoria multimídia no desenvolvimento da conceituação

This paper, contextualized by “1:1” (One Laptop per Child) learning modality, aims to contribute to the understanding of the current possibilities of programming activity for conceptualization development of public school students in Brazil. We propose, through the examination of some children’s productions, to explicit learning processes involved in programming with Squeak Etoys, a multimedia authoring software developed in Object-Oriented Language. The analysis of these productions, based on the methodology of Learning Projects and supported by Piaget's Genetic Epistemology, allowed the observation of the conceptual development and ownership levels in the activities of students.

Geometria na educação infantil: da manipulação empirista ao concreto piagetiano

Refletir sobre os conhecimentos de geometria do professor de educação infantil e as concepções epistemológicas que fundamentam suas condutas pedagógicas foi o objetivo de nossa pesquisa. A análise dos discursos indicou boa vontade das professoras para o trabalho geométrico, entretanto o desconhecimento da geometria enquanto teoria e a enraizada concepção epistemológica empirista, reportaram à ideia de que este conhecimento está nos objetos, bastando sua manipulação para que haja aprendizagem. Assim, caberia às crianças, por meio de estímulos e da organização dos materiais manipuláveis pelos docentes, a descoberta das formas geométricas presentes no mundo que as rodeia. Buscamos, na epistemologia genética de Jean Piaget, as bases sólidas para contribuições à reflexão e atuação de professores.

Turtles all the way down: outlines for a dynamic theory of epistemology

AbstractThe most serious problem facing epistemological research is how to establish solid foundations for epistemology within a recursive system of knowing. The aim of this paper is to respond to this problem by presenting some outlines for a dynamic theory of epistemology. This theory suggests that the most basic unshakeable unit of epistemology is a process of differentiation, which is a self‐referential activity. This paper elaborates on this thesis and illustrates its relevance to solving the problem of embodiment in Piaget's genetic epistemology. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Interaction or Intersubjectivity? A Reply to Lerman

Lerman, in his challenge to radical constructivism, presented Vygotsky as an irreconcilable opponent to Piaget's genetic epistemology and thus to von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism. We argue that Lerman's stance does not reflect von Glasersfeld' s opinion of Vygotsky's work, nor does it reflect Vygotsky's opinion of Piaget's work. We question Lerman's interpretation of radical constructivism and explain how the ideas of interaction, intersubjectivity, and social goals make sense in it. We then establish compatibility between the analytic units in Vygotsky's and von Glasersfeld's models and contrast them with Lerman's analytic unit. Consequently, we question Lerman's interpretation of Vygotsky. Finally, we question Lerman's use of Vygotsky's work in mathematics education, and we contrast that use with how we use von Glasersfeld's radical constructivism.

Postmodern readings of Piaget's genetic epistemology.

Postmodern readings of Piaget's genetic epistemology.

THE CYBERNETIC INSIGHTS OF JEAN PIAGET

Self-organization is one of the central concerns of cybernetics. In 1937, 12 years before Norbert Wiener's first book, Jean Piaget published an extensive study of his model of the child as a self-organizing cognitive agent that constructs its own knowledge. In this paper, I shall survey some of the fundamental commonalities of Piaget's genetic epistemology and cybernetical thinking.

The Box, a Naturalistic Experiment with Young Children: The Same Object as Mediating Factor for Different Activities

There have been a number of theories suggesting that there are qualitative differences in the way that children of different ages and adults perceive the world. The most famous of these theories is Piaget's genetic epistemology, describing and documenting differences in understandings of the physical and social worlds. In this paper we make the argument that there are also qualitative differences in the way children of different ages recognize the same objects as mediating devices for their activity. The object as mediating factor is based on the child's everyday experience with similar objects combined with his/her ontological development. A naturalistic experiment in which the same object was introduced into an infant/toddler classroom and a preschool classroom is presented as an example of these types of differences. The recognition that objects have very different meanings for children of different ages has important implication for the way teachers in general, and early childhood educators in particular, think about the introduction of materials into their classrooms.

