Relevance Of Philosophy Research Articles

The scope of chiropractic practice: A survey of chiropractors in the UK

In the UK, chiropractic has undergone significant change in recent years, particularly with the advent of statutory regulation and an increasing emphasis on evidence-based and multidisciplinary health care. Little is known about what effect, if any, such changes have had on the profession's view of its scope of practice. To ascertain the opinion of UK chiropractors regarding chiropractic beliefs and philosophy, the benefit of chiropractic intervention in paediatric, adolescent and adult conditions and its relationship with the National Health Service (NHS). Differences in opinion between chiropractors from different UK chiropractic associations – the British Chiropractic Association (BCA), McTimoney Chiropractic Association (MCA), the Scottish Chiropractic Association (SCA) and the United Chiropractic Association (UCA) – were also investigated. A one-shot postal questionnaire was sent to 490 randomly selected chiropractors in the UK registered with the General Chiropractic Council (GCC) (Sample 1). Subjects were selected by a simple random probability sample design. Sample 2 comprised a further 45 randomly chosen subjects from the same sampling frame and was used to test whether Sample 1 was representative of the population. Data were subjected to descriptive analysis using SPSS v10. Differences between groups were investigated by Chi-square analysis and the Kruskal–Wallis H -test. The response rate for Samples 1 and 2 was 54% and 53%, respectively. There was no difference between the two samples in terms of gender, age, college of graduation and chiropractic association membership. Internal consistency of the questionnaire was proven to be weak-moderate ( r = −.265 [interclass correlation (IC): −256; 95% confidence interval (CI): −368 to −.136] to .591 [IC: 583; 95% CI: .494–.659]). Overall, mechanical conditions of the musculoskeletal system were felt to be treated effectively by chiropractic intervention and there was 100% agreement that it was beneficial in treating mechanical dysfunctions of the spine. Non-musculoskeletal conditions in adults, including asthma (64%), gastro-intestinal complaints (61%) and pre-menstrual syndrome (PMS) (70%), were considered conditions that can benefit from chiropractic management. Opinions on the treatment of osteoporosis (43%), obesity (26%), hypertension (42%) and infertility (30%) were less conclusive. Childhood musculoskeletal and muscular conditions, infantile colic, otitis media and asthma were perceived to benefit from chiropractic intervention by more than 50% of the respondents. Statistically significant differences between chiropractors of different associations in the UK were present, particularly regarding the benefits of chiropractic treatment for non-musculoskeletal conditions. The chiropractors in this study may not view themselves as neuromusculoskeletal (NMS) specialists only. Respondents reported treating visceral/organic conditions and expressed a belief that patients with these complaints can benefit from chiropractic. Differences in opinion appear to remain between the professional associations, particularly in relation to treatment benefits for viscero-somatic conditions and philosophical relevance. However, these findings need to be explored in a more representative sample.

The assertion-candidate and the meaning of mood

The meaning of a declarative sentence and that of an interrogative sentence differ in their aspect of mood. A semantics of mood has to account for the differences in meaning between these sentences, and it also has to explain that sentences in different moods may have a common core. The meaning of the declarative mood is to be explained not in terms of actual force (contra Dummett), but in terms of potential force. The meaning of the declarative sentence (including its mood) is called the assertion-candidate, which is explained by what one must know in order to be entitled to utter the declarative with assertive force. Both a cognitive notion (knowledge) and a pragmatic notion (assertive force) are thus part of the explanation of the assertion-candidate. Davidson’s criticism that such a theory is in need of an account of the distinction between standard and non-standard uses of the declarative is answered: without counter-indications an utterance of a declarative sentence is understood as having assertive force. The meaning of an interrogative sentence, the question-candidate, and that of the other sentence types can ultimately be explained in terms of their specific relations to the assertion-candidate. Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory is used to show the philosophical relevance of a semantics of mood. The constructivist notion of proposition needs to be embedded in a theory of the assertion-candidate, which fulfils the offices of being the meaning of the declarative sentence, the content of judgement and assertion and the bearer of epistemic truth.

