Situation Of Philosophy Research Articles

Brief aus Estland

Abstract This personal letter describes the history and current situation of philosophy in Estonia. We sketch the development of academic philosophy since the foundation of Tartu University in 1632, and describe the current philosophical landscape. We discuss the challenges we are facing in trying to find a balance between the responsibility that a discipline in the humanties in a small country has with respect to local culture and society on the one hand, and our ambitions to build up an internationally collaborating department with an international graduate programme on the other. We close with a description of the relation between academic philosophy and Estonian society and the role that the Center for Ethics in Tartu plays in supporting that relation.

Jan Patočka — od opazovalca do disidenta (prevedla Julija Hoda)

Jan Patočka (1907–1977) je bil češki filozof in akademik, ki je zaradi svoje vloge predstavnika v skupini Karta 77 postal junak in mučenec disidentskega gibanja. Članek analizira obstoječe podatke o Patočki, o razmerah v filozofiji in klasični filologiji od štiridesetih do sedemdesetih ter o Karti 77. Posebej pozorno se posveča vprašanju, kako in zakaj se je Patočka, ki se je v odnosu do politike vse življenje držal ob strani, slednjič odločil sprejeti vidno vlogo v disidentskem gibanju, ki je nato pripeljala do njegove smrti marca 1977.

Beneath and Beyond the Fragments: The Charms of Simmel’s Philosophical Path for Contemporary Subjectivities

Our purpose in this article is to explore the reasons for the continued attractiveness of Simmel's thought today and to probe the contemporary affinities to his philosophical stance towards the world. Simmel anchored the ‘philosophical attitude' in the philosopher’s particularly developed disposition for Erlebnis, i.e. the unified pre-conceptual experience of each moment of reality and life, as well as in a particular mode of objectivating this experience. We provide an illustration of such an approach and its implications through Simmel's analysis of ‘remoteness from oneself’ and the restlessness it entails in The Philosophy of Money. We argue that Simmel's attempt at phenomenologically unveiling the contours and depths of life moments and fragments, as well as his emphasis on constant movement, provide much reassurance to contemporary subjectivities. But his philosophical stance is also driven by a quasi-mystical yearning for the One that lies beneath and beyond the fragments. We propose an initial assessment of the main implications of such a stance by relating it to the philosophical path it opened up (a path directly linking to Heidegger and his followers, but also in part to Deleuze) and by placing it in what we understand to be the new philosophical situation today.

Der schwierige Umgang mit der Geschichte. Ein Brief aus Spanien

Abstract The essay condenses experiences of my work in Spanish universities in a constellation of five topics: 1. The actual situation of philosophy in Spain, 2. Her historical dimension, 3. The corresponding style of philosophical writing by the example of Ortega y Gasset, 4. Beyond the tension of traditionalism and modernity: the underestimated philosophy of Javier Zubiri, 5. Perspectives.

Zur Situation der Philosophie in Deutschland um 1800 Kritische und kommentierte Edition eines unveröffentlichten Briefs von Lazarus Bendavid

AbstractThis article offers a critical edition of a handwritten and unpublished letter by the philosopher and mathematician Lazarus Bendavid. Created around 1805, the autograph is of great interest to the intellectual biography of the GermanJewish author as well as for the historiography of philosophy at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. The text describes and evaluates the situation of philosophy in Germany after Kant's death in great detail, mentioning the names of no less than 30 philosophers. The following edition includes a reconstruction of the communicative situation that led up to the letter, especially the identification of its recipient, and a brief characterization of its content, the rendition of the transcribed text in a text critical form, a thorough comment on the mentioned authors and works, a methodologically oriented editorial addendum and an interpretative commentary in the spirit of constellation research.

Further Questions: A Way Out of the Present Philosophical Situation (via Foucault)

Let us begin by assembling some signs of the present philosophical situation. On the one hand, the most important living French philosopher, Alain Badiou, calls for a “return to Plato,” despite the movement of anti-Platonism that dominated French and German thought in the 20th century. On the other hand, the present moment sees a resurgence of naturalism in philosophy in general (including and especially Anglophone analytic philosophy), despite the criticisms of naturalism that have appeared throughout the 20th century. Phenomenology seems to be at the center of both of these movements. On the one hand, it is the idea of a mathematized ontology that requires the return to Plato, a mathematized ontology constructed without a reflection on its transcendental grounds. On the other, the resurgence of naturalism is so strong that a book could be imagined and published with the bastard name of Naturalizing Phenomenology, as if the transcendental moment of phenomenology did not transform the very meaning of nature. These signs seem to indicate that we have entered into a phase of regression or even decline in philosophical thinking. If this interpretation of the signs is correct, if we have indeed entered into a phase of regression -- a twofold regression toward Platonism and toward naturalism -- we must ask the following question: is it possible for us to define something like a project or even a research agenda that would allow us to define a way of thinking that might lead us out of the present situation, a situation, it must be said, that seems dire for philosophy in general? If we can determine such a research agenda, perhaps we can also begin to understand what the tradition of “continental philosophy” has stood for.