Neurophenomenology and genetic epistemology as a basis for the study of consciousness

Analysis of the nature of consciousness and its relationship to epistemology establishes the need for a neurophenom-enological approach which provides an integrated basis from which to examine the biological and experiential aspects of consciousness. Epistemological, ontological, metaphysical, and methodological aspects of a neurophe-nomenological approach to the study of consciousness are addressed. Linguistic analysis shows that consciousness refers to a semantic domain ranging from biologically based abilities to culturally derived awarenesses and interactional potentials, reference, learning, and experience. Consciousness derives from physical, personal, social, and mental awarenesses and activities which provide the basis for the knower's relationships with and understandings of the environment. Consciousness and epistemology are both fundamentally concerned with the nature of human knowing. The ontology of consciousness resides in the epistemic structures mediating interaction between knower and known. Piaget's genetic epistemology and his perspectives on consciousness provide guidelines for a neurophe-nomenological study of consciousness. The study of both epistemology and consciousness require a linkage of neurological studies of brain function with phenomenological studies of contemplative practices and altered states of consciousness. Some neuroepistemological correlates of different consciousness conditions are briefly reviewed to illustrate the utility and necessity of this approach.

Some contributions of piaget's genetic epistemology and psychology to cognitive therapy

AbstractCognitive therapists are presently striving to establish a theoretical foundation for their therapeutical practice. Having shown the efficacy of cognitive therapies in the treatment of certain psychiatric disorders and having refined their intervention techniques, these therapists are seeking a theory‐based understanding of the psychological mechanisms subtending the changes occurring during therapy. The absence of a directly relevant cognitive theory led us to consider how certain concepts of 'Piaget' constructivism—essentially a theory of knowledge change—might contribute to the issue. Our paper is thus not an instance of applying Piagetian theory to cognitive psychotherapy but of its use as an epistemic instrument. Egocentrism and decentration, the growth of awareness and action, and the relations between cognition and emotion are elements of Piagetian theory as well as nodal points in the area of cognitive therapy. Some clinical examples illustrate our approach.

Regulatory constructivism: On the relation between evolutionary epistemology and Piaget's genetic epistemology

It is argued that fundamental to Piaget's life works is a biologically based naturalism in which the living world is a nested complex of self-regulating, self-organising (constructing) adaptive systems. A structuralist-rationalist overlay on this core position is distinguished and it is shown how it may be excised without significant loss of content or insight. A new and richer conception of the nature of Piaget's genetic epistemology emerges, one which enjoys rich interrelationships with evolutionary epistemology. These are explored and it is shown how a regulatory systems evolutionary epistemology may be embedded within genetic epistemology.

Referebces

Referebces

Developmental Psychology, God and the Good

The emergence of the modern concept of development is closely linked with the awakening of a historical consciousness in western thought. Historiography shifted from the veneration of the sacred to the analysis of the secular, and human change came to be viewed as progressive and developmental. Salvationist dogma about the hereafter was replaced by visions of a utopia here on earth. Progressive development involves a natural ordering of values and offers an empirical route for ascertaining the nature of God and the good. This is an impetus for Piaget's genetic epistemology, and is an important, if unacknowledged, feature of developmental theory. It is also the source of troubling difficulties.

The eternal context: Affective and cognitive egocentricity and maturation

For Professor Egan the eternal context is powered by the binary oppositions exemplified in fairy tales such as love/hate, courage/cowardice, security/anxiety, and so on. He argues that children's narratives stimulate the procession of binary discrimination and mediation, and therefore promote learning far more ‘reaching’ than that conceived by current curriculum design. First we contextualize Egan's remarks within the world of Piaget's genetic epistemology, contrasting Egan's affective scripts with Piaget's cognitive egocentricity. Then we expand the horizons to encompass a theory of mind, making the case that affective egocentric concepts bootstrap and then give way to descriptive, quantitative, and decontextualized concepts. A hallmark of development is indeed a step beyond the eternal context.

Piaget's epistemic subject and science education: Epistemological vs. psychological issues

Many individuals claim that Piaget's theory of cognitive development is empirically false or substantially disconfirmed by empirical research. Although there is substance to such a claim, any such conclusion must address three increasingly problematic issues about the possibility of providing an empirical test of Piaget's genetic epistemology: (1) the empirical underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence, (2) the empirical difficulty of testing competence-type explanations, and (3) the difficulty of empirically testing epistemic norms. This is especially true of a central epistemic construct in Piaget's theory — the epistemic subject. To illustrate how similar problems of empirical testability arise in the physical sciences, I briefly examine the case of Galileo and the correlative difficulty of empirically testing Galileo's laws. I then point out some important epistemological similarities between Galileo and Piaget together with correlative changes needed in science studies methodology. I conclude that many psychologists and science educators have failed to appreciate the difficulty of falsifying Piaget's theory because they have tacitly adopted a philosophy of science at odds with the paradigm-case of Galileo.

