Philosophy Of Consciousness Research Articles

‘Lotus and the Dagger’: A Reading of Vedantic Nationalism of Sri Aurobindo

Sri Aurobindo’s ideas of nationalism are eclectic, deriving their tradition from Hindu spiritualism, the vision of perfection in man as an entity, and intense esoteric realisation in the mystical philosophy of supramental consciousness of the being, as expounded in the Vedas and the Upanishads. Sri Aurobindo’s writings on political philosophy are a continuum, ranging from the utopian socialist ideas in Bande Mataram, a newspaper he edited to present the ideas of social, political, and judicial boycott to counter the British, to the writings of post-1910, when his life took a spiritual turn after years of spiritual realisations and yogic sadhana, where he mixes the power of the proletariat with the power of Vedantic mysticism. Sri Aurobindo’s ‘political vedantism’ is an attempt to restructure the political and social life of a colonised nation so that an indigenous idea of a nation can be constructed in concurrence with the Vedantic concept of society as a manifestation of a collective supremacy in man. Sri Aurobindo accepts spiritual determinism as the central principle of a nation, but at the same time, it is not a static concept to him but a constant movement of progressive self-evolution towards a perfection of the collective consciousness, manifested through the entity called the ‘nation’. This paper proposes to look at the ideas of spiritual nationalism of Sri Aurobindo and establish a dialogue with a nationalism that is neither socialist nor rightist.

In Search for Soviet Philosophy of Consciousness. A Review on: Soviet Philosophy of Mind: Etudes on History of Ideas. Ed. by A.D. Maydanskiy. Moscow: Kanon+ROOI “Reabilitatsiya”, 2023. 336 p.

In Search for Soviet Philosophy of Consciousness. A Review on: Soviet Philosophy of Mind: Etudes on History of Ideas. Ed. by A.D. Maydanskiy. Moscow: Kanon+ROOI “Reabilitatsiya”, 2023. 336 p.

Empathy, Intentionality and "Other Mind": from Phenomenology to Contemporary Versions of Naturalism

Purpose. This article discusses researching the nature and basic structure of acts of empathy. Such research first requires answering the question: are empathic acts intentional acts of our consciousness? If the answer to this question is affirmative, then there is a need to answer the following questions: what are the features of acts of empathy as intentional ones? And can such acts be qualified as opening a special and complex type of access (epistemic, social, and ethical) to "other minds"? Theoretical basis. The research is based on the problems set by the phenomenological tradition and the developed analytical philosophy, which found their continuation in the philosophy of mind. With the tendency to naturalization, representatives of these areas have another common sphere in the research of mental reality. The changes that both traditions are undergoing can be observed in the transformation of fundamental theoretical concepts such as "intentionality". The linguistic turn gives impetus to the development of new theoretical approaches to the understanding of consciousness, which give preference to the research of language rather than the research in the structure of the Self. The change in methodological guidelines is due to a few factors. In particular, this is a noticeable progress in empirical sciences and the dominance of Behaviorism guidelines in psychology, as well as the fact that the Anglo-American tradition inherits several features intrinsic to British empiricism. Today, three main directions of understanding intentionality can be distinguished. Starting from Brentano and Husserl, we have a classical theory – mental intentionality (phenomenological). As part of analytical philosophy and philosophy of language, we can talk about linguistically interpreted intentionality. Sellars’ model of intentionality has a definite linguistic component. Also, a modern version that functions in the philosophy of consciousness: attempts to naturalize intentionality (this is, for example, the research of Galen Strawson and Daniel Dennett). Originality. The problem is studied not in the context of the phenomenological or analytical traditions in their isolation, but in a problematic-conceptual way, which allows us to reach a new level of generalization and reveal the theoretical advantages of combining both traditions. Conclusions. Empathic Acts can be defined as intentional within the classical phenomenological tradition. As intentional acts, they have their specificity in that they are directed to the "other mind" and can form the basis for the research of intersubjectivity. For the analytic tradition and early philosophy of consciousness, such statements are not obvious. However, discussions about the role of corporality and the problem concerning embodied cognition are becoming increasingly common today. In such discussions, empathy, as an element in the knowledge of others and a possibility for grounding the social sciences, seems more promising than attempts to make epistemic access to other minds possible on the basis of the argument by analogy or on the basis of the inference to the best explanation.

