Philosophical Skepticism Research Articles

Suspension of Judgment as a Doxastic Default

Abstract In Outlines of Skeptical-Dogmatism, Mark Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism about philosophical views—i.e., he argues that we should disbelieve most philosophical views. Walker argues for Skeptical-Dogmatism over both Dogmatism and Skepticism. In response, I defend Skepticism—i.e., the view that we should neither believe nor disbelieve most philosophical views. I argue that Walker’s arguments overlook some of the most plausible forms of philosophical Skepticism where the Skeptic suspends judgment about most disputed philosophical views without assigning a credence of 0.5 to those views. In doing so, I argue that suspension of judgment is the default justified doxastic attitude—i.e., the doxastic attitude one is epistemically justified in adopting absent any reason to do otherwise. I also champion Skepticism by offering modified versions of some of Walker’s thought experiments, posing challenges for Skeptical-Dogmatism, and arguing that Skepticism and Skeptical-Dogmatism share some common benefits.

Ring Composition and the Skepticism of the De Republica

Abstract The fragmentary state of Cicero’s De Republica makes it difficult to see how it is a unified work. In this article, I argue that Cicero uses ring composition to unify the dialogue as a polemic against the Epicurean prohibition on political involvement. Cicero is following Plato in his use of ring composition, and just as Plato uses ring composition in the Republic to express his views about philosophical method, so does Cicero. Ring composition turns out to be central to a plausible skeptical reading of the De Republica, in which Cicero both tries to induce suspension of belief in the Epicurean prohibition on political involvement, as well as prevent the reader from unreflectively adopting his own provisionally held views, both consistent with his commitment to the pedagogical aims of Academic skeptical philosophy.

Remarks on Ángel Pinillos’ Treatment of Global Skepticism in Why We Doubt

Abstract Ángel Pinillos’ Why We Doubt offers an error theory for at least some versions of global skepticism: skeptical doubts are based on a faulty heuristic. Once this heuristic is replaced by a more apt principle inspired by Bayesian approaches to epistemology, the skeptical doubts are shown not to be motivated. I argue contra Pinillos that skeptical doubts may remain even if we grant the main line of Pinillos’ argument. Skeptical doubts might be generated by disagreement even when we accept Pinillos’ Bayesian inspired principle.

Navigating Skepticism: Cognitive Insights and Bayesian Rationality in Pinillos’ Why We Doubt

Abstract Pinillos’ Why We Doubt presents a powerful critique of such global skeptical assertions as “I don’t know I am not a brain-in-a-vat (biv)” by introducing a cognitive mechanism that is sensitive to error possibilities and a Bayesian rule of rationality that this mechanism is designed to approximate. This multifaceted argument offers a novel counter to global skepticism, contending that our basis for believing such premises is underminable. In this work, we engage with Pinillos’ adoption of Bayesianism, questioning whether the Bayesian principle that he invokes truly does fail to generate the verdict that we don’t we aren’t biv s, contrary to what Pinillos asserts. Furthermore, we argue that Pinillos’ empirical argument is not empirical enough; we need a lot more empirical work if we are going to counter global skepticism and win over neutral bystanders.

X-Phi within its proper bounds

ABSTRACT Using two decades worth of experimental philosophy (aka x-phi), Edouard Machery argues in Philosophy within its Proper Bounds (2017) that philosophers’ use of the “method of cases” is unreliable because it has a strong tendency to elicit different intuitive responses from non-philosophers. And because, as Machery argues, appealing to such cases is usually the only way for philosophers to acquire the kind of knowledge they seek, an extensive philosophical skepticism follows. I argue that Machery’s “Unreliability” argument fails because, once its premises are percisified, they are either self-defeating or without justification. This is a significant result because Machery’s arguments are the most widely cited and discussed x-phi arguments for philosophical skepticism and many hold that Machery provides the most empirically informed, convincing, and thus best case for this kind of skepticism. So, if my arguments are sound, then the best x-phi argument for philosophical skepticism fails. I further argue that this result provides strong reason to believe the more general conclusion that “negative” x-phi is likely doomed: x-phi likely can never support a substantive philosophical skepticism. Ultimately, I argue for the broad conclusion that all empirically minded arguments for philosophical skepticism are likely to fail for the same reasons that Machery’s does, i.e. they are (likely) self-defeating.