Jean piaget and george kelly: Toward a stronger constructivism

Abstract Among constructivist metatheoretical approaches, a strong version is defined as that which reveals reality to be actively and subjectively constructed rather than passively incorporated as objective environmental or innate “facts” by the subject. Given this definition, however, ambiguities arise concerning the potential and limits of construct integration over the course of development. Piaget's stronger constructivist model is offered as a means of clarifying and broadening the strong constructivist position on knowledge evolution. Piaget's genetic epistemology model places dramatic emphasis on the organizational capacity of the subject, specifying personal development as a strongly continuous and subsuming process. Discussion of commonalities between Piaget's position and Kelly's personal construct theory concludes this article.

From Piaget's Epistemic Subject to Pascual‐Leone's Metasubject: Epistemic Transition in the Constructivist—Rationalist Theory of Cognitive Development

The explanation of the transition from one epistemic theory to another is an important part of Piaget's genetic epistemology. It is argued that this epistemic transition leads to a retrodictable orthogenetic tendency toward optimizing equilibration. The objective of this paper is to establish a relationship between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject and to demonstrate that the postulation of the latter can be considered as an epistemic transition between two constructivist—rationalist theories, which leads to the development of a theory with greater explanatory power. Epistemic transition in this paper refers to a progressive problemshift (cf. Lakatos, 1970), between the theories of Piaget and Pascual‐Leone. Piaget builds a “general model” by neglecting individual differences, that is, studies the epistemic subject, whereas Pascual‐Leone by incorporating a framework for individual difference variables, studies the metasubject—the psychological organization of the epistemic subject. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate that Pascual‐Leone's theory of constructive operators is a model of the psychological organism (the metasubject), which is at work inside Piaget's epistemic subject. Finally, it is concluded that the greater explanatory power of Pascual‐Leone's theory can be interpreted as an epistemic transition between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject.

Role of the epistemic subject in Piaget's genetic epistemology and its importance for science education

AbstractAccording to Piaget, a fundamental epistemological distinction must be made between the psychological and the epistemic subject. The epistemic subject is studied by the genetic epistemologist who charts development through a “common universal rationality, which develops,” whereas the psychological subject is studied by the developmental/cognitive psychologist by focusing on accidental contingencies surrounding particular people and their individual differences. The epistemic subject as compared to the psychological subject is an idealized abstraction, viz., that set of underlying epistemic structures common to everyone at the same level of development. The objective of this study is to investigate the degree to which investigators in science education conceptualize the difference between the epistemic and the psychological subjects. It is argued that just as the ideal gas law (based on the theoretical formulation of Maxwell and Boltzmann) provides a “general model” to which the real gases approximate under different experimental conditions, so we can consider (by abduction) the epistemic subject to be an “ideal knower” to which the real (psychological) subjects approximate to varying degrees. The difference between the epistemic and the psychological subjects, however, cannot be used as an “epistemological shield” in defense of Piagetian theory. Any test of the Piagetian theory must involve psychological or real subjects. Empirical testability, however, need not be equated to being scientific. An analogy is drawn between Galileo's idealization, which led to the discovery of the law of free‐fall, and Piaget's epistemic subject. Research conducted in science education shows that at least for some critics the wide variations in the age at which individuals acquire the different Piagetian stages is crucial for rejecting the theory. It is argued that the real issue is not the “proportion of heterogeneity” but the understanding that Piaget, by neglecting individual differences, attempts to build a general model applicable across types of situations/subjects. The distinction between the epistemic and the psychological subjects is important not for defending Piaget's theory (which has serious theoretical flaws) but to understand epistemic transitions, for example, the one between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject. It is concluded that failure to understand the distinction between the epistemic and the psychological subjects would lead to misconstruing the significance of our research findings and, what is more serious, to a lack of a historical perspective.