Philosophy Of Biology Research Articles

The evolution of altruism and the units of selection problem

In this paper, I will address one of the main issues in the philosophy of biology: the evolution of altruism and cooperation and the related problem of the units of selection. Starting from the so-called paradox of altruism, I will critically examine standard evolutionary models for the resolution of that paradox, and the explanation of altruism. I review and assess the following models of selection: the traditional model of group selection, gene?s eye view, kin selection, direct reciprocity (reciprocal altruism), indirect reciprocity, and the updated version of group selection, namely Sober and Wilson?s model of multilevel selection. In the final section, I will try to explain why is the dismissal of multilevel selection based on its explanatory complexity so common, and why inclusive fitness theory and direct reciprocity are generally sufficient to explain a good part of biological phenomena related to altruism and cooperation.

Ernst Mayr’s Critique of Thomas Kuhn

In the early 1960s, American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn contributed to a “crisis of rationality” with his hypothesis that science develops by means of paradigm shifts. He challenged the positivist concept of cumulative and continuous scientific progress. According to Kuhn, the relation between two succeeding scientific traditions ‘separated by a scientific revolution’ is characterized by conceptual incommensurability that constrains the interpretation of science as a cumulative, steadily progressing enterprise. Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy was heavily criticized by German-American biologist Ernst Mayr as unapplicable to the history of biology. Mayr, one of the most outstanding evolutionary biologists of the 20th century and a “co-architect” of the so-called Modern Synthesis (contemporary Darwinism), published extensively on the history and philosophy of biology as he thought that theoretical biology cannot progress without proper philosophy of science. Being convinced of the progressive development of Darwinism, Mayr pointed out that Kuhn’s concept of scientific revolutions does not reflect conceptual changes in evolutionary biology. Here we summarize Mayr’s critiques of Kuhn and, based on our own research, take Mayr’s side in the controversy between two great thinkers.

Kinmaking, progeneration, and ethnography

Philosophers of biology and biologists themselves for the most part assume that the concept of kin is progenerative: what makes two individuals kin is a direct or indirect function of reproduction. Derivatively, kinship might likewise be presumed to be progenerative in nature. Yet a prominent view of kinship in contemporary cultural anthropology is a kind of constructivism or performativism that rejects such progenerativist views. This paper critically examines an influential line of thinking used to critique progenerativism and support performativism that cites cross-cultural diversity in what I will call kinmaking. I challenge several key assumptions made in moving from this appeal to ethnography to conclusions about kinship and progeneration, arguing that closer scrutiny of both the ethnographic record and inferences that draw on it in fact support progenerative views of kinmaking.

On the Nature of Organs and Organ Systems – A Chapter in the History and Philosophy of Biology

Contrasting definitions of organs based either on function or on strictly morphological criteria are the legacy of a tradition starting with Aristotle. This floating characterization of organs in terms of both form and function extends also to organ systems. The first section of this review outlines the notions of organ and body part as defined, explicitly or implicitly, in representative works of nineteenth century’s comparative morphology. The lack of a clear distinction between the two notions led to problems in Owen’s approach to the comparative method (definition of homolog vs. nature of the vertebrate archetype) and to a paradoxical formulation, by Anton Dohrn, of the principle of functional change. Starting from the second half of the twentieth century, with the extensive use of morphological data in phylogenetic analyses, both terms – organ and body part – have been often set aside, to leave room for a comparison between variously characterized attributes (character states) of the taxa to be compared. Throughout the last two centuries, there have been also efforts to characterize organs or body parts in terms of the underlying developmental dynamics, both in the context of classical descriptive embryology and according to models suggested by developmental genetics. Functionally defined organ are occasionally co-extensive with morphologically defined body parts, nevertheless a clear distinction between the former and the latter is a necessary prerequisite to a study of their evolution: this issue is discussed here on the example of the evolution of hermaphroditism and gonad structure and function.

