In a 2010 paper Feng and Buhi suggested that the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 had demoted the principle of common but differentiated responsibility and “silently” elevated the polluter-pays principle to a dominant position in international climate law. As evidence they cited the fact that some non-Annex I parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, including China, had taken positions previously associated only with Annex I parties, in particular on the provision of climate finance to (other) developing countries. Now, eight years later, with the Paris Agreement erected on the conceptual foundation of the Copenhagen Accord, I ask whether the Feng-Buhi hypothesis has gained plausibility. Certainly, the Paris Agreement obliges states to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions more than they would have otherwise. It thereby obliges them to incur a cost, or pay a price, for those emissions mitigated because of the Agreement. In this sense, states are under an obligation to price at least some of their emissions. (The general rule holds even if we exclude the United States and those less wealthy countries whose domestic mitigation effort may not be affected by the Agreement in the short term.) Other elements of the Agreement, detailed in this paper, also signify a treaty-led elevation of the polluter-pays principle in the climate change regime. Has it now therefore gained a legal foothold in the regime, if only implicitly? An alternative narrative is that the parties to the Agreement have agreed to reduce their emissions in response to, not any legal imperative, but what we might call the physical necessity of avoiding global warming of 2°C or above. A stronger counter-narrative points to certain political sensitivities that conspire to keep the polluter-pays principle’s ascendancy quiet, if not entirely “silent”. In practice, however, as I argue, the principle is increasingly being recognized as delivering a positive obligation for states to act. The logical endpoint of this progressive development of the law is that every “polluter-state” is to accept that the emission of greenhouse gases in its territory must come at a cost to the state, as a matter of law. An emerging legal compulsion to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by pricing them is not to be made light of in a field that is almost devoid of substantive law. Open acceptance of the principle may help to speed up and deepen the global response to climate change.