Foucher’s Old-school Skepticism: Representation, Resemblance, and the Causal Likeness Principle

Abstract Commentators generally agree that Foucher presumes the resemblance theory of representation and uses it to substantiate external world skepticism. In this paper, I challenge this picture. First, I argue that he does not assume that representation is reducible to, or even just works through, resemblance between representation and object. Indeed, his functional-similarity theory primarily appeals to resemblance between the respective effects the representation and the object (would) have on our minds. I also propose that his argument for the resemblance-requirement of representation depends on the causal likeness principle, and clarify its role in Foucher’s theory. Second, I show that his main interest lies with representation in the sense of truthfully making the object present. Accordingly, when Foucher concludes that we can only represent our own ideas, he merely means that our ideas reveal the ways objects affect us through our senses, as opposed to how they are in themselves.

Philosophical Scepticism and Western Medieval Theology. Roger Bacon: “The First True Scientist”

The main aim of this paper is to provide evidence for the inclusion of ancient philosophical scepticism in Christian theological discourse. The context is the environment of 13th-century Western Christianity, more specifically, one of its leading representatives, the theologian Roger Bacon. The study will be structured in three main parts, except for the introductory argument and conclusions. The first part will contain biographical and ideological notes on this author, the second will record the elements of scepticism likely to be taken up by Bacon’s vision, and the last part will show the specific presence of these elements in Western theologian thinking.

Capitalism as “the best of all possible worlds”: a marxist critique of Boaventura de Sousa Santos' postmodern political thought

The general aim of this work is to critically analyse certain conceptions and political positions of Boaventura de Sousa Santos on the problems of Western modernity and postmodernity. For the Portuguese sociologist, Western modernity is going through an unprecedented crisis of civilisation that can be identified through three fundamental dimensions: the epistemological dimension (the problem of Western scientific knowledge), the theoretical dimension (the problem of the Marxist theory of social emancipation) and the political dimension (the problems of the liberal social contract, social fascism and the disunity of left-wing forces). Postmodernity, however, represents the possibilities and opportunities for overcoming that crisis in view of the epistemological (the ecology of knowledge), theoretical (the new emancipatory political culture) and political (high-intensity democracy) renewals that are underway. The main hypothesis to be presented is that Boaventura Santos' political conceptions and positions – in parallel with his limited understanding of Marxism, the main interlocutor and target of his often mistaken criticism – correspond to the postmodern ideology, which can be characterised, according to Marxism, by epistemological scepticism, contempt for history and political defeatism. In this vein, the theoretical framework adopted here necessarily comes from Marxism, understood, according to Michael Löwy, as a social worldview, that is, an organic, articulated and structured set of values, representations, ideas and cognitive orientations about man in his relationship with nature, society and history, internally unified by a determined perspective and a certain socially conditioned point of view.

Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers

Abstract In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.

Philosophy Through Computation

We explore the possibility of teaching philosophy through the teaching of computer programming. It is pedagogically useful to use programming because it is extremely popular (especially due to the recent breakthroughs in machine learning), and it can provide a novel, interesting, and clear introduction to a variety of classic philosophical issues. We discuss two examples. The first is using programming to solve digital image manipulation tasks as a way of introducing and clarifying debates over external world skepticism. The second is programming a simulation of a simple 2-D cellular automaton as a way of introducing and clarifying debates over determinism and free will.

Systematicity and Skepticism

Abstract The fact that philosophy is systematic—that philosophical issues are thoroughly interconnected—was a commonplace among nineteenth century idealists, then neglected by analytic philosophers throughout much of the twentieth century, and has now finally started to get some renewed attention. But other than calling attention to the fact, few philosophers have tried to say what it consists in, or what its implications are. I argue that the systematicity of philosophy has disastrous epistemological implications. In particular, it implies philosophical skepticism: philosophers are rationally prohibited from believing any philosophical thesis. The argument goes by way of a new principle that connects inquiry with what is rational to believe. I conclude with a discussion of the relationship between my argument and other, more well-trodden arguments for philosophical skepticism.

Contextualism as a Solution to the Gettier Problem: Revisiting the Definition and Justification of Knowledge

The Gettier problem has significantly reshaped the discourse on the nature of knowledge, challenging the traditional definition of knowledge as Justified True Belief (JTB). This paper explores the philosophical implications of the Gettier problem and its impact on epistemology, focusing on two major responses: internalism and contextualism. Internalism emphasizes the cognitive subject's internal states as the basis for knowledge justification, while contextualism introduces variability in knowledge standards based on conversational and situational contexts. The strengths and limitations of each approach are critically analyzed, with internalism offering clear criteria for justification but struggling with external factors, and contextualism providing flexibility in knowledge attribution while risking subjectivity. The paper also examines how contextualism addresses philosophical skepticism and the Gettier problem by adjusting the criteria for knowledge depending on the context. Ultimately, this manuscript argues that while both internalism and contextualism have contributed to a deeper understanding of knowledge, further refinement of these theories is necessary to address their limitations, particularly regarding objectivity and skepticism.