Натуралистический поворот в современной философии: философия и нейронаука

The development of biology stimulates a naturalistic turn within the framework of philosophy, actualizes the problem of the dialogue between philosophical and scientific knowledge. In modern philosophy there is a tendency to imitate the empirical sciences. An attempt to conceptualize the empirical knowledge accumulated in modern brain sciences finds its expression within the neurophilosophy project. In classical philosophy, there was a skeptical assessment of the idea of a total reduction of the life of consciousness to the forms of motion of matter, which contributed to the preservation of dualism. The basis of modern neurobiology is the idea of the identity of physical and mental processes, the statement according to which information in our brain is encoded by the activity of neurons, neural networks. As a result, on the border of philosophy and science, corresponding ontological and epistemological programs are formed, designed to comprehend the classical philosophies of the opposition on naturalistic grounds. The author proposes an understanding of the naturalistic trend in modern epistemology, a reflection of the problem of the relationship between physical and mental processes on the example of the conceptualization of the achievements of modern neurosciences within the framework of the neurophilosophy project. The paper notes the diversity of interpretations of the concept of “neurophilosophy”, fixes the prerequisites for its occurrence, development problems and features of interpretation. In the definitions of the concept of “neurophilosophy” one can see a specific form of being of philosophy, the philosophy of neurosciences, a variant of biophilosophy, a form of the philosophy of consciousness. The paper highlights the problems that complicate the implementation of the neurophilosophy project: constant rethinking and supplementing the baggage of scientific knowledge about the brain, the lack of a unified theory of neurosciences, an interdisciplinary language, one-sided reductionism. To build neurophilosophy in the language of neuroscience means to liken it to a special scientific discipline. The project of neurophilosophy initiates, but does not offer models of a constructive dialogue between philosophy and neurosciences, reducing philosophical problems to the achievements of special scientific knowledge, which allows us to consider neurophilosophy, at this stage of its development, as a ‘scientific manifesto’, another attempt of science to do without philosophy. Against the background of the active appeal of philosophy to the special sciences, there is a need to build an empirical-ontological approach, which is based on the current achievements of the sciences, and makes it possible to bring empirical knowledge to the level of philosophical generalizations.

Cosmopsychism and the Problem of Evil

Cosmopsychism, the idea that the universe is conscious, is experiencing something of a revival as an explanation of consciousness in philosophy of mind and is also making inroads into philosophy of religion. In the latter field, it has been used to formulate models of certain forms of theism, such as pantheism and panentheism, and has also been proposed as a rival to the classical theism of the Abrahamic faiths. It has been claimed by Philip Goff that a certain form of cosmopsychism, namely agentive cosmopsychism, poses a threat to classical theism because it can explain features of the universe like fine-tuning without having to deal with the problem of evil. This is because, unlike the classical theist, the cosmopsychist can deny at least one of the divine attributes motivating the problem of evil, namely omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. In this paper, I shall consider which of the divine attributes the cosmopsychist should focus on when responding to the problem of evil and shall conclude that the rejection of omnibenevolence is the most satisfactory option.