Causal Analysis in Some Topics of Philosophy of Biology

Causal Analysis in Some Topics of Philosophy of Biology

RESEARCH OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF BIOLOGY IN THE KYIV WORLDVIEW AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE XX CENTURY

The article is devoted to the study of the phenomenon of the the Kyiv worldview and epistemological philosophical school within which the research of philosophical problems of biology in the second half of the XX century took place. The history of the Kyiv School of Philosophy of Biology was reconstructed, the directions and problems of scientific research carried out in Soviet Ukraine in the second half of the XX century were analyzed by representatives of the Ukrainian scientific community from the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences and Kyiv University. It is established that scientists of the Kyiv School of Philosophy of Biology, on the basis of materialist dialectics, studied evolutionary methods in biology and general methods of natural science, paid attention to the correct understanding of specific features of biological methods of living nature research and correlation with methods of other sciences. in science. This study is aimed at popularizing and disseminating the achievements of the Ukrainian philosophical heritage, their modern scientific vision for further modernization of scientific research and training of specialists in the fields of philosophy, social sciences, humanities and natural sciences.

Chapitre 10. Le normativisme pour la vertébrothérapie japonaise

According to Michel Foucault, French philosophy can be divided into two categories, one, the philosophy of consciousness, the other that of the concept. This dichotomy is linked to the terminology of Jean Cavaillès in his work entitled "On the logic and the theory of science". (Cavaillès J, PUF, 1947). In France, as this, there is a long tradition of epistemology whose project is to retrace the history of science by continuing the development of concepts that animate it and by analyzing their evolution. This tradition has long been interested in philosophy of medicine and biology. Its most important representative in this domain is Georges Canguilhem whose influence has spread widely. In this article, we will focus on one of the most representative of Canguilhem: «The normal and the pathological». (Canguilhem G, PUF, 1966). The reading of Canguilhem that we will propose here, focusing on some key concepts of his book, highlights in this author three fundamental points: the impossibility of objectivable pathology, the central role of individuality and the preeminence of normativism. We are aware of limits of this reading, which cannot fundamentally explore all of Canguilhem's thought or the tradition of French vitalism. On the other hand, it should help us in our effort, in terms of building an epistemology of vertebrotherapy, by carefully analyzing Canguilhem's work and the notebooks of a great Japanese vertebrotherapist in Shōwa's time, Fujimori Sr.

The genetic informational network: how DNA conveys semantic information.

The question of whether "genetic information" is a merely causal factor in development or can be made sense of semantically, in a way analogous to a language or other type of representation, has generated a long debate in the philosophy of biology. It is intimately connected with another intense debate, concerning the limits of genetic determinism. In this paper I argue that widespread attempts to draw analogies between genetic information and information contained in books, blueprints or computer programs, are fundamentally inadequate. In development, gene exons are the central part of an intricate and densely ramified semantic Genetic Informational Network. DNA in the entire genome is in a state of continuous positive and negative feedback with itself and with its 'environment', and is 'read' and acted upon by the cell in various alternative and complementary ways. The linear combinatorial coding relation between codons and amino acids is but one aspect of semantic genetic information, which is, when considered in its entirety, a far wider and richer concept.

Theology, philosophy of biology and virology: An interdisciplinary conversation in the time of COVID-19

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) moment has stimulated multiple intellectual attempts to make sense of the pandemic. The complexity of the challenge obviously requires an interdisciplinary approach. The specific problem explored in the article is the question whether a dialogue between Virology and Philosophy of Biology on the one hand and theology on the other may open new possibilities for understanding the very nature of reality. The point of departure is that the interdisciplinary conversation is a practice of negotiation and not of addition. New developments in Virology are narrated and the conventional association of viruses as mere pathogens is countered with an appreciation of their age, abundance and evolutionary impact. The discipline of Philosophy of Biology is included in the conversation to underline the metaphysical consequences of thinking about viruses. In the theology of creation, interpretations which resist equating viruses merely as natural evil are narrated. The central proposal of the article, transpiring from the conversation, identifies the notion of equivocity as fundamental description of reality. This ontological insight may do justice to contemporary Virology and to the sense of Mystery in theology and the Christian doctrine of creation.Intradisciplinary and/or interdisciplinary implications: The article is an explicit attempt to engage two disciplines of the natural science – Virology and Philosophy of Biology, and theology. Contemporary developments in the state of scholarship of these disciplines are mentioned. A basis in ontology is proposed for the conversation, and a central insight transpiring from the disciplines is suggested – that of equivocity. An interdisciplinary conversation may give rise to a more nuanced insight into the nature of reality.