Pierre Gassendi: Humanism, Science, and the Birth of Modern Philosophy

Pierre Gassendi: Humanism, Science, and the Birth of Modern Philosophy

Philosophical Skepticism as the Subject of Art: Maria Bussmann’s Drawings

Philosophical Skepticism as the Subject of Art: Maria Bussmann’s Drawings

Изгубената памет, изгубеното по пътя: антихуманистичният скептицизъм в романа „Везни“ на Павел Вежинов

The article examines the last novel of Pavel Vezhinov–Libra (1982), which in a narrower sense also culminates the last, clearly separated period/section in the writer’s work–the philosophical-scientific one (after the novel The Barrier, 1976). Here, the novel’s fiction masks in a highly stripped-down fashion a central scientific theory, both civilizational and biological–of human evolution as devolution. Part of a larger study, the article discusses the P. Vezhinov’s radical anti-humanist criticism in the broad context of late modern philosophical skepticism (Heidegger, Deep Ecology) and its autochthonous reflections in Bulgarian literature during the second half of the twentieth century.

Pakistan: A Responsible Nuclear State

This paper delves into the multifaceted factors contributing to the concerns expressed by various global stakeholders concerning the security of nuclear materials, facilities, and installations within Pakistan. The study comprehensively explores the tangible, perceived, and propagandistic elements that have collectively contributed to the prevailing global skepticism surrounding Pakistan's nuclear program. Furthermore, this research elucidates the domestic and international measures that Pakistan has undertaken to ensure the secure development, testing, deployment, utilization, and presence of nuclear weapons, employing both human expertise and technological resources. Additionally, the paper briefly highlights Pakistan's contributions to global peace, exemplified by its integral role in the global campaign against terrorism and active participation in United Nations Peacekeeping missions. Moreover, the paper provides insight into Pakistan’s adherence to international guidelines, notably those set forth by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and overarching international protocols concerning arms control and disarmament. By examining these facets, this study provides a comprehensive understanding of Pakistan’s nuclear program and its efforts to align with international norms, thereby fostering a more nuanced comprehension of the nation's stance within the global nuclear landscape.

The Auditory Field: The Spatial Character of Auditory Experience

It is widely accepted that there is a visual field, but the analogous notion of an auditory field is rejected by many philosophers on the grounds that the metaphysics or phenomenology of audition lack the necessary spatial structure. In this paper, I argue that many of the common objections to the existence of an auditory field are misguided and that, contrary to a tradition of philosophical scepticism about the spatiality of auditory experience, it is as richly spatial as visual experience — and in some ways even more so. By carefully considering the spatiality and boundedness of audition, along with how sounds or their sources are experienced as occurring within the surrounding acoustic environment, we can gain a better understanding of (i) our auditory experience of space and (ii) the conditions for the existence of spatial sensory fields in general in a way that does not privilege vision over the other senses.

Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism

Abstract Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude.

Skepticism as the Rudimentary Nature: A Postmodernist Approach to Muhammad Hafeez Khan’s Novel Adh Ahuray Lok: People with Lost Identities

This study examines the novel Adh Ahuray Lok (People with Lost Identities) by Muhammad Hafeez Khan from the perspective of skeptical nature in postmodernism. A significant amount of postmodernist theory relies on maintaining a skeptical attitude. The projects of philosophical postmodernism and philosophical skepticism appear deeply aligned, as both focus on doubting existing metanarratives and assumptions. They seek to justify the assumptions inherent in our systems of rationality, meaning, and truth. Furthermore, they challenge the modernist notion that objective knowledge is attainable or that we can confidently assert progress. The researcher has selected five diverse postmodernist theorists and incorporated one concept from each theorist to strengthen the argument regarding postmodernism's skeptical nature. The study employs a qualitative content analysis method to analyze the text of the chosen novel. The researcher concludes that postmodernism is rooted in skepticism, as supported by the analysis of the selected text.

Hume's skeptical philosophy and the moderation of pride

AbstractHume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value of skeptical philosophy for a humanistic education, giving us a reason to include Hume in curricula.