The mind-body problem and the irrationality of the brain’s phenomenal judgements

The article gives a brief overview of the problems faced by materialism in connection with the phenomenon of consciousness. Yet new arguments help to uncover the problems of alternative positions to materialism, above all, the dualism of properties. Key arguments show that it is difficult for non-physical consciousness to perceive its own nature even when it has direct access to experience. That is due to the fact that the physical substratum of consciousness implements a self-sufficient physical intelligence. And if that intelligence ceases to conclude that consciousness is non-physical, which would be unreasonable to it, then non-physical consciousness, despite any arguments it has had, inevitably comes to the wrong conclusion for itself that it is not non-physical. It turns out that consciousness requires such a study to know its nature, which paradoxically comes to the truth only in the error of the physical intelligence, with the latter constituting the intellectual faculties by which such inquiry is made. Such a need for error is difficult to justify. Likewise, by similar logic, it is impossible to prove flawlessly the existence of non-physical consciousness. If it existed, an individual with a perfect intelligence and direct, non-physical access to consciousness would come to a corresponding anti-physicalist conclusion on its basis. But such an outcome cannot happen, since this conclusion depends on an equally perfect and error-free physical intelligence, for which it is not true. Thus, we are deprived of sufficient justification to conclude that our consciousness is non physical. At the end, a path to finding a solution to the problem of consciousness is briefly outlined, providing a way out of a situation where there is such a strong critique for all positions in the philosophy of consciousness. It is related to an exploration of the nature of our antiphysicalist ideas.

X-Phi and the challenge from ad hoc concepts

Ad hoc concepts feature prominently in lexical pragmatics. A speaker can use a word or phrase to communicate an ad hoc concept that is different from the lexically encoded concept and the hearer can construct the intended ad hoc concept pragmatically during utterance comprehension. I argue that some philosophical concepts have origins as ad hoc concepts, and such concepts pose a challenge for experimental philosophy regarding these concepts. To illustrate this, I consider philosophers’ ‘what-it’s-like’-concepts and experimental philosophy of consciousness.

The functions of consciousness in visual processing.

Conscious experiences form a relatively diverse class of psychological phenomena, supported by a range of distinct neurobiological mechanisms. This diversity suggests that consciousness occupies a variety of different functional roles across different task domains, individuals, and species; a position I call functional pluralism. In this paper, I begin to tease out some of the functional contributions that consciousness makes to (human) visual processing. Consolidating research from across the cognitive sciences, I discuss semantic and spatiotemporal processing as specific points of comparison between the functional capabilities of the visual system in the presence and absence of conscious awareness. I argue that consciousness contributes a cluster of functions to visual processing; facilitating, among other things, (i) increased capacities for semantically processing informationally complex visual stimuli, (ii) increased spatiotemporal precision, and (iii) increased capacities for representational integration over large spatiotemporal intervals. This sort of analysis should ultimately yield a plurality of functional markers that can be used to guide future research in the philosophy and science of consciousness, some of which are not captured by popular theoretical frameworks like global workspace theory and information integration theory.

Philosophy of consciousness and AI: some problems of their interaction

Philosophy of consciousness and AI: some problems of their interaction

О структуре рефлективного философского зна­ния

The author draws a distinction between the reflective (epistemic) tradition of philosophiz­ing and the value philosophy, which perceives the world correlating it with the needs and interests of people as well as viewing it through the prism of the man’s value preferences. The author derives this distinction from the difference between denotative judgments about being and prescriptive judgments about the proper. These two types of judgments are claimed to be related but not reducible to each other and not derived from one an­other. The author defends the right of a refleсtive philosophy to speak in the language of verifiable judgments of truth, while opposing the position of cognitive imperialism, which absolutizes the truth and turns it into the substance of the human spirit. The author treats the anthropological and gnoseological interpretations of the reflective philosophy, which limit its subject to the analysis of the man in his praxiological, axiological and gnoseological relation to the world, as insufficient. The article defends the now unfash­ionable substantive understanding of philosophy, according to which its object is not the man, but the world surrounding and embracing us, and its subject is the possible unity of the world considered in the aspects of its integrative wholeness and taxonomic univer­sality. An integrative approach that looks for substantive distinctions and connections be­tween the subsystems of the world, is carried out by natural philosophy, social philoso­phy, and philosophy of consciousness. Philosophical ontology has a different objective. It begins with the axiomatic problem of the existence of the world, the relation between the real and the ideal, and proceeds to verifiable judgments about the referential relations between the various "realms of being”. The world is considered by the discipline of on­tology in a conceptual projection “the separate – the singular – the particular – the univer­sal”, which is different from a conceptual projection “the whole – the part”. The author argues for the importance of the ontological problematics, which is of great methodologi­cal importance for non-philosophical (first of all, social and humanitarian) sciences.