The Conduct of Life: A Philosophical Reading, Ralph Waldo Emerson By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)<br/>Society and Solitude: Twelve Chapters. A New Study Edition, with Notes, Philosophical Commentary and Historical Contextualization, Ralph Waldo Emerson By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)<br/>A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy. A New Philosophical Reading, William James By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)

The Conduct of Life: A Philosophical Reading, Ralph Waldo Emerson By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)<br/>Society and Solitude: Twelve Chapters. A New Study Edition, with Notes, Philosophical Commentary and Historical Contextualization, Ralph Waldo Emerson By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)<br/>A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy. A New Philosophical Reading, William James By H.G. Callaway (Ed.)

Apie kūną ir technologijas technikos universitete

Straipsnyje apžvelgiama 2007 m. konferencija Kūnas ir technologijos. Keliami klausimai apie filosofijos vaidmenį visuomenėje apskritai ir universitetuose konkrečiai. Teigiama, kad tarpdalykiškumas negali ir neturi tapti dingstimi nuleisti aukštai pakeltą filosofijos profesinių reikalavimų kartelę. Svarstomi pasitraukimo iš filosofijos tiek į platesnę (į vadinamuosius socialinius mokslus), tiek į siauresnę erdvę (į komparatyvistiką, dekonstrukciją, analitiką) motyvai. Klausiama, ar šis pasitraukimas neslepia susilpnėjusios filosofinės atsakomybės. Iškeliami tokie moksliškumo kriterijai kaip paprastumas ir išraiškos priemonių taupumas. Teigiama, kad mokslo konferencijos sutelkia Lietuvos filosofus, versdamos juos susirūpinti tiek savo bendruomeniškumo puoselėjimu, tiek filosofijos padėtimi universitetuose ir institutuose. Svarstoma, koks technikos universiteto vaidmuo skleidžiant filosofijos idėjas.

Discussions

In their paper, 'When are thought experiments poor ones?' (Peijnenburg and David Atkinson, 2003, Journal of General Philosophy of Science 34, 305-322.), Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson argue that most, if not all, philosophical thought experiments are "poor" ones with "disastrous consequences" and that they share the property of being poor with some (but not all) scientific thought experiments. Noting that unlike philosophy, the sciences have the resources to avoid the disastrous consequences, Peijnenburg and Atkinson come to the conclusion that the use of thought experiments in science is in general more successful than in philosophy and that instead of concocting more "recherche" thought experiments, philosophy should try to be more empirical. In this comment I will argue that Peijnenburg's and Atkinson's view on thought experiments is based on a misleading characterization of both, the dialectical situation in philosophy as well as the history of physics. By giving an adequate account of what the discussion in contemporary philosophy is about, we will arrive at a considerably different evaluation of philosophical thought experiments.

Mind incarnate: from Dewey to Damasio

Daedalus Summer 2006 To be a human being requires a functioning human brain, in a living human body, interacting with complex physical, social, and cultural environments, in an ongoing flow of experience. What could be more self-evident than the fact that the human mind is intrinsically incarnate? And yet, most people do not believe this. Traditional Western philosophical and religious traditions routinely assume the transcendence of mind over body. They assume that our inmost essence is mental and spiritual, which they regard as distinct from the bodily. To live in our culture is to unwittingly soak up the metaphysical mind-body dualism that pervades our commonsense views of cognition, knowledge, language, and values. Until quite recently, only a handful of intellectually courageous philosophers have outspokenly embraced a nondualistic view of mind and pursued the radical implications of such a view. Baruch Spinoza stands out in this regard, followed much later by Friederich Nietzsche and then the pragmatic naturalists Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, and John Dewey in America, and also the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty in France. Over the past twenty years, the situation in philosophy has begun to change. The terms ‘embodied mind’ and ‘embodied cognition’ have become buzzwords in psychology and the other cognitive sciences–and also, increasingly, in philosophy itself. Taking this change seriously is no small matter. If we give up the notion of a transcendent soul and a disembodied mind, then we must give up as well some of our most commonly cherished assumptions about what it means to be human.