The aims of anesthesia in infants: the relevance of philosophy, psychology and a little evidence

The aims of anesthesia in infants: the relevance of philosophy, psychology and a little evidence

Daydreams and Anarchy: A Defense of Anomalous Mental Causation

Must mental properties figure in psychological causal laws if they are causally efficacious? And do those psychological causal laws give the essence of mental properties? Contrary to the prevailing consensus, I argue that, on the usual conception of laws that is in play in these debates, there are in fact lawless causally efficacious properties both in and out of the philosophy of mind. I argue that this makes a great difference to the philosophical relevance of empirical psychology. 1 begin by making the case that revolutions and hurricanes are lawless phenomena, before arguing for a similar thesis about creativity, love, courage, dreams, daydreams, and musings. Furthermore, the empirical research on these phenomena suggests that the philosophical issues may be independent of what empirical psychology can tell us.

Pierre Bayle dans la Republique des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique (review)

Reviewed by: Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique José R. Maia Neto Antony McKenna and Gianni Paganini , editors. Pierre Bayle dans la République des Lettres: Philosophie, Religion, Critique. Paris: Honoré Champion, 2004. Pp. 589. Cloth, €90.00. Pierre Bayle is an early modern philosopher who has received relatively little attention given the philosophical relevance and historical influence of his work. Fortunately this situation has been rapidly changing in recent years. This volume, edited by Antony McKenna and Gianni Paganini, is a good sample of the volume, quality, scope, and polemical nature of current Bayle scholarship. The book contains twenty-five articles by the main Bayle scholars from France, Italy, England, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United States. It also contains an introduction by the editors, who give an overview of current scholarship, summarizing its main trends and achievements, and a useful name index. The articles are organized in five sections, each dealing with some aspect of Bayle's life and thought. The first set of articles, gathered under the heading, "Interlocutors, Friends and Enemies," deals with Bayle's personal relations as a Huguenot exiled in the Netherlands. Luisa Simonutti deals with Bayle's relations to one of the radical Reformed groups in Holland, the Quakers. Although Bayle disagreed with their religious views, he respected and maintained [End Page 476] healthy intellectual exchanges with them. Hans Bots examines Bayle's view of the "republic of letters," of which he was a major architect—a republic whose right to citizenship required the suspension of religious, political, and national partisanship and engagement in free intellectual debate. H. H. M. van Lieshout contests the entrenched view that Bayle lived as a recluse scholar in Rotterdam. Both she and Bots show how Bayle's main work, the Dictionary, exhibits his life committed to the "republic of letters." Finally, Hubert Bost focuses on Bayle's activity as a journalist, crucial in this republic but also revealing the difficulty of the pursued ideal of neutrality. The next three sections of the book deal with Bayle's thoughts on religion and philosophy. Anna Belgrado denies the late Bayle scholar Elizabeth Labrousse's thesis that Bayle's thought is wrought with Protestantism. Bayle's views on the Jews, the Middle Ages, and women are examined, respectively, by Myrian Yardeni, Gregorio Piaia, and Maria-Cristina Pitassi, who concur in concluding that, although not free from the prejudices of his time, Bayle's views are more complex and balanced than those of his contemporaries. Bayle's political views and in particular his view on tolerance receive a good deal of attention in the volume. Stefano Brogi explains Bayle's attack on the "rational theologians" (Le Clerc), at first sight puzzling given their defense of religious tolerance, pointing out Bayle's radical opposition between faith and reason. According to Jean-Michel Gros, it is this radical separation of philosophy from theology that renders Bayle's view of tolerance so modern, unlike Locke's, for instance, which still has a theological ground. Jonathan Israel explains another apparent puzzle: Bayle's defense of absolute monarchism despite his philosophical and religious ideas, which were no less radical than Spinoza's. Bayle, unlike Spinoza, does not support republicanism because of his pessimistic view of human nature. John Christian Laursen shows that the political menace posed by the Millenarians explains Bayle's unusual lack of tolerance towards them. One of the most influential contemporary Bayle scholars, Gianluca Mori, summarizes his view of Bayle as a philosophical atheist, and he is contested in this by Jean-Luc Solère, who argues that for Bayle, materialism does not provide a coherent metaphysical system alternative to the Christian one, so that Bayle's position amounts to a radical skepticism with regard to reason. In his contribution to the volume, Mori argues that Bayle's skepticism is restricted, and is not relevant to the issue of theism versus atheism. He replies to Solère's objections to his interpretation in an appendix to his article. Mori's interpretation relies on the method of reading Bayle's text as containing irreligious views hidden beneath apparently orthodox claims. Thomas Lennon relies on the opposite approach to argue...

