AbstractFor many years Simone Weil and Ludwig Wittgenstein have been placed side by side. Little of that work has tried to explicitly compare the two. Direct comparisons can, however, be made between Weil and Wittgenstein, which can show that the ways they approached philosophy shared numerous traits and ideas. Both thinkers rejected philosophical systems, both admitted that serious philosophical work did not try to reject all contradictions internal to it, and, in fact, both sought to make facing contradictions and seeming contradictions central to their method. Both wrote of the world with a sense of mystery that surrounds human life, a sense of transcendent good. Both engaged the problems with talking about such a good that cannot be neatly fit into language. Both also saw the task of philosophy as one concerned with meaning. Both also saw philosophy as a matter of “work on oneself.” This essay will examine what it means to say that philosophy is a matter of work on oneself. To do so, I want to examine primarily two essays, one from each philosopher, essays which bear remarkable similarity to each other in the sort of problem they deal with.They are section xi of Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment, and Weil's “Essay on the Concept of Reading.”
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