Nykstanti ugdymo filosofija Lietuvoje: paradoksas ar norma?

Straipsnis skirtas analizuoti ugdymo filosofijos problemas Lietuvoje. Jame konstatuojama, kad Lietuvoje skiriama nepakankamai dėmesio ugdymo filosofijai. Svarstoma, ar Lietuvos situacija yra išskirtinė, ar artima situacijai kitose valstybėse? Siekiama pagrįsti nuostatą, kad, nepaisant ugdymo mokslo naujovių, labai svarbu tęsti tradiciją jį sieti su filosofija, rodyti dėmesį ugdymo filosofijai. Pateikiami šiuolaikinės filosofijos pavyzdžiai, kuriais remiantis galima geriau susivokti šiuolaikinėje ugdymo mokslo situacijoje, kelti naujus reikalavimus ugdymo mokslui, jo ir filosofijos santykiui.

Philosophical reasoning: a study in the methodology of philosophizing

Preface. Introduction. Part I: The Task of Philosophy:. The Erotetic Nature of Philosophy: Philosophy as a Cognitive Enterprise. The Need for Philosophy: Humans as Homo Quaerens. Rationality is the Instrument of Philosophy. Philosophy as Truth Estimation. The Data of Philosophy. Metaphilosophical Issues. Part II: Philosophizing as an Erotetic Enterprise: The Dialectic of Question and Answer:. Questions and their Presuppositions: Issues Regarding the Legitimacy of Questions. Question Dynamics: Kant's Principle of Question Propagation and the Dialectical Exfoliation of Questions. Philosophy as a Venture in Erotetic Dialectic. Philosophical Assessment. Part III: What's on the Agenda?:. Unexamined Issues and Agenda Formation. The Recent Scene. Metaphilosophy a Part of Philosophy Itself. The Political Dimension: A Struggle for Ownership. The Systemic Dimension. Part IV: Philosophical Discourse:. The Narrative Dimension of Philosophy. The Method of Philosophy: Truth-Estimative Conjecture. Ongoing Explanation. Historical Unity of Philosophy. The Data of Philosophy. Part V: Interpreting Philosophical Texts:. Setting the Stage: Deconstructionism. Exegetical Interpretation. Why Philosophical Texts Need Interpretation. The Principle of Contextuality-Context Coherence as an Interpretative Standard. The First Law. The Second Law. The Third Law. The Fourth Law. Part VI: Rhetoric And Rational Argumentation:. Rhetoric Versus Argumentation: The General Situation. An Uneasy Union. The Special Case of Philosophy. Philosophy's Data: The Source of Plausibility. Part VII: Philosophical Aporetics:. The Pervasiveness of Apories. Aporetic Antinomies Structure the Issues. Part VIII: The Economic Dimension of Philosophical Inquiry:. Plausibility as a Guide to Issues of Precedence and Priority. Cost Effectiveness as a Salient Aspect of Rationality. Unacceptable Price Argumentation in Philosophy. Part IX: The Impact of Distinctions:. The Role of Distinctions. Dialectic Development via Distinctions. Developmental Dialectics. Part X: Inference to the Best Explanation and its Problems:. Difficulties with Inference to the Best Explanation. Best Systematization as a Viable Alternative. Part XI: The Coherentist Criteriology of Truth as a Philosophical Method:. Coherentism in Philosophy. How Context Helps via Local Appropriateness. Philosophical Coherentism is Self Sustaining. Part XII: Why Philosophizing Must Be Systematic: The Holistic Nature of Philosophy:. Externalities and Negative Side Effects. Systematic Interconnectedness as a Consequence of Aporetic Complexity. Local Minimalism versus Global Optimalism. Why Not Simply Live With Inconsistency? The Imperative of Cognitive Rationality. The Methodological Rationale of Systematicity in Philosophy. Part XIII: Systematization as an Instrument of Inquiry:. Hierarchical Systematization: The Euclidean Model of Knowledge. Systematicity and the Impetus to Coherence: The Network Model. On the Advantages of a Network Model. The Pivotal Role of Data for a Coherentist Truth-Criteriology. Coherentism's Exploitation of the Parameters of Systematicity. Systematization as Truth Criterion: The Hegelian Inversion. Part XIV: Developmental Dialectics and Complexity:. Spencer's Law: The Dynamics of Cognitive Complexity. The Methodological Status of Simplicity-Preference: Systematicity, Economy, and the Principle of Least Effort. Perennial Philosophy. Rational Dialectic in Philosophy. Part XV: Counterfactual Reasoning as a Philosophical Instrument:. Historical Stagesetting. Belief-Contravening Supposition: How Apories Arise in Hypothetical Contexts. The Centrality of Precedence (Right of Way). Logic as Such Does Not Resolve Matters. Reductio Ad Absurdum Argumentation. Evidential Contexts. The Situation in Philosophy. An Overview. Dispensing with Possible Worlds. Part XVI: Validating First Principles:. First Principles. Historical Postscript. Part XVII: God's Place in Philosophy (Non in Philosophia Recurrere est ad Deum):. Two Opposed Intuitions. Theistic vs. Naturalistic Questions. The Closure of the Secular Realm. Internal vs. External. Philosophy and Theology. Explanatory Economy in Philosophy. Conclusion. Part XVIII: Philosophy at the Turn of the Century: A Return to Systems?:. The Heritage of the 19th Century. The Revolt Against System (System-Dismissive Antisystems). The Shipwreck of Inter-Bellum Negativism. The Burned Bridges. The Rise of Particularism. A Vision of Wholeness. The New Order: A Revival of Systematic Philosophy. The Contemporary Situation.