The ‘weakening’ of Gianni Vattimo

Gianni Vattimo came on the philosophical scene as the philosopher of weak thought (pensiero debole), a name which he later believed may have diminished its philosophical relevance by not sounding v...

Speech Act Theory as a pragmatic view on language

The role of pragmatics in the philosophy of language has been a central subject of discussion since the initial distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. I shall emphasize here the philosophical relevance of a pragmatic conception of language, examining some of the main contributions to pragmatics such as found in Wittgenstein’s language games and in Austin and Searle’s Speech Act Theory. I shall also discuss some criticism of recent developments of these pragmatic conceptions of the analysis of language, showing, however, that there are ways of overcoming the difficulties which have been pointed out. Finally I propose Speech Act Theory as the best candidate for a pragmatic philosophy of language. Key words: pragmatics, Wittgenstein, Speech Act Theory.

On the Philosophical Relevance of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems

Godel began his 1951 Gibbs Lecture by stating: Research in the founda tions of mathematics during the past few decades has produced some results which seem to me of interest, not only in themselves, but also with regard to their implications for the traditional philosophical problems about the nature of mathematics. (Godel 1951) Godel is referring here especially to his own incompleteness theorems (Godel 1931). Godel's first incompleteness theorem (as improved by Rosser (1936)) says that for any consistent formalized system F, which contains elementary arith metic, there exists a sentence GF of the language of the system which is true but unprovable in that system. Godel's second incompleteness theo rem states that no consistent formal system can prove its own consisten cy.1 These results are unquestionably among the most philosophically important logico-mathematical discoveries ever made. However, there is also ample misunderstanding and confusion surrounding them. The aim of this paper is to review and evaluate various philosophical interpreta tions of Godel's theorems and their consequences, as well as to clarify some confusions.

Philosophy as a way of life

Michel Foucault surveyed the history of Western philosophy in terms of the Delphic ‘Know thyself’ and the Socratic ‘care of the self’. The former generates academic philosophy as we know it today whereas the latter conceives of philosophy as a ‘way of life’. At issue are competing notions of ‘truth’ and the philosophical relevance of the discursive/nondiscursive domains. Comparing this account with a similar but distinct reading of the same Greek texts by Greco-Roman historian Pierre Hadot, I underscore the ‘existentialist’ tenor of this distinction and assess the challenges and liabilities of pursuing philosophy as a ‘way of life’.

Relevance of philosophy of life and optimism for psychological distress among individuals in a stage where death is approaching

The purpose was to investigate the relevance of philosophy of life as well as optimism for the psychological distress among Swedish individuals in a stage where death is approaching. Sixty-nine persons were included; of these were 42 patients newly diagnosed with advanced gastrointestinal cancer and 26 were partners to these patients. The participants' philosophy of life was studied through a semi-structured interview. The interview statements were subjected to content analysis. Optimism was measured by the Life Orientation Test and psychological distress by the Hospitality and Depression Scale. The results showed that optimistic respondents had less psychological distress. Two aspects of philosophy of life had relevance for such distress. These were wondering about why the cancer had occurred and having a feeling of being able to live a good life having or living near a person with advanced cancer. In conclusion, the above-mentioned aspects of philosophy of life as well as optimism have relevance for psychological distress among these individuals, which stress the importance that health-care staff address both patients' and their partners' concerns about their philosophy of life.

