Philosophical Review Research Articles

Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres

Contextualists such as Cohen and DeRose claim that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions vary contextually, in particular that the strength of epistemic position required for one to be truly ascribed knowledge depends on features of the attributor’s context. Contextualists support their view by appeal to our intuitions about when it’s correct (or incorrect) to ascribe knowledge. Someone might argue that some of these intuitions merely reflect when it is conversationally appropriate to ascribe knowledge, not when knowledge is truly ascribed, and so try to accommodate these intuitions even on an invariantist view. DeRose (Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, 1998; Philosophical Review, 2002) argues that any such ‘warranted assertibility manoeuvre’, or ‘WAM’, against contextualism is unlikely to succeed. Here, I argue that his objections to a WAM against contextualism are not persuasive and offer a pragmatic account of the data about ascriptions of knowledge.

Demonstrative Concepts Without Re-Identification

Conceptualism in the philosophy of perception is the doctrine that perceptual experiences have a fully conceptualized content. Conceptualists have laid particular emphasis on the role demonstrative concepts play in experience, in order to deal with the objection that experiences are fine-grained. Normal perceivers, they point out, are able to form fine-grained demonstrative color concepts for the specific shades they perceptually discriminate. Recently, however, Sean Kelly (2001b: ‘Demonstrative concepts and Experience’, The Philosophical Review 110 (3), 397–420.) has argued that, in order to possess a particular demonstrative concept, a perceiver must be able to re-identify things which fall under that concept. Since normal perceivers typically fail at such re-identification, he concludes, they do not in fact possess demonstrative concepts for the specific shades of color they experience. In response to Kelly’s attempt to resurrect the objection from the fineness of grain of experience, I argue that his defense of this Re-identification constraint (i) is not as intuitive as it might seem, (ii) is ill-motivated, and (iii) appears to rest on a conflation between different kinds of concepts.

From a Phono-Logical Point of View: Neutralizing Quine’s Argument Against Analyticity

Though largely unnoticed, in “Two Dogmas” Quine (1951, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Philosophical Review 60, 20–43. Reprinted in From a Logical Point of View, 20–46) himself invokes a distinction: a distinction between logical and analytic truths. Unlike analytic statements equating ‘bachelor’ with ‘unmarried man’, strictly logical tautologies relating two word-tokens of the same word-type, e.g., ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor’ are true merely in virtue of basic phonological form, putatively an exclusively non-semantic function of perceptual categorization or brute stimulus behavior. Yet natural language phonemic categorization is not entirely free of interpretive semantic considerations. “Phonemic reductionism” in both its linguistic (Bloch 1953, Contrast, Language 29, 59–61) and behavioral (Quine 1990, The Phoneme’s Long Shadow, Emics and Etics: The Insider/Outsider Debate, T. Headland, K. Pike and M. Harris, (eds.), Newbury Park, CA, Sage Publications, 164–167) guise is false. The semantic basis of phonological equivalence, however, has repercussions vis-a-vis Quine’s critique of analyticity. A consistent rejection of meaning-based equivalencies eliminates not only analyticity, but imposes a form of phonological eliminativism too. Phonological eliminativism is the reductio result of applying Quinean meaning skepticism to the phonological typing of natural language. But unlike analyticity, phonology is presumably not subject to philosophical dismissal. The semantic basis of natural language phonology serves to neutralize Quine’s argument against analyticity: without the semantics of meaning, more than just synonymy is lost; basic phonology must also be forfeited.