The Place of Human Beings in the Natural Environment - Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology and the Dominant Anthropocentric Reading of Genesis

In a seminal essay from 1967, historian Lynn White, Jr., argues that the profound cause of today’s environmental crisis is the anthropocentric perspective, embedded in the Christian “roots” of Western tradition, which assigns an intrinsic value to human beings solely. Though White’s thesis relies on a specific tradition – the so-called “dominant anthropocentric reading” of Genesis – the idea that anthropocentrism provides the ideological basis for the exploitation of nature has proven tenacious, and even today is the ground assumption of the historical and philosophical debate on environmental issues. This paper investigates the possible impact on this debate of a different kind of anthropocentrism: Aristotle’s philosophy of biology. The topic is controversial, since it involves opposing traditions of interpretations; for the purpose of the present paper, the dominant anthropocentric reading of Gen. 1.28 will be analyzed, and the relevant passages from Aristotle’s De Partibus Animalium, showing his commitment to a more sophisticated anthropocentric perspective, will be reviewed.

The End of Factory Farming

The End of Factory Farming

How Did Philosophy of Science Come About?

Recent research has brought to light numerous facts that go against received views of the development of philosophy of science. One encounters several concepts, claims, or projects much earlier than is generally acknowledged. Auguste Comte was careful to distinguish each major science with respect to method and object, speaking of mathematical philosophy, biological philosophy, sociological philosophy, and so forth. He thereby in a sense anticipated the regionalist turn: philosophical analysis should be carried out with respect to a specific body of knowledge. He also adopted a general perspective, a scientific philosophy. In the light of new discoveries, later thinkers such as Pierre Duhem, Gaston Milhaud, and Abel Rey endeavored to reformulate Comte’s doctrine as a neopositivism, a logical positivism, or an absolute positivism. The aim of this article is to examine the constitutive concepts mentioned and the controversies that hinge on them, in an effort to reach a precise understanding of the aim, scope, and import of philosophy of science in the context of nineteenth-century France.

OPEN ACCESS, THE HUMANITIES, AND CONTEMPLATION THROUGH SCIENCE

OPEN ACCESS, THE HUMANITIES, AND CONTEMPLATION THROUGH SCIENCE

Between mechanical clocks and emergent flocks: complexities in biology

Even though complexity is a concept that is ubiquitously used by biologists and philosophers of biology, it is rarely made precise. I argue that a clarification of the concept is neither trivial nor unachievable, and I propose a unifying framework based on the technical notion of “effective complexity” that allows me to do justice to conflicting intuitions about biological complexity, while taking into account several distinctions in the usage of the concept that are often overlooked. In particular, I propose a distinction between two kinds of complexity, “mechanical” and “emergent”, which can be understood as different ways of relating the effective complexity of mechanisms and of behaviors in biological explanations. I illustrate the adequacy of this framework by discussing different attempts to understand intracellular organization in terms of pathways and networks. My framework provides a different way of thinking about recent philosophical debates, for example, on the difference between mechanistic and topological explanations and about the concept of emergence. Moreover, it can contribute to a proper assessment of metascientific arguments that invoke biological complexity.

What is Causal Specificity About, and What is it Good for in Philosophy of Biology?

The concept of causal specificity is drawing considerable attention from philosophers of biology. It became the rationale for rejecting (and occasionally, accepting) a thesis of causal parity of developmental factors. This literature assumes that attributing specificity to causal relations is at least in principle a straightforward (if not systematic) task. However, the parity debate in philosophy of biology seems to be stuck at a point where it is not the biological details that will help move forward. In this paper, I take a step back to reexamine the very idea of causal specificity and its intended role in the parity dispute in philosophy of biology. I contend that the idea of causal specificity across variations as currently discussed in the literature is irreducibly twofold in nature: it is about two independent components that are not mutually entailed. I show this to be the source of prior complications with the notion of specificity itself that ultimately affect the purposes for which it is often invoked, notably to settle the parity dispute.

Are Organisms Substances or Processes?