Concepts, Communication, and the Relevance of Philosophy to Human Rights: A Response to Randall Peerenboom

Concepts, Communication, and the Relevance of Philosophy to Human Rights: A Response to Randall Peerenboom

Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability, and Beatitude by Simon Francis Gaine

BOOK REVIEWS 643 Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom, Impeccability, and Beatitude. By SIMON FRANCIS GAINE. London and New York: T & T Clark, 2003. Pp 141. $40.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-567-08950-9. The beatific vision excludes the possibility of sin. Thus George Wall concludes that the blessed are unfree. John Donnelly, conversely, sacrifices the impeccability of the blessed in favor of their freedom (3-7). According to Simon Francis Gaine, Wall and Donnelly are led to these unorthodox views because of an inadequate conception of freedom. Gaine intends to show not only that the freedom of the blessed is coherent with the beatific vision, but that freedom, correctly understood, has its fullest development when the blessed are in complete possession of God and when they are no longer subject to sin. What leads one to see a tension between freedom and impeccability is the understanding of freedom as "freedom of indifference." The tension is solved, however, when one adopts the patristic and Thomistic conception of freedom, which the author, borrowing an expression from Pinckaers, calls "freedom for excellence." Gaine investigates the problem of freedom in heaven mostly from the theological perspective. His main interest is seemingly to defend the orthodox view of eschatology according to which freedom is supremely possessed by the blessed. The framework of the problem of freedom in the presence of the universal good is clearly theological, yet it is also of great philosophical relevance: what is at stake is the understanding of the pedect mode of freedom and the definition of freedom. The question of the freedom of the blessed thus bt:comes a litmus test for an author's understanding of freedom and a test case for the coherence of his psychology and moral theory. The historical approach to this question gives rise to an interesting observation: "It seems that the more voluntarist a theologian becomes, the more he must perhaps limit the freedom of the blessed in order to maintain an orthodox position on impeccability" (84). The main authors Gaine studies are Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Suarez. He first examines Suarez, who is significant as an historian, as it were, of medieval philosophy, and as one of the most influential thinkers to transmit medieval thought to modernity. Suarez provides us with a helpful conceptual tool by distinguishing between an intrinsic cause (i.e., the vision of God) of impeccability and an extrinsic cause (i.e., God's providence or grace}. Suarez attributes the intrinsic view, a position he himself adopts, to Thomas, while he classifies Scotus's and Ockham's views as extrinsic (16-21). Regarding the question of how there is freedom in the blessed, Suarez reviews the classical solutions of Augustine and Anselm of Canterbury for whom freedom, understood as freedom from the slavery of sin (Augustine) and as the power to preserve rectitude (Anselm}, is fully realized in heaven. But Suarez considers this an equivocal use of the notion of freedom, since in its core, freedom means for him not freedom from sin, but freedom from obligation and absence ofnecessity. In this regard, Suarez admits that the blessed are free to a certain extent, but due 644 BOOK REVIEWS to the necessitating character ofthe divine vision, this freedom is diminished (2132 ). On Scotus's account, the finite will of a creature has essentially the power to do otherwise than it does. This does not change in the vision of God. Though one cannot unwill or "nill" (nolle) happiness, one can always turn one's attention away from happiness and thus "not will" it (non velle). The vision of God does not by itself alter the will's capacity to turn away from God. It is God, not as beheld, but as providing a special grace, who prevents the blessed from sinning. God extrinsically determines the will so as to remain steadfast in the free enjoyment of the beatific vision (35-68). Ockham understands freedom as freedom of indifference: whatever the practical intellect dictates, the will has the power to will its opposite. The will does not necessarily will the good in general and it is capable of willing evil as such. The will is thus equally free to...

Free will, moral responsibility and ADHD

One of the oldest problems in philosophy concerns the relationship between free will and moral responsibility. If we adopt the position that we lack free will, in the absolute sense—as have most philosophers who have addressed this issue—how can we truly be held accountable for what we do? This paper will contend that the most significant and interesting challenge to the long‐standing status quo on the matter comes not from philosophy, jurisprudence or even physics, but rather from psychology. By examining this debate through the lens of contemporary behaviour disorders, such as Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, it will be argued that notions of free will, along with its correlate, moral responsibility, are being eroded through the logic of psychology, which is steadily reconfiguring large swathes of familiar human conduct as pathology. The intention is not only to raise some concerns over the exponential growth of behaviour disorders, but also, and more significantly, to flag the ongoing relevance of philosophy for prying open contemporary educational problems in new and interesting ways.