Epistemic Partiality in Friendship

Analytic moral philosophers have been taking a renewed interest in friendship in recent years. They have been especially liable to consider friendship in connection with debates over partiality and impartiality in ethics. Many important styles of ethical theory hold up impartiality and equal treatment—under one or another interpretation—as central moral concepts and ideals. Yet friendship and other close relations between persons seem to involve partiality and differential treatment. We care more about what befalls our friends than about what happens to strangers, and we are more motivated to advance our friends’ interests than those of strangers. We seem even to have special responsibilities toward our friends which we don’t have toward strangers. If friendship necessarily involves such partiality, then there is a tension, at least, between the constitutive elements and dispositions of friendship and those of morality: they seem to pull in opposite directions. Contemporary moral theorists have responded to this tension in a variety of ways. Some have sought to bring the apparent partiality of friendship under the wing of a more fundamental impartiality, thus reconciling friendship and the moral. Others have insisted on the primacy of friendship, and partiality, over impartial moral conceptions—

Sensitive and Insensitive Causation

Research Article| January 01 2006 Sensitive and Insensitive Causation James Woodward James Woodward Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (1): 1–50. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-001 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation James Woodward; Sensitive and Insensitive Causation. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2006; 115 (1): 1–50. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2005-001 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2006 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

What Is It Like to Be a Bot?

Our title is a take-off on Thomas Nagel's profound and famous piece, "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?," which first appeared in The Philosophical Review in 1974 and has been cited hundreds of times since. (Google finds 67,000 hits!) His point is that it's impossible to know what it's like to be a bat. Of course, we can imagine having leathery wings, navigating by sonar, eating bugs while flying, and hanging upside down to sleep, but that’s not the same as knowing what a bat experiences. In other words, we can't know what it's like for a bat to be a bat. Whether you agree with him or not, his view is even more relevant today than it was in 1974.

How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role?

Research Article| October 01 2005 How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role? Marc Lange Marc Lange Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (4): 433–468. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-4-433 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Marc Lange; How Can Instantaneous Velocity Fulfill Its Causal Role?. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2005; 114 (4): 433–468. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-4-433 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2005 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of Nature

Book Review| July 01 2005 Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of Nature Dale Jamieson, Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. ix, 380. Gary L. Comstock Gary L. Comstock Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (3): 416–419. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-3-416 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gary L. Comstock; Morality's Progress: Essays on Humans, Other Animals, and the Rest of Nature. The Philosophical Review 1 July 2005; 114 (3): 416–419. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-3-416 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2005 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Book Reviews You do not currently have access to this content.

Why Idealize?

Why Idealize?

Behaviorism and psychologism: Why block's argument against behaviorism is unsound

Ned Block ((1981). Psychologism and behaviorism. Philosophical Review, 90, 5–43.) argued that a behaviorist conception of intelligence is mistaken, and that the nature of an agent's internal processes is relevant for determining whether the agent has intelligence. He did that by describing a machine which lacks intelligence, yet can answer questions put to it as an intelligent person would. The nature of his machine's internal processes, he concluded, is relevant for determining that it lacks intelligence. I argue against Block that it is not the nature of its processes but of its linguistic behavior which is responsible for his machine's lack of intelligence. As I show, not only has Block failed to establish that the nature of internal processes is conceptually relevant for psychology, in fact his machine example actually supports some version of behaviorism. As Wittgenstein has maintained, as far as psychology is concerned, there may be chaos inside.

Symbolic content in the emergence of the Miesian free-plan

At a talk at the North Carolina State University in 1952, Mies van der Rohe recounted in rather dramatic terms a discovery that he had made while working on the design for the Barcelona Pavilion: ‘...

Hawthorne on knowledge and practical reasoning

Evans, G. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Graham, P. J. 2000. Transferring knowledge. Noais 34: 131-52. Harman, G. 1968. Knowledge, inference, and explanation. American Philosophical Quarterly 5: 164-73. Hawthorne, J. 2004. Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McDowell, J. 1993. Knowledge by hearsay. In Knowing from Words: Western and Indian Philosophical Analysis of Understanding and Testimony, ed. B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti, 195-224. Dordrecht: Kluwer. McDowell, J. 1998. Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ross, A. 1986. Why do we believe what we are told? Ratio 28: 69-88. Williamson, T. 1996. Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review 105: 489-523. THOMAS M. CRISP

The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's Religion

Research Article| January 01 2005 The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's Religion Seiriol Morgan Seiriol Morgan Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2005) 114 (1): 63–114. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-63 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Seiriol Morgan; The Missing Formal Proof of Humanity's Radical Evil in Kant's Religion. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2005; 114 (1): 63–114. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-114-1-63 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2005 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content.

Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto

Research Article| October 01 2004 Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto Jonathan Cohen Jonathan Cohen Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (4): 451–506. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-451 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Jonathan Cohen; Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2004; 113 (4): 451–506. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-4-451 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal Issue Section: Front Matter You do not currently have access to this content.

Excellence in leadership : demands on the professional school principal

A professional school principal is the educational leader and manager of a school, and is therefore responsible for the work performance of all the people in the school (i.e. both staff and learners). People are the human resources of schools. They use material resources (such as finances, information equipment, and facilities) to produce a product, namely, the educated learner. One of the principal's jobs (the so-called principalship) is to help the school achieve a high level of performance through the utilisation of all its human and material resources. This is done through effective, and ultimately excellence in, leadership. More simply stated: a principal's job is to get things done by working with and through other people. Studies of effective and excellent principals reveal that the major reason for principals' failure is an inability to deal with people. If the people perform well, the school performs well; if the people do not perform well, the school does not. In this sense, the leadership task of school principals is of the utmost importance and is probably the most important element of the principal's role and/or task. School principals are essential to the success of schools of all types and sizes. This philosophical review of the literature, which draws its conclusions from recent best practices with regard to excellence in school leadership and the so-called principalship, is an attempt to raise and answer some questions concerning new demands on the professional principalship in a changing South Africa where educational reform is the norm rather than the exception. South African Journal of Education Vol.24(3) 2004: 239-243

Practical Reason and the Possibility of Error

Previous articleNext article No AccessPractical Reason and the Possibility of Error*Douglas LavinDouglas Lavin Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 114, Number 3April 2004 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/381695 Views: 241Total views on this site Citations: 42Citations are reported from Crossref © 2004 by The University of Chicago. 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Philosophy in management

The focus of this article is centred on two main ideas: persuading management students to study philosophy, and convincing them that a study of philosophy could be relevant for them in a business environment underscored by uncertainty. Three approaches were considered, an historical approach, an analytical approach and a literary approach. The first approach entailed a review of major philosophers, the second entailed an analysis of values such as trust, justice, honesty, integrity, fairness, prudence, respect, competition, professionalism, and the third entailed an appraisal of the work of persons better known for their contributions to literature which illustrated moral issues in their society. This article is a reflection of some of these thoughts on the idea of introducing a course in introductory philosophy into the management syllabus. The ideas are still in the formative stage, and are currently being put into practice.

Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems

Research Article| January 01 2004 Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems Frederick Kroon Frederick Kroon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (1): 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-1-1 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Frederick Kroon; Descriptivism, Pretense, and the Frege-Russell Problems. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2004; 113 (1): 1–30. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-1-1 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2004 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.

The moral case for the estate tax

AbstractA historical review of philosophers who have considered the role of the wealthy in society is presented and the moral implications of this controversial tax discussed.

Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others

Book Review| October 01 2003 Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others Richard Foley, Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. x, 182. Judith Baker Judith Baker Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (4): 586–589. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-4-586 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Judith Baker; Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2003; 112 (4): 586–589. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-4-586 Download citation file: Zotero Reference Manager EasyBib Bookends Mendeley Papers EndNote RefWorks BibTex toolbar search Search Dropdown Menu toolbar search search input Search input auto suggest filter your search Books & JournalsAll JournalsThe Philosophical Review Search Advanced Search The text of this article is only available as a PDF. Cornell University2003 Article PDF first page preview Close Modal You do not currently have access to this content.