Making an Effort to Find out the Laws of the Historical Existence Field

The philosophical consciousness, aiming to attain universal knowledge, not only contemplates the meaning and value of the laws prevalent in nature but also dedicates time to the realm of historical and cultural existence shaped by specific events. Many philosophers have been primarily concerned with exploring the laws governing the field of cultural and social existence, where humans humanize themselves as social beings. Ibn Khaldun, a distinguished thinker, has made significant contributions to the field of humanities, particularly in the philosophy and science of history, approaching it with a perspective closely aligned with modern scientific understanding. Ibn Khaldun proposed original ideas on the methodologies of historical and social sciences, suggesting that laws similar to those in natural sciences can be discovered in history and social sciences. He delves into the merits of historiography, appreciates its various methods, and highlights historians' errors. Moreover, Ibn Khaldun, who presents an original metaphysics of history, initially endeavors to establish the fundamental principles that transform history into a scientific discipline encompassing social and political events. As one of the few thinkers to approach the realm of historical existence with philosophical interest, Ibn Khaldun adopts a rational and critical approach. Within this framework, he introduces a social and historical theory, referred to as "umran," to elucidate events within the domain of social and political existence. This article aims to shed light on Ibn Khaldun's unique perspective on the realm of historical and social existence and contribute to the ongoing discussions concerning this field.

Новые подходы в постановке и решениях проблемы сознания

Background. In scientific and theoretical terms, the theme of consciousness as a subject of psychological research is regularly updated. Since psychology established its scientific status, at each historical transition from one economic structure to another, general scientific knowledge has been updated. At the same time, the central issue of consciousness is being permanently changed: from methodological issues (introspection) to structural-functional and objectified knowledge (analytical philosophy of consciousness, cognitive science, neuroscience). In this process, the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” comes to the fore today (D. Chalmers, А. Revonsuo). Objective. The article seeks to outline the necessity for and explain new methodological approaches to the formulation of and conceptual solution to the problem of consciousness (G. Akopov), moving from the contexts of interdisciplinary discourse to psychological discourse. Methods. On the basis of previous author's reviews and research (G. Akopov) on the problems of consciousness, a certain range of philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological definitions and theories of consciousness is presented. The collected material, but for all its limitations in comparison with the hard-to-observe set of ideas, approaches and concepts that exist today in modern English-language literature on the problems of consciousness, allows us to identify a number of key points in an excessively multiple picture, more or less logically compatible. The typological approach we proposed in 2015 (an expanded version in 2021) allows us to streamline the entire set of ideas about consciousness. In accordance with the typology on the identification criterion, the concept of categories and categorical spaces of consciousness in various dimensions is specified. Results. A new methodology in the formulation and solution of the problem of consciousness has been formalized: categorical and typological approaches. The possibility of constructing categorical systems of various dimensions based on the typological identification of consciousness is demonstrated. The communicative nature of consciousness, implicitly represented in certain definitions of consciousness, is shown on the material of a number of existing approaches to identifying consciousness. Conclusion. Typological and categorical approaches make it possible to streamline and systematize the existing set of statements and solutions to the problem of consciousness. The relevant system of categorical spaces of various dimensions defines new opportunities for promising research, amplified by the thesis about the existence of non-verbal languages of consciousness in the socio-communicative, interpersonal and intrapersonal communicative dimensions. The new methodology, coupled with instrumental developments, makes it possible to pose and solve the topical problem of diversity and unity in human consciousness.

