Role of the epistemic subject in Piaget's genetic epistemology and its importance for science education

Abstract

AbstractAccording to Piaget, a fundamental epistemological distinction must be made between the psychological and the epistemic subject. The epistemic subject is studied by the genetic epistemologist who charts development through a “common universal rationality, which develops,” whereas the psychological subject is studied by the developmental/cognitive psychologist by focusing on accidental contingencies surrounding particular people and their individual differences. The epistemic subject as compared to the psychological subject is an idealized abstraction, viz., that set of underlying epistemic structures common to everyone at the same level of development. The objective of this study is to investigate the degree to which investigators in science education conceptualize the difference between the epistemic and the psychological subjects. It is argued that just as the ideal gas law (based on the theoretical formulation of Maxwell and Boltzmann) provides a “general model” to which the real gases approximate under different experimental conditions, so we can consider (by abduction) the epistemic subject to be an “ideal knower” to which the real (psychological) subjects approximate to varying degrees. The difference between the epistemic and the psychological subjects, however, cannot be used as an “epistemological shield” in defense of Piagetian theory. Any test of the Piagetian theory must involve psychological or real subjects. Empirical testability, however, need not be equated to being scientific. An analogy is drawn between Galileo's idealization, which led to the discovery of the law of free‐fall, and Piaget's epistemic subject. Research conducted in science education shows that at least for some critics the wide variations in the age at which individuals acquire the different Piagetian stages is crucial for rejecting the theory. It is argued that the real issue is not the “proportion of heterogeneity” but the understanding that Piaget, by neglecting individual differences, attempts to build a general model applicable across types of situations/subjects. The distinction between the epistemic and the psychological subjects is important not for defending Piaget's theory (which has serious theoretical flaws) but to understand epistemic transitions, for example, the one between Piaget's epistemic subject and Pascual‐Leone's metasubject. It is concluded that failure to understand the distinction between the epistemic and the psychological subjects would lead to misconstruing the significance of our research findings and, what is more serious, to a lack of a historical perspective.