ABSTRACT I argue that attempts in the philosophy of biology to show that organisms are processes, rather than substances, fail. Despite what process ontologists have said, substance ontology is perfectly able to accommodate the dynamic nature of organisms, their ecological dependence, and their vague boundaries, and their criticisms are directed not at substance ontology simpliciter, but only at specific (perhaps untenable) characterisations of substances. The paper ends by considering what a processual philosophy of biology that is radically in conflict with an ontology of substances might look like.

What Is It Like to Be a Dolphin? Echolocation and Subjectivity in Video Games

Echolocation is a rare ability of some bats, dolphins, and humans with reduced sightedness or visual impairment. Often visualized as a type of auditory sight, echolocation has no true analog for sighted humans without the ability, resulting in a wide range of interpretations when game designers attempt to capture this subjective experience. Video games have depicted echolocation with varying degrees of fidelity and realism, from musical scales and maps to fully realized three-dimensional worlds. This variety may be attributed in part to the inaccessible experience of the echolocating subjects. Designers must rely on their own subjective experiences to create a mental image of this ability. Synthesizing aspects of acoustic and biological sciences, philosophy, and disability studies, this article examines depictions of echolocation in video games, demonstrating that games require players to incorporate their own experiences in order to bridge the “explanatory gap” between the subjective experiences of visually impaired characters and knowledge of the objective processes of echolocation that are accessible to sighted players. With examples from Ecco the Dolphin (1992) and Perception (2017), this article will show that designers support their echolocation mechanics with narrative and supplementary information rather than actualizing the experience with gameplay.

Foucault’s 1960s Lectures on Sexuality

In this extended review essay we discuss the lectures on sexuality which Foucault delivered in the 1960s, published in a single volume in 2018. The first part of the volume comprises five lectures given at the University of Clermont-Ferrand in 1964 to psychology students. The second part is Foucault’s course ‘The Discourse of Sexuality’, given at the experimental University of Vincennes in 1969 in the philosophy department. We explore both the themes of the lectures, and the important editorial materials provided by Claude-Olivier Doron which situate these themes in relation to recent developments in the history and philosophy of biology, gender and sexuality. These lectures provide some important and surprising additions to Foucault’s more familiar interest in sexuality, with discussion of plant and animal biology, sex differentiation, the question of sexual behaviour, perversion and infantile sexuality.

Misconceptions, conceptual pluralism, and conceptual toolkits: bringing the philosophy of science to the teaching of evolution

This paper explores how work in the philosophy of science can be used when teaching scientific content to science students and when training future science teachers. I examine the debate on the concept of fitness in biology and in the philosophy of biology to show how conceptual pluralism constitutes a problem for the conceptual change model, and how philosophical work on conceptual clarification can be used to address that problem. The case of fitness exemplifies how the philosophy of science offers tools to resolve teaching difficulties and make the teaching of scientific concepts more adequate to the actual state of affairs in science.

DE DARWIN AO SÉCULO XXI: UMA BREVE REVISÃO DA JORNADA HISTÓRICO-EPISTEMOLÓGICA DAS IDEIAS SOBRE EVOLUÇÃO

Theories about the changes on the organisms, in the time scale, are know since the 18th century. However, the most famous, as well as the more debated, was the one by Charles Robert Darwin, in his great book On the origin of species (1859). It is interesting to note that while this naturalist was born, in 1809, a book by the French naturalist Jean Baptiste Antoine Pierre de Monet, known as Lamarck, was published, Philosophie zoologique, where another theory of the transformations of the organisms were also proposed. Darwin cited that theory quite enthusiastically, as he himself said in the On the origin; his first scientific work were, in fact, inspired in Lamarck, his theory of inheritance, in another of his books, Variation of animals and plants under domestication (1868), was basically lamarckian, particularly related to the inheritance of acquired characters. And, “from so simple beginning”, as Darwin expressed in the last lines of The origin, the “theory of species transmutations”, as he called at first his theory, was changed in the following years, until achieving the hegemonic theory of the XXth century, called The Evolutionary Synthesis. Is this journey that will be presented here, culminating with a contemporary proposal, in 2010, called The Extended Evolutionary Synthesis which is still being confronted with the former theory. Keywords: Biological evolution. Processes of evolution. Genetics. History and philosophy of biology.