Utility and Humanity: The Quest for theHonestumin Cicero, Hutcheson, and Hume

Hume consideredAn Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals(1751) incomparably the best of all his writings. In the argument advanced here, I propose that Hume's preference for theEnquirymay be linked to his admiration of Cicero, and his work,De Officiis.Cicero's attempt to discover thehonestumof morality inDe Officiishad a particular relevance and appeal for philosophers of the early eighteenth century who were seeking to establish what they called the foundation of morality. One of those philosophers was Francis Hutcheson; his differences with his contemporaries and with Hume are reviewed in the second and third parts of the essay. In the fourth and final section, I examine Hume's attempt to reconcile the foundation of morality, as he under-stood it, the sentiment of humanity, with the principles of utility and agreeableness. And an attempt is made, finally, to explain why Hume's critics (James Balfour, Thomas Reid) perceived Hume'sEnquiryto be the work of an Epicurean and a sceptic.

Justifying Practical Reason: What Chaim Perelman's New Rhetoric Can Learn from Frege's Attack on Psychologism

Chaïm Perelman's new rhetoric represents both the foundation of his normative inquiry into the notion of justice and a fascinating exploration of argumentation that has relevance for philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. Notwithstanding the undoubted merits of the new rhetoric, the process of theorizing by means of which it is formulated is inherently problematic. The problematic nature of this process derives from its pursuit within the unintelligible perspective of a metaphysical standpoint. In order to demonstrate the unintelligibility of this standpoint and of the theorizing that issues from it, I establish a parallel between Perelman's new rhetoric and Frege's views on logic. Specifically, I claim that while Frege wavers between a Kantian and an unKantian (scientific) conception of logic, Perelman wavers between a nonscientific and a scientific conception of practical reason. A scientific conception of logic and practical reason, I argue, makes it seem, respectively, that we can subject the laws of logic to a demand for judgment and that we can justify the ideals of practical reason. The unintelligibility of such a demand is demonstrated by Frege when he challenges the position of psychologism in logic. Indeed, Frege's challenge in this case effectively determines the form of the challenge that I mount subsequently against the intelligibility of Perelman's attempt to justify the ideals of practical reason. Both Frege's and Perelman's approaches fail, I argue, on account of their institution within philosophical inquiry of the methodology of scientific inquiry. Finally, the scientistic nature of the accounts of these theorists is examined in relation to comments by Hilary Putnam concerning the structure of philosophical controversy in general. [End Page 50]

Some Notes on the Relevance of Philosophy to Education

Some Notes on the Relevance of Philosophy to Education

PHILOSOPHY, HUMANISM AND TECHNO-SCIENTIFIC TRAJECTORIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper aims at reconstructing an accurate picture of development as it relates to science and technology, towards bringing out the relevance of philosophy in mediating between the loose ties of disputations it poses against human prospects in the social system. It takes a special interest in the situation of development in the African world. The ancient myths of evils in Pandora's box and the hidden hope of mankind has been used to describe the implications of science and technology on the purposes of human contrivance. This is particularly in respect of its fatalistic impact on developing societies. Therefore the notion of quantification in scientific and technological development varies in different countries, depending on the basis of its evaluation by recourse to its impact on the nexus of human socio political inclination. In this wise, many controversies have been generated with regards to critical developmental assessment of science and technology. (Humanities Review: 2001 1(2): 16-23)