Evolutionary Explanation and Consciousness

If there is a received orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, it is that all features of the mind, including meaning, action, and consciousness, can and perhaps must be naturalized (i.e., accommodated within the framework of the world of nature as understood by the natural sciences). At the same time, just about everyone working in philosophy of mind has realized for at least a decade that there are substantial problems with this enterprise of naturalizing the mind, in that there are features of the mind that do not seem to lend themselves to naturalistic explanation: in particular, meaning, consciousness, and free will. For naturalists (who comprise the majority of the field at the moment), this is seen as an urgent problem: they feel that we must naturalize the mind, and yet it looks as though we do not know how to do so. Oddly, even many of the writers who have forcefully argued that the mental cannot be reduced to the physical, or cannot be explained in evolutionary terms, still call themselves “naturalists,” even when they have no concrete naturalization of the mind to offer. A few other anti-naturalists and I, on the other hand, have tried to argue that the problems the naturalist faces are abiding and principled problems, and not merely a symptom of a current lack of development of psychology or neuroscience. In this article for the special issue, I shall attempt to do three things. First, I shall attempt to describe the current situation in philosophy of mind and cognitive science with respect to one special facet of the mind: consciousness. I shall try to explain, in a very abbreviated form, the historical factors that have led to the popularity of reductionist forms of naturalism, and then summarize several influential arguments to the effect that consciousness cannot be reduced to neuroscience or physics. I shall then differentiate two very different strands of this conversation: one which is about explanation (i.e., physical science cannot explain consciousness), and another which is about metaphysics (i.e., physical facts are not enough to determine facts about consciousness). Finally, I shall explain why I think that naturalizers of the mind can look for no solace from evolutionary explanation if–-as appears to be the case–-attempts at reductive explanation of the mind in terms of physics or neuroscience should continue to fail: in brief, because evolutionary explanation depends upon the fulfillment of a promissory note which only reductive explanation could make good on. It is thus only in the final section of this article that I shall approach the uniting theme of the special issue. However, to understand the status of evolutionary explanation in philosophy of mind, it is in my opinion necessary to see where it fits within a broader framework of naturalizing the mind.

The situativity of knowing, learning, and research.

The situative perspective shifts the focus of analysis from individual behavior and cognition to larger systems that include behaving cognitive agents interacting with each other and with other subsystems in the environment. The first section presents a version of the situative perspective that draws on studies of social interaction, philosophical situation theory, and ecological psychology. Framing assumptions and concepts are proposed for a synthesis of the situative and cognitive theoretical perspectives, and a further situative synthesis is suggested that would draw on dynamic-systems theory. The second section discusses relations between the situative, cognitive, and behaviorist theoretical perspectives and principles of educational practice. The third section discusses an approach to research and social practice called interactive research and design, which fits with the situative perspective and provides a productive, albeit syncretic, combination of theory-oriented and instrumental functions of research.

The situativity of knowing, learning, and research.

The situative perspective shifts the focus of analysis from individual behavior and cognition to larger systems that include behaving cognitive agents interacting with each other and with other subsystems in the environment. The first section presents a version of the situative perspective that draws on studies of social interaction, philosophical situation theory, and ecological psychology. Framing assumptions and concepts are proposed for a synthesis of the situative and cognitive theoretical perspectives, and a further situative synthesis is suggested that would draw on dynamic-systems theory. The second section discusses relations between the situative, cognitive, and behaviorist theoretical perspectives and principles of educational practice. The third section discusses an approach to research and social practice called interactive research and design, which fits with the situative perspective and provides a productive, albeit syncretic, combination of theory-oriented and instrumental functions of research.