Mapping the notions of the self and the world in the works of Henri Bergson and Nishida Kitarō

Few questions have been discussed more frequently throughout the history of philosophy and across cultures as what it means to realize the self and the world. From the long history of philosophers in both Western and Eastern traditions, there are two figures who notably stand out for their intuitive philosophies of consciousness to grasp the ultimate meaning of the self and the world — Henri Bergson and Nishida Kitarō. Both Bergson and Nishida used the intuitive method which resolutely oriented their philosophies towards the understanding of a unified whole. In this article, I will explore the similarities and points of difference in Bergson and Nishida’s philosophical projects in their attempts to explain the self’s connection with the world. Furthermore, I aim to establish a global history of Bergsonism which shares affinities with the Eastern traditions of thought and religious experience. The notions of duration and absolute nothingness, which Bergson and Nishida both used to express diverse perspectives on the nature of the self and the world, are presented to show how similar their stances are to one another even if the two conceptions have significant differences.

J. Savulescu's "The God Machine" as a Moral Agent and the Problem of Responsibility

This article is devoted to the issue of moral responsibility in connection with artificial intelligence technologies. In recent years, artificial intelligence has been actively developing towards greater autonomy, which makes the philosophical analysis of artificial moral agency extremely relevant. The relevance of the work is also determined by the increasing spread of artificial intelligence in professional areas, including those related to the adoption of responsible managerial, financial, etc. solutions. The main object of research in the article is a thought experiment — the project of the so-called “The God Machine” by the Western philosopher J. Savulescu, which allows us to turn to such an important aspect as the possibility of the influence of artificial intelligence on the development of human moral consciousness, since modern technologies, along with projects of biological moral human enhancement, claim the ability to create artificial moral agents. The authors give a comprehensive analysis of this project, correlating it with other concepts of modern analytical philosophy of consciousness, incl. Н. Frankfurt. The theoretical focus of the study is directed to the concepts of responsibility and freedom as key in formulating the criteria of moral agency. At the same time, the article considers the features of the implementation of the criteria of moral agency in relation to artificial intelligence. The article assesses the viability of J. Savulescu's project, in particular: to what extent artificial intelligence like the The God Machine can be considered as a moral agent, whether a person can acquire the characteristics of a moral, responsible and free person with the help of such an artificial mediator, and to what extent such projects contribute to the moral enhancement of mankind. It also points to the risks of paternalistic interference in the development of morality. Separately, the phenomenon of moral dilemmas is considered in connection with the problems of embedding artificial intelligence in the life of modern society, as well as the logical aspects of decision-making in the context of moral conflicts. The conclusion is formulated about the key importance of the category of responsibility for modeling the relationship between man and artificial intelligence in machine ethics.

«Детекторы реальности» и семантические парадоксы: научная рациональность на языке понятий системно-коммуникативной теории

The problem of the “experimenter’s regress” is widely discussed in the modern philosophy of science [Collins 1985]. However, it allows generalization and can be presented as a theoretical-cognitive paradox, as a philosophical-linguistic problem of reference and as a problem of philosophy of consciousness. The reli­ability of the functioning of “reality detectors” of any kind (devices, sensual abilities, theories, language statements or mental acts) is confirmed empiri­cally if they discover new objects and adequately describe their characteristics (in the format of measurement data, sensual qualities, scientific facts, referents of words and concepts). The properties of the observed reality discovered with their help, obviously, act as a rational criterion for the choice of observational in­struments or “reality detectors”. But after all, the criterion of rational selection (evaluation, recognition) of the results of observation from the array of all re­ceived data is the application of the best (more powerful, effective, reliable, and receptive) detectors of reality. This paradox of self-referral is also applicable to researchers themselves: the reputation of a scientist acts as a criterion for the se­lection of his research results (including acceptance of his publications in leading editions, etc.), and the research results obtained obviously determine his reputa­tion. Based on the systemic-communicative approach, the authors argue that sci­entific rationality does not contradict, but is based on the self-referential charac­ter of scientific communication.