The Global Turn in Critical Theory

The Global Turn in Critical Theory Christian Moraru (bio) Let me start off by reformulating two of the questions Jeffrey Di Leo poses in his introduction. The first is, What does theory mean now—how is its meaning shaped or reshaped under globalization? The second asks, What does the latter designate or, what does it represent historically? In relation to these two, here is a third one, as “theory” and “culture” cannot be kept apart: What is culture’s role in the global age or, what does it stand for in a phrase such as “global culture”? Some fancy it as a neutral vehicle set in motion by more powerful forces such as capital circulation. Others see culture and a certain type of globalization at odds, and they pin their hopes on this clash. At any rate, the controversy is healthy. Below, I intervene in it in an attempt at casting light on the dynamic of theory and cultural history over the past few decades. The overall argument I am making is that globalization, and its “theory,” can be better understood against the backdrop of the evolving discourse of modernity, postmodernity, and, particularly, postmodernism. I define the latter as cultural and multicultural critique, and in conjunction with late 20th-century developments of aesthetic, sociological, as well as geopolitical nature. This way, I uncover alliances, conflicts, and analogies that bespeak the enduring effectiveness of the postmodern paradigm. As Scott Lash, Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and other sociologists have maintained, there are two modernities, fairly differentiated structurally and chronologically. The thesis of Beck’s groundbreaking book Risk Society—Towards a New Modernization is that “Just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another modernity is coming into being.” “Today,” namely, 1986, when Risikogesellschaft: Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne came out, “[w]e are witnessing not the end but the beginning of modernity—that is, of a modernity beyond its classical industrial design” (10). But what does this “new modernity” mean? What defines it is, simply put, its own attempt at defining itself anew by [End Page 74] assessing, à la Giddens, the “consequences” and, subsequently, by revisiting the premises, of a former, “wealth production”-dominated modernity (Risk Society 12). Beck suggests that a new logic gets the upper hand during a later stage in modern history: the logic of risk. As he explains, “The gain in power from techno-economic ‘progress’ is being increasingly overshadowed by the production of risks.” The latter are no longer “latent side effects” (13). They take center stage because, while a previous modernity mass-manufactured chiefly goods, which translated, to some at least, into “wealth,” the new modernity produces risks—on a global scale. Significantly, modernity reacts before long to this globalization of risks. First, modern technologies have augmented and “universalized” the threats the German critic talks about. In turn, these threats sharpen modern self-consciousness, radicalize its self-perception, and enhance its capacity for autocriticism. Globalized risks call upon modernity to reinvent, reconceptualize itself. They make us more philosophical, more skeptical about the “logic of wealth” and “progress,” of rationality in the Weberian sense. The risks embedded in, and s elf-reflexively uncovered by, the second modernity impinge, in their novel intensity and extensity, 1 upon inherited temporal and spatial categories and thereby upon our basic notions and representations (22). And it is only natural that, both through their materiality and philosophical relevance, modernity’s upshots—more and more seized negatively, in terms of risk, than positively, as “accomplishments”—are the first to become “subject to public criticism and scientific investigation” (13). Furthermore, “the concept of risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernization”—the “new” or “second” 2 modernity. This concept helps us deal with the new hazards and menaces, as well as with modernity—“old” and “new”—itself. They are “politically reflexive” (21) insofar as they induce globalized reflexiveness and criticism, and draw political attention on a large scale. The globalization of risk unifies. It gradually globalizes modern consciousness as “well-distributed awareness of risk as risk” (Giddens 1990, 125), of risk identified as...

10.5840/croatjphil2002232

Modern theory of rationality has become large and rich. The search for the most general principles is driven forward as much as the countless specializations in countless branches. Often, the questions lie far apart. The methods to answer them are often disparate and none of the questions is exhausted. The theory of rationality has truly grown into a science of its own. Many details have become so special that the philosophical relevance is lost. It is, however, evident that the general topic is genuinely philosophical. This essay is concerned with giving a brief overview over the theory of rationality. Section 2 explains the common and an improved version of the fundamental scheme of all rationality assessments. With its help, we can give a schematic order of the main questions concerning the theory of rationality, and we shall find that some questions are addressed by a wealth of literature, whereas other questions find astonishingly little response. Section 3 discusses the fundamental issue that the theory of rationality seems to be both a normative and an empirical theory. Section 4, finally, shows how the unity of the theory of rationality can nevertheless be maintained. The purpose of this essay is to serve as a kind of guide for the reader. 1

L'esthétique de Hegel au carrefour de la parole et de l'action

AbstractThe following paper is not a literal exegesis of Hegel's æsthetics, but rather the attempt to encounter his æsthetics from a philosophical perspective which considers the æsthetic experience as intuition of finitude. From this perspective our purpose is to indicate the contemporary philosophical relevance of Hegel's æsthetics by underscoring some elements of it which can help us to rethink the relation between æsthetic experience and the subject in his interaction with his world. The question of this essay is: how can æsthetic experience be a substantial experience for the modern subject?