The Conditions of Philosophy in Totalitarian and Post‐Totalitarian Poland

This compound paper presents the views of two Polish philosophers on the strong international pressures influencing the development of Polish philosophy in recent times. The first part, by Leszek Koczanowicz, treats the philosophical situation and problems of totalitarian Poland under the influence of Soviet Marxism, while the second part, by Adam Chmielewski, focuses on the main trends and difficulties of post‐totalitarian Poland, dominated by Western influence.

Hegelianism in Slovenia: A Short Introduction

My modest aim and scope in this article is to outline the present philosophical situation in Slovenia, inasmuch as it is linked with the development of Hegelian thought and influenced by the work of Hegel. I will briefly discuss some historical characteristics of its origin, with no attempt to depict “ethnographic” features of it or to show its ideological basis. Later on I will introduce some aspects of Hegel's philosophy, as understood by Slovenian lacaniens, trying to summarize their reading of Hegel and consequently point out how deeply their work on Lacan is inspired by him. My hidden and not explicitly discussed assumption throughout this paper will be that their research, although manifestly concerned with Lacan, is for the most part inspired by Hegel, and therefore Slovenian Lacanians are actually Hegelians. I will, however, try to avoid disputing and making comments on the main views of their orientation and how they concur with Hegel — this would require an extra space for comparison of both standpoints and be too complicated hermeneutically.Slovenia, which used to be a part of Yugoslavia, grew up in a-rigorous tradition of communist thinking with Marxism as a systematical ideological basis. This happened in almost all Eastern European countries, which shared the same destiny till the fall of the Berlin wall.The ideological restrictions behind the so-called “iron curtain”, so typical and easily recognizable within all these countries, caused a total eclipse of almost every non-Marxist philosophy in Slovenia up to the sixties.

Die politisch-philosophische Situation: Die Postmoderne

The Political and Philosophical Situation: Post-Modernism For the author the main theme of Post-Modernism is the return of the difference. He shows that Enlightenment and Revolution universalism is only another type of particularism. Nazist and Stalinist terror signify the reinvestment of an archaic type of law and destiny. We cannot hope any longer to maintain a universalist approach to human cultures.

Gibson's affordances.

Gibson developed an interactionist view of perception and action that focused on information that is available in the environment. He thereby rejected the still-prevalent framing assumption of factoring external-physical and internal-mental processes. The interactionist alternative, which focuses on processes of agent-situation interactions, is taken in ecological psychology as well as in recent research on conversational communication, research on complex, socially organized activity, and philosophical situation theory. The concepts of qffordance and ability are key ideas in an interactionist account. In situation theory, abilities in activity depend on attunements to constraints, and affordances for an agent can be understood as conditions in the environment for constraints to which the agent is attuned. This broad view of affordances includes affordances that are recognized as well as affordances that are perceived directly.

A new phenomenological Marxism

Every generation of modern philosophy sets for itself the task of reinvent? ing the master thinkers of its tradition. In this century, this phenomenon has been borne out by repeated substantial reinterpretations of Marx, par? ticularly so in France where since 1945 emergent philosophical movements have infused new philosophical concepts into Marxism. As hermeneutics informs us, such infusion is a condition for the possibility of the continued vitality of any tradition, whether political, philosophical or otherwise. This interplay with other philosophical movements and their new vocabularies has been a particular strength of Western European, non-orthodox Marxism. "Existential" Marxism in France is perhaps the greatest expression of the lack of orthodoxy in Western Marxism.1 Its most influential works came after World War II, written by Merleau-Ponty and Sartre in the face of the situation of post-War Europe. The various versions of Existential Marxism influenced the interpretation of Marx in the entire post-war generation and introduced a rich phenomenological vocabulary into historical materialism, replacing its abstract, large-scale sociological descriptions with ones more adequate to phenomena of subjectivity, intersubjectivity and everyday life. However, with the rise of Althusser and now post-structuralism, the influence of existentialism has waned considerably. Against the trend toward anti-humanism in reaction to phenomenology and existentialism, Henry's work represents a revitalization of this important Western Marxist philosophical tradition, informing it with the criticism of Western metaphysics that has been developed by Levinas and Heidegger. While in some ways it is a return to this older movement, Henry's book is more importantly a new phenomenological Marxism appropriate to the contem? porary philosophical situation in France. Existential Marxism fell out of favor primarily because of its humanism.