Philosophy in the Focus of Russian Philosophical Consciousness: Some Aspects of Historiographical Discourse (Mid XIX - Early XX Century)

Philosophy in the Focus of Russian Philosophical Consciousness: Some Aspects of Historiographical Discourse (Mid XIX - Early XX Century)

Georg Northoff's Neurophilosophical Approach

When trying to give a universal definition to the term “neurophilosophy,” difficulties arise, since each researcher who identifies himself as a member of this field sets his own definition. The common thing for the work of “neurophilosophers” can be described as an interdisciplinary approach, which takes into account the achievements in the field of consciousness research of both philosophical thought and neuroscience. How this approach is implemented and what it represents depends on the particular researcher. This article focuses on Georg Northoff's neurophilosophical approach. For a long time Northoff has been developing a project of neurophilosophy, the distinguishing feature of which is its nonreductive nature: Northoff does not reduce consciousness to the brain but develops a special method that allows philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience to investigate the problems of consciousness and the brain in an integrated way. The article discusses the philosophical foundations of brain research that Nortoff provides, as well as the role of process ontology for the study of consciousness and the brain. In addition, the empirical studies of brain activity with which Northoff illustrates his philosophical claims are presented. The paper also identifies the philosophical significance of the brain-body-environment connection for the emergence of the processual self in Northoff's theory. At the same time, Northoff does not engage in a search for a solution to the consciousness-brain problem and, in particular, the hard problem of consciousness. Instead, he seeks to question and dissolve the problem while questioning its premises. Northoff argues that philosophers of consciousness refer to studies of particular areas and aspects of the brain to construct their theories, whereas to solve the problems of consciousness it is necessary to consider the brain holistically, as represented in neuroscientific research.

Philosophy and Science on the Way to Knowing and Making Consciousness

The latest progress in empirical studies of consciousness and spectacular advances in AI technologies kick philosophy out of the familiar comfort of uncontrolled proliferation of concepts and scholastic disputes. In the overview of the current state of empirical theories of consciousness, author reveals that those theories still find themselves in the pre-paradigmatic stage, therefore not yet posing an immediate existential threat to the philosophy of consciousness, though making it watch out. Author attempts to deal with the certain ambiguity of the term ‘consciousness’, stripping its meaning from parts already susceptible to science and technology and from parts still highly unlikely to be explained away. Besides, the relationship between philosophy and science is specified in general by analyzing them to their inner dynamics of theories and ontologies, showing that for science, the distinction between the two is substantially more important than for philosophy. From this perspective, philosophical schemas of consciousness claiming to be ‘experiential’ must have met recently formulated criteria for empirical theories of consciousness, otherwise failing to explain anything in the domain. Finally, author adds his pragmatic criterion that addresses the technological perspectives a theory provides. In the end, a winning competitive theory will have to let us produce and control artificial conscious devices.

The phenomenology of autobiographical retrieval.

In this article we review the literature on the phenomenology of retrieval from the personal past, and propose a framework for understanding how epistemic feelings and metacognitive reflections guide the retrieval of representations of past events in the Self Memory System. Our focus is on an overlooked aspect of autobiographical memory, the phenomenology of the retrieval process, as opposed to the products of retrieval themselves. As we argue in the present paper, this is not some magical collection of phenomena, but centers on the feeling of familiarity derived from retrieval fluency during the process of retrieval. The relationship between retrieval fluency and retrieved content, interpreted metacognitively is what gives autobiographical retrieval its particular phenomenological "flavor." To illustrate our point, we focus on two phenomena that only recently were considered alongside each other: the déjà vu experience and involuntary autobiographical memories. Our proposal is that the feeling of familiarity (i.e., this reminds me of something) for the personal past acts to guide deliberate, conscious memory search. We argue that the critical concept in the phenomenology of retrieval is fluency-how readily information comes to mind. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Memory Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Knowledge and Belief.

Istoriko-filosofskaya logika sochinenij po sovremennoj istorii literatury i iskusstva Kitaya

After the Th ird Plenum of the XI convocation of the Central Committ ee was held in 1978, China embarked on the path of reform and openness. Literature and art have become a symbol of a new era. Th e sphere of active research of scientists has become the question of how to describe what is happening at the present stage of the development of literature and art. Gradually, a new historical approach, diff erent fr om the traditional one, was formed, and a historical and philosophical consciousness, not characteristic of the previous time, was formed.